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1.1 Evolutionary game dynamics in populations
In social, economic, biological, technological, and various other types of networks, interconnected
agents with simple dynamics may give rise to complex and seemingly unpredictable collective be-
haviors [163]. Traffic jams, market crashes, viral epidemics, and power blackouts are just a few
examples of such collective behaviors having negative consequences. On the positive side, coor-
dinated efforts such as volunteer disaster relief, free-market stabilization, and countless examples
from biology provide a wealth of evidence that great challenges can be overcome through cooper-
ation between individuals. Research questions in this topic naturally focus on how to predict and
avoid the negative effects and how to promote the positive.
Another challenge in these types of networks is the promotion of cooperation among selfish
individuals. Usually on one hand, there is a group task requiring the individuals to cooperate to
optimize the collective performances, and on the other, each individual is self-interested and may
prefer not to do so when she prioritizes her own interest, resulting in a social dilemma. It, therefore,
becomes a fascinating yet formidable research question on how to reach a delicate balance between
desired cooperation among agents as the team tasks require and logical self-interest of each agent
ingrained to her instinct. As an illustration, in the famous snowdrift game, when a snowdrift blocks
the road, each driver may choose to cooperate and clear the snow with the others or defect and
burden the task on others’ shoulders. There are also many engineering tasks such as environmental
monitoring, smart manufacturing, and distributed information processing [28, 34, 37] that fit into
such kind of social contexts. In the case of environmental monitoring for example, on one hand,
we prefer to use as few sensors as possible to reduce energy consumption, and on the other hand,
the environment must be monitored as the group task.
Unfortunately, localized analysis of the agent dynamics may reveal little about the underlying
causes of these behaviors, in part because the major factors driving the collective dynamics may
lie not in the individual agents but in the complex structure of their interconnections. Studying
the system from a broader network perspective, perhaps subject to substantial simplification of
the agent-level dynamics, can help to characterize critical properties such as controllability, con-
vergence, stability, robustness, and performance [149]. Indeed we have seen a sweeping transition
from local to network-based analysis across various disciplines in engineering and the physical and
social sciences, which has led to many useful discoveries related to system dynamics on large com-
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plex networks. For control scientists and engineers, these results present further opportunities to
tackle large-scale social and economic issues in a control-theoretic framework.
One of the primary toolsets used to study these kinds of problems is evolutionary game theory.
Originally proposed as a framework to study behaviors such as ritualized fighting in animals
[160], evolutionary game theory has since been widely adopted in the social sciences. A key
innovation of evolutionary game theory is that rather than assuming agents make perfectly rational
choices, strategies and behaviors propagate through a population via some dynamic process that
often does not require the agents to be rational. In the biological world, this propagation is
manifested through survival of the fittest and reproductive processes, which are widely modeled
using population dynamics [149] [181].
Under the assumptions that the population is infinite and well-mixed (completely connected),
the population dynamics become a system of first-order differential equations, the most well-known
of which are replicator dynamics. While these assumptions can lead to reasonable approximations
for large, dense populations of organisms, there are many small societies, especially those involving
humans, and many networks, in which the structure of the interactions plays a major role [117],
leading to finite well-mixed and finite structured populations. In both of these cases, individuals
revise their choices based on update rules, the two most prominent of which are best-response
and imitation, resulting in the best-response and imitation dynamics [149, 155, 38]. Individuals
interact with their neighbors by means of playing games, earn payoffs correspondingly, and revise
their choices to the one that maximizes their payoffs against their neighbors if they follow the
best-response update rule, and mimic their highest-earning neighbor if they follow the imitation
update rule. It turns out that certain models of imitation reduce exactly to the replicator dynamics
in the limit of the population size as it goes to infinity [153].
Researchers have found that network topology [141], phenotypic interactions [73, 138], rep-
etition [172], punishment [175], population heterogeneity [136], emotion [139], as well as other
components in game setups can all affect the success of cooperators in face of defectors. However,
there remain many unanswered questions in each of these components. For example, although it
is generally believed that networked interactions can help the maintenance of cooperation, neither
the types of networks that lead to the maintenance, nor the asymptotic behavior of the dynamics
under such networks are known. This is mainly due to lack of rigorous mathematical statements
and dependence on simulation results. Additionally, in phenotypic interactions, the behavior of
the phenotype-based decision-making individuals in different game setups is still an open topic.
Moreover, although repeating the game played by the individuals in a population allows for con-
ditional strategies and hence the promotion of cooperation by direct reciprocity, the level up to
which cooperation is promoted remains unknown.
1.2 Problem statement
Given a population governed by some population dynamics, the key problem is to determine the
asymptotic behavior of the dynamics, leading to convergence analysis. If one can establish such
results, one of the next interesting problems is controlling the dynamics in order to reach a state
where all or most of the individuals play a desired strategy. This can be done by, for example,
offering payoff incentives to the agents, motivated by applications such as hastening the adoption
of new technologies or socially/environmentally beneficial behaviors and controlling the spread of
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viral epidemics [109].
The main problem studied in this thesis, followed by eight sub-problems, is stated in the
following:
• to perform convergence analysis and provide control protocols for population dynamics in
both infinite and finite, well-mixed and structured populations.
1. How does a population of individuals playing repeated snowdrift games behave in the
long run under the replicator dynamics? (Chapter 4)
2. How does a population of individuals acting based on their phenotypes behave in the
long run under the replicator dynamics? (Chapter 5)
3. What is the asymptotic behavior of a finite well-mixed heterogeneous population gov-
erned by the best-response update rule? (Chapters 6 and 7)
4. How to control a finite well-mixed heterogeneous population governed by the best-
response update rule? (Chapter 6)
5. What is the asymptotic behavior of a finite structured, heterogeneous population gov-
erned by the best-response update rule? (Chapter 8)
6. How to control a finite structured, heterogeneous population governed by the best-
response update rule? (Chapter 9)
7. What is the asymptotic behavior of a finite structured, heterogeneous population gov-
erned by the imitation update rule? (Chapter 10)
8. How to control a finite structured, heterogeneous population governed by the imitation
update rule? (Chapter 11)
Investigating the first two sub-problems leads to the following mathematical sub-problems, all
in the context of a continuously differentiable vector field:
1. What is the limit set of a point in a positively invariant simply-connected planar compact
set that does not have any interior fixed point? (Chapter 2)
2. What role do the interior and boundary fixed points of a positively invariant simply-connected
planar compact set play in forming the limit set of a point in the compact set? (Chapter 2)
3. What are the possible limit sets of a trajectory converging to a compact curve? (Chapter 3)
4. What are the possible limit sets of a trajectory converging to a compact manifold? (Chapter
3)
One of the mechanisms known to promote cooperation is direct reciprocity which is captured
by repeated games where individuals play a base game repeatedly and can base their action in
each round of the game on that of the opponent in the previous round, resulting in reactive
strategies. While much research has investigated the performance of different reactive strategies
under the prisoner’s dilemma game [114, 69, 63, 55, 93, 68], less has been devoted to the snowdrift
game [134, 86, 178] despite the fact that snowdrift captures many behavioral patterns that cannot
be well-modeled by the prisoner’s dilemma [61]. Moreover, the strategies are usually compared
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pairwise [15, 16], and hence, the performance of different reactive strategies in a population where
more than two are available remains an open problem. We address both issues in this thesis.
While considering snowdrift as the base game, we focus on a population of individuals playing four
reactive strategies, study the population under the replicator dynamics and let natural selection
to choose the fittest strategies. We consider an arbitrary number of repetitions of the base game
and present rigorous proofs for the convergence analysis of the resulting 3-dimensional dynamics.
Another mechanism known to be capable of promoting cooperation is having a cheap talk or
preplay communication [45] before the game, during which players simultaneously send costless
signals or messages to their opponents from a set available to each player before they play and
consequently act based on the received messages [181]. This results in several decision rules, the
most well-known of which are homophily, to cooperate only with similar others, and heterophily,
to cooperate only with different others, both being widely studied in different setups [47, 138]. The
evolution of the population shares of individuals following these and other decision rules has also
been studied under death-birth population dynamics [80, 157, 59, 156, 60, 77], more or less claiming
that preplay communication does not help to maintain cooperation in well-mixed populations and
under the prisoner’s dilemma game. The claim, however, remains without a mathematical proof
and is explained only via examples and simulations. Moreover, the behavior of homophilics and
heterophilics in exclusive populations of themselves or when only cooperators are involved remains
an open problem under the prisoner’s dilemma game. We aim to tackle both issues by revealing
the innate properties of homophilic and heterophilic individuals under the replicator dynamics,
and prove rigorously the simulation-based statement made in previous research.
Perception differences or heterogeneity of the individuals in a population is another factor in-
fluencing the cooperation level. Homogeneous populations, where each individual has the same
tendency to cooperate, have been widely studied under best-response dynamics in different situ-
ations such as when the population is structured [187, 109, 110, 88, 92, 164, 61], the dynamics
are noisy [84, 8, 7], and others [148, 123, 6, 99]. Although these works reveal interesting aspects
of the best-response dynamics, or equivalently, linear threshold models, they ignore the impact of
heterogeneity on the dynamics, which may cause complex features such as cooperation sustainabil-
ity (the level-off phenomenon) [139]. To capture this factor, we relax the network, and consider
a finite well-mixed heterogeneous population where each individual is associated with a possibly
unique threshold or payoff matrix, chooses between two options: cooperation and defection or A
and B, and updates her choice asynchronously according to the best-response update rule. We
then investigate the asymptotic behavior of the dynamics, try to reveal the role of perception
differences, and explain features such as the level-off phenomenon.
Perhaps the most influencing factor in the promotion of cooperation is the interaction network
of the population. While the assumption of well-mixed populations makes analysis easier, the
specific structure or topology of a network often plays a critical role in the dynamics. The primary
goal in studying networked population dynamics is to determine the asymptotic behavior of the
system, namely whether the dynamics converge to a single equilibrium state or limit cycle or fluc-
tuate chaotically between several states. The convergence properties of networks with arbitrary
structures has been investigated in the homogeneous (symmetric) case [110, 88, 92]. Moreover,
in [36], a combination of mean-field approximations and simulations were used to show that syn-
chronous best-response dynamics in symmetric games tend to converge to an equilibrium state
while imitation does not generally result in convergence to equilibria. In addition to making the
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convergence more likely, compared to synchronous models, asynchronous dynamics can provide a
more realistic model of the time-line over which independent agents make decisions and receive
information. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the population cannot be easily ignored, as explained
above. So it remains to be seen under what conditions arbitrary networks of heterogeneous agents
updating synchronously or asynchronously can be expected to converge to an equilibrium, and
that is one of the goals of this thesis.
Finally, control of decision-making populations has become an attractive topic recently where
researchers have started to try various methods to drive the population dynamics to a desired state.
For example in [145, 144], the authors aim to find the minimum number of agents such that when
these agents adopt a desired strategy under the imitation update rule, the rest of the agents in the
network will follow. In the context of best-response and imitation dynamics, a natural mechanism
for achieving strategy control is the use of payoff incentives. For instance, in [91], the payoffs of a
stochastic snowdrift game are changed in order to shift the equilibrium to a more cooperative one.
If the central agency can offer different rewards to each agent, a more efficient control protocol
may be possible. That is, by altering the payoffs of just some individuals, the population can be
led to a desired equilibrium state [144, 186]. As we will later discuss in Chapters 9 and 11, each
of these methods leads to a particular control problem that desires its own solutions in the form
of efficient algorithms, which we tackle in this thesis.
1.3 Approach and contribution
We handle the problems mentioned in the previous section by tools from dynamical systems,
e.g., monotone properties of the vector field, game theory, e.g., Nash equilibrium, evolutionary
game theory, e.g., convergence to Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability, control theory, e.g.,
Lyapunov-like functions, and some that we develop by our own in this thesis, which inspired us to
dedicate 3 chapters to these self-standing mathematical results: Chapter 2 where we tighten up the
Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem and Chapter 3 where we show that trajectories converging to a curve
in an arbitrary-dimensional continuously differentiable vector field, converge to the equilibrium
points on that curve, and then extend the result to vector fields possessing an arbitrary-dimensional
invariant compact manifold instead of a curve. In what follows, we provide more details on the
conceptual approaches taken in this thesis.
To analyze the asymptotic behavior of the replicator dynamics under the repeated snowdrift
game, we study two ratios of the four population shares and show that they exhibit a monotonic
behavior; namely we can divide the state space into four areas, in each of which, each of the
two ratios increases or decreases monotonically. This then implies that every interior trajectory
of the system always converges to a line segment. On the other hand, as a separate result, we
show in Chapter 3 that convergence to a simple open curve in general, implies convergence to the
equilibrium points on that curve. Therefore, we know that interior trajectories will converge to
an equilibrium on the line segment. Moreover, from evolutionary game theory, we know that if a
trajectory converges to an equilibrium, it has to be a Nash equilibrium. Then by finding all Nash
equilibria on the line segment, we determine the possible states to which an interior trajectory may
converge. Analysis of the boundary trajectories has been performed in previous studies, which we
will briefly review.
We take a different approach for cheap-talk games under the replicator dynamics. We inves-
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tigate the dominance relationships among the strategies, a notion taken from game theory, and
use the fact that if a strategy is weakly dominated by a pure strategy, then the population share
of either of the two must vanish in the long run, a result from evolutionary game theory. This
enables us to determine which types of individuals survive in most of the population mixtures, yet
it is not sufficient for investigating populations containing all four types, i.e., defectors, coopera-
tors, homophilics and heterophilics. To carry out the analysis for such populations, we develop a
general convergence theorem similar to the one on weakly dominated strategies, but this time the
strategy may be weakly dominated only in the absence of some strategies whose associated popu-
lation shares converge to zero. Using this result which can be applied more broadly to replicator
dynamics with other type of games, we can easily determine the final survivors in the population.
In case of finite well-mixed heterogeneous populations, we mainly develop the necessary tools by
our own, but the main idea of the proofs revolves around a discrete Lyapunov-like function that is
lower bounded by zero and upper bounded by a positive constant. Moreover, the function’s upper
bound is tight and along the system’s trajectory reaches and stays at its maximum after finite
time. The function does not monotonically increase though. However, we construct an infinite
set of time instants at each of which the function’s lower bound becomes tightened up, enabling
us to use this function as a Lyapunov-like function, and prove convergence of the dynamics to a
particular set.
In case of finite networked heterogeneous populations, we again mainly develop the necessary
tools by our own. For the best-response case, first by using a potential function, we prove that
every homogeneous population of individuals with tendencies for choosing options A and B, will
reach an equilibrium state in finite time. Then by using augmented graphs, we show how the result
can be extended to a network of individuals with arbitrary tendencies. Namely, we add to the
original network, nodes that balance the cooperation and defection tendencies of the individuals
in the original network without modifying their dynamics. For the imitation case, we show that
in populations where all individuals are opponent coordinating, i.e., earn a higher payoff if their
opponents play the same strategy as they do, the highest payoff earned by the individuals does
not decrease over time, and is upper bounded by some constant, resulting in a Lyapunov-like
function. When this highest payoff settles at some value, we look at the second highest payoff in
the population and show that it also converges to some fixed value, and by doing so show that the
whole population eventually reaches some equilibrium state.
For control of finite networked heterogeneous populations, we start by developing a general
framework for asynchronous network games with two available strategies, A and B. We define
a network game to be A-coordinating if agents who update to strategy A would also do so if
some agents currently playing B were instead playing A. Then we show that regardless of the
update rule, providing incentives to the individuals when the network is at equilibrium leads the
network to a unique equilibrium state, provided that the network game is A-coordinating. Both
best-response and imitation update rules satisfy this condition for coordination games, and we
use this fact to design efficient algorithms for the control problems in the corresponding context
mentioned earlier.
The contribution of this thesis is three-fold: First, we show how different mechanisms including
repetition, phenotipic interaction and heterogeneity can help to maintain and promote cooperation
under population dynamics. For the case of repeated games, the convergence analysis implies that
the repetition of the base game results in final population states where individuals cooperate more
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often compared to the original coexistence of cooperators and defectors in populations playing
the base game. While similar results have been claimed in populations containing fewer available
reactive strategies or when the payoffs are non-parametric, here we verify our result for four
reactive strategies and a fully parametric payoff matrix. This allows us to determine the range
of parameters where the more-cooperative final population states show up, shedding light on how
and under which condition repetition can actually promote cooperation. In the case of phenotipic
interactions, we show homophilics have the tendency to battle over their phenotype, leading to
a state where only one phenotype exists, while heterophilics show a more harmonic tendency,
leading to a maximum diversity state. It then follows that cooperators can survive in face of
homophilics, but will vanish against heterophilics. We also rigorously prove the incapability of
preplay communication in maintaining cooperation in well-mixed populations containing defectors.
In case of heterogeneous populations, we show that the state of the population dynamics always
either fluctuates between two or reaches a single state where a number of cooperators and defectors
coexist in the population. This coexistence in a well-mixed population is an impossible feature in
homogeneous populations, which highlights the crucial role of heterogeneity in the maintenance of
cooperation.
Second, by providing sufficient conditions for equilibrium convergence of networks governed by
best-response and imitation update rules, we find factors that may cause non-converging behavior.
Many real-life decision problems where one out of two actions must be chosen can be modeled
on networks consisting of individuals who are either coordinating, that is, take an action only
if sufficient neighbors are also doing so, or anticoordinating, that is, take an action only if too
many neighbors are doing the opposite. It is not yet known whether such networks tend to reach
a state where every individual is satisfied with his decision. We show that indeed any network
of coordinating and any network of anticoordinating individuals always reaches a satisfactory
state, regardless of how they are connected, how different their preferences are, and how many
simultaneous decisions are made over time. These results reveal that irregular network topology,
population heterogeneity, and partial synchrony are not sufficient to cause cycles or nonconvergence
in populations governed by the best-response dynamics, or the linear threshold models, other
factors such as imitation or the coexistence of coordinating and anticoordinating agents must play
a role. By showing a similar result in populations governed by the imitation update rule but
for a “smaller” class of networks, and showing that for a substantial class of other networks, the
dynamics never converge, we conclude that convergence under imitation is in general a less likely
phenomenon compared to the best-response dynamics.
Third, we provide control protocols for driving finite networked populations governed by the
best-response and imitation update rules to desired equilibrium states. We show that networks
governed by best-response dynamics are A-coordinating provided that each agent is coordinat-
ing and networks governed by imitation dynamics are A-coordinating provided that each agent
is opponent-coordinating. We then proceed to four control problems some of which have been
considered in previous research. The first is uniform reward control where a central agency has
the power to uniformly change the payoffs of every agent by providing them a reward to increase
their tendency to play a certain strategy, and the goal is to provide the minimum reward that
leads the network to a state where all play A. The second is targeted reward control where the
regulating agency can target individual agents and offer them independent sufficient rewards to
lead the network more efficiently to the desired state. The third is budgeted targeted reward con-
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trol where the reward budget is limited and the goal is to maximize the number of A-playing
individuals in the long run. The fourth is direct strategy control where the agency can directly
control the strategies of the agents, and the goal is to find the minimum number of agents required
to adopt the desired strategy, so that the whole network will eventually reach the desired state.
Using the unique equilibrium convergence property that results from being A-coordinating, we
design efficient algorithms for each of the above problems, and test their performance via several
simulations.
1.4 Scope and outline of the thesis
As mentioned previously, in this thesis, we set out to both perform convergence analysis and
provide control protocols for populations of decision-making individuals governed by either the
best-response or imitation dynamics. We divide the analysis in three parts. We start with infinite
well-mixed populations, leading to continuous-time dynamics in Part I, then proceed to finite well-
mixed populations, leading to discrete-time dynamics in Part II, and finalize with finite structured
populations, leading to again discrete-time, yet more complex dynamics in Part III. We elaborate
on each part in detail in the following.
1.4.1 Part I: infinite well-mixed populations
In Part I, we focus on infinite, well-mixed populations, leading to continuous dynamics, the most
well-known of which are the replicator dynamics. The results are not all restricted to the replicator
dynamics though; namely, Chapters 2 and 3 are applicable to general continuously differentiable
vector fields. The chapters appear more or less in an increasing order according to the dimension
of the vector field investigated therein. We start with planar vector fields in Chapter 2 where
we revisit the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem, then proceed to arbitrary dimensional vector fields
possessing an invariant compact curve in Chapter 3 and find the possible limit sets of trajectories
converging to the curve. Then we extend the result from a curve to an arbitrary-dimensional
invariant compact set. Next, we proceed to the 4-dimensional replicator dynamics corresponding
to a population of individuals playing repeated snowdrift games in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter
5, we investigate the arbitrary-dimensional replicator dynamics corresponding to a population of
individuals having preplay communication in a prisoner’s dilemma game.
1.4.2 Part II: finite well-mixed populations
In Part II, we focus on finite well-mixed populations, leading to discrete dynamics, the most
well-known of which are the best-response dynamics, or equivalently linear threshold models. We
consider a finite well-mixed heterogeneous population where each individual is associated with a
possibly unique threshold or payoff matrix, chooses between two options A and B, or cooperation
and defection, and updates her choice asynchronously according to the best-response update rule.
We start with when all agents’ payoff matrices are that of either a prisoner’s dilemma or a snowdrift
game in Chapter 6, investigate possible control protocols of the model, and proceed to the case
when all agent’s payoff matrices are that of coordinating games in Chapter 7.
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1.4.3 Part III: finite networked populations
In Part III, we focus on finite structured populations, leading to again discrete dynamics, two well-
known of which are the best-response and the imitation dynamics. Correspondingly, the chapters
are divided equally between these two dynamics: Chapters 8 and 9 investigate populations governed
by the best-response dynamics and Chapters 10 and 11 investigate populations governed by the
imitation dynamics. The chapters are also equally divided between the convergence analysis of
the dynamics and the control of the dynamics: Chapters 8 and 10 are dedicated to the long run
behavior of the dynamics while Chapters 9 and 11 are dedicated to the control of the dynamics.
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(Chapter 7)
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1.6 Preliminaries
Consider a C`, ` ≥ 1, vector field
x˙ = f(x) x ∈ IRn. (1.1)
The flow generated by the vector field is denoted by ϕt(·) : IRn×IR→ IRn, and given a set P ⊂ IRn,
ϕt(P) is defined as
⋃
p∈P ϕt(p). For a point p ∈ IRn, the orbit through p, denoted by O(p), is defined
as the set of points in the phase space that lie on the trajectory passing through p; more precisely,
O(p) = {x ∈ IRn |x = ϕt(p), t ∈ IR}. Note that a fixed point x, i.e., φt(x) = x ∀t ∈ IR, is also
an orbit. By a non-fixed orbit we mean an orbit that is not a fixed point. Similarly a non-fixed
trajectory is defined. The positive semi-orbit of p, denoted by O+(p), is defined as the orbit of p
induced by the flow ϕt(p) for t ≥ 0, i.e., O+(p) = {x ∈ P |x = ϕt(p), t ≥ 0} [184], and O−(p), the
negative semi-orbit, is defined similarly but for t ≤ 0.
The boundary of a set S, denoted by bd(S), is the set of points p such that every neighborhood
of p includes at least one point in S and one point out of S, and the interior of S, denoted by
int(S), is the greatest open subset of S. The closure of a set S is denoted by S. The distance from




where ‖ · ‖ is taken as an arbitrary norm in IRn. Correspondingly, the distance between two sets
S1 and S2 is defined by d(S1,S2) = infs1∈S1 d(s1,S2). Given x ∈ IRn, we say ϕt(x) converges to a
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set S ⊂ IRn as t → ∞, and denote it by ϕt(x) → S as t → ∞, if and only if for any  > 0, there
exists some M > 0 such that
d (ϕt(x),S) <  ∀t > M.
A set S is said to be invariant with respect to the vector field, if s ∈ S implies that O(s) ⊆ S, and
positively invariant if s ∈ S implies that O+(s) ⊆ S.
A point q ∈ IRn is called an ω limit point of p ∈ IRn, if there exists a time sequence {ti} → ∞
such that {ϕ(ti, p)} → q. The set of all ω limit points of p is the ω limit set of p, denoted by ω(p).
The α limit set, denoted by α(p), is defined similarly but by taking {ti} → −∞ [56].
Lemma 1.1. [76, refinement of Proposition 1.4.] Consider some point p ∈ IRn whose positive-semi
orbit O+(p) is bounded. Then ω(p) is nonempty, closed, connected and invariant under the vector
field.
1.7 Background on replicator dynamics
The replicator dynamics are described by [181, 149, 179]
x˙i = [u(ei, x)− u(x, x)]xi, i = 1, . . . , n (1.2)




x ∈ IRn |
n∑
i=1
xi = 1, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , n
}
,
ei is the ith unit vector, also called the ith vertex of ∆, and u : ∆×∆→ IR is the utility function
defined by u(x, y) = xTAy with A ∈ IRn×n being the payoff matrix. Since u(·, ·) is C1 in IRn, it can
be shown that (1.2) has a unique continuous solution [181, Proposition 3.20],[149, Section 4.A.2],
we denote which by x(t).
The following lemma shows that different payoff matrices may lead to the same replicator
dynamics.
Lemma 1.2. [181, pp 73] The replicator dynamics (1.2) are invariant under the addition of a
constant to all the entries of any column of the payoff matrix A.
Let H be a nonempty subset of {1, . . . , n}. Then the convex hull of the unit vectors ei, i ∈ H,
is called a face of ∆, and is denoted by ∆(H). The simplex ∆ itself is a face; when H is proper,
the face is called a boundary face, and when it has only two members, it is called an edge of ∆.
Lemma 1.3. A face is invariant under the replicator dynamics.
Proof. The proof uses some ideas from the proof of Proposition 3.20 in [181] where only the simplex






∣∣∣αi ≥ 0∀i ∈ H} .
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Let x(0) ∈ Z. Then for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
xj(0) = 0
(1.2)
==⇒ xj(t) = 0 ∀t, (1.3)
xj(0) > 0
(1.3)
==⇒ xj(t) > 0 ∀t, (1.4)
where (1.4) can be shown by contradiction: assume on the contrary that xj(t1) ≤ 0 for some
t1 ∈ IR. If xj(t1) = 0, then in view of (1.3), xj(0) = 0, which is a contradiction. If on the other
hand, xj(t1) < 0, then due to the continuity of x(t), there exists some time t2 such that xj(t2) = 0,
which again leads to contradiction. Now (1.3) and (1.4) imply
x(t) ∈ {z ∈ IRn | zi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ H, zj = 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} −H} = Z ∀t,
which proves the invariance of Z.










= {x ∈ IRn | y(x) = 0} ,
where y(x) =
∑n
i=1 xi − 1. For this, it suffices to show that given x ∈ Y , it holds that ∂y(x)∂x x˙ = 0,
















Finally, since both Z and Y are invariant, their intersection is also invariant and is given by








= convex-hull{ei | i ∈ H} = ∆(H).
Hence, ∆(H) is invariant.
The above result has several important implications: first, the simplex ∆ is invariant; second,
each vertex is a fixed point; third, each boundary face is invariant, implying that its dynamics can
be determined independently from the rest of the simplex, and fourth, both the interior and the






Theorem after counting separately the
fixed points on the boundary and
interior of a planar region
This chapter tightens the classical Poincare´-Bendixson theorem for a positively invariant, simply-
connected compact setM in a continuously differentiable planar vector field by further characteriz-
ing for any point p ∈M, the composition of the limit sets ω(p) and α(p) after counting separately
the fixed points on M’s boundary and interior. In particular, when M contains finitely many
boundary but no interior fixed points, ω(p) contains only a single fixed point, and when M may
have infinitely many boundary but no interior fixed points, ω(p) can in addition be a continuum
of fixed points. WhenM contains only one interior and finitely many boundary fixed points, ω(p)
or α(p) contains exclusively a fixed point, a closed orbit or the union of the interior fixed point
and homoclinic orbits joining it to itself. When M contains in general a finite number of fixed
points and neither ω(p) nor α(p) is a closed orbit or contains just a fixed point, at least one of ω(p)
and α(p) excludes all boundary fixed points and consists only of a number of the interior fixed
points and orbits connecting them. As an application of such tightening of the Poincare´-Bendixson
theorem, we carry out global convergence analysis for the planar case of a class of widely studied
dynamical systems called replicator dynamics associated with evolutionary game theoretic models.
2.1 Introduction
Determining the asymptotic behavior of general continuous vector fields, even qualitatively, is still
a daunting task. In the nineteenth century, Poincare´ studied this problem for planar systems by
focusing on the global behavior of the systems’ trajectories without integrating the corresponding
differential equations [128, 129, 130, 131, 35]. The related classical results are commonly referred
to as the Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem [127, 20], which we summarize below. Consider the vector
field
x˙ = f(x) x ∈ IR2 (2.1)
16 2. Tightening Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem
where f is C1 on an open set U in IR2. Denote the ω and α limit sets of a point p by ω(p) and
α(p), respectively.
Theorem 2.1 (Standard form of the Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem). [124, pp 245] For the vector
field (2.1), suppose that there exists a point p ∈ U , whose positive semi-orbit is contained in a
compact subset of U . Then if ω(p) contains no critical point of (2.1), ω(p) is a periodic orbit of
(2.1).
Similar other forms of the theorem can be found in [56, 64, 35], which are often used to establish
the existence of periodic orbits, and thus not applied to the case when ω(p) contains fixed points.
A more comprehensive version of the theorem reads as follows.
Theorem 2.2 (Comprehensive form of the Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem). [184, Theorem 9.0.6]
[76, Theorem 1.8] For the vector field (2.1), let M ⊂ U be a positively invariant complex for the
vector field containing a finite number of fixed points. For any p ∈M, one of the following holds:
1. ω(p) is a fixed point;
2. ω(p) is a closed orbit;
3. ω(p) consists of a finite number of fixed points p1, . . . , pn and orbits γ with α(γ) = pi and
ω(γ) = pj, where pi and pj are not necessarily different. Moreover, for two distinct fixed
points pi and pj, there exists at most one orbit γ such that α(γ) = pi and ω(γ) = pj.
From this theorem, although possibilities such as strange attractors and chaotic orbits can be
easily ruled out, the third case in the theorem still gives rise to sometimes a large number of
possible limiting behaviors. For example, whenM contains just four fixed points on its boundary,
there can be more than 300 different compositions of ω(p) even under the simplifying assumption
that there is at most one honoclinic orbit at each fixed point. Some existing results have tried to
reduce the possible scenarios; in [11, Theorem 68], the third case has been stated more precisely
by stipulating that the trajectories γ must be the continuations of one another. Then for the
example just mentioned, ω(p) can have more than 50 different compositions. In addition, one may
tighten the theorem after knowing more properties of the vector field, e.g., being “relatively prime
analytic”. A planar vector field f is relatively prime analytic if the two components f1 and f2 of
f (i) do not have a common analytic factor in any neighborhood of any point in IR2 and (ii) have
convergent power series in some neighborhood of every point in IR2 [125]. By a separatrix cycle
of (2.1) we mean a continuous image of a circle which consists of the union of a finite number
of fixed points and compatibly oriented separatrices of (2.1), pj, γj, j = 1, . . . ,m, such that for
j = 1, . . . ,m, α(γj) = pj and ω(γj) = pj+1 where pm+1 = p1. A graphic of (2.1) is the union
of a finite number of compatibly oriented separatrix cycles of (2.1). The following form of the
Poincare´-Bendixson theorem restricts the third case of Theorem 2.2 to a graphic.
Theorem 2.3 (Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem for a relatively prime analytic vector field). [124, pp
245, Theorem 3] Suppose that (2.1) is relatively prime analytic in U . Consider p ∈ U and suppose
that p’s positive semi-orbit is contained in a compact subset of U . Then one of the following holds:
1. ω(p) is a fixed point;
2. ω(p) is a closed orbit;
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3. ω(p) is a graphic of (2.1).
When the conditions of this theorem are satisfied, the example we considered just now of having
M containing four fixed points on its boundary will guarantee that there is at most one honoclinic
orbit at each fixed point and thus there are more than 50 possible outcomes of ω(p). This example
shows that if one is interested in categorizing all possible asymptotic behaviors of a planar system
qualitatively, one may still encounter difficulty even with the help of the existing most tightened
form of the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem. In the field of mathematical biology, when theoretical
biologists try to predict the possible long-term evolutionary outcome of competing sub-populations
using planar dynamical systems models, they run into many possible global phase portraits, each
of which corresponds to a possible evolutionary outcome [23]. So there is great need in looking
into how classical results, like the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem, can be further tightened giving
fewer and thus more tractable limiting behaviors under different assumptions about the specific
properties of the system.
The aim of this chapter is to reduce the number of possible compositions of the limit sets of
a vector field when knowing the number of fixed points on the boundary and in the interior of a
given positively invariant, simply-connected compact set M. We first investigate the case when
M’s interior contains no fixed point; we show that for any p ∈ M, ω(p) must be a fixed point if
M has a finite number of fixed points and must be either a fixed point or a continuum of fixed
points ifM has an infinite number of fixed points. In terms of the example given previously, such
results imply that ω(p) in the example can only be one of the fixed points, so there are at most
four possibilities. Then we proceed to the case whenM’s interior contains exactly one fixed point,
and show that at least one of the ω or α limit sets is a fixed point, closed orbit or the union of
the interior fixed points and homoclinic orbits1 joining it to itself. Finally, we study the case of
having a finite number of interior fixed points in M. So the main contribution of the chapter is
that the new results make it possible to provide more specific and tractable global convergence
statements based on the counting of the fixed points on the boundary and in the interior of M.
To illustrate the effectiveness of our results, we apply our theorems to planar replicator dynamics
that are popular models in theoretical biology to study evolutionary processes in large populations
of interacting agents; we show that some known related results become much more straightforward
to derive.
2.2 Main results
Before presenting our main results on tightened versions of the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem, we
first review some basic relevant results. The following lemma provides a sufficient condition for
the existence of an ω limit set. It is applicable to higher dimensional spaces, but we restrict it here
to the plane.
Lemma 2.1. [184, Proposition 8.1.3] For the vector field (2.1), letM⊂ U be a positively invariant
compact set. Then for any point p ∈M, it holds that ω(p) 6= ∅.
1A homoclinic orbit is an orbit that starts from and ends at the same fixed point.
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A continuous connected arc in the plane is said to be transverse to the vector field, if the vector
field has no fixed points on the arc and nowhere becomes tangent to the arc [64]. By a transverse
we refer to a closed line segment L that is transverse to the vector field. Due to the continuity of
the vector field, clearly one can construct a transverse through any non-fixed point. The following
lemma illustrates how the flow through a point p approaches a transverse through a non-fixed ω
limit point q ∈ ω(p) when it exists.
Lemma 2.2. [42, reformulation of Lemma 1.26] For the vector field (2.1), consider a point p ∈ U
such that O(p) ⊂ U . Let q ∈ ω(p) be a non-fixed point of (2.1) and let L be a transverse through
q. Then there exists a sequence {ti} → ∞, such that {φ(ti, p)} ∈ L and {φ(ti, p)} → q.
The following result guarantees the existence of a fixed point inside a closed orbit, and is an
immediate consequence of Index Theorem [184, Theorem 6.0.1].
Lemma 2.3. [184, Corollary 6.0.2][56, Corollary 1.8.5] Enclosed by any closed orbit of (2.1) in
U , there must be at least one fixed point.
Now we are ready to present the main results of the chapter.
2.2.1 M has no interior fixed point
The following is the main result for the first case that we consider in this chapter.
Theorem 2.4 (No interior fixed points). For the vector field (2.1), consider a positively invariant,
simply-connected compact set M⊂ U that contains a finite number of fixed points, all on bd(M).
Then for any p ∈M, ω(p) is a fixed point on bd(M).
Proof. From Theorem 2.2, it suffices to prove that ω(p) contains only fixed points since then only
situation 1 is possible and the corresponding fixed point can only be on bd(M) as int(M) contains
no fixed points. We prove this by contradiction, so assume on the contrary that there is a non-
fixed point q ∈ ω(p). Then one can construct a transverse L through q, and from Lemma 2.2,
we know that O+(p) intersects L for infinitely many times and such intersection points are in M
since O+(p) ⊂ M. So one can pick two consecutive intersection points p1 and p2 such that the
line segment p1p2 lies inM. Should p1 and p2 coincide, ω(p) would be a closed orbit, lying inM,
but encircling no fixed point as all the fixed points are on bd(M). This cannot happen in view of
Lemma 2.3, and thus p1 and p2 must be distinct.
As illustrated by Figure 2.1, we construct the simply-connected compact set S whose boundary
is formed by the semi-orbit O+(p) from p1 to p2 and the line segment p1p2. Since O+(p) always
intersects L from the same side to the other, the orientation of the p1-to-p2 semi-orbit with respect
to the line segment p1p2 must be one of the two cases shown in Figure 2.1. From the definition of
L, the vector field at any point on p1p2 intersects p1p2 from the same side of the line, and thus S
is either positively invariant as shown in Figure 2.1.(a) or negatively invariant as shown in Figure
2.1.(b).
Since the boundary p1-to-p2 semi-orbit and p1p2 both lie inM, we know that S ⊆M. Hence,
int(S) ⊆ int(M) and contains no fixed point. Moreover, neither O+(p) nor L contains any fixed
point, so bd(S) does not contain any fixed point. Therefore, S contains no fixed point. Conse-
quently, if S is positively invariant, applying Theorem 2.2, we know that for any point s ∈ S, ω(s)











Figure 2.1: The two possible cases for the positive semi-orbit O+(p) in the proof of Theorem 2.4.
can only be a closed orbit confined in S. But this contradicts Lemma 2.3. If on the other hand,
S is negatively invariant, we apply the same argument after inverting the direction of the vector
field and again reach the same contradiction. So the proof is complete.
One might think that the condition in Theorem 2.4 requiringM to be simply connected is too
strong and wonder what happens if M has holes in it. The following result explains that being
simply connected follows naturally from the positive invariance property of M and the fact that
its interior is empty of fixed points..
Proposition 2.1. For the vector field (2.1), consider a connected compact set M ⊂ U that is
positively invariant. If the exterior boundary of M does not encircle any fixed points, then M is
simply connected.
We need the following result for the proof.
Lemma 2.4. For the vector field (2.1), if a set S ⊂ U is negatively invariant, so is its closure S.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the contrary that S is not negatively invariant.
Then there exists p ∈ bd(S) such that φ(p, tp) at some negative finite time tp < 0 is bounded away
from S. We denote the distance from φ(p, tp) to S by d > 0. It then follows from the continuity
of the solutions with respect to the initial conditions (Theorem 3.5 in [78]) that there is a point
q ∈ S that is close enough to p such that φ(q, tp) is at least d2 away from S. But this contradicts
the fact that S is negatively invariant.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the contrary that M is not
simply-connected. Let J be the smallest simply-connected compact set whose boundary bd(J ) is
M’s exterior boundary. Then the set J −M is nonempty and open since M is closed but not
simply-connected. Furthermore, J −M consists of one or more simply-connected, disjoint open
sets. Let A be one of these sets, and then it must be negatively invariant since M is positively
invariant. So in view of Lemma 2.4, A is also negatively invariant. On the other hand, since M’s
exterior boundary does not encircle any fixed points, A is free of any fixed point. Now if the vector
field is reversed, A becomes a positively invariant compact set free of any fixed point, which from
Theorem 2.2 implies that for any u ∈ A, ω(u) is a closed orbit confined in A. But this contradicts
Lemma 2.3.
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If in addition to being positively invariant,M is also negatively invariant, i.e.,M is invariant,
then Theorem 2.4 can get even more strengthened.
Theorem 2.5 (No interior fixed points). For the vector field (2.1), consider an invariant, simply-
connected compact set M ⊂ U that contains a finite number of fixed points, all on bd(M). Then
for any p ∈M, both ω(p) and α(p) are fixed points, not necessarily different, on bd(M).
Proof. Theorem 2.4 implies that for any p ∈M, ω(p) contains only a single fixed point on bd(M).
The same holds for α(p) after reversing the direction of the vector field sinceM is also negatively
invariant. This completes the proof.
2.2.2 M has no interior, but infinity many boundary fixed points
Theorem 2.2 requires that the vector field contains a finite number of fixed points, so it cannot
be used in the situation in this subsection. Instead, we make use the following version of the
Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem that deals with the case when there are infinitely many fixed points.
For a limit set ω(p), let ωC(p) be the set of all fixed points in ω(p).
Theorem 2.6 (Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem for vector fields that may have infinitely many fixed
points). [35, Theorem 6.1 with adjustment] For the vector field (2.1), let M ⊂ U be a positively
invariant compact set. Then for any p ∈M, one of the following two holds:
1. ω(p) is a closed orbit;
2. the set of those orbits that are not fixed points contained in ω(p) is at most countable; more-
over, for any non-fixed point q ∈ ω(p), α(q) is contained in a connected subset of ωC(p) and
ω(q) is also contained in a connected subset of ωC(p).
Using Theorem 2.6, we obtain the following theorem that is the counterpart of Theorem 2.4
when the vector field may have infinitely many fixed points on bd(M):
Theorem 2.7. For the vector field (2.1), consider a positively invariant, simply-connected compact
set M⊂ U that has no interior fixed point, but may contain an infinite number of fixed points on
bd(M). Then for any p ∈M, one of the following two holds:
1. ω(p) is a fixed point on bd(M);
2. ω(p) is a continuum of fixed points on bd(M).
Proof. Following similar steps as those in the proof for Theorem 2.4, one can construct the simply-
connected compact set S as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Using similar arguments for S as those in
the proof for Theorem 2.4, after applying Theorem 2.6, one knows that ω(p) does not contain any
fixed point. On the other hand, ω(p) has to be connected [184, Proposition 8.1.3], so it can only
be a connected subset of the fixed points in M, which is either a fixed point or a continuum of
fixed points on bd(M).
In the following subsection, we look into the situation when M has one and only one interior
fixed point.
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2.2.3 M has exactly one interior fixed point
Now we present the counterpart of Theorem 2.4 discussing the case whenM contains exactly one
interior and finitely many boundary fixed points.
Theorem 2.8 (one interior fixed point). For the vector field (2.1), consider a positively invariant,
simply-connected compact set M⊂ U that contains exactly one interior fixed point x∗ and a finite
number of fixed points on its boundary. Then for any p ∈M, at least one of the following holds:
1. ω(p) is a fixed point, a closed orbit encircling x∗ or the union of {x∗} and a (possibly union
of) homoclinic orbit(s) joining x∗ to itself;
2. α(p) is {x∗}, a closed orbit encircling x∗ or the union of {x∗} and a (possibly union of)
homoclinic orbit(s) joining x∗ to itself.
Proof. We investigate all possibilities for ω(p) and show that each results in one of the cases of the
theorem. Should ω(p) be a singleton fixed point or a closed orbit that has to encircle g according
to Lemma 2.3, we arrive at Part 1. of the theorem. So consider the situation when ω(p) is
neither. It then follows Theorem 2.2 that ω(p) contains non-fixed points; we pick one such point
q and construct a transverse L through q. From Lemma 2.2, we know that O+(p) intersects L for
infinitely many times. Consider two consecutive intersections p1 and p2 which have to be distinctive
since ω(p) is not a closed orbit. We construct the simply-connected compact set S whose boundary
is formed by the semi-orbit O+(p) from p1 to p2 and the line segment p1p2. Similar to the proof of
Theorem 2.4, one can show that:
(i) S is in the form of one of the two cases shown in Figure 2.1,
(ii) S is positively invariant in Case (a) of the figure and negatively invariant in Case (b), and
(iii) x∗ ∈ int(S) is the only fixed point in S.
If S is positively invariant, O+(p) ∩ int(S) 6= ∅, implying the existence of some sp ∈ O+(p) ∩
int(S). Consequently, ω(sp) = ω(p). Then, applying Theorem 2.2, we know that ω(sp) consists of
a number of fixed points in S and the orbits connecting them. However, since x∗ is the only fixed
point in int(M), such orbits can only connect x∗ to itself. So ω(sp) is the union of {x∗} and a
(possibly union of) homoclinic orbit(s) joining x∗ to itself, so is ω(p). So in this case Part 1 of the
theorem holds.
Otherwise, if S is negatively invariant, then there exists a point sp ∈ O−(p) ∩ int(S) where
O−(p) is the same as O+(p), but when time is reversed. Consequently, after reversing the direction
of the vector field, one can check the three cases in Theorem 2.2 as ω(sp) lead to the three cases
in Part 2 of the theorem respectively.
Theorem 2.8 is indeed restricting the third case of Theorem 2.2, for at least one of the ω or
α limit sets. Note that if in addition x∗ is hyperbolic2 and the vector field contains no closed
orbits, then for any point p ∈ M, either ω(p) is a fixed point or α(p) = {x∗}. It is also worth
mentioning that some cases in Part 1 and Part 2 of Theorem 2.8 never take place at the same time.
For example, it is impossible to have both ω(p) and α(p) being the union of {x∗} and homoclinic
orbits joining x∗ to itself. We exclude such cases for general positively invariant compact regions
as follows. We call a point on a closed orbit a periodic point.
2A fixed-point x∗ is said to be hyperbolic if every eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix of the vector field at x∗ has
a nonzero real part.
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Proposition 2.2. Let M ⊂ U be a positively invariant compact set under the vector field (2.1).
For any non-periodic point p ∈M, if ω(p) = α(p), then the limit sets contain only fixed points.
For the proof, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.5 (Lemma 9.0.2 [184]). Let L ⊂ M be a transverse to the vector field. Then for any
point p ∈M, O+(p) intersects L in a monotone sequence; that is, if pi, i > 1, is the ith intersection
of O+(p) with L, then pi ∈ [pi−1, pi+1].
Proof of Proposition 2.2. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the contrary that ω(p) includes a
non-fixed point q. Then we can construct a transverse L through q, which in view of Lemma 2.2, has
infinitely many intersection points with O+(p). Consider two consecutive intersections pi and pi+1
which are distinctive since p is not on a closed orbit. We construct the simply-connected compact
set S whose boundary is formed by the semi-orbit O+(p) from p1 to p2 and the line segment p1p2,
resulting in either Case (a) or (b) in Figure 2.1. First we look at Case (a). From Lemma 2.5, we
know q ∈ int(S) since otherwise, the intersections of O+(p) with L do not converge to q. On the
other hand, S is positively invariant, implying that α(p)∩S = ∅. Hence, q 6∈ α(p). Now we look at
Case (b). In view of Lemma 2.5, q ∈M−S. On the other hand, S is negatively invariant, implying
that α(p) ⊆ S. Hence, again q 6∈ α(p). However, this contradicts the assumption ω(p) = α(p),
which completes the proof.
In case M contains finitely many fixed points, we can sharpen the result of Proposition 2.2.
Corollary 2.1. For the vector field (2.1), let M ⊂ U be a positively invariant compact set con-
taining a finite number of fixed points. Then for any non-periodic point p ∈ M, if ω(p) = α(p),
then the limit sets exclusively contain a single fixed point.
Proof. In view of Proposition 2.2, ω(p) and α(p) contain only fixed points. On the other hand,
ω(p) is connected [184, Proposition 8.1.3]. Hence, ω(p) and α(p) are either a fixed point or a
continuum of fixed points. The latter is impossible since there are only a finite number of fixed
points in M.
In the following section, we look at the situation when there are a finite number of fixed points
in int(M).
2.2.4 M has finitely many interior fixed points
Following the previous subsection of having one interior fixed point in the positively invariant
compact setM, we now extend the result to the more general case of having finitely many interior
fixed points in M.
Theorem 2.9 (finitely many interior fixed points). For the vector field (2.1), consider a positively
invariant, simply-connected compact set M ⊂ U containing a finite number of fixed points. Then
for any point p ∈M, at least one of the following holds:
1. ω(p) is a fixed point, a closed orbit encircling at least one interior fixed point or the union of
some interior fixed points together with the orbits connecting them;
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2. α(p) is an interior fixed point, a closed orbit encircling at least one interior fixed point or the
union of some interior fixed points together with the orbits connecting them.
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Theorem 2.8 and we omit it here.
Compared to the classical form of the Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem 2.2, what Theorem 2.9
has further clarified is the role of the interior fixed points of M play to influence the topological
structure of the limit sets. For example, as an immediate result of Theorem 2.9, if the third case
of Theorem 2.2 takes place for p, then ω(p) and α(p) cannot be free of interior fixed points at the
same time; in other words, unless ω(p) is simply a fixed point or a closed orbit, some interior fixed
points must be in either ω(p) or α(p). Another implication of Theorem 2.9 is the exclusion of the
boundary fixed points from one of ω(p) and α(p). From Theorem 2.9, if ω(p) is not simply a fixed
point, then at least one of ω(p) or α(p) does not contain any boundary fixed point. In a sense,
this implies that the interior fixed points are more important for determining the structures of the
limit sets. Finally, we note that Corollary 2.1 can also be utilized here to rule out some trivial
cases when ω(p) and α(p) are the same.
At the end of this section, we present the following version of Theorem 2.9 without requiring
M to be simply connected.
Theorem 2.10. For the vector field (2.1), consider a positively invariant, compact set M ⊂ U
that contains a finite number of fixed points. Then for any p ∈ M, at least one of the following
holds:
1. ω(p) is a fixed point, a closed orbit or the union of some interior fixed points with the orbits
connecting them;
2. α(p) is one of the interior fixed points, a closed orbit or the union of some interior fixed
points with the orbits connecting them.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.8. The difference is that if ω(p) or α(p) is a closed
orbit, it may encircle areas that do not belong to M.
In the following section, we discuss how to apply the tightened results for the Poincare´-
Bendixson theorem to replicator dynamics, an important class of population dynamics as models
for theoretical biologists, economists and sociologists.
2.3 Application to replicator dynamics
Because of the constraint x ∈ ∆, the n-dimensional replicator dynamics (1.2) give rise to in fact
an (n − 1)-dimensional vector field. In this section, we consider the planar replicator dynamics,
that is when n = 3. Except for a few trivial cases, the planar replicator dynamics usually have
at most one interior fixed point in the planar simplex, which reduces to a triangular area, making
it a suitable case study for the applications of the results developed in the previous section. The
corresponding payoff matrix is a 3-by-3 real matrix with 9 parameters. However, in view of Lemma
1.2, one can transform the payoff matrix into the following form with 6 parameters
A =
0 −b −fa 0 c− f
d e− b 0
 , a, b, c, d, e, f ∈ IR,
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without changing the replicator dynamics. We are interested in the asymptotic behavior of (1.2),
particularly the limit sets of an arbitrary point in ∆. In view of Lemma 1.3, each edge is invariant,
and thus exhibits a one-dimensional flow that can be easily determined. Therefore, we focus on
the limit sets of ∆’s interior points. In [23] (later corrected in [24]), the possible phase portraits
of such planar dynamics are classified into 49 qualitatively different cases. The classification is
made according to the locations of the fixed points, i.e., (i) more than two fixed points in int(∆),
not all on a straight line, (ii) more than one fixed point in int(∆), all on one straight line, (iii)
exactly one fixed point in int(∆) and (iv) no fixed point in int(∆). The fourth class leads to most
of the possible phase portraits, and is itself classified into the following sub-cases: (iv-a) two edges
point-wise fixed, (iv-b) one edge point-wise fixed and (iv-c) no edge point-wise fixed. For the last
sub-case (iv-c), i.e., when there is no fixed point in int(∆) and no edge is point-wise fixed, the
author of [23] made the following statement in Section III.c: “... we can deduce that on every edge
there is at least one corner which has a non-vanishing EV(eigenvalue) in direction of that edge,
whence we can infer that only robust flows on the edges occur. (new paragraph) As a consequence
of the Poincare´-Bendixson theory, the only possible robust PP (phase portrait)’s are 34 to 43.”
Here PP 34 to 43 are referring to those in Figure 2.5 of [23].
However, as discussed in Section 2.1, for each of the phase portraits just referred to, the
Poincare´-Bendixson theorem itself usually cannot give the description of the global convergence
only based on some local stability analysis, which prevents to reach directly the quoted conclusions
in [23]. Instead, one has to rely on results like those developed in the previous section to draw
such conclusions. We illustrate this point by deriving the phase portrait of (1.2) for three example
payoff matrices as follows.
Example 2.1. Consider the following payoff matrix
A1 =
 0 0 −11 0 −2
−3 0 3
 . (2.2)
Then for the replicator dynamics (1.2), as shown in Figure 2.2(a), the fixed points are e1 and q2
which are hyperbolic saddle points, e3 which is hyperbolic stable and e2 which is a center fixed
point. The flow on the edges is also shown in Figure 2.2(a). Consider a point p on the intersection
of int(∆) and the stable invariant manifold of q2. Then α(p) has to be a fixed point from Corollary
2.5. However, the only point in the simplex that a trajectory may converge to as t → −∞ is e2.
Hence, α(p) = e2. So there exists an orbit γ that starts from e2 and ends at q2 (Figure 2.2(b);
indeed γ can be shown to be a straight line). Now the area Z1 surrounded by γ, the line segment
q2e3 and the edge e3e2 is an invariant simply-connected compact set that does not include any
interior fixed point. Hence, from Corollary 2.5, every orbit in Z1 starts from and ends at a fixed
point. On the other hand, q2 is a hyperbolic saddle, and thus the only orbit that converges to
it is γ. Hence, every orbit in int(Z1) starts from e2 and ends at e3, namely for all z ∈ int(Z1),
α(z) = e2 and ω(z) = e3 (Figure 2.2(c)). Now consider the other part of the simplex, i.e., the area
Z2 surrounded by γ, the line segment q2e1 and the edge e1e2. Again, in view of Corollary 2.5, for
all z ∈ int(Z2), ω(z) and α(z) are fixed points. However, neither e1 nor q2 can be the limit set of
any point z ∈ int(Z2). So for all z ∈ int(Z2), ω(z) = α(z) = {e2}, namely, every orbit in int(Z2)
is a homoclinic orbit joining e2 to itself (the resulting phase portrait matches PP 45 in [23]). 




















Figure 2.2: Deriving the phase portrait of the replicator dynamics with the payoff matrix A1 in
(2.2). (a) e1 and q2 are hyperbolic saddle, e3 is a hyperbolic stable and e2 is a center fixed point.
p is a point on the stable invariant manifold of q2. (b) In view of Corollary 2.5 and because of the
local stability results, α(p) = e2. This results in the trajectory γ that divides ∆ into Z1 and Z2.
(c) Again, Corollary 2.5 and the local stability results imply that for each z ∈ int(Z1), α(z) = e2
and ω(z) = e3, and for each z ∈ int(Z2), α(z) = ω(z) = e2.
Example 2.2. Consider the following payoff matrix
A2 =
 0 3 −1−1 0 3
1 1 0
 . (2.3)
Then for (1.2), as shown in Figure 2.3(a), the fixed points are e1, e3 and q1 which are hyperbolic
saddle points, e2 which is hyperbolic unstable, and g which is hyperbolic stable. The flow on
the edges is also shown in Figure 2.3(a). From [65] we know that no limit cycle shows up in
3-dimensional replicator dynamics. Hence, only trivial closed orbits around g may be observed.
However, this is not possible since g is stable. Hence, no closed orbit exists. Further, since g is
stable, no homoclinic orbit exists that joins g to itself. Hence, in view of Theorem 2.8, for any
point p ∈ int(∆), either ω(p) is a fixed point, or α(p) is {g}. The latter, however, is not possible
since g is stable. Hence, ω(p) is a fixed point. On the other hand, the only fixed point, to which
convergence is possible, is g. Hence,
∀p ∈ int(∆), ω(p) = {g}. (2.4)


















Figure 2.3: Deriving the phase portrait of the replicator dynamics with the payoff matrix A2 in
(2.3). (a) e1, e3 and q1 are hyperbolic saddle, e2 is a hyperbolic unstable, and g is a hyperbolic
stable fixed point. (b) Because of Corollary 2.8, the local stability results and the fact that no
limit cycle exists, ω(p) = {g} for all p ∈ int(∆). Hence, the unique out-going trajectory from q1,
denoted by γ1, converges to g. (c) The rest of the orbits in int(∆) start from e2 and end at g.
This is because any out-going trajectory from e2, e.g., γ2, together with γ1 divide the simplex into
the zones Z1 and Z2, each of which satisfy the condition of M in Corollary 2.8. Hence, every
trajectory in int(Zi), i = 1, 2, start from e2 and end at g.
So the unique orbit γ1 that lies on the intersection of int(∆) and the unstable invariant manifold
of q1 converges to g, (Figure 2.3(b)). Consider an arbitrary out-going orbit from the unstable fixed
point e2, and denote it by γ2. In view of (2.4), γ2 converges to g. As shown in Figure 2.3(c), γ1 and
γ2 divide the simplex into areas Z1 and Z2. Each area is an invariant simply-connected compact
set. Hence, from Corollary 2.5, for any point z ∈ int(Zi), i = 1, 2, α(z) is a fixed point. On the
other hand, α(z) cannot be any of q1, g, e3 or e1. Hence, α(z) = e2. Therefore, except for γ1, every
orbit in the interior of the simplex, starts from e2 and ends at g. To sum up, we have the following
∀p ∈ int(∆), α(p) =
{
q1 if p lies on the invariant unstable manifold of q1
e2 otherwise
.
This together with (2.4), completely determines the asymptotic behavior of any orbit in the interior
of the simplex (the resulting phase portrait matches PP 15 in [23]). 






















Figure 2.4: Deriving the phase portrait of the replicator dynamics with the payoff matrix A3 in
(2.5). (a) e2 and g are hyperbolic saddle, e1 and e3 are hyperbolic unstable and q3 and q2 are
hyperbolic stable fixed points. The trajectories γ1 and γ2 lie on the unstable invariant manifold of
g. (b) Because of Corollary 2.8 and the local stability results, the unstable invariant manifold of g
is confined to q2 and q3 and the stable invariant manifold of g is confined to e1 and e3. This results
in the four zones Z1, . . . ,Z4. (c) In view of Theorem 2.4, ∀z ∈ int(Z1), α(z) = e1 and ω(z) = q2,
∀z ∈ int(Z2), α(z) = e1 and ω(z) = q3, ∀z ∈ int(Z3), α(z) = e3 and ω(z) = q3, and ∀z ∈ int(Z4),
α(z) = e3 and ω(z) = q2.
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Example 2.3. Consider the following payoff matrix
A3 =
0 1 33 0 1
5 −1 0
 . (2.5)
Then for (1.2), as shown in Figure 2.4(a), the fixed points are e2 and g which are hyperbolic saddle
points, e1 and e3 which are hyperbolic unstable, and q3 and q2 which are hyperbolic stable. The
flow on the edges is shown in Figure 2.4(a). Similar to the previous example, since g is hyperbolic,
it can be shown that no closed orbit exists. Consider the trajectories γ1 and γ2 that lie on the
unstable invariant manifold of g. In view of Corollary 2.5, they have to converge to a fixed point.
On the other hand, no trajectory converges to e1 or e3. So γ1 and γ2 converge to q2 and q3. If they
both converge to the same qi, i = 2, 3, then one of the trajectories of the stable manifold of g will
be trapped in an invariant simply-connected compact set whose interior is empty of fixed points.
Hence, in view of Corollary 2.4, the trajectory has to converge to either q2 or q3 as t→ −∞, which
is impossible. Hence, γ1 and γ2 converge to different qi, i = 2, 3, e.g., γ1 converges to q2 and γ2
to q3, as shown in Figure 2.4(b). Similarly by reversing the direction of the vector field, it can
be shown that one of the two trajectories of the unstable invariant manifold of g converges to e1
and the other to e3 as t → −∞. Then the invariant manifolds of g divide the simplex into the
four areas Z1, . . . ,Z4. Similar to the previous examples, it can be shown that in the interior of
each of the areas, every orbit starts from the stable and ends at the unstable fixed point in that
area (Figure 2.4(c)). Therefore, the limit set of every point in the simplex is determined, which
completes the derivation of the phase portrait (the resulting phase portrait matches PP 10 in [23]).

2.4 Concluding remarks
For a continuously differentiable vector field, we have investigated the possible limit sets of an
arbitrary point in a positively invariant compact set M, after counting the number of its interior
and boundary fixed points. As the main result, we have shown in Theorem 2.9 that when M
contains a finite number of interior fixed points, if neither ω(p) nor α(p) contains just a fixed
point or a closed orbit, then at least one of ω(p) or α(p) excludes all boundary fixed points and
consists only ofM’s interior fixed points with non-fixed orbits connecting them. This tightens the
classical Poincare´-Bendixson theorem by clarifying the critical role of the interior fixed points in
any positively invariant compact set. Moreover, Theorem 2.9 dramatically reduces the number of
possibilities for the ω limit set. For example, in the case when the interior ofM is empty of fixed
points, Theorem 2.9 reduces to Theorem 2.4 stating that the ω limit set of an arbitrary point in
M can only be one of the fixed points on the boundary of M. Although the state-of-the-art is
still far away from extending the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem to higher dimensions, it would be of
great interest to develop results similar to those in this chapter for vector fields whose dimensions
are greater than two at least for those M with special properties, e.g., when the dynamics in M
is known not to exhibit chaos3.
3We would like to thank Dr. Hildeberto Jardon for several illuminating discussions and for introducing us to
the literature, and Prof. Henk W. Broer and Prof. Robert Roussarie for their helpful comments.
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2.5 Appendix
In this Appendix, we present Figure 2.5 which is a copy of Figure 6 in [23].
Figure 2.5: Phase portraits 30 to 46 in [23]. Full circle • and empty circle ◦ represent a sink and
a source, respectively. The figure is taken from Figure 6 in [23].
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Chapter 3
Limit sets of trajectories converging to
compact curves or manifolds
For continuously differentiable vector fields, we first characterize the ω limit set of a trajectory
converging to a compact curve Γ ⊂ IRn. We show that the limit set is either a fixed point or a
continuum of fixed points if Γ is a simple open curve, and otherwise can be in addition a curve
in the form of either a closed orbit or a number of fixed points and compatibly oriented orbits
connecting them. An implication of the result is a tightened-up version of the Poincare´-Bendixson
theorem. Next we extend the results to continuously differentiable vector fields possessing an
arbitrary-dimensional invariant compact manifoldM, and find the possible limit set of a trajectory
converging toM. Particularly, the area between each attracting (resp. repelling) set of the vector
field restricted toM and the boundary of its region of attraction (resp. repulsion) does not intersect
the limit set, even when the attracting and repelling sets partially coincide with the boundary of
M. This gives a sense of perspective on the extension of the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem to higher
dimensions. Then we elaborate on the special case when M is diffeomorphic to a plane and the
restriction of the vector field to M is hyperbolic at every fixed point. The results shed light on
the qualitative properties of a vector field near a compact manifold, and are illustrated by several
examples, mainly from replicator dynamics, the well-known population dynamics.
3.1 Introduction
After presenting the results on the possible limit sets of a point in a planar vector field in Chapter
2, now we broaden our attention to higher-dimensional vector fields and focus on the possible
limits sets of a trajectory converging to some compact set that can be as simple as a curve or as
complicated as a general invariant compact manifold. Convergence of trajectories is a fundamental
problem in dynamical systems [127]. Understanding the way and to where the solutions of a system
may converge provides qualitative information on the behavior of the states of a system. Most
of the available research focuses on the stability of an invariant set [21, 167, 43]. Examples of
fundamental results in such a setting are Lyapunov’s asymptotic stability and LaSalle’s invariance
principle [152]. Regarding, in particular, the latter, even if it is known that a certain invariant
set is, e.g. asymptotically stable, it is not straightforward to further conclude to where, precisely,
the trajectories in the neighborhood of such a set converge. The behavior of a flow near an
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isolated fixed point in planar dynamical systems was studied by Poincare´ [132], leading to notions
such as the limit set, and from there, many extensions have been worked out, e.g. the Hartman-
Grobman theorem [76]. Intuitively, the limit set of a trajectory (if it exists) describes the fate of
a system’s state in the long run. This becomes relevant in the qualitative description of natural
phenomena. For example, in population dynamics [68, 149, 138], a limit set may describe the fate
of an ecosystem; in flexible robotics, convergence to the so-called slow-manifold helps to simplify
the controller’s design [51]. On a more mathematical side, limit sets may have a simple topological
structure such as fixed points or periodic orbits, but they can also be as complicated as strange
attractors. Moreover, the analysis of limit sets and convergence of trajectories becomes more
complicated as the dimension of the phase space grows. The perfect example is the celebrated
Poincare´-Bendixson theorem [42, 76, 184] which exists for planar systems but its extension to
higher dimensions is still an open (and very hard) problem.
For spaces with the dimensions higher than one, [167] considers flows in locally compact phase
space near a compact manifold M (see also [21]). The main result describes the stability of and
convergence to M and provides three mutually exclusive scenarios that may occur, as explained
in the following theorem. Given a point p, let ω(p) and α(p) denote the ω and α limit sets of p,
respectively.
Theorem 3.1. [167] Let X be a locally compact space and M⊂ X a non-open compact invariant
set isolated from closed invariant sets. Then, one and only one of the following cases may occur.
1. M is positively asymptotically stable.
2. M is negatively asymptotically stable.
3. There exist points x 6∈ M and y 6∈ M such that ∅ 6= ω(x) ⊂M and ∅ 6= α(y) ⊂M.
It turns out that such a description does not hold when the phase space is a complete metric
space [43]. Moreover, whenever either 1. or 3. in Theorem 3.1 occurs, it remains open to establish
how the ω limit set of an arbitrary point x 6∈ M looks like. In [111], the authors describe
the topological properties of asymptotically stable sets M within a locally compact phase space,
and in [4] the authors provide a rather general description of regions of attractions of nonlinear
dynamical systems. However, none of these studies treats the description of the limit set of a
trajectory converging to an arbitrary-dimensional invariant compact manifold. This missing piece
is needed in the analyses of various dynamical systems such as population dynamics where given
that a certain species becomes extinct [135], the fate of the other species is of interest, and slow-fast
systems where the dynamics close to the so-called slow manifold is relevant [75, 82, 161].
We address this open problem by investigating the actual limit set of a given trajectory converg-
ing to a compact invariant curve Γ or in general a compact invariant manifoldM of a continuously
differentiable vector field. More specifically, we are rather interested in where, within Γ or M,
the converging trajectory converges to. For the first case, we show that a trajectory converging
to the curve Γ has an ω limit set in the form of a fixed point or a continuum of fixed points if
Γ is a simple open curve, and otherwise can be in addition a curve in the form of either a closed
orbit or a number of fixed points and compatibly oriented orbits connecting them. Part of the
results will be later used in Chapter 4. For the second case, we show that the areas surrounded
by the attracting (resp. repelling) sets of the vector field restricted to M and the boundaries of
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their regions of attraction (resp. repulsion) do not attract the converging trajectory, and hence,
do not intersect the corresponding limit set. The results do not impose any stability properties
on M although the results also hold if M is, for example, asymptotically stable, complementing
Theorem 3.1. In the special case when M is diffeomorphic to a plane and the restriction of the
vector field to M is hyperbolic at every fixed point, we show that the limit set is either a fixed
point or a subset of the union of the boundaries of the attracting or repelling sets of the vector
field restricted to M and the attracting and repelling sets’ attraction and repulsion regions. In
general terms, the results of this chapter shed light on the qualitative properties of a vector field
near invariant compact manifolds and, in particular, give a sense of perspective on the extension of
the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem to higher dimensions spaces, one of the cornerstones of the study
of dynamical systems.
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide definitions and
preliminary results. In Section 3.3, we present the main results for the case when a trajectory
converges to a compact curve. As a consequence, we are able to give a tightened up version
of Poincare´-Bendixson theorem, see Theorem 3.4. We proceed in Section 3.4 with a couple of
nontrivial academic examples where the main results are applied to. In Section 3.5, we deal with
the problem of convergence to an m-dimensional, m ∈ N, compact invariant set. We construct
a compact invariant subset N ⊂ M which contains all the possible limit sets of a trajectory
converging to M. Then, in Section 3.6, we discuss the interesting case when the manifold M
is 2-dimensional and has only hyperbolic singularities. Next, in Section 3.7 we provide several
examples for our main results, particularly some in the context of population dynamics. We
finalize the chapter with the concluding remarks.
3.2 Preliminaries
We consider a C`, ` ≥ 1, vector field
x˙ = f(x) x ∈ IRn. (3.1)
The following is a fundamental result on the continuity of the vector field with respect to the initial
condition.
Theorem 3.2. [78, Theorem 3.5] Let f(x) be continuous and locally Lipschitz in x on X where
X ⊂ IRn is an open connected set. Let y(t) be a solution of x˙ = f(x) with y(t0) = y0 ∈ X . Suppose
y(t) is defined and belongs to X for all t ∈ [t0, t1]. Then given  > 0, there is δ > 0 such that if
‖z0 − y0‖ < δ,
then there is a unique solution z(t) of x˙ = f(x) defined on [t0, t1], with z(t0) = z0, and z(t) satisfies
‖z(t)− y(t)‖ <  ∀t ∈ [t0, t1].
The boundary and interior of a set S ⊂ IRn are denoted by bd(S) and int(S), respectively. The
following definitions are essential for stability and attractiveness notions.
Definition 3.1 (Trapping region [103]). A set U ⊂ IRn is a trapping region (of the vector field f)
if it is compact and ϕt(U) ⊂ int(U) for all t > 0.
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Note that, by definition, a trapping region ‘shrinks’ as it evolves over time.
Definition 3.2 (Attracting set [103]). A set A is an attracting set (of the vector field f) if there
is a trapping region U so that A ⊂ U and⋂
t>0
ϕt(U) = A.
The set U is called a trapping region of A.
An invariant set S is said to be stable if for any neighborhood U of S, there is a neighborhood
V of S such that φt(V) ⊆ U for all t > 0, that is, all trajectories with initial conditions in V stay
in U . An invariant set S is said to be asymptotically stable if it is stable and for every x ∈ V ,
d(ϕt(x),S)→ 0 as t→∞ [103]. The following result reveals the relationship between the previous
definitions.
Lemma 3.1. [103, Lemma 4.18] An attracting set is asymptotically stable. Conversely if a compact
set is asymptotically stable, then it is an attracting set.
In a similar way, a set R ⊂ IRn is a repelling set if it is an attracting set when time is reversed.
Definition 3.3 (Attraction region). The attraction region of an attracting set A, denoted by
Ω(A), is defined by
Ω(A) = {x ∈ IRn | d (ϕt(x),A)→ 0 as t→∞} .






where U is any trapping region of A [103]. Note that Ω(A) is open, and any trapping region U ⊃ A
is a compact and proper subset of Ω(A). The repulsion region of a repelling set R, denoted by
Ω(R), is defined similarly, but when t→ −∞.
Given a compact invariant setM⊂ IRn, the restriction of the vector field f onM is denoted by
f |M. A set A ⊆M is said to be an attracting (resp. repelling) set of f in M if A is an attracting
(resp. repelling) set of the restriction f |M. Correspondingly, the attraction region ΩM(A) and
repelling region ΩM(R) are defined on M with respect to f |M.
The definition of an attracting set of f in M readily implies that A is in the interior of some
trapping region U , i.e., A ⊂ int(U), yielding A ⊂ int(M). However, as we will show in Section 3.7,
there are cases where there exists a set A′ contained in or intersecting the boundary ofM, which all
trajectories in a neighborhood of A′ inM, are attracted to. Such a set A′ is not an attracting set
according to Definition 3.2, yet it behaves similar to one. This motivates the following definitions.
Definition 3.4 (Semi-Trapping region). Given an invariant compact set M⊂ IRn, a set U ′ ⊂M
is a semi-trapping region of f inM, if it is compact, U ′∩bd(M) 6= ∅, and the set Uˆ = U ′∩ int(M)
satisfies ϕt(Uˆ) ⊂ int(Uˆ) for all t > 0.
Definition 3.5 (Semi-Attracting set). Given an invariant compact set M ⊂ IRn, a set A′ ⊂ M
is a semi-attracting set of the vector field f |M, if A′ ∩ bd(M) 6= ∅, and there is a semi-trapping
region U ′ so that A′ ⊂ U ′ and ⋂
t>0
ϕt(U ′) = A′.
The set U ′ is called a semi-trapping region of A′.
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3.3 Limit set of trajectories converging to curves
Consider a C`, ` ≥ 1, vector field (3.1). Let Γ be a compact invariant curve under the vector
field, and consider a point p ∈ IRn, the trajectory through which converges to Γ as t → ∞. Our
goal is to find the possibilities for ω(p). One of the trivial candidates is the set of fixed points
on Γ, denoted by N . If N = ∅, then Γ is a closed orbit. If N 6= ∅, then N is the union of its
connected components Ni, each of which we refer to as a fixed point component of Γ and is either
a single fixed point or a continuum of fixed points. For the rest of Γ, denoted by I = Γ−N , we
observe that I is either empty or the union of the non-fixed orbits in Γ, denoted by Ii. Each Ii is
connected and disjoint from any other Ij, i.e., Ii ∩ Ij = ∅ for all i 6= j. We show in Proposition
3.1 that the non-fixed orbits Ii do not intersect ω(p), unless they are part of a flow-aligned curve
defined in the following.
Definition 3.6 (Flow-aligned curves). We say an invariant simple closed curve Γ is a simple
flow aligned curve, if it is either a closed orbit or a continuum of fixed points, or each Ni ⊆ Γ
contains the ω limit point of exactly one non-fixed orbit and the α limit point of exactly one (not
necessarily different) non-fixed orbit in Γ. A connected union of simple flow-aligned curves is called
a flow-aligned curve.
The last case of the definition of a simple flow-aligned curve implies the union of sets of fixed
points (either a single or a continuum of fixed points) and compatibly oriented orbits joining them.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the vector field (3.1), and let p be an arbitrary point in IRn. If ϕt(p)
converges to a compact curve Γ, then for every non-fixed orbit Ii ⊆ Γ that is not a subset of any
flow-aligned simple sub-curve of Γ, it holds that ω(p) ∩ Ii = ∅.
Proposition 3.1 implies that if a trajectory converges to an invariant curve having non-fixed
orbits, then the corresponding ω limit set is built upon flow-aligned curves. We remark, however,
that the converse is not necessarily true. Using saddle points, one can easily construct an invariant
flow-aligned curve that is not an ω limit set of any point not belonging to the curve.
For the proof of Proposition 3.1, we first consider a non-fixed orbit Ii ⊆ Γ that is not a subset
of any flow-aligned simple sub-curve of Γ. It follows that Ii is not a closed orbit, and hence is
diffeomorphic to a line segment since it is compact. So, without loss of generality, we assume Ii
is a line segment. Next, let (z1, . . . , zn) be a coordinate system such that Ii lies along the z1-axis
where one ending point of Ii coincides with the origin and the other, denoted by r, lies on the
positive z1-axis. Since Ii is an orbit and hence invariant, there exists a flow on Ii, say in the
positive direction of the z1-axis. We show that this flow does not allow any point on Ii to be an
ω limit point of p. Consider a point q ∈ Ii and constant  ∈ (q1, r1 − q1) where xj denotes the jth
entry of x. Define Ii (q) ⊂ Ii as a line segment of length 2, centered at q, i.e.,
Ii (q) = {ζ ∈ Ii | q1 −  ≤ ζ1 ≤ q1 + } .
We show the existence of a sufficiently small tubular neighborhood of Ii (q) in which the flow in
the z1 direction is always positive. Denote the z-coordinate of ϕt(p) by z(t). For δ > 0, define Qδ,




∣∣∣ z1 ∈ Ii (q), d(z, Ii (q)) ≤ δ} .
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Lemma 3.2. There exist constants δ > 0 and r > 0 such that if z ∈ Qδ, then z˙1 > r > 0.
Proof. The proof follows from the flow-box or rectification theorem [14, Corollary 10 of Ch. 2].
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Take δ from Lemma 3.2 and define the following two subsets of the
boundary of Qδ: D1 = {z ∈ Qδ | z1 = q1− } and D2 = {z ∈ Qδ | z1 = q1 + }. If there exists some
point ξ ∈ ω(p) ∩ Ii, then there exists a time sequence {tj}∞j=1, tj →∞, such that ϕ(tj, p) ∈ Qδ for
all tj. On the other hand, in view of Lemma 3.2, corresponding to each tj there exists some tˆj > tj
such that ϕ(tˆj, p) 6∈ Qδ. So, if q ∈ ω(p), it would mean that ϕt(p) must enter Qδ infinitely many
times. However, the fact that ϕt(p)→ Γ as t→∞ implies the existence of M > 0 such that
d (ϕt(p),Γ) < δ ∀t > M. (3.3)
In other words, after t = M , the flow through p stays in a distance of δ from Γ. Moreover, in view
of Lemma 3.2, if ϕt(p) enters Qδ, it enters from D1 and leaves from D2 in finite time. Hence, for
ϕt(p) to enter Qδ for the second time after t = M , it must get from D2 to D1 in a distance δ of Γ
without entering Qδ. This implies the existence of a simple closed sub-curve Γ′ ⊆ Γ connecting D2
to D1, containing Ii. On the other hand, if none of such sub-curves are flow aligned, then again
due to Lemma 3.2, it is impossible for ϕt(p) to return to Qδ, leading to the proof.
Proposition 3.1 results in the following two corollaries.
Corollary 3.1. Consider the vector field (3.1), and let p be an arbitrary point in IRn. If ϕt(p)
converges to a compact simple open curve Γ, then ω(p) is a single fixed point or a continuum of
fixed points on Γ.
Proof. First we look at the case when Γ is invariant. From Proposition 3.1 and since Γ is simple,
ω(p) ∩ I = ∅. Hence, ω(p) ⊆ Γ − I = N . Moreover, it follows from Lemma 1.1 that ω(p) is
connected since Γ is compact. Hence, there exists a fixed point component Ni ⊆ N such that
ω(p) ⊆ Ni, leading to the result. Now if Γ is not invariant, from Lemma 1.1 we know that ω(p) is
invariant; hence, ω(p) is a subset of the invariant part of Γ. Then by repeating the same argument
as above, we reach the conclusion.
As an immediate consequence of Corollary 3.1, if the vector field does not admit a continuum
of fixed points and Γ is a simple open curve, then the trajectory through p converges to a fixed
point on Γ.
Corollary 3.2. Consider the vector field (3.1), and let p be an arbitrary point in IRn. If ϕt(p)
converges to a simple closed curve Γ, then one of the following holds for ω(p):
• if Γ is flow-aligned, then ω(p) is a single fixed point on Γ, a continuum of fixed points on Γ
or the whole Γ itself;
• otherwise, ω(p) is either a single fixed point or a continuum of fixed points on Γ.
Proof. If Γ is not invariant, then as stated in the proof of Corollary 3.1, ϕt(p) converges to the
invariant part of Γ which is a simple open curve, and hence, not flow-aligned. The result then
follows from Corollary 3.1. So consider the case when Γ is invariant. Since Γ is compact, it follows
from Lemma 1.1 that ω(p) is connected. Having this in mind, first we consider the case when Γ
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is flow-aligned. If ω(p) = Γ, the result is trivial; otherwise, since ω(p) is connected, it is a subset
of a simple open sub-curve Γ′ of Γ. Then ϕt(p) converges to Γ′, which in view of Corollary 3.1
results in ω(p) being a fixed point or a continuum of fixed points on Γ. The case when Γ is not
flow-aligned follows from Proposition 3.1 and the proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 3.1.
Now we proceed to the main result of this chapter where a (possibly non-simple, open or closed)
compact curve in general, is considered as the curve to which ϕt(p) converges.
Theorem 3.3. Consider the vector field (3.1), and let p be an arbitrary point in IRn. If ϕt(p)
converges to a compact curve Γ ⊂ IRn. Then ω(p) is one of the following sets
• a single fixed point on Γ,
• a continuum of fixed points on Γ, or
• a flow-aligned sub-curve of Γ and possibly continuum of fixed points connected to it.
Proof. We prove by contradiction: if ω(p) is not in the form of any of the three cases mentioned
in the theorem, then it contains a non-fixed orbit Ii ⊆ Γ that is not a subset of any flow-aligned
closed sub-curve of Γ, which is a contradiction according to Proposition 3.1.
Theorem 3.3 clarifies the flow structure of the ω limit sets within a curve. This particularly
finds extensive application in planar dynamics, where limit sets in invariant regions are always
either a curve or a fixed point. After all, the third case in Poincare´-Bendixson theorem leaves
many possibilities for the geometrical structure of the limit set, a wide range of which is impossible
based on Theorem 3.3. This motivates us to present the following tightened-up version of Poincare´-
Bendixson theorem. We note that a similar result, but with a different proof, has been stated in
[11, Theorem 68].
Theorem 3.4 (Tightened-up Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem). Consider a C`, ` ≥ 1, planar vector
field. Let M be a positively invariant compact set for the vector field, and assume that M has a
finite number of fixed points. Let p ∈M, and consider ω(p). Then one of the following holds:
1. ω(p) is a singleton;
2. ω(p) is a closed orbit;
3. ω(p) is a flow-aligned curve consisting of a finite number of fixed points p1, . . . , pn and orbits
γ with α(γ) = pi and ω(γ) = pj, where pi and pj are not necessarily different.
Proof. The proof follows Theorems 2.2 and 3.3 and the fact thatM does not possess any continuum
of fixed points.
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Figure 3.1: According to Theorem 2.2, all of the shown sets could possibly be ω limit sets of a
planar vector field. However, with the refinement of Theorem 3.4, we rule out such cases.
3.4 Examples
Example 3.1. This example is related to Poincare´-Bendixson theorem. In Figure 3.1 we present
three invariant sets that, according to Theorem 2.2, are possible ω limit sets for a planar vector
field. However, from Theorem 3.4, we know that they, in fact, are not.
Example 3.2. Consider the C1 planar vector field
r˙ = −(r − 1)5, θ˙ =
{
0 r = 1





r 6= 1 , (3.4)
possessing a continuum of fixed points on the unit circle, denoted by Γ. If for some point p in the
plane, ϕt(p) converges to Γ, then Theorem 3.3 says that ϕt(p) either converges to a fixed point
or continuum of fixed points in Γ. Although seemingly counter intuitive, the continuum does not





Figure 3.2: Phase portraits of (3.4). The red unit circle, Γ, consists only of fixed points. Depending
on the initial condition, a trajectory of (3.4) approaching Γ converges to a proper subset of Γ.
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3.5 Limit set of trajectories converging to compact invari-
ant manifolds
Consider the C`, ` ≥ 1, vector field (3.1). We assume that there is an m-dimensional, m ∈
{1, . . . , n}, compact manifold M⊂ IRn invariant under the flow of f . Denote by A the set of all
attracting sets of f in M, that is
A = {A ⊂M|A is an attracting set of f in M} .
Corresponding to each A ∈ A , the set UA := ΩM(A) − A does not contain any invariant
subset, and every trajectory in UA converges to A. Hence, intuitively, UA does not attract any
trajectory converging to M. The same holds for each UR := ΩM(R) − R corresponding to an
R ∈ R where R is defined similar to A , but for the repellors R of f in M (see Figure 3.3-(a)








is a candidate for containing the limit set of a trajectory converging to M (see Figure 3.3-(c)).
This is upheld by the fact that NA ,R does not contain any trapping region (both in forward and
backward time) and that among its elements, NA ,R contains every fixed point, attracting set and
repelling set of M.
Similar arguments hold for the semi-attracting regions of M. Just as before, define the set of
all semi-attracting sets of f in M by
A ′ = {A′ ⊂M|A′ is a semi-attracting set of f in M}
and the region of attraction of each A′ ∈ A ′ by
ΩM(A′) = {x ∈M| d(φt(x),A′)→ 0 as t→∞} .
Then, again, for every A′ ∈ A ′, the set UA′ := ΩM(A′) − A′, intuitively does not attract any
trajectory converging to M. This time, however, UA′ contains some part of the boundary of M,
which is due to the fact thatA′∩bd(M) 6= ∅ and bd(M) is invariant, yielding ΩM(A′)∩bd(M) 6= ∅
(see Figure 3.4-(a) to (b)). The same holds for each UR′ := ΩM(R′) − R′ corresponding to a
R′ ∈ R ′ where ΩM(R′) and R ′ are defined similarly to ΩM(A′) and A ′. Now by subtracting these















Since the limit set of a trajectory converging toM is connected, the trajectory may converge only
to a connected component of N which we therefore call a candidate limit set and denote it by Ni.
Then N = ⋃iNi where each Ni is a maximal connected subset of N and Ni ∩Nj = ∅ for all i 6= j
(see Figure 3.4-(e)). The following result reveals the invariance of the candidate limit sets under
the vector field, implying in particular the invariance of their boundaries.
Proposition 3.2. Each candidate limit set Ni is invariant.




Figure 3.3: (a) An example of M as an invariant set in the form of a disc. The set M has 1
attractor (a stable fixed point in blue) A and 1 repellor (an unstable fixed point in red) R. (b)
The regions of attraction ΩM(A) and repulsion ΩM(R) are open sets depicted in light-blue and
light-red respectively. (c) The set NA ′,R′ =M−UA − UR.
We need the following lemma for the proof.
Lemma 3.3. Under the vector field (3.1), if a set is invariant, so is its boundary.
Proof. Following a similar proof to that of Lemma 9 in [137], we prove by contradiction. Consider
some set S that is invariant under (3.1), and assume on the contrary that bd(S) is not invariant.
Then there exists a point s ∈ bd(S) such that for some time T > 0, either i) ϕT (s) ∈ int(S) if
s ∈ S or ii) ϕT (s) is bounded away from S if s 6∈ S. Let d = d(ϕT (s), bd(S)) where d > 0. It then
follows from the continuity of the vector field with respect to the initial conditions (Theorem 3.2)
and the fact that s is a boundary point that in Case i) there is a point y 6∈ S that is close enough
to s such that ϕT (y) belongs to S and is at least d2 away from bd(S), implying ϕT (y) ∈ int(S),
and in Case ii) there is a point y ∈ S that is close enough to s such that ϕT (y) is at least d2 away
from S. Both cases contradict the fact that S is invariant.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. ConsiderN defined in (3.5). The boundary of each UA is the union of the
boundary of the attraction region ΩM(A) and the boundary of the attracting set A, respectively,
which are both invariant. The same holds for every UR,UA′ and UR′ . On the other hand, M is







Figure 3.4: An example ofM as an invariant set in the form of a disc. The setM has 1 attracting
set A (a stable fixed point in blue), 1 repelling set R (an unstable fixed point in red), 1 semi-
attracting set A′ (in yellow), 1 semi-repelling set R′ (in green). (b) ΩM(A) and ΩM(R) are open
sets depicted in light-blue and light-red; ΩM(A′) and ΩM(R′) are the sets depicted in light-green
and light-yellow respectively. (c) The set N =M−UA − UR − UA′ − UR′ .
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invariant, implying that its boundary is also invariant in view of Lemma 3.3. Hence, because of
the definition (3.5), N is invariant. Therefore, each Ni is invariant since their union constructs N
and they are mutually disjoint.
Therefore, the boundary of each Ni is also invariant, implying the following.
Corollary 3.3. The boundary of each candidate limit set Ni is a union of orbits.
Proof. The proof follows Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 3.3.
As the main result of this section, we show that the Ni’s are the only possible sets to where
a trajectory converging to M may eventually converge. So the limit set of such a converging
trajectory is contained in one of the Ni’s, i.e., ∃Ni : ω(p) ⊆ Ni.
Theorem 3.5. Consider the vector field (3.1) possessing an invariant compact manifoldM⊂ IRn.
Let p be an arbitrary point in IRn. If ϕt(p)→M as t→∞, then there exists a candidate limit set
Ni such that ϕt(p)→ Ni as t→∞.
To get intuition on the theorem, consider a point p belonging to the invariant set M, which
obviously satisfies the condition ϕt(p) → M as t → ∞. Then either there exists some Ni 3 p
or p belongs to some UA,UR,UA′ or UR′ . The first case readily yields the result. For the second,
we note that no point q in any of UA,UR,UA′ or UR′ can be an ω limit point of p since due to
the openness of these sets, any sufficiently small neighborhood of q will eventually converge to
A,ΩR,A′ and ΩR′ , respectively, making q a wandering point. So the intersection of ω(p) with all
UA,UR,UA′ and UR′ is empty. Hence, ω(p) is a subset ofM minus all UA,UR,UA′ and UR′ , which
results in ω(p) ⊆ N . Then due to the connectedness of ω(p), there exists some Ni ⊆ N such that
ω(p) ⊆ Ni, leading to the result.
To rigorously prove Theorem 3.5, in general, for p in or outside of M, we first focus on an
arbitrary point q in a UA corresponding to some A ∈ A , and show that q cannot be an ω limit
point of p. For this, we construct Bδ(q), a neighborhood of q in IRn, and show the existence of
some finite time, after which ϕt(p) never intersects Bδ(q). To construct Bδ(q), we first show that
q lies in some trapping region of A and then expand this trapping region under the flow for some
finite time in both positive and negative direction to get a neighborhood of q in M, denoted by
B0(q). The neighborhood B0(q) is then expanded to Bδ(q) by further including all points in IRn
with the distance δ from B0(q), and whose projection ontoM lies in B0(q). We formally construct
Bδ(q) by the following steps.
First, we prove that trapping regions remain so under the flow. Given a set S, we define
St = ϕt(S) for t ∈ IR.
Lemma 3.4. Consider a trapping region S. Given α ∈ IR, Sα is also a trapping region, that is
Sα is compact and Sα+t ⊂ int(Sα) for all t > 0.
Proof. The compactness of Sα follows from the compactness of S. For the other result, by definition
we have that for every t > 0,
ϕt(S) ⊂ int(S)⇒ ϕα(ϕt(S)) ⊂ ϕα(int(S))⇒ ϕα+t(S) ⊂ int(ϕα(S))⇒ Sα+t ⊂ int(Sα),
which completes the proof.
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Next, we show that q belongs to the boundary of some trapping region. The result is restricted
to attracting sets for now and later extended to repelling sets.
Lemma 3.5. Consider an attracting set A ∈ A and a point q ∈ UA. There exist a trapping region
S ⊂M and constant α ∈ IR, for which q ∈ bd(Sα).
Proof. Consider a trapping region S of A. Lemma 3.4 implies that the sequence of Sti ’s is nested
for any increasing sequence of ti ∈ IR, i.e., Sti+1 ⊂ Sti if ti+1 > ti. Moreover,
⋂
t>0 St = A and⋃
t<0 St = ΩA. Hence, bd(St)→ bd(A) as t→∞ and bd(St)→ bd(ΩA) as t→ −∞. This results
in the proof since St evolves continuously in time.
Next, consider some trapping region S of A. Let a ∈ IR be such that q ∈ bd(Sa), which exists
in view of Lemma 3.5, and consider some constant b ∈ (0, |a|). Then B0(q) = Sa−b − Sa+b is a
neighborhood of q in M, due to the following result.
Lemma 3.6. Given α ∈ IR and β > 0, it holds that d(bd(Sα), bd(Sα+β)) > 0.
Proof. In view of Lemma 3.4, Sα+β ⊂ int(Sα+β2 ) ⊂ Sα+β2 ⊂ int(Sα). On the other hand, Sα+β2 is
a compact set. Hence, bd(Sα+β2 ) ⊂ int(Sα − Sα+β), completing the proof.
Finally, we construct Bδ(q) based on B0(q) as follows. SinceM is a manifold, there exists some
constant δM > 0 such that all points in IRn whose distance to M is not greater than δM have a
well-defined and unique projection onto M. Given δ ∈ (0, δM), define Bδ(q) by
Bδ(q) = Sa−bδ − Sa+bδ
where for any σ ∈ IR, Sσδ is defined by
Sσδ =
{
z ∈ IRn ∣∣ d(z,Sσ) < δ, zM ∈ Sσ}
where zM is the projection of z ∈ IRn on M.
Lemma 3.7. For all δ ∈ (0, δM), Bδ(q) is a neighborhood of q.








bd(Sa), bd(Sa+b)) , d (bd(Sa), bd(Sa−b))) .
The ball is nonempty according to Lemma 3.6. On the other hand, it is a subset of the interior of
Bδ(q), which leads to the proof.
Now we show the existence of a sufficiently large time, after which the trajectory through p in
Theorem 3.5 never intersects Bδ(q), δ ∈ (0, δM). Consider a bounded set U ⊂ IRn. Given a point
u ∈ bd(U), we say the vector field at u is pointing into U if there exists  > 0 such that the closed
line segment with the end points u and u+ f(u) is a subset of the closure of U .
Proposition 3.3. Consider an attracting set A ∈ A , and let q be any point in UA. There exist
δq ∈ (0, δM) and tq > 0 such that
ϕt(p) 6∈ Bδ(q) ∀δ ∈ (0, δq),∀t > tq.
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Proof. The idea of the proof is to show the existence of δq ∈ (0, δM) and M > 0 such that if
ϕt(p) ∈ Bδ(q) for some t > M and δ ∈ (0, δq), then in finite time, ϕt(p) enters Sa+2br for some
r > δM, where Bδ(q) ∩ Sa+2br = ∅, and never returns to Bδ(q). We prove in the following three
steps.
Step 1. We show the existence of some δ1 > 0 such that the flow through every point z ∈ IRn
whose distance to B0(q) is less than δ1, will be in Sa+2br for some r > δM, within a particular
time interval. Consider a point x ∈ B0(q). We first show that x reaches bd(Sa+3b) in finite time.
According to Lemma 3.5, there exists some constant c(x) ∈ IR such that x ∈ bd(Sc(x)). Then
ϕT (x)(x) ∈ bd(Sa+3b) and ϕt(x) ∈ Sa+3b ∀t ≥ T (x) (3.6)
where T (x) = a+ 3b− c(x) and is finite since a− b ≤ c(x) ≤ a+ b. Next, from Theorem 3.2, there
exists δ1x > 0 such that for all t ∈ [supx∈B0(q) T (x), supx∈B0(q) T (x) + b],





bd(Sa+2b), bd(Sa+3b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
. (3.7)
The constant r is positive since d
(
bd(Sa+2b), bd(Sa+3b)) > 0 in view of Lemma 3.6. Now based on
the second statement in (3.6), from (3.7) we obtain that for all t ∈ [supx∈B0(q) T (x), supx∈B0(q) T (x)+
b],
‖z − x‖ < δ1x ⇒ ϕt(z) ∈ int(Sa+2br ). (3.8)
On the other hand, since B0(q) does not include any fixed point and the vector field is con-
tinuous, δ1 = minx∈B0(q) δ
1
x is well defined and positive. Then (3.8) yields that for all t ∈
[supx∈B0(q) T (x), supx∈B0(q) T (x) + b] = [4b, 5b],
d(z,B0(q)) < δ1 ⇒ ϕt(z) ∈ int(Sa+2br ). (3.9)
Step 2. We show the existence of some δ2 ∈ (0, δM) such that the projection onto M of the
vector field at every point in the side-boundary Dδ2 of Sa+bδ2 , where Dy = {z ∈ IRn | d(z,Sa+b) <
y, zM ∈ bd(Sa+b)} for y > 0, is pointing into Sa+bδ2 . Consider some point x ∈ bd(Sa+b). In view of
Lemma 3.4, the vector field at x is pointing into Sa+b. Hence, due to the continuity of the vector
field, there exists δ2x ∈ (0, δM) such that the projection of the vector field at every point in Dδ2x
ontoM is pointing into Sa+bδ2x . Since bd(Sa+b) does not include any fixed point and the vector field
is continuous, δ2 = minx∈bd(Sa+b) δ2x is well-defined and positive. Hence, Sa+bδ2 is well-defined and
the projection onto M of the vector field at every point on its side-boundary Dδ2 is pointing into
Sa+bδ2 .
Step 3. Let δq = min(δ
1, δ2), and consider some δ ∈ (0, δq). The fact that ϕt(p) → M as
t→∞ implies the existence of M > 0 such that
d (ϕt(p),M) < δ ∀t > M. (3.10)
If ϕt(p) 6∈ Bδ(q) for all t > M , the result is trivial by taking tq = M . So consider the case when
there exists some t1 > M such that ϕt1(p) ∈ Bδ(q). Then (3.9) yields the existence of t2 > t1 such
that
ϕt2(p) ∈ int(Sa+2br ). (3.11)
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Now consider some time t3 > t2. Towards contradiction, we show ϕt3(p) 6∈ Bδ(q). Assume on the
contrary that ϕt3(p) ∈ Bδ(q). Then from (3.11) and since a + b < a + 2b and Bδ(q) is open on its
side-boundary Dδ, it holds that ϕt(p)M must pass bd(Sa+b) from inside at some time t4 ∈ (t2, t3)
due to the Jordan–Brouwer separation theorem [5]. Consequently, ϕt(p) must pass Dδ at t4 from
inside and exit Sa+bδ . This is a contradiction since the projection onto M of the vector field is
pointing into Sa+bδ at every point on its side-boundary Dδ. Therefore, ϕt(p) 6∈ Bδ(q) for all t > t2,
which leads to the proof by taking tq = t
2.
Next, if R 6= ∅, we focus on an arbitrary point q ∈ UR for some repelling set R ∈ R, and define
Cδ(q) similar to Bδ(q). Correspondingly, we can state the following result, the proof of which is
similar to that of Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.4. Consider a repelling set R ∈ R, and let q be any point in UR. There exist
δq ∈ (0, δM) and tq > 0 such that
ϕt(p) 6∈ Cδ(q) ∀δ ∈ (0, δq),∀t > tq.
Now we focus on the semi-attracting sets; the case with semi-repelling sets can be handled
similarly. We follow the same steps as those for attracting sets to build a neighborhood of an
arbitrary point q in UA′ for some A′ ∈ A ′ .
Lemma 3.8. Consider a semi-trapping region S. Given α ∈ IR, Sα is also a semi-trapping region,
that is it is compact, Sα ∩ bd(M) 6= ∅, and the set Sˆα = Sα ∩ int(M) satisfies ϕt(Sˆα) ⊂ int(Sˆα)
for all t > 0.
Proof. According to the definition of a semi-trapping region we have that
S ∩ bd(M) 6= ∅ ⇒ ϕα(S ∩ bd(M)) 6= ∅ ⇒ ϕα(S) ∩ ϕα(bd(M)) 6= ∅. (3.12)
Now since M is invariant, its boundary is so as well. Therefore, (3.12) implies
ϕα(S) ∩ bd(M) 6= ∅ ⇒ Sα ∩ bd(M) 6= ∅.
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.4.
Then similar to Lemma 3.5, we have the following result.
Lemma 3.9. Consider a semi-attracting set A′ ∈ A ′ and a point q ∈ UA′. There exist a semi-
trapping region S ⊂M and a constant α ∈ IR, for which q ∈ bd(Sα).
Next, consider some semi-trapping region S of A′ and let a ∈ IR be such that q ∈ bd(Sa), which
exists in view of Lemma 3.9, and consider some constant b ∈ (0, |a|). Then it can be shown that
again B0(q) = Sa−b−Sa+b is a neighborhood of q inM. Correspondingly, for a given δ ∈ (0, δM),









where for σ ∈ IR,
S˜σδ =
{
z ∈ IRn ∣∣ d(z, (bd(M) ∩ Sσ)) < δ} .
Similar to Lemma 3.7, we can state the following based on the construction of B′δ(q).
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Lemma 3.10. For all δ ∈ (0, δM), B′δ(q) is a neighborhood of q.
Now we proceed to the main result for semi-attracting sets.
Proposition 3.5. Consider a semi-attracting set A′ ∈ A ′, and let q be any point in UA′. There
exist δq ∈ (0, δM) and tq > 0 such that
ϕt(p) 6∈ B′δ(q) ∀δ ∈ (0, δq),∀t > tq.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as those in that of Proposition 3.3, and we use some of
the notations here as well.
Step 1. One can show the existence of δ1x > 0 such that the following holds for all t ∈
[supx∈B0(q) T (x), supx∈B0(q) T (x) + b] = [4b, 5b]:
‖z − x‖ < δ1x ⇒ ϕt(z) ∈ Sa+2br ∪ S˜a+2bδ3








bd(Sa+2b), bd(Sa+b)). Then by defining δ1 =
minx∈B0(q) δ
1
x, it holds that for all t ∈ [4b, 5b],
d(z,B0(q)) < δ1 ⇒ ϕt(z) ∈ Sa+2br ∪ S˜a+2bδ3 . (3.13)
Step 2. One can show the existence of some δ2 ∈ (0, δM) such that the projection onto M of
the vector field at every point on the boundary Dδ2 of Sa+bδ2 is pointing into Sa+bδ2 .
Step 3. Let δq = min(δ
1, δ2, δ3), and consider some δ ∈ (0, δq). The fact that ϕt(p) → M as
t→∞ implies the existence of M > 0 such that
d (ϕt(p),M) < δ ∀t > M. (3.14)
If ϕt(p) 6∈ B′δ(q) for all t > M , the result is trivial by taking tq = M . So consider the case when
there exists some t1 > M such that ϕt1(p) ∈ B′δ(q). Then (3.15) yields the existence of t2 > t1
such that
ϕt2(p) ∈ Sa+2br ∪ S˜a+2bδ3 . (3.15)
Now consider some time t3 > t2. Towards contradiction, we show ϕt3(p) 6∈ B′δ(q). Assume on the
contrary that ϕt3(p) ∈ B′δ(q). Then from (3.15) and since a + b < a + 2b and B′δ(q) is open on its
boundary Dδ, ϕt(p)M must pass either bd(Sa+b) from inside or bd(S˜a+b) at some time t4 ∈ (t2, t3)
due to the Jordan–Brouwer separation theorem [5]. The second case is a contradiction since δ < δ3,
which in view of (3.14) implies that ϕt(p) can never pass from bd(S˜a+b) and enter B′δ(q) for t > M .
On the other hand, the first case is a contradiction since the projection ontoM of the vector field
is pointing into Sa+bδ at every point on its boundary Dδ. Therefore, ϕt(p) 6∈ B′δ(q) for all t > t2,
which leads to the proof by taking tq = t
2.
Now we proceed to the proof of Theorem 3.5.
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Assume on the contrary that there exists some point q such that q ∈ ω(p) and either q ∈ UA for
some A ∈ A , q ∈ UR for some R ∈ R, q ∈ UA′ for some A′ ∈ A ′ or q ∈ UR′ for some R′ ∈ R ′.
The first case implies that a point in UA is an ω limit point of p, which is impossible in view of
Proposition 3.3 and Lemma 3.7. Similarly, the other cases result in a contradiction. Hence, (3.16)
holds. So ω(p) ⊆ N . On the other hand, ω(p) is bounded since ϕt(p)→M as t→∞. Hence, in
view of Lemma 1.1, ω(p) is connected. So there exists a connected component Ni of N such that
ω(p) ⊆ Ni, completing the proof.
One interesting possible application of Theorem 3.5 is to repeatedly apply it to a single manifold.
For this, given an invariant compact manifoldM, we first characterize N containing all candidate
limit sets. Then Theorem 3.5 implies convergence to N that in view of Proposition 3.2 is itself
an invariant compact manifold. Hence, Theorem 3.5 can again be applied, but this time to N
instead of M. Namely, we find the (semi-)attracting and (semi-)repelling sets of N and subtract
their corresponding UA,UR,UA′ and UR′ from N to get a new N , say N ′, to which ϕ(p) converges.
This process can be repeated until no further reduction of N is possible. As an illustration, by
applying Theorem 3.5 for the second time to the set N in Figure 3.4, we obtain N ′ in Figure 3.5
where the converging trajectory may converge to.
N ′
Figure 3.5: The set N ′ after applying Theorem 3.5 for the second time to the original set N in
Figure 3.4. The two big black fixed points were semi-attracting and semi-repelling sets of f in (the
original) N , respectively. Hence, the two non-fixed orbits connected to them have no intersection
with ω(p) and can be ruled out from N , resulting in N ′. Repeating this procedure will not further
reduce N ′.
Following this approach, we obtain, for example, the following slightly-weaker version of Corol-
lary 3.1 in Section 3.3, indicating the strength of Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.4. Consider the vector field (3.1), and let p be an arbitrary point in IRn. If ϕt(p)
converges to a one-dimensional invariant compact manifold M, in the form of a compact, simple
open curve, then ω(p) is a single fixed point or a continuum of fixed points on M.
Proof. Consider one of the ending points z ofM, which is a fixed point sinceM is invariant. The
fixed point z is either a singleton or belongs to a continuum of fixed points in M. In the first
case, we define Y = {z}, and in the second case we define Y as the whole continuum. If Y =M,
the result is trivial; otherwise, Y is either a semi-attracting or a semi-repelling set of f in M.
Therefore, the orbit connected to Y , say OY , does not belong to N . Hence, in view of Theorem
3.5, ϕt(p) converges to M− OY which is an invariant compact manifold. So by repeating the
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above procedure for M−OY , we rule out another non-fixed orbit connected to the ending single
fixed point or continuum of fixed points inM−OY . Therefore, the repetition of this process will
eventually rule out all non-fixed orbits from ω(p), completing the proof.
3.6 When M is diffeomorphic to a plane and f |M has only
hyperbolic singularities
Although the boundary of each Ni consists of orbits, its topology may be as complicated as, for
example, the union of infinitely many regions, each surrounded by a homoclinic orbit of the same
fixed point. However, the vector field does not exhibit such complicated phenomenons if f |M is
hyperbolic. Given an invariant manifold M ⊂ IRn, we call a fixed point p ∈ M hyperbolic under
f |M, if every eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix of f |M at p, has a non-zero real part. This is
a weaker notion of hyperbolicity in general: if p ∈ M is a hyperbolic fixed point of f , then it
is also hyperbolic under f |M, but not necessarily the other way around. When in addition to
the hyperpolicity of f |M, the compact invariant manifold M is two-dimensional, the possibilities
for the limit set of a trajectory converging to M will be limited to the boundaries of the (semi-
)attracting and (semi-)repelling sets or those of their attraction and repulsion regions, as stated
in the following. Moreover, intuitively each closed subcurve of the limit set must be compactly
oriented, so that if we start from one point on the subcurve, we return to it after passing through
the subcurve. After making the hyperbolicity assumption, this leads to the following definition
that is a special case of flow-aligned curves for general C1 vector fields in Section 3.3.
Definition 3.7 (hyperbolic flow-aligned curves). Under the vector field (3.1), consider an invari-
ant, compact, simple closed curve Γ. We say Γ is a hyperbolic flow-aligned simple curve, if i)
every fixed point on Γ is hyperbolic under f |Γ and ii) Γ is a closed orbit or each fixed point on Γ is
the ω limit set of exactly one orbit in Γ and the α limit set of exactly one (not necessarily differ-
ent) orbit in Γ. A connected union of hyperbolic flow-aligned simple curves is called a hyperbolic
flow-aligned curve.
The second case in the definition corresponds to a number of fixed points and compactly
oriented connecting orbits. Now we present the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.6. Consider the vector field (3.1) possessing a two-dimensional invariant compact
manifold M ⊂ IRn diffeomorphic to a plane. Suppose that every fixed point on M is hyperbolic
under f |M. Let p be an arbitrary point in IRn. If ϕt(p) → M as t → ∞, then ω(p) is either a
single fixed point or a hyperbolic flow-aligned curve formed by the boundaries of a number of
• attracting, repelling, semi-attracting and semi-repelling sets in M, and
• attracting, repelling, semi-attracting and semi-repelling set’s attraction region in M.
We start the proof by determining the possible structure of the candidate limit sets Ni. The
hyperbolicity assumption on M leaves no interior for any Ni. We show this in Lemma 3.11, but
for that we need the following result.
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Proposition 3.6. Consider a C`, ` ≥ 1, planar vector field, and let M be a positively invariant
compact set in IR2, containing finitely many fixed points. Let Γ denote a connected union of flow-
aligned closed curves γi and G be the union of the simply-connected compact sets whose boundaries
are γi. If for some point p ∈M− G we have that ω(p) = Γ, then G is an attracting set.
Proof. First we prove that G is stable. For δ > 0, define the neighborhood YδΓ of Γ by
YδΓ =
{
z ∈ IR2 | d(z,Γ) < δ} .
Now consider an arbitrary neighborhood U of G. There exists δ1 > 0 such that Yδ1Γ ⊂ U . Moreover,
since M contains finitely many fixed points, there exists δ2 > 0 such that Yδ2Γ contains no other
closed orbit or fixed point but those in G. Let δ3 = min{δ1, δ2}. The fact that ω(p) = Γ, implies
ϕt(p)→ Γ as t→∞. Hence, there exists some M > 0 such that
φt(p) ∈ Yδ3Γ ∀t > M. (3.17)
Again since M contains finitely many fixed points, there exists a non-fixed point q on Γ, and one
can construct a transverse segment L through it. From Lemma 2.2, O+(p) intersects L infinitely
many times. Since the sequence of intersections converges to q, there exists some intersection
q1 after t = M such that the closed line segment q1q is a subset of Yδ3Γ . Denote by q2 the first
intersection after q1. The intersections q1 and q2 are distinct since otherwise, ω(p) is a closed
orbit, which is in contradiction with ω(p) = Γ ⊂ G 63 p. Denote that part of O+(p) confined to
q1 and q2 by Oq1,q2(p). Then the simply-connected compact set V whose boundary is the union of
Oq1,q2(p) and that part of L between q1 and q2, is positively invariant. Moreover, in view of (3.17),
Oq1,q2(p) ⊂ Yδ3Γ , which together with q1q ⊂ Yδ3Γ imply that
V ⊂ Yδ3Γ ⊂ U . (3.18)
Now V ∩Γ 6= ∅ since otherwise, V does not contain any fixed point, which is impossible since then
for any point v ∈ V , ω(v) = ∅, a contradiction in view of Lemma 1.1. On the other hand, the fact
that Γ equals ω(p), which is invariant according to Lemma 1.1, implies that bd(V) and Γ never
intersect. Therefore, Γ ⊂ V , resulting in G ⊂ V . Hence, corresponding to every neighborhood U
of G, there exists a neighborhood V of G such that all trajectories that start in V stay in V , and
hence in U according to (3.18), for all t > 0. This proves the stability of G.
Next, we prove the asymptotic stability of G by showing that every trajectory in V converges
to G. It suffices to show that for an arbitrary point v ∈ V − G, ω(v) = Γ. Clearly ω(v) is a subset
of V and in view of Lemma 1.1 is nonempty. Should ω(v) be a closed orbit, it would have to be Γ
since there are no closed orbits in Yδ3Γ −G. So assume otherwise. Through a proof by contradiction,
we show that ω(v) is not a single fixed point. Assume on the contrary that ω(v) = {g} for some
fixed point g ∈ V . From (3.18) and since the only fixed points in Yδ3Γ are those in G, we obtain
g ∈ G. Similar to what was shown in the first part, one can show the existence of two consecutive
intersections of O+(p) with L, say qi and qi+1, such that v does not belong to the simply-connected
compact set Vˆ whose boundary is the union of Oqi,qi+1(v) and that part of L between qi and qi+1.
Hence, the orbit connecting v to g, denoted by ν, starts out of Vˆ , intersects L at some point and
converges to g. Denote the last intersection of O+(v) with L by l. Then the simply-connected
compact setW , whose boundary is the union of that part of ν from l to g, that part of L between l
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and q, and that part of Γ from q to g is positively invariant. This implies that O+(qi+1) and hence
O+(p) never reaches Γ −W , contradicting ω(p) = Γ. So ω(v) is not a single fixed point. Then
according to Theorem 2.2, ω(v) consists of a finite number of fixed points and orbits connecting
them, all in V . However, the only fixed points that O+(v) may converge to are those on Γ (not
the ones inside) since Γ is invariant. So ω(v) consists of a finite number of fixed points on Γ and
orbits in V connecting them. From contradiction, it can be shown that every non-fixed orbit in
ω(v), connecting two (not necessarily the same) fixed points of Γ, also belongs to ω(p), and vice
verse. Therefore, ω(v) = Γ, and since G is stable, we conclude that it is asymptotically stable,
implying that it is an attracting set in view of Lemma 3.1, completing the proof.
Lemma 3.11. Assume that the conditions in Theorem 3.6 are satisfied. Then, for every candidate
limit set Ni, it holds that int(Ni) = ∅, or equivalently Ni = bd(Ni).
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the contrary that there exists an Ni whose interior
is nonempty. First we show that the only possible fixed points in Ni are hyperbolic saddles. By
definition, no sink or source fixed point belongs to Ni; otherwise, Ni is the source or fixed point
itself, which is impossible since then int(Ni) = ∅. On the other hand, the hyperbolic assumption
on M implies that every fixed point is either a hyperbolic saddle, source or sink. So the only
possible fixed points in Ni are hyperbolic saddles.
Next, the hyperbolic assumption on M implies that M contains finitely many isolated fixed
points [76]. Hence, Ni contains finitely many hyperbolic saddle points, each having exactly one one-
dimensional invariant stable manifold. Therefore, there are finitely many invariant stable manifolds
in Ni. So there exists a point y ∈ int(Ni) that does not lie on any of the stable manifolds. On
the other hand, according to Corollary 3.3, Ni is invariant. Hence, in view of Theorem 2.2, ω(y)
is nonempty and takes one of the three forms therein. However, ω(y) does not equal a single fixed
point since it does not lie on the stable manifold of any saddle point in Ni. Moreover, ω(y) cannot
be a closed orbit γ since then γ with its inside constructs an attracting (or repelling) set whose
domain of attraction (or repulsion) includes y, implying that y 6∈ N and hence y 6∈ Ni. Similarly,
ω(y) cannot be a union of fixed points and connecting orbits γ since then in view of Proposition
3.6, again the union with its inside constructs an attracting set if y is located outside of the union.
The same can be shown if y is located inside the union. Hence, ω(y) does not take any of the three
forms in Theorem 2.2, a contradiction. Therefore, int(Ni) = ∅.
On the other hand, Ni is closed since in (3.5),M is closed, each of UA and UR is open, and that
for each UA′ and UR′ , both of its intersections with int(M) and bd(M) are open. So Ni = bd(Ni),
completing the proof.
Next, we show that ω(p) is either a single fixed point or limited to the boundaries of the two
cases mentioned in Theorem 3.6.
Lemma 3.12. Under the conditions in Theorem 3.6, ω(p) is either a single fixed point or a
connected union of nonempty subsets of the boundaries of the eight sets mentioned in Theorem
3.6.
Proof. The result is trivial if ω(p) is a single fixed point, so consider otherwise. According to
Theorem 3.5, there exists an Ni such that ω(p) ⊆ Ni. Moreover, Ni = bd(Ni), due to Lemma
3.11. Now according to the definition of Ni, bd(Ni) is a subset of bd(M) and the union of the
boundaries of the eight types of sets stated in Theorem 3.6. However, bd(M) is itself a subset
3.7. Examples 51
of the boundaries of the eight types; otherwise, it contains part of the boundary of a set that is
neither a semi-attracting nor a semi-repelling set or their attraction and repulsion regions, which
by definition of N , implies the existence of an Nj whose interior is nonempty, which is impossible.
So ω(p) is a nonempty subset of the union of the boundaries of the two cases mentioned in Theorem
3.6. This leads to the proof since ω(p) is connected according to Lemma 1.1.
Finally, we prove Theorem 3.6 by invoking Theorem 3.4 in Section 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. In view of Lemma 3.12, we only need to consider the case when ω(p) equals
the union of nonempty subsets of the boundaries of the eight sets mentioned in Theorem 3.6,
and show that the union is indeed a hyperbolic flow-aligned closed curve. The hyperbolicity of
the union is obvious, so we only need to show the flow-alignedness. Since each of the eight sets
mentioned for ω(p) in Theorem 3.6 is a bounded, simple invariant curve, ϕt(p) converges to a
bounded invariant curve Γ. On the other hand, no continuum of fixed points shows up in Γ due to
the hyperbolicity assumption on M. Therefore, from Theorem 3.4 in Section 3.3, ω(p) is either a
single fixed point or the union of simple (hyperbolic) flow-aligned sub-curves of Γ, leading to the
proof.
3.7 Examples
Example 3.3. We show the limit set of a trajectory approaching an invariant circle. Let (r, θ, z), r ≥
























Figure 3.6: Phase portrait, in Cartesian coordinates, of (3.19) with the initial condition (r, θ, z) =
(0, 0,−1). The plane {z = 0} is full of fixed points and the shown trajectory converges to it.
However, from the dynamics the unit circle centered at the origin is invariant and forms the
associated limit set.
The orbit through p = (r, θ, z) = (0, 0,−1) converges to the unit circle in the invariant plane
{z = 0}, centered at the origin. In view of Section 3.5, this unit circle can be taken as the invariant
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compact setM. It then follows thatN =M since there are no (semi-)attractors or (semi-)repellors
in M. Therefore, according to Theorem 3.5, ϕt(p) converges to the whole N which is the unit
circle. The corresponding phase-portrait is shown in Figure 3.6.
3.7.1 Application to the replicator dynamics
We illustrate the developed results by the well-known population dynamics, the replicator dynamics
(1.2), mainly used to explain the evolution of species in biology [149, 68, 179, 135]. As in other
population dynamics, it may often happen that a species vanishes in the long run under the
replicator dynamics, i.e., xi(t) → 0 as t → ∞ for some i = 1, . . . , n. For example, the following
result that is a modified version of [181, Proposition 3.2], implies that if there is a mixture of
species, say y ∈ ∆, that outperforms some species i against any population vector, then the
population portion of species i converges to zero, provided that all species are initially present in
the population.
Proposition 3.7. [181] Consider the dynamics (1.2), and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If there exists y ∈ ∆
such that
u(y, z) > u(ei, z) ∀z ∈ ∆,
then for all x(0) ∈ int(∆) it holds that xi(t)→ 0 as t→∞.
This property together with the invariance of the faces, makes the replicator dynamics a perfect
case study to illustrate the results of this chapter. In what follows, we provide 6 examples, each
considers a population of 4 species, the first of which vanishes in the long run (which can be
shown by Proposition 3.7 or other results such as [181, Proposition 3.2]). The payoff matrices
are mainly extended forms of some of those in [23]. Note that although the replicator dynamics
describe the evolution of n variables, they are indeed an (n − 1)-dimensional system due to the
constraint
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. So in view of the framework in Section 3.5, the vector field of the examples
are C`, ` ≥ 1, and 3-dimensional, and the compact invariant manifold M is two-dimensional and
equal to the face ∆(e2, e3, e4). As mentioned above, all e2, e3 and e4 are fixed points. Moreover, the
interior of every edge can be shown to have either zero, one or an infinite number of fixed points.
In case an edge ∆(ei, ej), i, j ∈ {2, 3, 4} admits a unique fixed point in its interior, we denote the
fixed point by xij. Similarly, in case the interior of the face ∆(e2, e3, e4) admits a unique fixed
point, we denote it by x234. We determine the sign of the eigenvalues of the fixed points; the first
two of each case correspond to the eigenvectors lying in ∆(e2, e3, e4). For different initial states p
of the simplex, we plot the flow through p with the help of the software Dynamo [150]. In case of
a continuum of fixed points, the software only draws some of the fixed points.
Example 3.4. The payoff matrix, and the sign of the eigenvalues of the fixed points are as follows
pi3.4 =

−1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
 ,

e2 : +,+, 0
e3 : +,+, 0






, x234 : −,−,−.
The set M is the face shown in Figure 3.7-(a). There exists only one attracting set, the fixed
point x234, while the fixed points at the corners of M are semi-repelling sets. It then follows
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(a) Phase portrait of f |M (b) Phase portrait of the full dynamics
Figure 3.7: Flow patterns of the replicator dynamics with the payoff matrix pi3.4 in Example 3.4.
Circles denote fixed points. (a) Phase portrait of the face ∆(e2, e3, e4) representing M. Color
temperatures are used to show motion speeds where red corresponds to the fastest and blue the
slowest motion. (b) The evolution of the phase flow φt(p) for different values of p in the interior
and on the boundary of ∆.
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that UA is the interior of M except for the inner fixed point x234, i.e., UA = int(M) − {x234}.
Now ∪R′∈R′UR = M − {e2, e3, e4, x2,3, x3,4, x2,4, x234}. Therefore, the set N is given by N =
{e2, e3, e4, x2,3, x3,4, x2,4, x234}. Moreover, from the payoff matrix pi1, every fixed point on M is
hyperbolic under f |M, implying that Theorem 3.6 can be used. Therefore, the only possible limit
sets of trajectories converging to M are the fixed points in M (see Figure 3.7-(b)). Note that,
since bd(M) is not flow-aligned, a trajectory approaching M cannot converge to its boundary.
Example 3.5. The payoff matrix, and the sign of the eigenvalues of the fixed points are as follows
pi3.5 =

−1 −2 −1 −3
0 0 1 −1
0 1 0 −2








x ∈ X 1 : −, 0,−
x ∈ X 2 : 0,+,−
where X 1 and X2 denote, respectively, the stable and unstable parts of the continuum of fixed
points in int(∆(e2, e3, e4)).
(a) Phase portrait of f |M (b) Phase portrait of the full dynamics
Figure 3.8: Flow patterns of the replicator dynamics with the payoff matrix pi3.5 in Example 3.5
Circles denote fixed points.
The set N is as shown in Figure 3.9. Theorem 3.5 guarantees that the possible limit sets are
contained in one of the elements of N , that is, either a single fixed point, or the cycle shown in
Figure 3.9 (see also Figure 3.8). Note that the cycle is a flow-aligned closed curve constructed
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Figure 3.9: The set N in orange corresponding to Example 3.5. The connected elements of N
contain the possible limit sets of a trajectory converging to M.
by two non-fixed orbits connected to a continuum of fixed points and hence is not ruled out from
possible limit sets by Theorem 3.3.
Example 3.6. The payoff matrix, and the sign of the eigenvalues of the fixed points are as follows
pi3.6 =

0 0 0 −2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , x ∈ X : 0, 0,−
where X = ∆(e2, e3, e4).
Figure 3.10: Flow patterns of the replicator dynamics with the payoff matrix pi3.8 in Example 3.6.
Circles denote fixed points.
The set M corresponds to a set filled with fixed points, and N = M. This means that the
limit set of a trajectory converging to M can, in principle, be any compact subset of M, in view
of Theorem 3.5. In this case, however, since every point p ∈M has an associated transverse stable
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eigenspace, we can conclude that every trajectory converging toM converges to one and only one
fixed point on M (see Figure 3.10).
Example 3.7. The payoff matrix, and the sign of the eigenvalues of the fixed points are as follows
pi3.7 =

−1 −1 0 −2
0 0 −1 1
0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0
 ,

e2 : 0, 0, 0
e3 : −,+, 0
e4 : −,+,−
,
(a) Phase portrait of f |M (b) Phase portrait of the full dynamics
Figure 3.11: Flow patterns of the replicator dynamics with the payoff matrix pi3.7 in Example 3.7.
Circles denote fixed points.
As shown in Figure 3.11-(a), every trajectory in M is a homoclinic orbit. Moreover, there is
no (semi-)trapping region, and thus, no (semi-)attracting nor (semi-)repelling sets. This implies
that N =M and then, any compact, invariant subset of M cannot be ruled out by Theorem 3.5
from being a limit set of a trajectory converging to M. See Figure 3.11-(b) for some trajectories
converging to M.
Example 3.8. The payoff matrix, and the sign of the eigenvalues of the fixed points are as follows
pi3.8 =

−1 −4 −4 −4
0 0 1 −1
0 1 0 −3
















(a) Phase portrait of f |M (b) Phase portrait of the full dynamics
Figure 3.12: Flow patterns of the replicator dynamics with the payoff matrix pi3.8 in Example 3.8.
Circles denote fixed points.
N ′
Figure 3.13: The set N corresponding to Example 3.8. The connected elements of N contain
the possible limit sets of a trajectory converging to M. In this case, and in contrast to Example
3.5, the cycle shown in the figure, together with its interior, is a possible limit set of a trajectory
approaching M
An analysis of f |M, depicted in Figure 3.12-(a), shows that N is as given in Figure 3.13. It
follows from Theorem 3.5 that the possible limit sets are any of the fixed points inM or a compact,
invariant subset of the N ′ shown in Figure 3.13. As shown in Figure 3.12-(b), the trajectories
indeed converge to the aforementioned limit sets.
Example 3.9. The payoff matrix, and the sign of the eigenvalues of the fixed points are as follows.
pi3.9 =

0 −.5 −.5 −.5
0 0 −1 1
0 1 0 −1






, x2,3,4 : ±.6j,−
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(a) Phase portrait of f |M (b) Phase portrait of the full dynamics
Figure 3.14: Flow patterns of the replicator dynamics with the payoff matrix pi3.9 in Example 3.9.
Circles denote fixed points.
There are no attracting, repelling, semi-attracting or semi-repelling sets of f |M (see Figure
3.14-(a)). Therefore M = N . This implies that no compact, invariant subset of M may be ruled
out by Theorem 3.5 from the limit set of a trajectory converging to M. Figure 3.14-(b) shows
examples of those compact limit sets, among which are fixed points and periodic orbits.
3.8 Concluding remarks
We have studied the limit sets of trajectories converging to a compact invariant curve Γ or a
compact invariant manifold M. Our results complement some fundamental theorems such as
those found in [167, 21]. Our main contribution is the description of the limit set of a trajectory,
which converges to M, in terms of the invariant sets contained in M. We have shown that there
exist compact invariant sets Ni where the ω limit set is contained. For particular applications,
our results shed light on the topological properties of ω limit sets in some special dimension. For
example, ifM is 1-dimensional and in the form of a simple open curve, we show that the ω limit set
is either a fixed-point or a continuum of fixed points; ifM is 2-dimensional and has only hyperbolic
fixed points, then the ω limit set is either an isolated fixed point, or a compatibly oriented closed
curve. Our results can be applied to some biological models such as population dynamics, where
in a series of examples, we are able to rigorously identify the ω limit sets. Thus we provide proof
on the fate of certain species by only looking at the invariant sets of the phase space.
Our results are also aimed towards extending the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem to arbitrary
dimensions. Although the current state-of-the-art is far away from a complete classification of
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ω limit sets in dimensions higher than 2, our main result, i.e., Theorem 3.5, already refines the
possibilities by providing a constructive way to discern invariant subsets containing ω limit sets
in arbitrary dimensions. For example, consider a compact planar M embedded in an invariant,
compact set D ⊂ IR3. For a point p ∈ D, we are interested in ω(p). If ϕt(p)→M, then Theorem
3.5 implies that ω(p) is contained in an isolated and compact candidate limit set Ni. This already
provides a sort of classification of the possible limit sets. If, in addition, the vector field restricted
to M has only hyperbolic fixed points, then Theorem 3.6 provides a complete classification of
ω(p).
Several future research topics can be specified, the most immediate one is the extension of
Theorem 3.5 to consider M as any invariant set and not necessarily a manifold. Another is to
refine Theorem 3.5 in case whereM has some particular properties, such as the case whereM has
non-hyperbolic fixed points. Finally, one can explore the application to the controlled dynamics,
where the possible limit sets of the state of the open-loop system is known, but we one would like
to avoid some due to their undesired properties such as instability. Then Theorem 3.5 suggests
that it is sufficient to change only the vector field close to those undesired limit sets, and not the
whole domain of the state space (since the state will surely converge to one of the limit sets).
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Chapter 4
Global convergence for replicator
dynamics of repeated snowdrift games
To understand the emergence and sustainment of cooperative behavior in interacting collectives,
we perform global convergence analysis for the evolutionary replicator dynamics of a large, well-
mixed population of individuals playing a repeated snowdrift game with four typical strategies,
which are always cooperate (ALLC), tit-for-tat (TFT), suspicious tit-for-tat (STFT) and always
defect (ALLD). The dynamical system model in focus is a three-dimensional ODE system that
is parameterized by the payoffs of the base game. We demonstrate how the asymptotic behavior
of the system changes as the mutual cooperation payoff changes, and in particular show that for
the full range of payoffs, every trajectory of the system converges to an equilibrium point. The
convergence results highlight three findings that are of particular importance for understanding
the cooperation mechanisms among self-interested agents playing repeated snowdrift games. First,
the inclusion of TFT- and STFT-players, the two types of conditional strategy players in the
game, increases the share of cooperators of the overall population compared to the situation when
the population consists of only ALLC- and ALLD-players. This confirms findings in biology and
sociology that reciprocity may promote cooperation in social collective actions, such as reducing
traffic jams and division of labors, where each individual may gain more to play the opposite of
what her opponent chooses. Second, surprisingly enough, regardless of the payoffs, there always
exists a set of initial conditions under which ALLC players show up in the long run, which does
not hold for all the other three types of players. So an ALLC-player, although perceived as the
one that can be easily taken advantage of in snowdrift games, has certain endurance in the long
run. Third, the parametric framework makes it possible to actually control the final population
shares, a challenging topic in population dynamics, by tuning the payoffs of the base game.
4.1 Introduction
After presenting the mathematical results in Chapters 2 and 3, now we proceed to one of the
main sub-problems in this thesis, that is how repetition of a game played by the individuals of
a population can help the promotion of cooperation in that population. Game theory provides a
framework for studying various control problems such as robust control, distributed control and
optimization for traffic systems, communication networks and multi-agent systems in general; in
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this context, the different types of games that have been modeled and analyzed in the literature
include potential games [97, 38, 89, 98, 90], stochastic games [9, 31, 182], constrained games
[10], repeated games [96, 155], matrix games [25], networked games [57], and others [46, 162,
173, 95, 113, 50]. More recetnly, evolutionary game theory has gained more attention since it
is a powerful tool in understanding the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals as
reported by biologists, sociologists, economists, etc [176, 115, 149, 181, 139]. Researchers have
found that network topology [141], phenotypic interactions [73, 138], punishment [175], population
heterogeneity [136], as well as other components in game setups can all affect the success of
cooperators in face of defectors. One stimulating mechanism for the evolution of cooperation
that is generally believed to promote cooperation, especially in human societies [177], is direct
reciprocity [172]. This mechanism is captured by repeated games where individuals play a base
game repeatedly and can base their action in each round of the game on that of the opponent in
the previous round, resulting in reactive strategies.
Perhaps the most typical reactive strategy is the simple yet successful tit-for-tat (TFT ) strategy
where the player starts with cooperation and cooperates if the opponent cooperated and defects
if the opponent defected in the last round. A more defective version of the strategy is the suspi-
cious tit-for-tat (STFT ) strategy which is the same as TFT except that the player starts with
defection. In addition to these conditional strategies, there are two unconditional ones which are
the two extreme strategies in repeated 2-strategy games: always-cooperate (ALLC) and always-
defect (ALLD). While much research has been carried out to investigate the performance of
different reactive strategies under the prisoner’s dilemma game, the cornerstone of game theory,
[114, 69, 63, 55, 93, 68], less has been devoted to the anti-coordination snowdrift game [134, 86, 178]
despite the fact that the snowdrift game captures many behavioral patterns that cannot be well-
modeled by the prisoner’s dilemma game [61]. Moreover, the existing results on the snowdrift game
are mainly experimental or simulation based. For example, in [86], based on human experiments
the authors postulate that iterated snowdrift games can explain high levels of cooperation among
non-relative humans. However, few mathematical statements have been constructed to support
such claims.
The performance of different reactive strategies also remains an open problem. Usually the
strategies are compared using 2-strategy games, e.g., the two famous competitions conducted by
Axelord [15, 16] where strikingly, the simple TFT was placed first in both (note that although
TFT is known to be successful mostly in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, it has also been reported
to be successful in the repeated snowdrift game [86, 41]). The situation would be different if more
than two strategies could be played in the game. Then the best strategy can be decided by natural
selection, which is captured by evolutionary dynamics such as the well-known replicator dynamics
[19, 26, 27, 40]. Due to nonlinearity, the replicator dynamics, however, may exhibit quite complex
behaviors. Indeed, except for a few cases [39] [188], analytical analysis is restricted to only those
modeled by planar dynamical systems [24]. This makes the performance investigation of more
than three reactive strategies generally challenging under the replicator dynamics.
We address both of the above issues in this chapter. While considering the snowdrift game
as the base game, we study the evolution of a large population of individuals playing the four
just mentioned strategies, ALLC, TFT , STFT and ALLD, under the replicator dynamics. We
consider a completely parameterized payoff matrix with an arbitrary number of repetitions of the
base game and present rigorous proofs for the convergence analysis of the resulting 3-dimensional
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dynamics. In particular, by studying the dynamics of two crucial ratios of the state variables, we
show that each trajectory of the system converges to an equilibrium point, excluding the possibility
of a limit cycle or chaotic behaviors. Our convergence analyses shed light on the social dilemma in
the snowdrift game, that is why selfish individuals cooperate while they earn more if they defect
against their cooperative opponents. This is done by showing that first of all, even in the presence
of the very defective strategy ALLD, for some range of payoffs and initial population portions,
the population evolves to the state where all mutually cooperate. In other words, natural selection
disfavors individuals playing ALLD and instead chooses those playing more cooperative strategies
such as TFT and even ALLC. Secondly, the convergence results postulate that among the four
types of players, ALLCs are surprisingly the best in terms of survival and appearance in the long
run, explaining why selfish individuals may repeatedly cooperate in a snowdrift social context. As
a second contribution, due to the parametric framework we provide, our stability analysis can be
used to actually control the final state of the replicator dynamics. By tuning the parameters, one
can control the final population portions of individuals playing the reactive strategies. Moreover,
for populations initially having four co-existing types of players, by comparing those final states
in which one or two types of players die out to those with all four, it becomes clear how adding
a third or fourth strategy can change the final population state. These results lead to addressing
the crucial question of how to control portions of different types of individual in a decision-making
population?
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the replicator
dynamics for repeated snow drift games with the above four reactive strategies. In Section 4.3,
we provide the global convergence results and discuss their implications on the success of the
strategies. We end with the concluding remarks in Section 4.4.
4.2 Problem formulation
We consider an infinitely large, well-mixed population of individuals that are playing repeated
games over time. Each game has two players with two pure strategies: one is to cooperate,
denoted by C, and the other to defect, denoted by D, and the payoffs of the game, described by






where R, S, T and P are real numbers and sometimes in the literature are called the reward,
sucker’s payoff, temptation and punishment respectively. We call this two-player, symmetric game,
the base game and denote it by G. When the payoffs of the game satisfy
T > R > S > P, (4.2)
the game is called a snowdrift game (also known as the hawk-dove or the chicken game). The game
has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, both of which correspond to the situation when the two
players play opposite strategies, and for this reason such a game is also called an anti-coordination
game, often used to study how players may contribute to the accomplishment of a common task. In
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this study, we are particularly interested in the case in which individuals play the game repeatedly
over time and adjust their strategies according to what their opponents have played in the past.
Formally, a repeated game, denoted by Gm, m ≥ 2, with reactive strategies is constructed from the
base game G by repeating it for m rounds, and limiting a player’s choice of strategies in the current
round to be based on the opponent’s choice in the previous round. In fact, a reactive strategy s
can always be represented by the triple (p, q, r), where p is the probability of cooperating in the
first round, and q (respectively r) is the probability of cooperating if the opponent has cooperated
(respectively defected) in the previous round. We consider the following strategies:
• always-cooperate (ALLC), (1, 1, 1): always cooperates;
• tit-for-tat (TFT), (1, 1, 0): cooperates in the first round, and then chooses what the opponent
did in the previous round;
• suspicious-tit-for-tat (STFT), (0, 1, 0): defects in the first round, and then chooses what the
opponent did in the previous round;
• always-defect (ALLD), (0, 0, 0): always defects.
When two players play the repeated game Gm, the payoffs for the reactive strategies can be
calculated every m rounds, leading to the payoff matrix A := [aij] defined by
A =

ALLC TFT STFT ALLD
ALLC mR mR S + (m− 1)R mS




cT S + (m− 1)P





ALLD mT T + (m− 1)P mP mP
 .
To illustrate how the matrix A is obtained, we take the match between TFT and ALLD as
an example. In round one, the TFT player cooperates and the ALLD player defects, so their
payoffs according to (4.1) are S and T respectively. From round two, both TFT and ALLD
players defect and hence receive P . So over time the payoffs for the TFT player are S, P , P , . . .
while those for the ALLD player are T , P , P , . . .. Summing up the payoffs over the m rounds,
one obtains the entries of a23 and a32 in A. Hence, the repeated game G
m can be taken as
a normal, symmetric two-player game with the payoff matrix A and with the pure-strategy set
{ALLC, TFT, STFT,ALLD}. Having clarified how a pair of individuals play games with each
other, we now describe the evolutionary dynamics of the whole population. Towards this end, we
introduce replicator dynamics, which is a standard model from evolutionary game theory [181, 149].
Let 0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, 3 and 4, denote the population shares at time t of those individuals
playing the pure strategies ALLC, TFT , STFT and ALLD respectively. Since the four types of
players constitute the whole population, it follows that for all t,
∑4




x1 x2 x3 x4
]>
.
Then x ∈ ∆ where ∆ is the 4-dimensional simplex defined by
∆ :=
{
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to represent the population vectors corresponding to all ALLC players, all TFT players, all STFT
players and all ALLD players respectively. Then the evolutions of xi, i = 1, . . . , 4, are described
by the replicator dynamics [181, 149]
x˙i = [u(ei, x)− u(x, x)]xi, (4.4)
where u(·, ·) is the utility function defined by
u(x, y) = x>Ay for x, y ∈ ∆
determining the fitness of a player. In essence, (4.4) indicates that in an evolutionary process, the
reproduction rate of the strategy-i players is proportional to the difference between the fitness of
strategy-i players u(ei, x) and the average population fitness u(x, x) as a consequence of the fact
that the more payoff an individual acquires when playing against its opponents, compared to the
average payoff of the whole population, the more new offspring proportionally it produces.
We perform global convergence analysis of the replicator dynamics (4.4). More specifically, for
any given initial condition x(0) ∈ ∆, we aim to determine the asymptotic state of x(t) for (4.4).
4.3 Global convergence result
The main results of this chapter are presented in this section. First we find the equilibrium points
of the system. Then for the convergence results, we divide the analysis into several parts using
the notion of face defined in Section 1.7: Given H ⊆ {1, 2, 3, 4},H 6= ∅, the face ∆(H) is defined
as the convex hull of the unit vectors ei, i ∈ H. For simplicity, we remove the braces when H
is represented by its members. For example, we use ∆(1, 3, 4) instead of ∆({1, 3, 4}). When H
is proper, ∆(H) is called a boundary face. Lemma 1.3 enables us to analyze the evolution of a
trajectory starting from bd(∆) separately from that starting from int(∆).
We start with analyzing the boundary of the simplex. However, the boundary of the simplex
itself consists of the four planar faces ∆(1, 2, 3), ∆(1, 2, 4), ∆(1, 3, 4) and ∆(2, 3, 4). Because of
Lemma 1.3, we can also analyze the dynamics (4.4) on each of these faces separately. Yet again,
the boundary of each of these planar faces consists of three one-dimensional faces known as the
edges of the simplex. For example, the boundary of the face ∆(1, 2, 3) consists of the edges ∆(1, 2),
∆(1, 3) and ∆(2, 3). On the other hand, each of the edges are also invariant in view of Lemma
1.3. Therefore, we study separately trajectories starting from an edge and those starting from the
interior of a planar face. Then we proceed to the interior of the simplex.
To simplify the analysis, we carry out on the matrix A some operations that preserve the
dynamics (4.4). Subtracting mR from the entries of the first and second columns, and mS from
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the entries of the third and fourth columns of A, we acquire the following matrix
A′ := [a′ij] =











cS −mR 0 0
m(T −R) T + (m− 1)P −mR 0 0
. (4.5)
In view of Lemma 1.3, the dynamics (4.4) are unchanged with A′ in place of A. Since A′ is more
structured with zero block matrices, in what follows we focus on A′ instead of A.
4.3.1 Equilibrium points
To determine the equilibria of the system, we first look for those on the boundary of the simplex,
and then for those in the interior.
boundary equilibrium points
Let ∆o and ∆oo denote the set of equilibrium points of the replicator dynamics (4.4) that belong
to ∆ and bd(∆), respectively. Depending on the payoffs, ∆oo will be a combination of the unit











































X 12 = {αe1 + (1− α)e2 : α ∈ [0, 1]},
X 34 = {αe3 + (1− α)e4 : α ∈ [0, 1]},
X 123 = {x ∈ int(∆(1, 2, 3)) | a′31x1 + a′32x2 − a′13x3 = 0}
where a′ij’s are the entires of A
′ defined in (4.5). Here, the superscript ij in xij (resp. X ij) simply
means that xij (resp. X ij) belongs to the edge ∆(i, j). The following proposition determines ∆oo.
Proposition 4.1. Assume (4.2) holds. It follows that
1. if S < R < T+(m−1)P
m
, then
∆oo = X 12 ∪ {x13, x14, x23, x24} ∪ X 34;
2. if T+(m−1)P
m
≤ R < T+S
2
, or if m = 2n+ 1, n ≥ 1 and T+S
2
< R < (n+1)T+nS
2n+1
, then
∆oo = X 12 ∪ {x13, x14, x23} ∪ X 34;
3. if m = 2n+ 1, n ≥ 1 and R = T+S
2
, then
∆oo = X 12 ∪ {x13, x14, x23} ∪ X 34 ∪ X 123;
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4. if m = 2n, n ≥ 1 and R = nT+(n−1)S
2n−1 , then















< R < T , or if m = 2n, n ≥ 1 and T+S
2
≤ R < nT+(n−1)S
2n−1 ,
then
∆oo = X 12 ∪ {x13, x14} ∪ X 34.
For the proof, we need to take a closer look at the payoff matrix A′. The order in the magnitudes
of the entries in each column of A′, clarified in the following lemma, proves useful both in the
determination of the equilibria and the asymptotic behavior of the replicator dynamics (4.4).
Lemma 4.1. Assume (4.2) holds. Consider the payoff matrix A′ and denote the maximum positive,
positive, negative and minimum negative entries of each column by ‘++’, ‘+’ , ‘−’ and ‘−−’,
respectively. Then A′ has the following sign structure
1.

0 0 + ++
0 0 ++ +
+ ++ 0 0
++ + 0 0
 when S < R < T+(m−1)Pm ;
2.

0 0 + ++
0 0 ++ +
+ ++ 0 0
++ 0,− 0 0
 when T+(m−1)Pm ≤ R < T+S2 ;
3.

0 0 ++ ++
0 0 ++ +
+ ++ 0 0
++ − 0 0
 when m = 2n+ 1, n ≥ 1, and R = T+S2 ;
4.

0 0 ++ ++
0 0 + +
+ ++, 0 0 0
++ − 0 0
 when m = 2n+ 1, n ≥ 1, and T+S2 < R ≤ (n+1)T+nS2n+1 ;
5.

0 0 + ++
0 0 ++ +
+ 0,− 0 0
++ −− 0 0
 when m = 2n, n ≥ 1, and T+S2 ≤ R < nT+(n−1)S2n−1 ;
6.

0 0 ++ ++
0 0 ++ +
+ − 0 0
++ −− 0 0
 when m = 2n, n ≥ 1, and R = nT+(n−1)S2n−1 ;
7. and

0 0 ++ ++
0 0 + +
+ − 0 0
++ −− 0 0
 when max{ dm−22 eS+bm2 cTm−1 , dm2 eT+bm2 cSm } < R < T.
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Here, when an entry takes both 0 and one other sign (separated by a comma), 0 takes place if the
equality sign of the R condition holds, and otherwise the other sign is valid.
Proof. The sign of the elements of A′ are determined by (4.2). First note that T > R implies
a′31 > 0. On the other hand, since m ≥ 2, we have that a′41 > a′31 > 0. Hence, due to the fact that
the third and fourth entries of the last column of A′ are zero, a′41 and a
′
31 are denoted by ‘++’
and ‘+’, respectively. Similarly S > P implies a′14 > a
′




24 are denoted by














it follows that a′23 > 0. Additionally,
R > P, S > P ⇒ (m− 1)R + S > mP,














cS > T + (m− 2)P + P = T + (m− 1)P.
Hence, a′32 > a
′




32 and also the ordering of a
′
13 and
a′23. Since m ≥ 2, devision by m− 1 is valid, and hence the following hold
a′42 > 0 ⇐⇒ R <
T + (m− 1)P
m
, (4.6)
















m− 1 . (4.8)
The average of T , P , . . . , P︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
























































(n− 1)S + nT
2n− 1 m = 2n
nS + nT
2n
m = 2n+ 1
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(n+ 1)T + nS
2n+ 1
m = 2n+ 1
.
















































The above equation results in cases 2) and 3) of the lemma. The remaining cases can be verified
similarly using (4.9) and (4.10).
The boundary of ∆ is the union of the boundary faces ∆(1, 2, 3), ∆(1, 2, 4), ∆(1, 3, 4) and
∆(2, 3, 4). So in order to find the equilibria on bd(∆), we can investigate each face separately.
The following proposition, the proof of which follows from the convergence results and methods in
[135], determines the interior equilibrium points in each of them.
Proposition 4.2. Assume (4.2) holds. The interiors of the faces ∆(1, 2, 4), ∆(1, 3, 4) and ∆(2, 3, 4)
do not contain an equilibrium point of the dynamics (4.4). If m = 2n+ 1, n ≥ 1 and R = T+S
2
, or
m = 2n, n ≥ 1 and R = nT+(n−1)S
2n−1 , then the interior of the face ∆(1, 2, 3) contains the continuum
of equilibrium points X 123, and does not contain any other equilibrium. For all other values of m
and the payoffs, the interior of ∆(1, 2, 3) does not contain an equilibrium point.
Now we prove Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. In view of Proposition 4.2, there is no equilibrium point in the interior
of any of ∆(1, 2, 3), ∆(1, 2, 4), ∆(1, 3, 4) and ∆(2, 3, 4), except for Cases 3) and 4) where X 123
appears. Hence, all of the rest of the boundary equilibrium points are located on the 6 edges of the
simplex. The edges ∆(1, 2) = X 12 and ∆(3, 4) = X 34 are always a continuum of equilibrium points.
The vertices e1, e2, e3, e4 are also always equilibrium points, but they are included in X 12 and X 34.
Hence, the rest of the equilibrium points can be determined by investigating the dynamics in the
interior of the remaining four edges. We just provide the analysis for the edge ∆(1, 4), and the
rest can be done similarly. For the dynamics on this edge, after using the constraint x1 + x4 = 1,
we obtain







In view of Lemma 4.1, a′14, a
′








to (0, 1) and hence is an equilibrium point of the differential equation (4.11). Correspondingly, the
vector x∗ =
[
x∗1 0 0 (1− x∗1)
]>
= x14 is an equilibrium point of the dynamics (4.4). Since x∗1
is the unique interior equilibrium point of (4.11), it can be concluded that int(∆(1, 4)) ∩ ∆oo =
{x14}.
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The local stability of the equilibrium points generally depends on the payoffs in A, and can
be determined based on the convergence results in this section. However, the following result
guarantees the asymptotic stability of x14 for all payoffs satisfying (4.2).
Proposition 4.3. Assume (4.2) holds. Then x14 is asymptotically stable.
Proof. The proof follows Proposition 4.7 and Lemma 4.6 in Appendix 4.5.1.
Interior equilibrium point
The dynamics (4.4), may or may not possess an interior equilibrium depending on the payoff
matrix A. As shown in the following proposition, if the dynamics have an interior equilibrium, it
is unique and equal to
xint =

(a′42 − a′32)(a′13a′24 − a′14a′23)
(a′31 − a′41)(a′13a′24 − a′14a′23)
(a′24 − a′14)(a′31a′42 − a′32a′41)
(a′13 − a′23)(a′31a′42 − a′32a′41)
 /r
where a′ij are the entries of A
′ in (4.5), and
r = (a′13a
′
24 − a′14a′23)(a′31 − a′41 + a′42 − a′32) + (a′31a′42 − a′32a′41)(a′13 − a′23 + a′24 − a′14) > 0. (4.12)

























Proposition 4.4. Assume (4.2) holds. It follows that
1. if S < R < T+S
2
or if m = 2n, n ≥ 1 and T+S
2
≤ R < nT+(n−1)S
2n−1 , then the dynamics (4.4)
possess exactly one interior equilibrium point xint that is a hyperbolic saddle with two negative
eigenvalues; additionally, for all initial conditions on the open line segment
Lint = {x ∈ int(∆) |x1 = b2x2, x4 = b1x3} ,
the solution trajectory converges to xint;
2. otherwise, the dynamics have no interior equilibrium point.




, which due to the block anti-
diagonal structure of the payoff matrix A′, are crucial in determining the asymptotic behavior of
the replicator dynamics and are explained as follows.






is greater than (resp. equal to, resp. less than) 0
if and only if x4
x3








than (resp. equal to, resp. less than) 0 if and only if x1
x2
is greater than (resp. equal to, resp. less
than) b2.
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Proof. In view of Lemma 1.3, x(0) ∈ int(∆) implies x(t) ∈ int(∆) for all t. Hence, 0 < xi(t) <
1, i = 1, . . . , 4, for all t. So it is possible to define the ratio xi
xj
(t), i, j = 1, . . . , 4 and calculate its






= [u(ei, x)− u(ej, x)]xi
xj
.


































In view of Lemma 4.1, a′1, a
′



























This proves the “ greater than” cases. The “ equal to” and “ less than” cases can be proven
similarly.
Determining the signs of b1 and b2 will prove useful, and is clarified in the following lemma.







entries of A′ in (4.5).






31. Hence, b2 > 0 regardless of the payoffs in
A′. Moreover, the inequality a′14 > a
′





Now we proceed to the proof of Lemma 4.2.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Consider Case 1). In view of Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.1, b1, b2 > 0.
Then each of the following two sets define a plane in the simplex
P1 =
{
















increases or decreases. Hence, if an interior equilibrium point exists, it has to lie on the interior of
the intersection of the two planes P1 and P2, which is the open line segment Lint. According to
Lemma 4.2, Lint is invariant under the replicator dynamics (4.4). The dynamics of x2 on Lint can
be expressed as
x˙2 = k(fx2 − g)(rx2 − s)x2 (4.14)




(a′41 − a′31)2(a′13 − a′23 + a′24 − a′14)
> 0,
f = a′32 − a′42 + a′41 − a′31 > 0,
g = a′41 − a′31 > 0,
s = (a′13a
′
24 − a′14a′23)(a′31 − a′41) > 0,





, which are easily
proven to be unstable, stable and unstable, respectively. Hence, for any initial condition on Lint,





and x∗ ∈ Lint, we get that x∗ = xint. Hence, xint is an interior equilibrium, and for all x(0) ∈ Lint,
x(t) → xint. Now the eigenvalues of xint are determined. Consider the replicator dynamics
(4.4). Replace the vector x by xˆ =
[
x1 x2 x3 1− x1 − x2 − x3
]>
, and eliminate the differential
equation for x˙4 to get a 3rd order system. Then, the characteristic equation of the corresponding
Jacobian matrix about xint is λ3 +aλ2 + bλ+ c = 0 where a, b, c ∈ IR. It can be verified that c = ab
and that c > 0 > a, b. Hence, the corresponding eigenvalues of xint are a,−a,−b, which completes
the proof of this case.
Now consider Case 2) where a′13 ≥ a′23. Hence, b1 ≤ 0 in view of Lemma 4.3. Hence, P1 does
not intersect ∆ implying that the ratio x4
x3
is always greater than b1. Hence, in view of Lemma 4.2,
x1
x2
monotonically increases in int(∆). Hence, there is no interior equilibrium point in this case.
4.3.2 Trajectories starting on an edge
Clearly each vertex is an equilibrium point of the replicator dynamics (4.4). Hence, it remains to
investigate the dynamics in the interior of each edge. Due to invariance, the convergence analysis
of the dynamics (4.4) on an edge ∆(k, j), k, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, k 6= j, can be reduced to the analysis
of the following 2-dimensional replicator dynamics
x˙i = [ei













The stability analysis of the above dynamics can be found in [181, Section 3.1.4], implying that a
trajectory starting from an edge always converges to an equilibrium on that edge. In general, ∆
contains 6 edges on its boundary, two of which, ∆(1, 2) and ∆(3, 4), are a continuum of equilibrium
points; the analysis of ∆(1, 3) and ∆(2, 3) can be found in [135], and the other two can be analyzed
according to [181].
4.3.3 Trajectories starting in the interior of a planar face
The following proposition provides a general convergence result for each planar boundary face.
Proposition 4.5. If x(0) belongs to one of the faces ∆(1, 2, 3), ∆(1, 2, 4), ∆(1, 3, 4) or ∆(2, 3, 4),
then x(t) converges to a point in that face as t→∞.
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A detailed convergence analysis of the face ∆(1, 2, 3) can be found in [135]. For the other three
faces, the reader may refer to [23] where some general stability analyses have been performed for
a planar simplex.
4.3.4 Trajectories starting in the interior of the simplex
Dynamics in the four sections made by the crucial ratios





divide the simplex into the four following zones:
D14 =
{




































We investigate interior trajectories of the simplex by studying the dynamics in the above zones
and start by D14 and D23.
Lemma 4.4. D14 and D23 are positively invariant under (4.4).
Proof. First D14 is shown to be positively invariant. Assume the contrary, i.e., a trajectory x(t)
starts from some point in D14 at t = t0 but does not belong to D14 at some time t∗ > t0. Due to the
continuity of the trajectory, there exists some time t1 ∈ (t0, t∗) at which the trajectory intersects


























is zero at some time t3 ∈ (t0, t2). Hence, in view of Lemma 4.2, x4
x3
(t3) = b1. This
implies that the trajectory has intersected the boundary of D14 at some time earlier than t1, a
contradiction. Hence, if a trajectory starts in D14 at some time t = t0, it remains there afterwards.
Similarly the positive invariance of D23 can be shown.
Proposition 4.6. Consider a trajectory x(t) of the dynamics (4.4) that passes through x0 at some
time t0. If x0 ∈ D14, then one of the following cases happen
lim
t→∞
x(t) = x14 or lim
t→∞
x(t) = x∗ ∈ X 12 ∩∆NE.
If x0 ∈ D23, then
lim
t→∞
x(t) = x∗ ∈ ({x23} ∪ X 12) ∩∆NE.
Proof. Consider the case when x0 ∈ D14. In view of Lemma 4.4, x(t) ∈ D14 for all t ≥ t0. Hence,
both inequalities x1
x2
(t) > b2 and
x4
x3





monotonically increase with time. Hence, both ratios converge to either a
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constant or ∞. In case one of the ratios, e.g., x1
x2
, converges to a constant, that constant must be
strictly positive. This follows from the fact that x1
x2
(t0) > 0 and that x1
x2
monotonically increases.
In general, one of the following cases may occur:
1) x1
x2
→ α > 0 and x4
x3
→ β > 0. Hence, x converges to the following line segment
Lα,β = {x ∈ ∆ |x1 = αx2, x4 = βx3} .
In view of Corollary 3.1 in Chapter 3, x→ Lα,β ∩∆o. In what follows, it is shown that int(Lα,β)∩
∆o = ∅. First note that α > b2. This can be proven by contradiction: Assume that α ≤ b2. Since
x(t0) ∈ D14, it holds that x1
x2
(t0) > b2. Hence,
x1
x2
(t0) > b2 ≥ α. Then, due to the continuity of
the trajectory, there exists some time t1 > t0 such that x1
x2
(t1) = b2. Hence, x(t
1) 6∈ D14, which
contradicts the invariance property of D14. So α > b2. Now note that int(Lα,β) ⊆ int(∆). On the
other hand, in view of Lemma 4.4, the only interior equilibrium of the system (if there exists any),
belongs to the plane
{




. However, as it was discussed above, x1
x2
→ α > b2. Hence,
int(∆)∩∆o = ∅. So int(Lα,β)∩∆o = ∅. Thus, x→ bd(Lα,β)∩∆o. The boundary of Lα,β consists








]> ∈ X 12, xβ = [0 0 11+β β1+β]> ∈ X 34.
According to Lemma 4.7 in Appendix 4.5.2, if x converges to a point, it must belong to ∆NE.
However, xβ 6∈ ∆NE in view of Lemma 4.8 in Appendix 4.5.2. Hence, x 6→ xβ implying that
x→ xα. On the other hand, xα ∈ X 12 and xα must belong to ∆NE. Hence, x→ x∗ ∈ X 12 ∩∆NE.
2) x1
x2
→ α > 0 and x4
x3
→∞. Hence, x converges to the following line segment
Lα,∞ = {x ∈ ∆ |x1 = αx2, x3 = 0} .
Due to Corollary 3.1, x converges to an equilibrium or a continuum of equilibria on Lα,∞. On the
other hand, Lα,∞ lies on the face ∆(1, 2, 4), and in view of Proposition 4.2, no interior equilibrium
exists on this face. Hence, x converges to the intersection of Lα,∞ with the boundary of ∆(1, 2, 4)
which is {xα, e4}. However, e4 6∈ ∆NE and hence x 6→ e4 in view of Lemma 4.7. Hence, x → xα.
So, similar to the previous case, x→ x∗ ∈ X 12 ∩∆NE.
3) x1
x2
→ ∞ and x4
x3
→ β > 0. Similar to the previous case, it can be shown that x → xβ or





→∞. Hence, x converges to the following line segment
L∞,∞ = {x ∈ ∆ |x2 = 0, x3 = 0} = ∆(1, 4).
Due to Corollary 3.1, x → ∆(1, 4) ∩∆o = {e1, x14, e4}. On the other hand, e1, e4 6∈ ∆NE. Hence,
x→ x14 in view of Lemma 4.7.
Summarizing the above four cases completes the proof for when x0 ∈ D14. Now let x0 ∈ D23.





either to a positive constant or to 0. In general, one of the following cases may occur:
1*) x1
x2
→ α > 0 and x4
x3
→ β > 0. Similar to when x0 ∈ D14, this case results in x → x∗ ∈
X 12 ∩∆NE.
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2*) x1
x2
→ α > 0 and x4
x3
→ 0. Hence, x converges to the following line segment
Lα,0 = {x ∈ ∆ |x1 = αx2, x4 = 0} .
In view of Corollary 3.1, x→ Lα,0 ∩∆o. Clearly Lα,0 ⊆ ∆(1, 2, 3). On the other hand, according
to Proposition 4.2, int(∆(1, 2, 3)) ∩ ∆o either is empty or equals to X 123. In view of Theorem
4.1, the second case only happens when m = 2n + 1, n ≥ 1 and R = T+S
2
, or m = 2n, n ≥ 1
and R = nT+(n−1)S
2n−1 . However, for both of these values of R, it can be verified that b1 < 0.
Hence, D23 = ∅, which contradicts the assumption x0 ∈ D23. Hence, int(∆(1, 2, 3)) ∩∆o = ∅. So
int(Lα,0)∩∆o = ∅ and x→ bd(Lα,0). Thus, x→ {xα, e3}. However, e3 6∈ ∆NE and hence x 6→ e3,
in view of Lemma 4.7. Hence, x→ xα resulting in x→ x∗ ∈ X 12 ∩∆NE.
3*) x1
x2
→ 0 and x4
x3
→ β > 0. Hence, x converges to the following line segment
L0,β = {x ∈ ∆ |x1 = 0, x4 = βx3} .
Similar to the previous case, it can be shown that x → {xβ, e2}. Hence, in view of Lemma 4.7,
x→ {xβ, e2} ∩∆NE. So x→ {e2} ∩∆NE since xβ 6∈ ∆NE. On the other hand, e2 ∈ X 12. Hence,
x→ x∗ ∈ X 12 ∩∆NE.
4*) x1
x2
→ 0 and x4
x3
→ 0. Hence, x converges to the following line segment
L0,0 = {x ∈ ∆ |x1 = 0, x4 = 0} = ∆(2, 3).
Due to Corollary 3.1, x → ∆(2, 3) ∩ ∆o = {e2, x23, e3}. On the other hand, e3 6∈ ∆NE. Hence,
x → {x23, e2} ∩∆NE in view of Lemma 4.7. Since e2 ∈ X 12, it can be concluded that x → x∗ ∈
(X 12 ∪ {x23}) ∩∆NE.
By summarizing the above cases, the proof for when x0 ∈ D23 is complete.
Lemma 4.5. Consider a trajectory x(t) of the dynamics (4.4) that passes through x0 at some time
t0. If x0 ∈ Y14, then either x(t) leaves Y14 after some finite time, or
lim
t→∞
x(t) = xint or lim
t→∞
x(t) = x∗ ∈ X 12 ∩∆NE.
If x0 ∈ Y23, then either x(t) leaves Y23 after some finite time, or
lim
t→∞
x(t) = xint or lim
t→∞
x(t) = x∗ ∈ (X 12 ∪ X 123) ∩∆NE.
Proof. Consider the case when x0 ∈ Y14. If x leaves Y14 after some finite time, the conclusion
can be drawn directly. So let Y14 be invariant. Then the inequalities in the definition of Y14 hold
for all t ≥ t0. Hence, in view of Lemma 4.2, x1
x2
monotonically decreases and hence converges to
a constant α ≥ b2, and x4x3 monotonically increases and hence converges to a constant β ≤ b1 as
t→∞. Hence, x(t) converges to the line segment Lα,β = {x ∈ ∆ |x1 = αx2, x4 = βx3}. So based
on Corollary 3.1, x(t) converges to Lα,β ∩∆o. On the other hand, ∆o includes at most one interior
equilibrium point xint according to Proposition 4.4. Hence, either x(t)→ xint or x(t)→ Lα,β∩∆oo.
The first case leads to the conclusion directly, so consider the second case. First note that α > 0






(0) > 0 to β. Hence, α, β > 0. So on the set Lα,β ∩ bd(∆), either x1 = x2 = 0 or x3 = x4 = 0
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holds. Then Lα,β∩bd(∆) equals a point x∗ ∈ X 12∪X 34. On the other hand, ∆oo ⊆ bd(∆). Hence,
since X 12 ∪ X 34 ⊆ ∆oo it holds that Lα,β ∩∆oo = x∗ ∈ X 12 ∪ X 34. Thus, in view of Lemma 4.7 in
Appendix 4.5.2, x(t)→ x∗ ∈ (X 12 ∪X 34)∩∆NE. On the other hand, X 34 ∩∆NE = ∅ according to
Lemma 4.8 in Appendix 4.5.2. Hence, x(t)→ x∗ ∈ X 12 ∩∆NE, which completes the proof of this
part.
Now consider the case when x0 ∈ Y23 and Y23 is invariant (otherwise, the result is trivial).
Hence, in view of Lemma 4.2, x1
x2
monotonically increases and hence converges to a constant α ≤ b2,
and x4
x3
monotonically decreases and hence converges to a constant β ≥ b1 as t → ∞. So similar
to the previous case, either x(t) → xint or x(t) → Lα,β ∩ ∆oo. Again the first case leads to the





(0) > 0 to α. If β is also positive, then the same as when x0 ∈ Y14 takes place,
which makes the result trivial. So let β = 0. Then Lα,β = {x ∈ ∆ |x1 = αx2, x4 = 0}. Hence, in
view of Theorem 4.1, Lα,β ∩∆oo = x∗ ∈ {x13} ∪ X 12 ∪ X 123. So in view of Lemma 4.7 and 4.9 in
Appendix 4.5.2, x(t)→ x∗ ∈ (X 12 ∪ X 123) ∩∆NE, which completes the proof.
Global results
We proceed to the global convergence analysis. As one would expect, the convergence results
depend on the payoffs and to some extent also on m. We provide the results from small to large
R via the following four theorems.
Theorem 4.1. Assume (4.2) holds. Let x(0) ∈ int(∆). Denote the 2-dimensional stable manifold
of xint by W s(xint). If S < R < T+S
2
, then
1. x(0) ∈ W s(xint)⇒ lim
t→∞
x(t) = xint;
2. x(0) 6∈ W s(xint)⇒ lim
t→∞
x(t) = x14 or x23;
3. x14 and x23 are asymptotically stable and their basins of attraction are separated by W s(xint);
4. x(0) ∈ D14 ⇒ lim
t→∞
x(t) = x14 ;
5. x(0) ∈ D23 ⇒ lim
t→∞
x(t) = x23.
Proof. Case 1) of the theorem is a direct result of Theorem 4.4. Now we proceed to Case 2).
According to Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.1, b1, b2 > 0. Hence, the interior of the simplex can be
written as
int(∆) = D14 ∪ D23 ∪ Y14 ∪ Y23 ∪ Lint ∪ Pˆ11 ∪ Pˆ12 ∪ Pˆ21 ∪ Pˆ22 (4.15)
where Lint is defined in Theorem 4.4 and






















Hence, x(0) belongs to one of the sets on the right hand side of (4.15). If x(0) ∈ D14, then in
view of Proposition 4.6, x(t) converges to either x14 or a point in X 12 ∩ ∆NE. However, in view
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of Lemma 4.8 in Appendix 4.5.2, X 12 ∩ ∆NE = ∅. Hence, x(t) → x14. This proves Case 4).
Similarly Case 5) can be shown. Now consider the case when x(0) ∈ Y14. In view of Lemma 4.5,
if x(t) remains in Y14, it converges to a point in X 12 ∩ ∆NE. However, in view of Lemma 4.8,
X 12 ∩∆NE = ∅, which implies x(t) leaves Y14 after some finite time. Hence, x(t) enters one of the
sets Lint, Pˆ11, or Pˆ22 at some time t1 > 0. If x(t1) ∈ Lint, then x(t)→ xint in view of Proposition
4.4. If x(t1) ∈ Pˆ11, then x(t) enters D14 after t = t1 since x1x2 > b2 in Pˆ11 and hence in view of
Lemma 4.2, x4
x3
increases at Pˆ11. So x(t)→ x14 in view of Case 4). Similarly, it can be shown that if
x(t1) ∈ Pˆ22, then x(t)→ x23. Hence, if x(0) ∈ Y14, then x(t) converges to one of the points x14, x23
or xint. The same can be shown for when x(0) ∈ Y23 since X 123 6⊆ ∆oo when R < T+S
2
. Moreover,
the cases when x(0) belongs to one of the sets Lint, Pˆ11, Pˆ12, Pˆ21 or Pˆ22 are already included in the
arguments for Y14 and Y23. Hence, x(t) converges to one of x14, x23 or xint. On the other hand,
only for x(0) ∈ W s(xint), x(t)→ xint. Hence, Case 2) is proven.
Both x14 and x23 are asymptotically stable in view of Proposition 4.7 and lemma 4.6. Denote
their corresponding basin of attractions by B14 and B23. Clearly B14 and B23 are disjoint. Define
Bˆ14 := bd(B14)∩ int(∆) and Bˆ23 := bd(B23)∩ int(∆). Consider a point x∗ ∈ Bˆ14. The solution x(t)
with the initial condition x∗, converges to one of x14, x23 or xint as it was shown above. However,
x(t) 6→ x14 since x∗ 6∈ B14. Moreover, x∗ 6∈ B23 since x∗ ∈ bd(B14) and B14 ∩ B23 = ∅ and B23
is open. Hence, x(t) → xint. So xint lies on B14. The same can be shown for B23. Now both
Bˆ14 and Bˆ23 are 2-dimensional invariant manifolds, and for any initial condition located on them,
x(t) → xint. On the other hand, xint is hyperbolic in view of Theorem 4.4, and hence W s(xint)
is the unique 2-dimensional invariant manifold passing through xint. Hence, Bˆ14 and Bˆ23 coincide
and are equivalent to W s(xint). This proves Case 3) and hence the whole.
An example of the two-dimensional stable manifold mentioned in Theorem 4.1 is shown in
Figure 4.1. For intermediate values of R, the convergence results depend on whether m is odd or
even. Therefore, two separate theorems are dedicated to these values.
Theorem 4.2. Assume (4.2) holds. Let x(0) ∈ int(∆). Assume m = 2n, n ≥ 1. It follows that





x(t) = x∗ ∈ {x14, xint, e2};
2. if T+S
2




x(t) = x∗ ∈ {x14, xint} ∪ (X 12 ∩∆NE);




x(t) = x∗ ∈ {x14} ∪ X 123 ∪ (X 12 ∩∆NE).
Proof. In view of Lemma 4.3, b1, b2 > 0 in Cases 1) and 2). Hence, by following the same steps
as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, it can be shown that x(t) → x∗ ∈ {x14, x23, xint} ∪ (X 12 ∩∆NE).
However, x23 6∈ ∆o in view of Theorem 4.1 and hence x(t) 6→ x23. Then in view of Lemma 4.7,



































Figure 4.1: An example of the two-dimensional stable manifold mentioned in Theorem 4.1 for
payoff values T = 6, R = 4, S = 3, P = 2 and the number of repetitions m = 8. The blue points
are samples of the stable manifold.
Case 2) is proven. Moreover, the fact that X 12 ∩∆NE = {e2} for R = T+S2 , proves Case 1). For
Case 3), b2 > 0, but b1 = 0 in view of Lemma 4.3. Hence, int(∆) can be written as follows
int(∆) = D14 ∪ Y14 ∪ Pˆ11 (4.17)
where Pˆ11 is defined in (4.16). Then similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we arrive at the conclusion.
Theorem 4.3. Assume (4.2) holds. Let x(0) ∈ int(∆). Assume m = 2n + 1, n ≥ 1. It follows
that





x(t) = x∗ ∈ {x14, x23} ∪ X 123;
2. if T+S
2






Proof. In view of Lemma 4.3, b2 > 0 ≥ b1 in all cases. Hence, by following the same steps as in the
proof of Case 3) of Theorem 4.2, it can be shown that x(t)→ x∗ ∈ {x14, x23}∩ (X 12∩∆NE)∩X 123
where X 123 shows up only in Case 1) according to Theorem 4.1. Then according to Lemma 4.8
in Appendix 4.5.2, X 12 ∩ ∆NE = ∅, which proves Case 1) and Case 2) except when R equals
(n+1)T+nS
2n+1
. When the equality happens, X 12 ∩ ∆NE = {e2} in view of Lemma 4.9 in Appendix





(0) for all t > 0. On the other hand, x1
x2
(0) > e2 since x(0) ∈ int(∆). Hence, x(t) 6→ e2,
which completes the proof.
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x(t) = x∗ ∈ {x14} ∪ (X 12 ∩∆NE).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Case 3) in Theorem 4.3.
The integration of the convergence results when the initial condition is in the interior of the
simplex and when it is on the boundary of the simplex, yields the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Assume (4.2) holds. For any initial condition x(0) ∈ ∆, the solution x(t) of the
replicator dynamics (4.4), converges to a point in ∆ as time goes to infinity.
Therefore, no limit cycle or strange attractor can take place in the dynamics, and we always
have convergence to a point.
4.3.5 Discussion
Now that we know the asymptotic behavior of the replicator dynamics (4.4) for all range of payoffs,
we can proceed to the interpretation of the results in terms of the individuals playing the four types
of strategies. Assume that the payoffs satisfy the snowdrift constraint (4.2). Consider a population
where the portions of individuals playing ALLC, TFT , STFT and ALLD are all nonzero.
For small values of R, i.e., less than the average of T and S, almost always the population
converges to one of the following states: (1) x14 that is a mixed population of ALLC and ALLD
players or (2) x23 that is a mixed population of TFT and STFT players. Both states are evolu-
tionary (and hence asymptotically) stable (see Appendix-B). Therefore, evolutionary forces select
against any mutant population at these two states. Moreover, for an zero-measure set of initial
states, the population converges to xint where all four types of players are present. Clearly, xint is
not stable and small perturbations can lead the population to one of x14 and x23.
Now if the base game is repeated for even number of times, as R increase, the state x23
moves towards e2 where only TFT players are present. When R equals the average of T and S,
x23 coincides with e2, and hence STFT players stand out (except for those zero-measure initial
conditions that lead to xint). As R further increases, the single equilibrium state e2 is expanded
to the set X 12 ∩∆NE. Therefore, the population either converges to x14 where ALLC or ALLD
players coexist or to a state where ALLC and TFT players coexist. At the same time, xint is
converging to the face ∆(1, 2, 3), and when R equals nT+(n−1)S
2n−1 , x
int lies on X 123 where ALLC,
TFT and STFT players coexist.
If the base game is repeated for odd number of times, STFT players survive for a greater range
of R. This time for R being equal to T+S
2
, xint lies on X 123. Then suddenly, by a small increment
in R, the set X 123 disappears, and no population converges to x23. Therefore, starting from any
initial condition, the population converges to the polymorphic population of ALLC and ALLD
players, i.e., x14. This is the only situation where both conditional strategies TFT and STFT are
wiped out of the population, and is continued up to when R equals (n+1)T+nS
2n+1
.
When R further increases, the behavior of the system is almost the same for both odd and
even m. The population either converges to x14 where ALLC and ALLD coexist or to a mixed
population of ALLC and TFT players. Moreover, as R increases, x14 gets closer to e1 where all
individuals are ALLC players.
80 4. Global convergence for replicator dynamics of repeated snowdrift games
In general, perhaps STFT can be considered as the worst strategy in terms of survival especially
for R > T+S
2
. Conversely, regardless of the payoffs, there always exists a set of initial conditions
for which ALLC players show up in the long run. Moreover, in addition to x14, all the limit states
in X 12 ∩ ∆NE (except for e2) have a nonzero portion of ALLC players. This makes the simple
ALLC strategy perhaps the most robust in terms of survival and appearance in the long run.
Interestingly, x14 is always an evolutionary (and asymptotically) stable state of the system,
regardless of the payoffs. This state consists of S−P
S−P+T−R ALLC players that can be considered
as cooperators and T−R
S−P+T−R ALLD players that can be considered as defectors. On the other
hand, the unique evolutionary stable state of the base game consists of S−P
S−P+T−R C players, i.e.,
cooperators, and T−R
S−P+T−R D players, i.e., defectors. Thus, the repetition of the base game and the
introduction of the two conditional strategies TFT and STFT , does not eliminate or even change
this evolutionary stable mixture of cooperators and defectors, but adds some new more-cooperative
final states such as those on X 12.
An important performance measure of a given population state x is the average number of
times cooperation is played in the population which we call the average cooperation level of that







where Cij is the number of times cooperation is played in the m rounds when two individuals
playing the strategies corresponding to indices i and j are matched to play the repeated game Gm.
The average cooperation level at x14 is S−P
S−P+T−R since only ALLC players cooperate, and reaches
1 at any state in X 12 since both ALLC and TFT players cooperate. Therefore, based on the
convergence results, adding enough TFT players to a population of ALLC and ALLD players can
dramatically increase the average level of cooperation, especially for large values of R, resulting in
a more cooperative population. The claim does not change when STFT players are also present in
the population. The convergence analysis also reveals how the average cooperation level changes
as R increases. Particularly, in the presence of the four types of players, increments in R make the
final population more probable to become completely cooperative.
4.4 Concluding remarks
The evolution of a well-mixed population of individuals playing a repeated snowdrift game with
four typical conditional strategies -ALLC, ALLD, TFT and STFT - is studied under the replicator
dynamics. The asymptotic behavior of the dynamics as well as their evolutionary game-theoretical
implications are demonstrated. The convergence analysis sheds light on why selfish individuals
cooperate in snowdrift social dilemmas, and provides a parametric framework to control the final
population portions of the four individual types1.
1We would like to thank Dr. Hildeberto Jardo´n-Kojakhmetov for his technical discussions.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Evolutionary stability: proof of Proposition 4.3
A state x ∈ ∆ is said to be an evolutionary stable state (strategy) (ESS) of A if it satisfies the
following two conditions [149, pp. 81]:
x>Ax ≥ y>Ax ∀y ∈ ∆, (4.18)
[x>Ax = y>Ax and y 6= x]⇒ x>Ay > y>Ay. (4.19)
The set of all evolutionary stable states is denoted by ∆ESS.
Lemma 4.6 (Proposition 3.10 in [181]). Every x ∈ ∆ESS is asymptotically stable under the
replicator dynamics (4.4).
Proposition 4.7. x14 ∈ ∆ESS. Moreover, x23 ∈ ∆ESS if R < T+S
2
.
























In view of Lemma 4.1, a′41 > a
′
31 ≥ 0 and a′14 > a′24 ≥ 0. Hence, a′14a′41 > a′24a′41, a′14a′41, implying
that the maximum element of Ax14 is a′14a
′
41. Hence, any y ∈ ∆ satisfying y2, y3 = 0 maximizes
y>Ax14. So x14>Ax14 is the maximum of y>Ax14, which implies that (4.18) is in force. On the
other hand, if for some y ∈ ∆, x14>Ax14 = y>Ax14, then y maximizes y>Ax14. Such a y satisfies










, y>Ax14 = (a′14 + a
′
41)y1y4. (4.20)





41)− a′41]2 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ a′142y4 + a′412(1− y4) ≥ (a′14 + a′41)2y4(1− y4)









≥ (a′14 + a′41)y1y4.
Hence, in view of (4.20), x14
>















⇒ y = x14.
Hence, x14
>
Ax14 > y>Ax14 for all y 6= x14. So (4.19) is true, implying x14 ∈ ∆ESS.
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4.5.2 Nash equilibria and their relation to convergence points
Call a trajectory x(t) an interior trajectory, if x(0) ∈ int(∆). When investigating the final state
(convergence point) of an interior trajectory, several equilibrium points often show up as possible
candidates. In what follows, a known game theoretical result is reviewed to confine the possi-
ble candidates. Define ∆NE, the subset of strategies (states) that are in Nash equilibrium with
themselves [181, Section 1.5.2], by
∆NE =
{
x ∈ ∆ |x>Ax ≥ y>Ax ∀y ∈ ∆} .
Lemma 4.7. ([181, Proposition 3.5]) If an interior trajectory x(t) converges to a point x∗, then
x∗ ∈ ∆NE.
Similar to Lemma 1.3, it can be easily verified that ∆NE is invariant under the addition of
a constant to all of the entries of a column of the payoff matrix A. Hence, we change A in the
definition of ∆NE with the more simple-structure payoff matrix A′ in future derivations. The
following lemma reveals those points of X 12 and X 34 that belong to ∆NE.
Lemma 4.8. Assume (4.2) holds. Then X 34 ∩∆NE = ∅. Moreover,
• if S < R < T+S
2
or m = 2n+ 1, n ≥ 1 and T+S
2
≤ R < (n+1)T+nS
2n+1
, then
X 12 ∩∆NE = ∅;
• if m = 2n+ 1, n ≥ 1 and R = (n+1)T+nS
2n+1
, or m = 2n, n ≥ 1 and R = T+S
2
, then
X 12 ∩∆NE = {e2};
• if m = 2n+ 1, n ≥ 1 and (n+1)T+nS
2n+1
< R < T , or m = 2n, n ≥ 1 and T+S
2
< R < T , then
X 12 ∩∆NE ={
αe1 + (1− α)e2
∣∣∣α ∈ [0,min{mR−dm2 eT−bm2 cST−R , mR−T−(m−1)Pm(T−R) , 1}]} .
Proof. Let x ∈ X 34. Then A′x = [a′13x3 + a′14x4 a′23x3 + a′24x4 0 0]>. So based on the definition
of ∆NE,
x ∈ ∆NE ⇐⇒ a′13x3 + a′14x4 ≤ 0 and a′23x3 + a′24x4 ≤ 0.






24 > 0. Hence, because of x3 +x4 = 1 and x3, x4 ≥ 0,
it can be concluded that x 6∈ ∆NE. Now let x ∈ X 12. Then
A′x =
[









Then based on the definition of ∆ESS, we have




31 > 0 in view of Lemma 4.1. So





































. Substituting the values of a′ij from A
′ in the above equation completes
the proof.
The following lemma reveals those singleton boundary equilibria that belong to ∆NE.
Lemma 4.9. x13, x24 6∈ ∆NE and x14 ∈ ∆NE. Moreover, if S < R < T+S
2
, or m = 2n + 1, n ≥ 1
and R = T+S
2
, then x23 ∈ ∆NE. Otherwise, x23 6∈ ∆NE.
Proof. The sign-structure of A′x13 is of the form
[




Hence, x13 6∈ ∆NE by definition. Similarly x24 6∈ ∆NE can be shown. Now the result for x23 is











Let S < R < T+S
2
or m = 2n+ 1, n ≥ 1 and R = T+S
2
. In view of Lemma 4.1, a′32 > a
′
42 and hence
z3 > z4. Similarly, z2 ≥ z1. Moreover, it can be verified that z2 = z3. Hence, z2, z3 = maxi∈{1,...,4} zi.
Hence, any x ∈ ∆(2, 3), maximizes x>z = x>A′x23 over ∆. Hence, since x23 ∈ ∆(2, 3), it holds
that x23
>
A′x23 ≥ y>A′x23 for all y ∈ ∆. Hence, x23 ∈ ∆NE. For all other payoffs, either x23 6∈ ∆
or z1 > z2. The first case clearly implies x
23 6∈ ∆NE. For the second case, e1>A′x23 > x23>A′x23,
which rules out x23 from ∆NE.
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Chapter 5
Homophily, heterophily, and the
diversity of messages in cheap-talk
games
A simple yet seemingly effective use of preplay communication or cheap talk in evolutionary games
is when players choose strategies based on whether an opponent sends the same message as they
do. In addition to pure cooperation and defection, players have two new strategies in this set-
ting: homophilic (resp. heterophilic) cooperation, which is to cooperate (defect) only with those
who send the same message as they do. We show that under the replicator dynamics, homophilic
cooperators engage in a battle of messages and will become dominated by whichever message
that is most prevalent at the start, while populations of heterophilic cooperators exhibit a more
harmonious behavior, converging to the state of the maximal diversity. Then we study the popu-
lation shares of individuals associated with the four decision rules when prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
is taken as the base of the cheap-talk game. The hostility of heterophilics to individuals with
similar tags leaves no room for pure cooperators to survive in a population of the two whereas
the one-message dominance of the homophilics allows for pure cooperators with the same tag as
the dominant homophilics to coexist in the population, demonstrating that in this context ho-
mophilics are more cooperative than heterophilics. By establishing a convergence theorem on
strategies that are weakly dominated only in the absence of some other strategies, we complete
previous research on PD games with preplay communication by proving that the frequencies of
all but pure defectors converge to zero in a population where for each available pre-play message,
there is a nonzero population share of defectors sending that message. This implies homophily and
heterophily cannot maintain cooperation in this setting, which urges studying cheap-talk games
under other reproduction dynamics.
5.1 Introduction
As we have discussed the effects of reciprocity on the evolution of cooperation in Chapter 4, here
we focus on another mechanism known to promote cooperation, namely preplay communication.
Evolutionary game theory has proven to be a powerful tool in understanding the emergence and
evolution of cooperation in natural and social systems [151, 106, 104, 22, 115, 140, 143, 149]. Per-
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haps the most widely studied game setup is the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), in which defection is
a strictly dominant strategy against cooperation despite the fact that mutual cooperation would
result in higher payoffs than mutual defection for both players [112]. Researchers have struggled
to explain how cooperation can actually be maintained and even promoted in evolutionary PD
games. As a result, different modified game settings have been proposed, which include iterative
[172, 135], spatial [116], multi-player [147] and emotional games [139]. In this context, a seemingly
effective modification is the introduction of cheap talk games [45] that allows a costless, nonbind-
ing, nonverifiable communication between the players before the game, a preplay communication.
Players simultaneously send costless signals or messages to their opponents from a set available to
each player before they play and consequently act based on the received messages [181]. Equiv-
alently, in biology, one can think of individuals having recognizable phenotypes such as tags, on
which they base their decisions [17, 174, 72]. Preplay communication differs from signaling games
[122] where there is exactly one sender who does not act and only sends a message, and exactly
one receiver who does not send a message and only acts according to the received message. A
simple yet interesting setup in preplay communication is when each player treats similarly all re-
ceived messages that are different from what she sends. This leads to four types of decision rules
in a normal 2 × 2 game, two unconditional: pure cooperation (resp. defection), that is to always
cooperate (defect), and two conditional: homophilic cooperation or homophily (resp. heterophilic
cooperation or heterophily), that is to cooperate (defect) only with those sending the same message
as you do.
Several studies have investigated the asymptotic behavior of individuals’ population shares
associated with these four decision rules under birth-death population dynamics. With regard
to the evolution of homophily itself, some postulate homophily to evolve under a wide variety of
conditions [47] while others claim that it evolves less easily than suggested by earlier studies [138].
Many others have studied the four types in a structured population and when PD is taken as the
base game [80, 157, 59, 156, 60, 77]. Particularly in [59], homophilic cooperators are shown to
take over 75 percent of a lattice-structured population. Jansson [74] argues that the dominance
of homophilics in [59] is mainly due to the population structure not the tag mechanism (preplay
communication). He upholds his claim by conducting a simulation on a well-mixed population
with random interactions and 4 tags, and showing that homophilics only take 23 percent of the
population whereas defectors take 61. However, still a considerable portion of the population is
taken by non-pure defectors, leaving open the question of whether their survival, particularly that
of homophilics, is due to random interactions and mutation. In general, it seems that preplay
communication does not help to maintain cooperation in well-mixed populations. In [17] for
example, it is stated that altruism is lost when the tag and decision rule traits are always inherited
together, which is the case under usual evolutionary game theoretical settings such as the replicator
dynamics [154, 135, 178]. The claim, however, lacks a mathematical proof and is explained only
via examples and simulations. Mathematical analyses on the asymptotic behavior of population
dynamics with preplay communication [18, 180, 79, 71] do not completely solve this problem either.
We only know that if a strategy is strictly dominated in the base game of a cheap-talk game, e.g.,
cooperation in the PD game, its relative frequency goes to zero along any interior solution path
of the replicator dynamics [181]. This implies that in the face of pure defectors, the population
share of pure and homophilic cooperators goes to zero. So heterophilic cooperators are not ruled
out, pleading for a more comprehensive analysis.
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In this chapter, we begin by uncovering the innate characteristic of well-mixed homophilic and
heterophilic populations under the replicator dynamics in a general game setting. In particular,
we find that populations of homophilic cooperators engage in a battle of messages (tags), and will
become dominated by whichever message that was most prevalent at the start, while populations
of heterophilic cooperators exhibit a more harmonious behavior, converging to a state of maximal
message diversity. These results hold for the broad class of evolutionary games for which there is an
advantage to mutual cooperation over defection. When engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma game, a
mixture of both types of cooperators can result in a limit cycle, with each tag dominating for some
fraction of time. Moreover, pure cooperators may coexist with homophilic cooperators but vanish
in the presence of heterophilics. Finally, by developing a convergence theorem on weakly dominated
strategies, we establish once and for all that defectors completely take over the population, leaving
no room for cooperation of any type including pure, homophilic and heterophilic cooperators.
5.2 Replicator dynamics for cheap-talk games
We consider a large population of individuals playing symmetric two-player games with two strate-
gies, to “cooperate,” denoted by C and to “defect,” denoted by D, and with the payoffs integrated






, T , R, P , S ∈ IR,
where R > P , i.e., mutual cooperation exceeds mutual defection. We refer to this game as the
base game G and are interested in when individuals have some preplay communication, resulting
in a cheap-talk game GM, by which we mean the acts that before playing the base game G, each
player sends one costless message to her opponent, and simultaneously receives the message sent
by her opponent. The two preplay messages initiated by the two players are sent simultaneously
and chosen from a finite set M = {1, . . . ,m},m ≥ 2, of messages available to both players. The
players may then base their strategies on the messages they have received, resulting in decision
rules. We consider the case when messages different from that of the player herself are treated
similarly, yielding the following four decision rules:
1. C, pure cooperation, under which the player always cooperates regardless of her opponent’s
message;
2. C∗, homophilic cooperation or homophily, under which the player cooperates if and only if
her opponent’s message matches that of her own;
3. D∗, heterophilic cooperation or heterophily, under which the player cooperates if and only if
her opponent’s message is different from that of her own;
4. D, pure defection, under which the player always defects regardless of her opponent’s mes-
sage.
Let K = {C,C∗, D∗, D} be the set of decision rules. Then each individual sends a message i ∈M
and follows a decision rule X ∈ K, resulting in a cheap-talk pure strategy Xi that we characterize
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by the unit vector whose elements are all zero except for the (4(i− 1) + pX)th element:
Xi = [0 . . . 0 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
4(i−1)+pX
0 . . . 0]>
where pX , X ∈ K, is defined as pC = 1, pC∗ = 2, pD∗ = 3 and pD = 4. Based on their strategies
in the cheap-talk game, players earn payoffs in the base game, which is captured by the cheap-talk
payoff matrix piM defined by
piM =

pi ⊗ 1 1⊗ pi . . . 1⊗ pi









where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and 1 the 2 × 2 all-one matrix. Then the payoff an
individual playing strategy Xi, X ∈ K, i ∈ M, earns against another individual playing strategy
Yj, Y ∈ K, j ∈ M, equals u(Xi, Yj) where u, the utility function, is defined by u(x, y) = x>piMy
for x, y ∈ IR4m.
We study the evolution of individuals’ population shares under the replicator dynamics. Denote






and the average payoff an Xi-playing individual earns against the population equals u(Xi, x). The
evolution over time of the population share of individuals playing Xi is given by the replicator
dynamics
x˙Xi = [u(Xi, x)− u(x, x)]xXi . (5.1)
The main goal of this chapter is to study the asymptotic behavior of the four types of individuals
in different population mixtures under the dynamics (5.1).
5.3 Convergence results
We provide the convergence results in this section. First, we consider a population of homophilic
cooperators and then that of heterophilic cooperators.
Theorem 5.1. Consider an exclusive population of homophilic cooperators under the dynamics
(5.1). Then for any i, j ∈M,
xC∗i (0) > xC∗j (0)⇒ limt→∞xC∗j (t) = 0.
Proof. Should xC∗j = 0, the result would be trivial. So assume otherwise. Then 0 < xC∗j (0) < 1,
and in fact following some standard continuity argument, one can check that 0 < xC∗j (t) < 1 for
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all t ≥ 0. So we can define the ratio xC∗i
xC∗
j




















Since R > P and xC∗i (0) > xC∗j (0), the right-hand side of (5.2) is positive at t = 0, so xC∗i /xC∗j
increases at t0, which in turn makes xC∗i − xC∗j increase and so does the infinitesimal increment
of xC∗i /xC∗j . Repeating this argument, we know that xC∗i /xC∗j keeps increasing nontrivially for the






On the other hand, since 0 < xC∗i , xC∗j < 1, this implies limt→∞ xC∗j (t) = 0, which completes the
proof.
As indicated by Theorem 5.1, homophilic’s hostility towards outsiders results in a battle of
messages (tags), where a single message ends up taking over the entire population (see Figure
5.1). Not surprisingly, the winning message turns out to be the one that started with the greatest


















Figure 5.1: Evolution of homophilic cooperators.
population share. The intuition behind is that individuals sending the most populous message are
also most likely to interact with cooperative opponents. The final population state is also robust
against message mutations, meaning that any newly formed messages are quickly eliminated. In
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the rare case of having two or more most populous message in the start, they will share the final
population equally.
Theorem 5.2. Consider an exclusive population of heterophilic cooperators under the dynamics
(5.1). Then for any i, j ∈M,
xD∗i (0) 6= 0, xD∗j (0) 6= 0⇒ limt→∞xD∗i (t) = limt→∞xD∗j (t).











Thus, similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1, one can show the result for xD∗i (0) 6= 0 and xD∗j (0) 6=
0.
Remark 5.1. Indeed there is a compelling one-to-one correspondence between the dual trajectories
of the replicator dynamics for an exclusive population of homophilic cooperators and an exclusive
population of heterophilic cooperators: they can be taken as the same trajectory, one flows forwards
and the other backwards in time.
From Theorem 5.2, in populations consisting exclusively of heterophilic cooperators, we observe
the opposite phenomenon as that in the homophilic case, resulting in a harmony of messages (tags)
(see Figure 5.2). Although diversity is a known property of heterophilic populations, it has not



















Figure 5.2: Evolution of heterophilic cooperators.
yet been shown that heterophily indeed drives the population to a maximally balanced state with
all messages holding equal shares of the population. This occurs because members sending the
least common message are now most likely to meet a cooperative opponent while the converse is
true for members sending the most common message. Hence there is a balancing effect putting
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upward pressure on those tags having below average representation and downward pressure on
those having above average representation until the difference in population share between groups
converges to zero. An interesting side effect occurs if a brand new message appears via mutation.
This new message will be welcomed into the population but will grow only until it reaches the same
population share as all the other tags. In this sense heterophilic cooperators produce a population
that is more tolerant than homophilic cooperators and will hence result in greater diversity. These
results hold for any symmetric game in which the payoffs for mutual cooperation are greater
than those for mutual defection. This battle and harmony of messages has been reported in the
simulation work [138], but in a death-birth process and different game setup.
To investigate how cooperative homophilics and heterophilics are, particularly in the face of
pure cooperators and defectors, we choose the base game to be the challenging prisoner’s dilemma
game, in which the payoffs satisfy
T > R > P > S. (5.3)
So far we have seen that a population of homophilics will become dominated by a single tag,
while a population of heterophilics converges to a maximally tag-balanced state. When these
two types are mixed, one would expect a conflict to arise out of the simultaneous battle and
harmony of messages, and indeed we observe just that - the population share of each tag exhibits
large oscillations, which, depending on the payoffs and the number of available tags, may persist
indefinitely suggesting a heteroclinic cycle (see Figure 5.3), or instability may occur. For example,
Figure 5.3: Co-evolution of homophilic and heterophilic cooperators.
consider a homophilic cooperator with some rare message i appearing as a mutant in a population.
This mutant will defect against all messages not equal to i, which hold for the vast majority of the
population. Then, if the average individual payoff in the population is below some threshold, the
mutant will invade and eventually wipe out all existing messages, resulting in a uniform population
of homophilics sending message i. Now a heterophilic cooperator sending the same message i can
invade this population since it defects against its own tag, but the homophilics that make up the
population cooperate in return with this new mutant. As a result, the population will eventually
be completely taken over by heterophilics with message i, which again creates an opening for an
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homophilic cooperator with a different rare tag j to invade, and the process repeats indefinitely
among different messages, resulting in a heteroclinic cycle.
Now if we consider a population that contains both homophilic and pure cooperators, an
interesting phenomenon occurs. Having various messages but no preference in others, the pure
cooperators are subject to the prejudices of the other homophilic cooperators and thus the battle
of messages remains in effect. Once again, the message(s) occupying the largest portion of the
initial population will prevail as indicated in the following theorem, and the final population will
generally contain both homophilic and pure cooperators sending this message. Let xX , X ∈ K,
and xi, i ∈ M, denote the population share of individuals following decision rule X and sending
message i, respectively. Clearly xX =
∑
j∈M xXj , xi =
∑
Y ∈K xYi .
Theorem 5.3. Consider an exclusive population of pure and homophilic cooperators where for
every message i ∈ M, xC∗i (0) > 0. Then under the dynamics (5.1) and when (5.3) is fulfilled, at





∃i ∈M : lim
t→∞
xi(t) = 1.











C1 R R S S R S R S
C∗1 R R S S T P T P
D∗1 T T P P R S R S
D1 T T P P T P T P
− − − − − − − − −
C2 R S R S R R S S
C∗2 T P T P R R S S
D∗2 R S R S T T P P
D2 T P T P T T P P

. (5.4)
Based on the population in question, x(0) ∈ int(∆(S)) for some S ⊆ {Xj |X ∈ {C,C∗}, j ∈ M}
where S 3 C∗i for all i ∈ M. Consider the reduced cheap-talk payoff matrix corresponding to







C1 R R | R S
C∗1 R R | T P
− − − − −
C2 R S | R R
C∗2 T P | R R
.
For any i ∈M, Ci is weakly dominated by C∗i in ∆(S). In addition, for any j ∈M, j 6= i,
u(C∗i , C
∗
j ) > u(Ci, C
∗
j ) and u(C
∗
i , Cj) > u(Ci, Cj).
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xC∗j (t) = 0.
Repeating this argument for all other j ∈M, j 6= i, we obtain
lim
t→∞






xC∗j (t) = 0 ∀j ∈M− {i} ⇒ limt→∞xi(t) = 1. (5.6)
Since at least one of (5.5) and (5.6) takes place for every i ∈M, we conclude that at least one of





∃i ∈M : lim
t→∞
xi(t) = 1,
which completes the proof.
In fact, homophilic cooperators are the only type with which pure cooperators can coexist in
the prisoner’s dilemma. Heterophilic cooperators still defect against pure cooperators sending the
same message, so in a mixed population of these two types engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma, the
heterophilic cooperators will wipe out the pure cooperators as they converge to the balanced state:
Theorem 5.4. Consider an exclusive population of pure and heterophilic cooperators where for





Proof. Based on the population in question, x(0) ∈ int(∆(S)) for some S ⊆ {Xj |X ∈ {C,D∗}, j ∈
M} where S 3 D∗i if S 3 Ci, for all i ∈ M. Consider the reduced cheap-talk payoff matrix







C1 R S | R R
D∗1 T P | R R
− − − − −
C2 R R | R S
D∗2 R R | T P
.
For any i ∈M, Ci is weakly dominated by D∗i in ∆(S). Moreover,
u(D∗i , Ci) > u(Ci, Ci).




The proof then follows the fact that the above equation holds for every i ∈M.
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It is worth mentioning that pure cooperators also do not survive in a population of the three
types of individuals, as stated in the following.
Proposition 5.1. Consider an exclusive population of pure, homophilic and heterophilic cooper-
ators where for every message i ∈ M, if xCi(0) > 0, then xD∗i (0) > 0. Then under the dynamics




Proof. Based on the population in question, x(0) ∈ int(∆(S)) for some S ⊆ {Xj |X ∈ {C,D∗}, j ∈
M} where S 3 D∗i if S 3 Ci, for all i ∈ M. Consider the reduced cheap-talk payoff matrix











C1 R R S R S R
C∗1 R R S T P T
D∗1 T T P R S R
− − − − − − −
C2 R S R R R S
C∗2 T P T R R S
D∗2 R S R T T P

.
The rest of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 5.4.
Setting aside all interactions between homophilic, heterophilic and pure cooperators, defectors
still play their dominance role in this game. The following result mathematically supports this
claim, which is a negative answer to the posed hypothesis, that preplay communication may by
itself facilitate the emergence of cooperation in the PD game, and hence highlights the emergence
of other reproductive dynamics such as the chromodynamics [73] for altruism to evolve. Moreover,
this postulates that the survival of homophilics in Janson’s simulation [74] is not their intrinsic
property, but perhaps caused by random interactions or mutation.
Theorem 5.5. Consider a population where for each message, the population share of pure defector
sending that message is nonzero. Then under the dynamics (5.1) and when (5.3) is fulfilled, the








What enables us to prove Theorem 5.5, is the establishment of a fundamental convergence result
that applies more broadly to any normal two-player game, motivating us to frame it in the following
general terms. We use the framework introduced in Section 1.7 and the dominance relationship
defined in the Appendix (Section 5.5). Let P and H be two nonempty subsets of {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2,
such that H ⊂ P . It often happens that a pure strategy a is not weakly dominated in the face
∆(P), but it is weakly dominated in the boundary face ∆(H). Then of course Proposition 5.2
can be applied whenever the initial population state x(0) belongs to int (∆(H)), but what if x(0)
belongs to int (∆(P)) and not to int (∆(H))? Intuitively, a similar result to that of Proposition
5.2 should hold when we know that xj → 0 for all pure strategies j that are in P but not in H.
We confirm this in the following main result. Let ∨ denote the logical disjunction symbol.
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Theorem 5.6. Let P be a set of pure strategies, and consider a nonempty subset H of it. Suppose
that a pure strategy a is weakly dominated by some strategy y in the face ∆(H). Also let u(y, b) >
u(a, b) for a pure strategy b ∈ H. If
lim
t→∞
xj = 0 ∀j ∈ P −H, (5.7)
then under the dynamics (5.1) and for any x(0) ∈ int (∆(P)), it holds that
lim
t→∞
xa = 0 ∨ lim
t→∞
xb = 0. (5.8)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.2 in [181]. For each pure strategy j, let
γj = u(y − ea, ej). Since a is weakly dominated by y in ∆(H), it holds that γj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ H.
















= u(ea − x, x)−
∑
j∈P
yju(ej − x, x)






























Because of (5.7) and the fact that all xj(t)’s are confined to [0, 1] for all t ≥ 0, each integral∫ t
0
xj(τ)dτ, j ∈ P −H, converges to some constant αj. On the other hand, since 0 ≤ xb(t) ≤ 1 for
all t ≥ 0, the integral ∫ t
0
xb(τ)dτ either converges to +∞ or to some constant αb. In the first case,
since γb > 0 it holds that va → −∞ and hence xa → 0, according to the definition of va. In the
second case, by the uniform continuity of xb it can be shown that xb → 0, which completes the
proof.
Now we proceed to the proof of Theorem 5.5.
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Proof of Theorem 5.5. Based on the population in question, x(0) ∈ int(∆(S)) for some S ⊆
{Xj |X ∈ K, j ∈ M} where S 3 Di for all i ∈ M. Consider the reduced cheap-talk payoff
matrix corresponding to decision rules C and D∗. A typical case is presented at (5.4). For any
i ∈M, Ci is weakly dominated by Di in ∆(S). In addition,
u(Di, Ci) > u(Ci, Ci).
Hence, in view of Proposition 5.2,
lim
t→∞
xCi(t) = 0 ∀i ∈M. (5.9)
Similarly, for any i ∈M, C∗i is weakly dominated by Di in ∆(S). In addition,
u(Di, C
∗





Hence, in view of Proposition 5.2,
lim
t→∞
xC∗i (t) = 0 ∀i ∈M. (5.10)
Now define the set S¯ = S − {Xi |X ∈ {C,C∗}, i ∈M}. For any i ∈M, there exists a sufficiently
small  > 0 such that the mixed strategy y = (1− )Di + Dj for some j 6= i weakly dominates D∗i
in ∆(S¯). In addition,




i ) ∀i ∈M.
Hence, by taking P = S and H = S¯, from Theorem 5.6 we obtain
lim
t→∞
xD∗i (t) = 0 ∀i ∈M. (5.11)
By summarizing (5.9) to (5.11), we arrive at the proof.
5.4 Concluding remarks
The results in this chapter reveal the intrinsic qualities of homophilic and heterophilic cooperators.
“Only my phenotype (message) should survive” is the tendency homophilics show leading indeed to
only one group surviving in their exclusive population. This suggests the presence of homophily in
populations where one phenotype dominates the population share. It is also because of this attitude
that homophilics are the only type of individuals with whom pure cooperators may survive, under
the prisoner’s dilemma. On the other hand, heterophilics exhibit a“welcoming” attitude leading
to diversity and balance in their exclusive population. This suggests the presence of heterophily
in highly phenotype-balanced populations. A population mixture of these two types results in
oscillations that can either persist as in a heteroclinic cycle, or become unstable. This heteroclinic
cycle may be helpful when seeking populations exhibiting both homophily and heterophily. The
last result here is that if pure defectors are present, there is no room for cooperation of any kind
in the prisoners’ dilemma.
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5.5 Appendix
We present a classical result on weakly dominated strategies [181]. Consider the framework intro-
duced in Section 1.7. Every strategy i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is a pure strategy. For ease of notation, we also
refer to ei, the ith column of the n × n identity matrix, as the pure strategy i. A mixed strategy
is a vector x ∈ ∆, and can be obtained by some convex combination of e1, e2, . . . , en. Consider a
nonempty subset H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. We say that strategy x weakly dominates strategy y in ∆(H),
if (i) x, y ∈ ∆(H), (ii) u(x, z) ≥ u(y, z) for all z ∈ ∆(H) and (iii) u(x, r) > u(y, r) for at least
one r ∈ ∆(H). This is a reformulation of weak dominance in the whole simplex. The following
proposition, which we have reformulated to make it applicable to ∆(H) instead of just ∆, is a
classical result on convergence of weakly dominated strategies under the replicator dynamics (1.2).
Proposition 5.2 ([181], weakly dominated strategies). Suppose that a pure strategy a is weakly
dominated by some strategy y in ∆(H). If u(y, b) > u(a, b) for some pure strategy b, then the
following holds under the dynamics (1.2) and for any initial state x(0) ∈ int (∆(H)):
lim
t→∞
xa(t) = 0 ∨ lim
t→∞
xb(t) = 0.






under best-response update rule in finite
heterogeneous populations
To study how sustainable cooperation might emerge among self-interested interacting individu-
als, we investigate the long-run behavior of the decision-making dynamics in a finite, well-mixed
population of individuals, who play collectively over time a population game. Repeatedly each
individual is activated asynchronously to update her decision either to cooperate or defect accord-
ing to the myopic best-response rule. The game’s payoff matrices, chosen to be those of either
prisoner’s dilemma or snowdrift games to underscore cooperation-centered social dilemmas, are
fixed, but can be distinct for different individuals. So the overall population is heterogeneous.
We first classify such heterogeneous individuals into different types according to their cooperating
tendencies stipulated by their payoff matrices. Then we show that no matter what initial strate-
gies the individuals decide to use, surprisingly one can always identify one type of individuals
as a benchmark such that after a sufficiently long but finite time, individuals more cooperative
compared to the benchmark almost surely always cooperate while those less cooperative compared
to the benchmark almost surely defect. When such fixation takes place, the total number of coop-
erators in the population either becomes fixed or fluctuates at most by one. Such insight provides
theoretical explanation for some complex behavior recently reported in simulation studies that
highlight the puzzling effect of individuals’ heterogeneity on collective decision-making dynamics.
Then we demonstrate how to control the total number of cooperators in the long run by influ-
encing the agents’ payoffs gained from the games over time. In particular, given a population
and limited number of available payoff matrices that the agents may be associated with, we de-
termine all reachable final number of cooperators, and also all payoff matrix distributions among
the agents that lead to those final numbers. In addition, we find the minimum number of agents
whose payoff matrices must be changed to reach those desired numbers of cooperators in the long
run. The results indicate that the minimum number does not equal the difference of the current
number of cooperators in the population from the desired one, a side-effect caused by the level-off
phenomenon that shows up in such models.
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6.1 Introduction
We have studied how cooperation evolves in infinite populations governed by the replicator dy-
namics in Part I; in this part, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in finite well-mixed
populations. We focus on the case when the individuals play the snowdrift or prisoner’s dilemma
games in this Chapter and focus on the coordination game in Chapter 7. The study on mechanisms
of emergence of cooperation in self-interested social populations has attracted extensive attention
in the past decades [62, 66, 68, 12, 118]. One general consensus is that human’s ability to learn
plays a key role to build up sustainable collective cooperation in a competitive environment. Re-
cent experimental studies [176, 107, 169] indicate that in a social group how human subjects learn
to update their strategies may affect dramatically the outcome of the group’s interactions. For ex-
ample, the cooperation level of a group of individuals is higher when each individual focuses more
on the frequencies of the behaviors of the peers (frequency-based learning) instead of the success
among the peers (success-based learning) [176]. However, how the frequency-based individuals
learn remains an open question, which requires much more in-depth theoretical investigation on
possible learning rules and the resulted population decision-making dynamics. Evolutionary game
theory [50, 9, 57, 189, 144, 91] has provided promising theoretical tools, and in fact postulated
a variety of dynamical models under frequency-based learning [170, 166, 138, 48, 135]. In one
popular model, decision makers always follow the myopic best response rule to maximize their
utilities against their opponents [149, 155, 38].
Various simulation based studies have disclosed several features of such best-response evolu-
tionary dynamics. For homogeneous populations where individuals have the same tendency to
cooperate, people have identified the surprising suppression of network effects in different game
setups [164, 61, 146]. For heterogeneous populations where individuals’ tendencies to cooperate are
different, we have reported a new “level-off” phenomenon [139]; to be more specific, level-off here
refers to the phenomenon that staring with a population of a low cooperation level, the level rises
with the share of more-cooperative individuals but then levels off as the share reaches some thresh-
old. These and other related simulation studies [99] provide intuition on how the decision-making
dynamics in large populations governed by the best-response rule evolve over time, but sometimes
the results are descriptive due to the lack of rigorous mathematical proofs. Some related mathe-
matical results can in general only be applied to homogeneous populations in specific setups, such
as deterministic updates within well-mixed and finite populations [6], infinite population or mean
field approximation [110, 88, 92, 123], and noisy updates [187, 84, 8, 109]. Only a few papers with
mathematical analysis have studied heterogeneous populations [1, 70], but still with restrictive
assumptions like infinite populations or deterministic updates. So a great challenge is to develop
new mathematically rigorous tools to analyze asynchronous decision-making dynamics under the
best-response update rule in finite heterogeneous populations.
While to model and analyze such population dynamics are the necessary steps towards under-
standing the evolution of cooperation, controlling them is a more relevant topic for its interesting
applications, e.g., facilitating the spread of innovation and technology [187]. As with most popula-
tion dynamics in general, control of the strategic interactions under the best-response update rule
is quite challenging. For example, it is already a non-trivial task to identify the most appropriate
control input. There are a number of options, e.g., individuals’ utilities, the strategies of a group of
individuals and the addition of some individuals with fixed strategies. The problem becomes even
more complicated in the case of heterogeneous populations since the heterogeneity distribution
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among the individuals may prevent a uniform choice of a control input. If individuals’ strategies
are chosen as the control input, it remains a demanding task to decide which group of individu-
als must be targeted in order to e.g., minimize the control efforts. Different methods have been
suggested to control the number of agents with a specific strategy in decision-making populations.
For example, in [145, 144], the strategies of a group of agents are fixed to a desired strategy for the
duration of the game; in [91], the payoffs of a stochastic snowdrift game are changed; and in [186],
some changes in terms of an emission tax rate and the price of an emission permit are applied
to individuals’ utilities. However, control of best-response dynamics, specially in heterogeneous
populations, remains an open problem.
In this chapter we consider a finite, well-mixed, heterogeneous population in which each in-
dividual, also referred to as agent, has her own (possibly unique) utility function when playing
evolutionary games where the base game is the classical prisoner’s dilemma or snowdrift game to
capture the well-known cooperation social dilemma. The agents are activated randomly to play
the game and consequently best-response updates are asynchronous. Our main results are to ex-
plicitly determine the long run dynamic behavior without using mean-field or other approximation
methods and to control the dynamics. We are able to show that no matter what initial strategies
the individuals decide to use, surprisingly one can always identify one type of individuals as a
benchmark such that after a sufficiently long but finite time, more-cooperative individuals almost
surely cooperate while those less cooperative almost surely defect. It is also shown that the total
number of cooperators in the population will either become fixed or fluctuate at most by one.
The importance of these new findings is threefold. First, these global convergence results explain
rigorously why sustainable cooperation can emerge among selfish heterogeneous individuals. Sec-
ond, the level-off phenomenon [139] is validated and proved rigorously and thus shows the subtlety
of controlling the level of cooperation if one wants to use population heterogenity as a means to
intervene collective decision-making processes. And third, the different thresholds in the level-off
behavior for populations with diverse compositions indicate the sometimes restrictive nature of
the homogeneity assumption in social evolutionary models.
After presenting the convergence results, we provide a control mechanism for the population
dynamics. While it may be possible to set a robot to a desired strategy, it seems unrealistic to ask
a company to always cooperate with other competing firms or to ask a person to always expose
the same behavior in face of other members of a social group. Instead we follow the approach
where payoff incentives are provided to a group of agents, resulting in changes to their payoff
matrices. This change can represent increasing the taxes in case of companies, effective training
in case of human or a simple modification in the programmed values in case of robots. Then for
a given population, we first find those numbers of cooperators in the long run that one can reach
by modifying the agents’ payoffs. Next, for a desired final number of cooperators, we find m, the
minimum number of agents whose payoff matrices must be changed to reach that number, and
show which agents’ payoff matrices must be changed accordingly. The results indicate that the
minimum number m is not necessarily the difference of the current number of cooperators in the
population from the desired one, a side-effect caused by the level-off phenomenon.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we present the model for decision-
making dynamics. The main convergence results are shown in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, we focus
on the mathematical characteristics of the level-off phenomenon. Then in Section 6.5, we present
the control mechanism for the population dynamics. We finalize the chapter with the conclusions
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in Section 6.6.
6.2 Decision-making under best-response updates
We consider a finite, well-mixed population of n agents that are participating in a population
game evolving over time t = 0, 1, . . . . Each agent can choose either to cooperate (C) or defect (D).
At each time t, an agent is randomly activated to update her strategy according to how well she
is doing when she plays her current strategy against the population. More specifically, the four







where the payoffs Ri, Ti, Si and Pi are real numbers corresponding to strategy pairs C-against-C,
D-against-C, C-against-D and D-against-D respectively. Let si(t) denote agent i’s strategy at
time t in the vector form, which is either sC
∆
= [1 0]> to cooperate or sD ∆= [0 1]> to defect.
Obviously, sC = 1− sD with 1 = [1 1]>. So agent i’s payoff at time t against the population can
be calculated by








and nC(t) denotes the number of cooperators in the whole
population at time t. The myopic best-response update rule for agent i dictates that agent i
chooses the strategy that maximizes her payoff. In case both cooperation and defection return the
same payoff, we assume agent i sticks to her current strategy. Therefore, the update rule is that




si(t) if ui(si(t), sC(t)) ≥ ui(1− si(t), sC(t))
1− si(t) otherwise
. (6.2)
When studying homogeneous populations, people are mainly interested in how the portion
of cooperators changes over time; for heterogeneous populations like in this chapter, the more
complex central topic is how the portions of cooperators with different utility functions evolve.
Towards this end, we classify the heterogeneous individuals into different types according to their
cooperating tendencies stipulated by their payoff matrices Ai in (6.1). We focus on those Ai with
special structures [139]: the entries of Ai satisfy
Ti > Ri > max{Si, Pi}, Si 6= Pi. (6.3)
Then Ai corresponds to either a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game satisfying Pi > Si or a snowdrift
(SD) game satisfying Si > Pi. We call each agent with a PD (resp. SD) payoff matrix a PD
agent (resp. SD agent). In fact, as we will later show in Lemma 6.1, PD agents always tend to
defect under (6.2); however, an SD agent’s tendency to cooperate depends on the ratio Si−Pi
Ti−Ri+Si−Pi ,
namely, the higher the ratio is, the more cooperative the agent becomes, except for those ratios
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) for some k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} that result in the same cooperative





) into the same type. We assume there are altogether l > 0 types and label them
by 1, . . . , l according to the descending order of the ratios. Correspondingly, each SD agent of
the jth, j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, type is called an SDj agent. Then there are altogether l + 1 types of
agents after taking into account the PD agents. Let nPD denote the number of PD agents and




= (nSD1 , nSD2 , . . . , nSDl , nPD)
and obviously





pi = n, pi ≥ 0
}
.
We find that after scaling up the agents’ ratios by n, some comparisons involving the numbers of
different types of agents can be easier to be made. For this reason, for an SDj agent i, we define





Ti −Ri + Si − Pi . (6.4)
The temper of a PD agent is defined to be zero. We study the effects of heterogeneity of the
population when similar types are sufficiently apart in tempers; to be more precise, we assume
n∗SDi−1 > dn∗SDie and bn∗SDic > n∗SDi+1 , ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , l − 1} (6.5)
where for a real number a, dae and bac return the smallest integer greater than or equal to a
and the largest integer less than or equal to a respectively. We use nCSDi to denote the number
of cooperators among the SDi players and n
C
PD that among the PD players. Then we stack all
the nCSDi and n
C
PD together, and call the resulted (l + 1)-dimensional vector the distribution of













The main goal of this chapter is to study given the type of a heterogeneous population p ∈ P ,
how the system state x evolves over time t under the update rule (6.2) and the activation sequence
of the agents. Here, we assume that the agents are activated persistently as follows.
Persistent activation assumption: For every agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any time t = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
with probability one there exists some finite time t′ ≥ t at which agent i is activated.
This is a very mild assumption that holds in most of the usual stochastic settings, e.g., when each
agent is activated at a rate determined by a Poisson clock [30].
Given the asynchronous, nonlinear nature of the dynamics of x(t), it is not clear whether x(t)
will converge at all. In fact, we will show that depending on the given type p, the state x(t)
almost surely converges to either a single state or a set of two states, and more importantly the
convergence takes place globally in finite time. The key technical step is to construct a Lyapunov-
like function. We provide the details of our main convergence results and their proofs in the next
section.
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6.3 Convergence of the best-response dynamics
To understand better the best response update rule (6.2), we first rewrite it in the form emphasizing
the effects of the agents’ tempers.
Lemma 6.1. When an agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} updates its strategy si(t) at time t ≥ 0 according to
(6.2), then
si(t+ 1) = s
D (6.6)
if i is a PD agent, and
si(t+ 1) =

sC nC(t) < n
∗
SDj
si(t) nC(t) = n
∗
SDj




if i is an SDj agent for some j ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
Proof. The update rule (6.2) dictates that agent i chooses the strategy that provides her the
highest payoff against the population. Hence, according to the definition of ui, agent i chooses the
strategy corresponding to the bigger entry of AisC(t):
AisC(t) =
[
RinC(t) + Si(n− nC(t))
TinC(t) + Pi(n− nC(t))
]
. (6.8)
If agent i is a PD agent, from (6.3) it follows that Ti > Ri > Pi > Si. So the second entry is always




sC (Ri + Pi − Ti − Si)nC(t) > n(Pi − Si)
si(t) (Ri + Pi − Ti − Si)nC(t) = n(Pi − Si)
sD (Ri + Pi − Ti − Si)nC(t) < n(Pi − Si)
.






Ri − Ti + Pi − Si < 0





sC nC(t) < n
Si−Pi
Ti−Ri+Si−Pi
si(t) nC(t) = n
Si−Pi
Ti−Ri+Si−Pi




which is the same as (6.7) because of (6.4).
Lemma 6.1 tells us that a PD agent will always update to defect while an SD agent’s decision
depends on the comparison between its temper and the current total number of cooperators in the
whole population. So the largest possible number of cooperators after every agent has updated at
least once is n− nPD =
∑l
j=1 SDj. In this case, an immediate observation is that if
n− nPD < n∗SDl , (6.9)
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and even when all the possible cooperators (namely all the SD players) are indeed cooperating,
the least cooperative type of SD player, ie. SDl players, will all cooperate. This motivates us to
distinguish populations with various p’s according to whether the inequality (6.9) holds.
Definition 6.1. For any of those p with which (6.9) holds, we say the corresponding population
is biased since in it even the least cooperative type of SD agents tends to cooperate; otherwise, we
say the population is unbiased.
We first observe that, from Lemma 6.1, if any PD agent is activated, her updated strategy
is always to defect. Because of the persistent activation assumption, after a sufficient number of
updates, all the PD agents have been activated at least once, then all of them stick to defection
afterwards. We summarize it below.






(t), . . . , nCSDl(t), 0
) ∀t ≥ tPD.
In the rest of the chapter, we use tPD in Lemma 6.2 to denote the time that the convergence to
the state stipulated in the lemma has taken place. The long-run behavior for biased populations
is rather straightforward to establish, which is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. For a given biased population, almost surely there exists some time τ such that for
all t ≥ τ
x(t) = (nSD1 , nSD2 , . . . , nSDl , 0).








nSDj = n− nPD < n∗SDl
(6.5) :n∗SDl ≤ n∗SDi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l}
⇒ nC(t) < n
∗
SDi
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l},∀t ≥ tPD.
Hence, from Lemma 6.1, if any of the SD agents is activated after tPD, she chooses cooperation as
her strategy. Furthermore, since the agents are activated persistently, almost surely there exists
some time τ ≥ tPD such that all of the SD agents have become activated before τ , and thus choose
cooperation without changing it afterwards. So the proof is complete.
However, the analysis of the long-run behavior for unbiased populations is much more compli-
cated, and we need some additional technical notions. For an unbiased population, we can still
examine the accumulated number of SD players according to their ordering, and more precisely











and call the SDkp agents the benchmark agents since such players, as will be shown later, indicate
clearly who will always cooperate in the long run. The following property follows directly from






∀j < kp. (6.11)
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Now we are ready to present the first main result of this section, which identifies the invariant
set of the system for unbiased populations. To do so, we define the following (l + 1)-dimensional
vectors
x∗ ∆= (nSD1 , . . . , nSDkp−1 , 0, . . . , 0),
x∗−
∆
= (nSD1 , . . . , nSDkp−1 , bn∗SDkpc −
kp−1∑
j=1
nSDj , 0, . . . , 0),
x∗+
∆
= (nSD1 , . . . , nSDkp−1 , dn∗SDkpe −
kp−1∑
j=1
nSDj , 0, . . . , 0).





differ by one, and are the same if and only if n∗SDkp is an integer. For unbiased populations, we
further classify them into two categories: we say the population is clean-cut if
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj ≥ n∗SDkp ,
otherwise, ruﬄed.
Proposition 6.1. For a given unbiased population with the benchmark kp, when the population is
clean-cut, x∗ is invariant; otherwise when it is ruﬄed, {x∗−, x∗+} is.
We need the following lemma in the proof.
Lemma 6.3. If x(t0) ∈ {x∗, x∗−, x∗+} at some t0 ≥ tPD, then
nCSDi(t0 + 1) = n
C
SDi
(t0) = 0 ∀i > kp, (6.12)
nCSDi(t0 + 1) = n
C
SDi
(t0) = nSDi ∀i < kp. (6.13)




nSDj ≥ n∗SDkp ≥ bn∗SDkpc. (6.14)
Similarly, at both x∗− and x
∗








So at x∗, x∗− and x
∗





So from Lemma 6.1 we know that if an SDi, i > kp, agent is active at t0, her strategy at t0 + 1
remains to defect, which proves (6.12).
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==⇒ nC(t0) < n∗SDkp−1 .
So at x∗, x∗− and x
∗
+, nC(t0) < n
∗
SDkp−1





So from Lemma 6.1 we know that if an SDi, i < kp, agent is active at t0, her strategy at t0 + 1
remains to cooperate, which proves (6.13).
Proof of Proposition 6.1. It suffices to show that for some t0 ≥ tPD, in clean-cut populations
(x(t0) = x
∗) ⇒ (x(t) = x∗ ∀t ≥ t0) , (6.15)
and in ruﬄed populations(
x(t0) ∈ {x∗−, x∗+}
) ⇒ (x(t) ∈ {x∗−, x∗+} ∀t ≥ t0) . (6.16)
We first observe that in a clean-cut population at x∗, nCSDkp (t0) = 0. Then from (6.14) and Lemma
6.1, we know that
nCSDkp (t0 + 1) = n
C
SDkp
(t0) = 0. (6.17)
Combining (6.17) with (6.12) and (6.13) in Lemma 6.3, we conclude that (6.15) holds for t = t0 +1
and then by induction holds for any t ≥ t0.












Then one of the following three cases must takes place.
Case 1: bn∗SDkpc −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj = dn∗SDkpe −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj . Then bn∗SDkpc = dn∗SDkpe = n∗SDkp ,
implying that nC(t0) = n
∗
SDkp
. Hence, from Lemma 6.1, if an SDkp agent is active at t0, she will
not change her strategy. Therefore,
nCSDkp (t0 + 1) = n
C
SDkp
(t0) = bn∗SDkpc −
kp−1∑
j=1




Case 2: nCSDkp (t0) = dn∗SDkpe −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj and dn∗SDkpe 6= n∗SDkp . Then
nC(t0) = dn∗SDkpe > n∗SDkp .
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Hence, from Lemma 6.1, if an SDkp agent is active at t0, she updates to s
D at t0 + 1. So
nCSDkp (t0 + 1) = n
C
SDkp




Case 3: nCSDkp (t0) = bn∗SDkpc −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj and bn∗SDkpc 6= n∗SDkp . Then
nC(t0) = bn∗SDkpc < n∗SDkp .
Hence, from 6.1, when an SDkp agent is active at t0, she updates to s
C at t0 + 1. So
nCSDkp (t0 + 1) = n
C
SDkp




Moreover, when the active agent at t0 is not an SDkp agent, we have that




Combining (6.19), (6.20), (6.21) and (6.22) together, we have
nCSDkp (t0 + 1) ∈
{bn∗SDkpc − kp−1∑
j=1






Combining the above deduction with (6.12) and (6.13) in Lemma 6.3, we conclude that (6.16)
holds for t = t0 + 1 and then by induction holds for any t ≥ t0.
In fact, a much stronger statement than Proposition 6.1 can be made, which shows the invariant
state/set is also globally attractive with probability one.
Theorem 6.2. For a given unbiased population with the benchmark kp, if the population is clean-
cut, then almost surely there exists some time τ such that
x(t) = x∗ ∀t ≥ τ ; (6.23)
otherwise, almost surely there exists some time τ and two infinite time sequences {ti−}∞i=1 and
{ti+}∞i=1 such that








+ i = 1, 2, . . . .
The theorem implies that almost surely after finite time the population reaches a state where
every SDi, i = 1, . . . , kp − 1, agent cooperates, and every SDi, i = kp + 1, . . . , l, agent and every
PD agent defects. In other words, almost surely all the agents that have a higher (resp. lower)
temper than that of the benchmark agents, become cooperators (resp. defectors) after a sufficiently
long, but finite, time. Moreover, if the population is clean-cut, all SDkp agents defect. Otherwise,
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if further x∗− = x
∗
+ or equivalently bn∗SDkpc = dn∗SDkpe, we have that n∗SDkp −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj of the
SDkp agents cooperate, and the rest defect; else in case x
∗
− 6= x∗+, the number of SDkp agents who
cooperate fluctuates between bn∗SDkpc −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj and dn∗SDkpe −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj .
To prove Theorem 6.2, we make use of a Lyapunov-like function h(x) defined for populations
with kp ≥ 2. Let α(x) = 0 if nCSD1 6= nSD1 ; otherwise, let α(x) return the largest index of those
SD agents such that
nCSDj(t) = nSDj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , α(x)}, (6.25)
α(x) ≤ kp − 2. (6.26)







Obviously, h(x) is lower bounded by zero and upper bounded by
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj . One main step
in proving Theorem 6.2 is to show that h’s upper bound is tight and along the system’s trajec-
tory x(t), h almost surely reaches and stays at its maximum after finite time, after which all
SD1, SD2, . . . , SDkp−1 agents always cooperate. Then by using a similar function g(x), we can
prove all SDkp+1, SDkp+2, . . . , SDl agents always defect after finite time, and the strategies of the
SDkp players depends on whether the inequality
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj ≥ n∗SDkp holds. Although along x(t),
h does not always increase, its lower bound can be tightened up as time grows. To be more spe-
cific, we will construct an infinite set B of time instants tb, such that for any tb ∈ B, it holds that
h(t) ≥ h(tb) for all t ≥ tb; more precisely
B = {tb} ∆=
{
t ≥ tPD |nC(t) =
kp−1∑
j=1
nSDj if clean-cut or nC(t) ∈ {bn∗SDkpc, dn∗SDkpe} otherwise
}
.
Then at tb, the number of cooperators in a clean-cut population is x
∗, and that in a ruﬄed
population is x∗− or x
∗
+. Now we show by the following two lemmas that such a constructed B is
not only non-empty but infinite.











In a ruﬄed population, if at some time T > tPD,
nC(T ) < bn∗SDkpc, (6.29)
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Proof. For the clean-cut population, we first prove by contradiction that there exists some finite









nSDj ∀t > T. (6.32)





==⇒ nC(t) < n∗SDi ∀i < kp.
Hence, from Lemma 6.1 and the persistent activation assumption, we know that almost surely
there exists a finite time τ , before which all of the SDi, i < kp, agents, have updated at least once
to fix their strategies to cooperation. Then
x(τ) =
(
nSD1 , . . . , nSDkp−1 , n
C
SDkp
(τ), . . . , nCSDl(τ), 0
)
,








which contradicts (6.32). So (6.31) must be true.
Further, since nC takes integer values and changes at most by one each time, the transition of
nC from (6.27) to (6.31) implies the existence of T
′ to make nC become
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj at T
′, and
thus (6.28) is proved.
For the ruﬄed population, similarly, we first prove by contradiction the existence of a finite
time T¯ > T such that
nC(T¯ ) ≥ bn∗SDkpc. (6.33)
Assume the contrary, that is
nC(t) < bn∗SDkpc ∀t > T. (6.34)





==⇒ nC(t) < n∗SDi ∀i ≤ kp.
Then from Lemma 6.1, the persistent activation assumption and Lemma 6.2, almost surely there
is a finite time τ > T such that
x(τ) =
(
nSD1 , . . . , nSDkp , n
C
SDkp+1
(τ), . . . , nCSDl(τ), 0
)
.







nSDi ≥ n∗SDkp ≥ bn∗SDkpc,
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which contradicts (6.34). So (6.33) is true and thus the transition of nC from (6.29) to (6.33)
implies (6.30).











In a ruﬄed population, if at T > tPD,
nC(t) > dn∗SDkpe, (6.37)







Proof. This lemma can be proven by contradiction following the analogous steps as those in the
proof for Lemma 6.4.
Since Lemma 6.4 covers the situation for t > tPD, nC(t) <
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj , Lemma 6.5 for the
situation nC(t) greater than the sum, and the situation nC equals the sum corresponds to t ∈ B,
we have shown that for any t > tPD, either t ∈ B or there is a finite t′ > t satisfying t′ ∈ B. So we
have actually proven the following.
Lemma 6.6. The set B is infinite.
After knowing B has infinite time instants in it, we show the nondecreasing property of h(x)
along x(t) at t ∈ B.
Lemma 6.7. If tb ∈ B, then
h(t) ≥ h(tb) ∀t ≥ tb. (6.39)
We need the following two lemmas in the proof.











===⇒ nC(tb) < n∗SDkp−1 .
Otherwise,
nC(tb) ∈
{bn∗SDkpc, dn∗SDkpe}⇒ nC(tb) ≤ dn∗SDkpe
(6.5) : dn∗SDke < n∗SDkp−1
}
⇒ nC(tb) < n∗SDkp−1 .
Hence, (6.40) holds for all unbiased populations.
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∀t ≥ tb. (6.41)
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the contrary that (6.9) can be violated. Then let
t1 ≥ tb + 1 be the first such violation time. So














By comparing nC(tb) and nC(t1) from (6.43) and (6.42) and knowing that nC changes at most by
one per time, we obtain
∃t′ ∈ [tb, t1 − 1] : nC(t′) = dn∗SDα(tb)+1e − 1. (6.44)
Let ts be the greatest of all such possible t
′. Then in view of (6.42),
nC(t) ≥ dn∗SDα(tb)+1e ∀t ∈ [ts + 1, t1]. (6.45)
Now we show that if an agent changes her strategy from D to C within [ts + 1, t1], it must be
an SDα(tb)+1 agent. Let tc denote some time in [ts + 1, t1]. For an SDj, j > α(tb) + 1, agent, it
follows that
(6.45)⇒ nC(tc − 1) ≥ dn∗SDα(tb)+1e − 1
j > α(tb) + 1
(6.5)
==⇒ dn∗SDα(tb)+1e − 1 ≥ n
∗
SDj
⇒ nC(tc − 1) ≥ n∗SDj , (6.46)
which, from Lemma 6.1, implies that the SDj cannot change her choice to C at tc. On the other
hand, for an agent SDj, j < α(tb) + 1, we have
j ≤ α(tb) (6.25)===⇒ nCSDj(tb) = nSDj , (6.47)
and by the definition of t1, since tc − 1 ≤ t1,
nCSDj(tc − 1) = nCSDj(tb), (6.48)
which together imply that
nCSDj(tc − 1) = nSDj ∀tc ∈ [ts + 1, t1]. (6.49)
Therefore, all SDj agents are already cooperators at tc − 1 and hence do not change their choices
to C at tc. So only an SDα(tb)+1 agent can change her choice from D to C within [ts + 1, t1].
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Now if t1 > ts + 1, from Lemma 6.1, (6.45) implies that no SDi agent changes her choice to C
during [ts + 2, t1]. Hence, no agent changes her choice from D to C during [ts + 2, t1]. So
nC(t) ≤ nC(ts + 1) ∀t ∈ [ts + 1, t1]. (6.50)
On the other hand, (6.50) also holds if t1 = ts + 1, verifying it in general. Now, (6.45) and the
equality nC(ts) = dn∗SDα(tb)+1e − 1 imply
nC(ts + 1) = dn∗SDα(tb)+1e. (6.51)
Then (6.45), (6.50) and (6.51) lead to
nC(t) = dn∗SDα(tb)+1e ∀t ∈ [ts + 1, t1]. (6.52)
So
x(ts + 1) = x(t1)
implying that
nC(ts) = nC(t1) ≥ n∗SDα(tb)+1,
which is a contradiction since ts < t1 and t1 was defined as the first time after tb at which nC
becomes non-less than n∗SDα(tb)+1.
Proof of Lemma 6.7. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the contrary that (6.39) can be
violated at some time t1 ≥ tb + 1. Hence, for some i = 1, . . . , nSDα(tb)+1 , an SDi agent has changed
her choice from C to D at t1. So from Lemma 6.1,
nC(t1 − 1) > n∗SDi . (6.53)
On the other hand, it follows from (6.5) that n∗SDi ≥ n∗SDα(tb)+1 . Hence, (6.53) implies
nC(t1 − 1) > n∗SDα(tb)+1 ,
which contradicts Lemma 6.9 since t1 − 1 ≥ tb.
Lemma 6.7 has shown how the lower bound of h is tightened up as time grows. In the following
two lemmas, we show that h indeed reaches its maximum. First, we observe that the following
statement follows directly from Lemma 6.9.
Corollary 6.1. For a fixed tb ∈ B, consider the first time after tb that an SDα(tb)+1 agent, whose
strategy was sD at tb, is activated. Then this agent updates her strategy to s
C, and does not change
it afterwards.
Then we prove that h reaches its maximum.
Lemma 6.10. Almost surely there exists some time th, at which h reaches and after which remains
at its maximum, i.e., h(t) =
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj for all t ≥ th.
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Proof. If there exists tb ∈ B such that h(tb) =
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj , then from Lemma 6.7, h(t) ≥∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj for all t ≥ tb, and thus the result holds straightforwardly. Otherwise, the only other
possibility is that for each tb ∈ B, h(tb) <
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj . We will show below that this, however,
will never happen. In this case, for every tb ∈ B, there exists an SDα(tb)+1 agent whose strategy is
sD at tb. On the other hand, due to the persistent activation assumption, every such agent almost
surely will become activated at some finite future time, and in view of Corollary 6.1, will update
her choice to C and will not change it afterwards. This cannot be true since B is infinite according
to Lemma 6.6, but the number of SDα(tb)+1 agents are finite. So the contradiction completes the
proof.
For the same reason of defining h, in order to show that all of the SDkp+1, . . . , SDl agents
eventually become defectors, we define another Lyapunov-like function γ(x) defined for populations
with kp ≤ l − 1. Let γ(x) = 0 if nCSDl 6= 0; otherwise, let γ(x) return the smallest index j of those
SDj agents such that
nCSDj(t) = 0 ∀j ∈ {γ(t), . . . , l},
γ(t) ≥ kp + 2.
Clearly g has a minimum of 0 and indeed similar to the property of h, one can show that g
eventually reaches its minimum.
Lemma 6.11. Almost surely there exists some time tg at which g reaches and remains at its
minimum, i.e., g(t) = 0 for all t ≥ th.
Now we are ready to prove the main result.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. If kp ≥ 2, then in view of Lemma 6.10 and according to the definition of h,
there exists some time th such that
nCSDj(t) = nSDj ∀t ≥ th, ∀j ∈ {1 . . . , kp − 1}. (6.54)
On the other hand, if kp ≤ l− 1, then in view of Lemma 6.11 and according to the definition of g,
there exists some time tg such that
nCSDj(t) = 0 ∀t ≥ tg, ∀j ∈ {kp + 1, . . . , l}. (6.55)
Let tm = max{th, tg}. From (6.54) and (6.55), it follows
x(t) =
(
nSD1 , . . . , nSDkp−1 , n
C
SDkp
(t), 0, . . . , 0
) ∀t ≥ tm. (6.56)
Clearly (6.56) also holds if kp = 1 or kp = l, implying that it holds in general for any unbiased
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Hence, x(tb) = x
∗, and in view of Lemma 6.1, x(t) = x∗ for all t ≥ tb. On the other hand, if the



















Hence, x(tb) ∈ {x∗−, x∗+}, and in view of Lemma 6.1, x(t) ∈ {x∗−, x∗+} for all t ≥ tb. Therefore,
(6.23) and (6.24) are proven by taking τ = tb.
To construct the two infinite subsequences, if x∗− = x
∗
+, the result is trivial. Otherwise, let
τi > τ be the ith time after t = τ that an SDkp agent is activated. The time sequence {τi} is







Without loss of generality assume x(τ1) = x
∗









(τ1) = bn∗SDkpc. (6.57)
It can be easily verified that x(t) does not change within [τ1, τ2 − 1]. Hence, nC(τ2 − 1) = nC(τ1).
On the other hand, x∗− 6= x∗+ yields bn∗SDkpc < n∗SDkp < dn∗SDkpe. Hence, because of (6.57),
nC(τ2− 1) < n∗SDkp , which in view of Lemma 6.1 implies that the active SDkp agent at τ2 switches
her choice from D to C. Hence, nCSDkp (τ2) = n
C
SDkp
(τ1) + 1 = dn∗SDkpe −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj . Therefore,
x(τ2) = x
∗
+. Similarly, it can be shown that x(τ3) = x
∗
−. In general, by induction
x(τ2r+1) = x
∗
−, x(τ2r+2) = x
∗
+ ∀r = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Taking {ti−}∞i=1 = {τ2r+1}∞r=0 and {ti+}∞i=1 = {τ2r}∞r=0, we arrive at the conclusion.




∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1};
however, then the agents must be activated pairwise persistently, that is for any pair of agents i
and j and each time t, with probability one there exists some finite time t′ > t such that i and
j are activated consecutively at t′ and t′ + 1, respectively. Although stronger than the persistent
activation assumption, the pairwise persistent activation assumption is satisfied in most stochastic
settings as well, particularly when agents are activated independently, e.g., according to Poisson
clocks.
The following result can be derived directly from Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, and specifies the
number of long-run cooperators.
Corollary 6.2. For a population with p ∈ Pn, almost surely there exists some time τ such that
for all t ≥ τ , if the population is biased, nC(t) =
∑l
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and if it is ruﬄed,
nC(t) ∈
{bn∗SDkpc, dn∗SDkpe},
with two infinite time sequences {ti−}∞i=1 and {ti+}∞i=1 satisfying for i = 1, 2, . . .,
nC(t
i
−) = bn∗SDkpc, nC(ti+) = dn∗SDkpe.
Corollary 6.2 and Lemma 6.8 can be used the derive lower and upper bounds for the number
of long-run cooperators.
Corollary 6.3. For an unbiased population with benchmark kp, almost surely there exists some
time τ such that for all t ≥ τ ,
n∗SDkp ≤ nC(t) < n∗SDkp−1 .
After having presented the mathematical analysis of the long-run behavior of the decision-
making dynamics, in the next section, we look into how the number of long-run cooperators
changes when the cooperation tendencies of some SD players are manipulated.
6.4 The level-off phenomenon
For heterogeneous populations, important research questions arise that do not show up for homoge-
neous populations. In particular, we are interested in knowing whether increasing some individuals’
tendencies to cooperate results in the rise of the cooperation level of the whole population. Mainly
through simulations, we have provided a negative answer to this question in [139]. In this chap-
ter, we give more thorough theoretical analysis showing that the total number of cooperators in
the long run, denoted by nfC , may initially increase as the tendencies of a portion of individuals
increases, but levels off as the portion grows until the size of the portion passes a threshold, after
which the number of cooperators may continue to grow. We call this particular relationship be-
tween the number of long-run cooperators and the portion of manipulated population the level-off
phenomenon. Let us first illustrate this phenomenon by an example.
Example 6.1. Consider the decision-making dynamics formulated in Sec. 6.2 for a population of




, n∗SD3 , n
∗
SD4
, n∗SD5) = (75, 60, 50, 40, 15),
and the type-vector
p = (7, 0, 3, 20, 60, 10).
For r = 0, 1, . . . 60 agents of the SD5 type, we change them to SD2 agents. We plot n
f
C against r in
Figure 6.1. Clearly, as the number of SD2 agents increases, the number of long-run cooperators n
f
C
first increases as r grows from 0 to 10, levels off for 10 ≤ r ≤ 30, increases again for 30 ≤ r ≤ 40,
and experiences two more level-offs afterwards. So increasing r does not necessarily increase the
number of long-run cooperators.
To explain such level-off phenomena mathematically, we first observe from Figure 6.1 that every
plateau in the curve takes the value of one of the integer-valued tempers n∗SDb , b ∈ {1, . . . , l}. We
formulate this observation more rigorously in the following proposition.
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Figure 6.1: For Example 1, the number of long-run cooperators nfC against the number of SD5
agents r, whose types have changed to SD2.
Proposition 6.2. For b ∈ {1, . . . , l}, assume n∗SDb is an integer. Then almost surely nfC = n∗SDb,
if and only if
∑b−1













⇒ kp = b,
it follows from Corollary 6.2 and
∑b−1
s=1 ps ≤ n∗SDb that almost surely nfC(p) = n∗SDb .
(necessity) Let nfC(p) = n
∗
SDb
. First n∗SDb ≤
∑b
s=1 ps is proven by contradiction. Assume the
contrary, i.e., n∗SDb >
∑b
s=1 ps, then kp ≥ b + 1. Consider the situation when the population is
clean-cut, i.e.,
∑kp−1




s=1 ps. On the other
hand, by the definition of kp,
∑kp−1
s=1 ps < n
∗
SDkp−1
. Hence, nfC(p) < n
∗
SDkp−1




, which is impossible. Therefore, the population is ruﬄed, i.e.,
∑kp−1




Hence, in view of Corollary 6.2, nfC(p) = n
∗
SDb
= n∗SDkp , but this is in contradiction with kp ≥ b+1.
So n∗SDb ≤
∑b
s=1 ps must be true.
Now
∑b−1
s=1 ps ≤ n∗SDb is proven by contradiction. Assume the contrary, i.e.,
∑b−1






s=1 ps < n
∗










s=1 ps ≥ n∗SDb−1 , yielding kp ≤ b − 1. On the other hand, in view of








s=1 ps ≤ n∗SDb .
The proposition shows the existence of a range of type-vectors that almost surely will lead to
n∗SDb cooperators in the population in the long run. The following theorem takes advantage of this
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result, and determines precisely those changes in the types of the agents in order to achieve and
maintain n∗SDb cooperators in the long run. For a type-vector p, denote by p
r
i→j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , l},
the new type-vector after the type of r ≥ 0 agents changes from SDi to SDj. When all the tempers
n∗SDb are integers, from Corollary 6.2, we know that n
f
C(p) always exists for any p ∈ Pn.
Theorem 6.3 (sustainable cooperation levels). For a given population with p ∈ Pn, assume all













C(p), if and only if i ≤ b, j ≥ b+ 1 and r >
∑b










C(p), if and only if one of the
following holds
1. i = j,
2. i ≥ b+ 1 and j ≥ b,
3. i ≥ b+ 1, j ≤ b− 1 and r ≤ n∗SDb −
∑b−1
s=1 ps,
4. i = b, j ≤ b− 1 and r ≤ n∗SDb −
∑b−1
s=1,
5. i = b, j ≥ b+ 1 and r ≤∑bs=1−n∗SDb ,
6. i ≤ b− 1 and j ≤ b,
7. i ≤ b− 1, j ≥ b+ 1 and r ≤∑bs=1 ps − n∗SDb .
Hence, in order to have nfC(p
r
i→j) greater than (resp. less than) n
f
C(p), all of the above cases must
be violated. This results in either i ≥ b, j ≤ b− 1 and r > n∗SDb −
∑b−1
s=1 ps or i ≤ b, j ≥ b+ 1 and
r >
∑b
s=1 ps − n∗SDb . It can be verified that only in the first case, nfC(pri→j) becomes greater than




i→j) becomes less than n
f





C(p), which completes the proof.
Theorem 6.3 confirms the existence of cooperation levels that are robust against changes in the
cooperation tendencies of the agents. Namely, unless one of the first two cases in the theorem takes
place, the number of long-run cooperators is robust against the changes in types of the population.
Note that this robustness is against both increasing and decreasing cooperation tendencies.
Another usage of Theorem 6.3 is to determine quantitatively the widths of the plateaus for
curves like Figure 6.1. In Example 6.1, since i ≥ b and j ≤ b− 1, Case 1) of Theorem 6.3 implies
that increasing the type of r SD5 agents to SD2, does not increase the total number of cooperators
if and only if r ≤ n∗SD4 −
∑3
s=1 ps = 40− 20 = 20. Therefore, the width of the first plateau is 20.
The following proposition discusses what happens when the number of cooperators is not equal
to any temper n∗SDb .
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Proposition 6.3. Given a population with p ∈ Pn, if the number of long-run cooperators is some
constant between two consecutive tempers of the agents, n∗SDb and n
∗
SDb−1, b ∈ {2, . . . , l}, where
n∗SDb−1 is an integer, then changing an SDi agent to SDj where j < b ≤ i, increases the number





SDb−1 ⇒ nfC(p1i→j) > nfC(p), j < b ≤ i.









n∗SDkp . Then, since
∑kp−1
s=1 ps < n
∗











pˆs ≤ n∗SDb−1 .
If
∑b−1
s=1 pˆs < n
∗





s=1 ps + 1 = n
f
C(p) + 1. If on the other hand,
∑b−1
s=1 pˆs = n
∗
SDb−1 , then it can










SDb−1 implies kp = b
and
∑kp−1
s=1 ps ≥ n∗SDkp . Hence, from Theorem 6.2, the condition j < b ≤ i in Proposition 6.3
implies that a defector changes to a cooperator. On the other hand, in view of Theorem 6.3, the
above proposition implies that sustainable cooperation levels only maintain at the tempers of the
agents. Therefore, Proposition 6.3 together with Theorem 6.3 provide a complete characterization
of the level-off phenomena.
6.5 Controlling the number of cooperators
Now that we know the behavior of the population game after a sufficient number of time steps, we
are interested in investigating whether it is possible to control the number of cooperators in the
final state. Before proceeding to the rest of this section, we present the following reformulation of
Corollary 6.2 that we use during the proofs. Given p ∈ Pn, we denote the number of cooperators
in the population at time t by nC(p, t). We also extend the definition of kp as follows. For the












i=1 pi ≥ n∗SDl and kp = l + 1 otherwise. Then the total number of cooperators in the long run
can be determined as follows.
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Corollary 6.4 (reformulation of Corollary 6.2). For a population with the type vector p ∈ Pn and
temper n∗, almost surely there exists some time τ such that if kp = l + 1 holds, or kp 6= l + 1 and∑kp−1
i=1 pi ≥ n∗SDkp hold, then
∃τ : nC(p, t) =
kp−1∑
i=1
pi ∀t ≥ τ.
and if kp 6= l + 1 and
∑kp−1




∃τ : nC(p, t) ∈
{bn∗SDkpc, dn∗SDkpe} ∀t ≥ τ
with two infinite time sequences {ti−}∞i=1 and {ti+}∞i=1 satisfying for i = 1, 2, . . .,
nC(p, t
i
−) = bn∗SDkpc, nC(p, ti+) = dn∗SDkpe.
We take this result as the base of our control design in the next section. We also note that the
above convergence result holds “almost surely”, that is it happens with probability one. Corre-
spondingly, the results of this section hold also almost surely; however, we drop this term in our
statements in the rest of the chapter for sake of simplicity.
Now given a population of the fixed size of n agents, each of which belongs to one of the types
SD1, . . . , SDl and PD, we study whether it is possible to make the number of cooperators equal to
some reference value r for all time greater than some time τ . While there may be several ways to
achieve this goal, e.g., fixing the strategies of some of the agents to cooperation, we take the type
distribution of the agents as the control input. This is achieved by modifying the parameters of the
agents’ payoff matrices. By changing the types of a group of agents, a (new) type vector is acquired
which leads to a possibly new number of cooperators in the final state. The interesting point is
that since the long run behavior of the population state is independent of the initial strategies
of the agents, it does not matter when and in which order the changes in the types are applied.
Just when all changes take place, the number of cooperators reaches the new final state after some
time τ . So we ignore when the type modifications are applied, and shape our research question as
follows:
Problem 1. (Reachable number of cooperators): Consider the temper n∗, type vector
ξ and initial population state x(0). For a given nonnegative integer r and under the update rule
(6.2), is it possible that by just changing the types of some of the agents, the number of cooperators
equals r for all time greater than some constant τ?
Each set of changes results in a (possibly new) type vector p. So to determine all of those r
providing a positive answer to the above problem, we start with defining the reachable set Dn as
all nonnegative integers r for which there exists a type vector p so that under the update rule
(6.2), the number of cooperators equals and remains r after some time τ , i.e.,
Dn :=
{
r ∈ Z≥0 | ∃p ∈ Pn : (∃τ : nC(p, t) = r ∀t ≥ τ)
}
.
Dn is completely determined by the following proposition.
Proposition 6.4. It holds that
Dn =
{
0, 1, . . . ,min
{bn∗SD1c, n}} . (6.58)
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Proof. First it is shown that if r > n∗SD1 , then r 6∈ Dn. Use contradiction. Assume that there
exists a type vector p ∈ Pn such that
∃τ : nC(p, t) = r ∀t ≥ τ. (6.59)
According to Corollary 6.4, one of the followings holds
∃τ : nC(p, t) =
∑kp−1
i=1
pi ∀t ≥ τ, (6.60)
∃τ : nC(p, t) ∈
{bn∗SDkpc, dn∗SDkpe} ∀t ≥ τ. (6.61)















which is in contradiction with the definition of kp. On the other hand, if (6.61) holds, according
to Corollary 6.4, nC fluctuates between bn∗SDkpc and dn∗SDkpe in the long run. So in view of (6.59),
bn∗SDkpc = dn∗SDkpe = n∗SDkp = r.
But this is in contradiction with the assumption r > n∗SD1 . Hence,
r 6∈ Dn ∀r > n∗SD1 . (6.62)
Now note that the number of cooperators cannot exceed the total number of agents in the popu-
lation, i.e., n. Thus, r ≤ n. This together with (6.62) confine Dn as follows
Dn ⊆
{
0, 1, . . . ,min
{bn∗SD1c, n}} . (6.63)
To complete the proof, we show that any r that belongs to
{
0, 1, . . . ,min
{bn∗SD1c, n}}, also belongs
to Dn. Consider the case when dn∗SDle ≤ n. If
r ∈ {dn∗SDle, dn∗SDle+ 1, . . . ,min{bn∗SD1c, n}} , (6.64)
then there exists an index b ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that r = n∗SDb or there exists an index b ∈ {2, . . . , l}
such that n∗SDb−1 > r > n
∗
SDb
. In any case, consider the following type vector
q = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
b−1











⇒ kq = b.
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Since
∑b−1
i=1 qi = 0 < n
∗
SDb
, in view of Corollary 6.4, there exists a time τ such that nC(q, t) =∑b
i=1 qi = r for all t ≥ τ . Hence, r ∈ Dn. Now if
r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , dn∗SDle − 1}} , (6.65)
then consider the following type vector





i = r < n
∗
SDl
and hence kq′ = l + 1. So in view of Corollary 6.4, there exists a





i = r for all t ≥ τ . Therefore, r ∈ Dn. Since (6.64) and (6.65)
completely cover the set
{
0, 1, . . . ,min
{bn∗SD1c, n}}, and for each case, it is shown that r ∈ Dn,
equation (6.58) is concluded in this case.
Now consider the case when dn∗SDle > n. Then min
{bn∗SD1c, n} = n and we need to show that
if r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, then r ∈ Dn. This can be shown using q′ in (6.66). So in general, it is proven
that if r ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,min{bn∗SD1c, n}} then r ∈ Dn. Hence,{
0, 1, . . . ,min
{bn∗SD1c, n}} ⊆ Dn
which together with (6.63) complete the proof.
Now that the reachable set Dn is clarified, we know to which variables we are potentially able
to set the number of cooperators in the long run. However, it is still not clear how the types of
the agents must change. As previously mentioned, each set of changes in the types of the agents
results in a possibly new type vector. Therefore, if we know that (or those) feasible type vector(s)
p under which the number of cooperators equals the reference value for all time greater than some
constant τ , we also know the type of which agent should be changed to what, by just comparing the
original type vector ξ with p. For a population of size n and a reference r ∈ Dn, define F(r, n) as
the set of all feasible type-populations p ∈ Pn such that under the updater rule (6.2), the number
of cooperators equals r for all time greater than some constant τ , i.e.,
F(r, n) := {p | p ∈ Pn, (∃τ : nC(p, t) = r ∀t ≥ τ)}.
Our goal is to determine F(r, n). Then it becomes clear how the types of the agents must change
to have r cooperators in the long run. We need to define the following sets for a given n ∈ N,
r ∈ Dn and b ∈ {1, . . . , l + 1}:
F b1(r, n) :=
{






F b2(r, n) :=
{






Theorem 6.4. Given the temper n∗, population size n and reference value r ∈ Dn,
1. if there exists b ∈ {2, . . . , l} such that n∗SDb−1 > r > n∗SDb, then F(r, n) = F b1(r, n);
2. if there exists b ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that r = n∗SDb, then F(r, n) = F b1(r, n) ∪ F b2(r, n);
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3. if r ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,min{dn∗SDle − 1, n}}, then F(r, n) = F l+11 (r, n).
Proof. Let p ∈ F(r, n). Because of the definition of F(r, n) and the fact that r belongs to the
reachable set Dn, it holds that
∃τ : nC(p, t) = r ∀t ≥ τ. (6.67)
On the other hand, according to Corollary 6.4, one of the followings takes place
∃τ : nC(p, t) =
kp−1∑
i=1
pi ∀t ≥ τ, (6.68)
∃τ : nC(p, t) ∈
{bn∗SDkpc, dn∗SDkpe} ∀t ≥ τ. (6.69)
Now we proceed to the three cases of the theorem:
1. ∃b ∈ {2, . . . , l} : n∗SDa−1 > r > n∗SDb .








which is in contradiction with the condition for kp being equal to l + 1, i.e.,
∑l




if (6.69) is in force, then in view of Corollary 6.4, nC fluctuates between bn∗SDkpc and dn∗SDkpe in
the long run. Hence, according to (6.67),
bn∗SDkpc = dn∗SDkpe = n∗SDkp = r.




(6.68) holds. On the other hand, due to Corollary 6.4, (6.68) holds either if kp = l + 1, which is
impossible, or if
∑kp−1










⇒ n∗SDkp−1 > r ≥ n∗SDkp .
By comparing this equation with n∗SDb−1 > r > n
∗
SDb





r. So p ∈ Fa1 , implying that F(r, n) ⊆ F b1(r, n). On the other hand, for any q ∈ F b1(r, n), the
following holds according to Corollary 6.4
∃τ : nC(q, t) = r ∀t ≥ τ.
Thus, q ∈ F(r, n) and hence F b1(r, n) ⊆ F(r, n). Therefore, we conclude that F(r, n) = Fa1 which
proves the first part of the theorem.
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2. ∃b ∈ {1, . . . , l} : r = n∗SDb .
First note that kp = l + 1 does not hold since then r =
∑l
i=1 pi = n
∗
SDb
which is in contradiction
with the condition for kp = l + 1, i.e.,
∑l
i=1 pi < n
∗
SDl
. Hence, kp 6= l + 1. According to Corollary
6.4, F(r, n) ⊆ F b1(r, n)∪F b2(r, n). On the other hand, similar to the previous part, if q ∈ F b1(r, n),
then q ∈ F(r, n) and hence F b1(r, n) ⊆ F(r, n). So we only need to prove that F b2(r, n) ⊆ F(r, n).
Consider q ∈ F b2(r, n). Since kq = b and
∑b−1
i=1 qi < r, in view of Corollary 6.4,
∃τ : nC(q, t) ∈
{bn∗SDkq c, dn∗SDkq e} ∀t ≥ τ. (6.70)
Since n∗SDb = r ∈ Z and kq = b, it holds that bn∗SDkq c = dn∗SDkq e = n∗SDkq = r. Hence, (6.70)
implies
∃τ : nC(q, t) = r ∀t ≥ τ.
Hence, q ∈ F(r, n), implying F b2(r, n) ⊆ F(r, n), which completes the proof of the second part of
the theorem.
3. r ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,min{dn∗SDle − 1, n}}.
Clearly (6.69) does not hold in this case; otherwise,
n∗SDkp = r ≤ min
{dn∗SDle − 1, n} ≤ dn∗SDle − 1 < n∗SDl (6.71)
which is in contradiction with (6.5). Therefore, (6.68) is in force. Then in view of (6.67), it holds
that
∑kp−1
i=1 pi = r. On the other hand, according to Corollary 6.4, (6.68) holds only if
kp−1∑
i=1
pi ≥ n∗SDkp or kp = l + 1.
The first yields a contradiction since in view of (6.71),
kp−1∑
i=1











The second case, i.e., kp = l + 1, results in
∑l
i=1 pi = r. Hence, p ∈ F l+11 (r, n). So F(r, n) ⊆
F l+11 (r, n). Now if q ∈ F l+11 (r, n), then kp = l + 1 and in view of Corollary 6.4, since
∑l
i=1 qi = r,
the following holds
∃τ : nC(q, t) = r ∀t ≥ τ.
Hence, q ∈ F(r, n), implying that F(r, n) = F l+11 (r, n), which completes the proof of the third
part of the theorem and hence the whole.
Now that F(r, n) is determined, it becomes clear how to change the types of the agents to
set the final state of the number of cooperators to r. However, as F(r, n) is a set, there may
be several ways to change the types of the agents and some may require more changes than the
others. Note that by a change, we mean the type transition of some agent i from her current type
to another. Some of the changes in the types do not affect the number of cooperators in the long
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run at all. For example, in case the number of cooperators has reached an equilibrium point n∗SDkp ,
by changing the type of an SDkp+1 agent to SDkp+2, still nC reaches and stays at the equilibrium
n∗SDkp after some finite time τ . We are not interested in these kind of changes. In general, we seek
the minimum number of changes needed to set the number of cooperators to r at the final state.
Problem 2. (Minimum type-change cooperation control) Given the temper n∗, type
vector ξ ∈ Pn and reference value r ∈ Dn, what is the minimum number of agents needed to
change their types to ensure that under the update rule (6.2), the number of cooperators equals r
for all time greater than some constant τ? Moreover, the types of which agents should be changed
and to what types they should be changed?
We can reformulate Problem 2 as the following optimization problem.
Problem 3. Given the temper n∗, type vector ξ ∈ Pn and reference value r ∈ Dn,
m := arg min
p∈Pn
‖p− ξ‖1 s.t. ∃τ : nC(p, t) = r ∀t ≥ τ
where ‖ · ‖1 is the 1-norm, i.e., ‖x‖1 =
∑
i |xi|.
Now m provides the minimum number of changes in Problem 2. Moreover, each optimal
solution p is a type vector that (i) guaranties the number of cooperators becomes r for all time
greater than some τ and (ii) among all other type vectors with such a property, p has the minimum
difference from the given type vector ξ. Therefore, by comparing p with ξ, it becomes clear how
the types of the agents must change. For example, if ξ = (5, 4) and p = (8, 1), we know that the
types of 3 PD agents must be changed to SD1 in order to make the number of cooperators equal
to the desired value r in the long run. For a reachable r, the following theorem determines m and
the way the types must change.
Theorem 6.5. Consider the temper n∗, type vector ξ ∈ Pn and reference value r ∈ Dn. Then
1. if there exists b ∈ {2, . . . , l} such that n∗SDb−1 > r > n∗SDb, then m = |r−
∑b−1
i=1 ξi|. Moreover,
when r−∑b−1i=1 ξi > 0, the minimum is achieved if and only if r−∑b−1i=1 ξi agents are chosen
from the types SDb, . . . , SDl and PD, and the type of each of these agents is changed to one
of the types SD1, . . . , SDb−1. When r−
∑b−1
i=1 ξi < 0, the minimum is achieved if and only if
r −∑b−1i=1 ξi agents are chosen from the types SD1, . . . , SDb−1, and the type of each of these
agents is changed to one of the types SDb, . . . , SDl or PD.
2. If there exists b ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that n∗SDb = r, then
(a) if
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb−1 and
∑b−1
i=1 ξi ≤ n∗SDb, then m =
∑b
i=1 ξi − dn∗SDb−1e + 1 and the
minimum is achieved if and only if
∑b
i=1 ξi − dn∗SDb−1e + 1 agents are chosen from the
types SD1, . . . , SDb, and the type of each of these agents is changed to one of the types
SDb+1, . . . , SDl or PD;
(b) if
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb−1 and
∑b−1
i=1 ξi > n
∗
SDb
, then if ξb + n
∗
SDb
< n∗SDb−1, it holds that
m =
∑b−1
i=1 ξi−n∗SDb, and the minimum is achieved if and only if
∑b−1
i=1 ξi−n∗SDb agents are
chosen from the types SD1, . . . , SDb−1, and the type of each of these agents is changed




it holds that m =
∑b
i=1 ξi − dn∗SDb−1e + 1, and the minimum is achieved if and only if
in addition to the above changes, ξb + n
∗
SDb
− dn∗SDb−1e + 1 agents are chosen from the
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types SD1, . . . , SDb, and the type of each of these agents is changed to one of the types
SDb+1, . . . , SDl or PD;
(c) if
∑b
i=1 ξi < n
∗
SDb
, then m = n∗SDb −
∑b
i=1 ξi, and the minimum is achieved if and only
if n∗SDb −
∑b
i=1 ξi agents are chosen from the types SDb+1, . . . , SDl and PD, and the
type of each of these agents is changed to one of the types SD1, . . . , SDb;
(d) if n∗SDb−1 >
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb and
∑b−1
i=1 ξi ≤ n∗SDb, then m = 0, i.e., no changes are
required;
(e) if n∗SDb−1 >
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb and
∑b−1
i=1 ξi > n
∗
SDb
, then m =
∑b−1
i=1 ξi − n∗SDb, and the
minimum is achieved if and only if
∑b−1
i=1 ξi − n∗SDb agents are chosen from the types
SD1, . . . , SDb−1, and the type of each of these agents is changed to one of the types
SDb, . . . , SDl and PD.
3. If r ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,min{dn∗SDle − 1, n}}, then m = |r−∑li=1 ξi|. Moreover, when r−∑li=1 ξi >
0, the minimum is achieved if and only if the types of r −∑li=1 ξi number of the PD agents
are changed to SD. When r−∑li=1 ξi < 0, the minimum is achieved if and only if the types
of r −∑li=1 ξi number of the SD agents are changed to PD.
Proof. Let p denote the type vector after applying the minimum number of changes to the types
of the agents in order to have r cooperators for all time greater than some constant τ . Then
p ∈ F(r, n). We proceed to the three cases of the theorem:
1. ∃b ∈ {2, . . . , l} : n∗SDb−1 > r > n∗SDb .
According to Theorem 6.4, p ∈ F b1(r, n) in this case. By comparing ξ with any p ∈ F b1(r, n), it




|pi − ξi| ≥
b−1∑
i=1









Now if r −∑b−1i=1 ξi > 0, the number of the agents belonging to the types SD1, . . . , SDb−1 is less
than the desired number. So the type of r −∑b−1i=1 ξi of the agents belonging to any other type,
i.e., SDb, . . . , SDl or PD have to be changed to any of the types SD1, . . . , SDb−1. This proves the
“only if” part. Now let q denote the type vector after r−∑b−1i=1 ξi agents of the types SDb, . . . , SDl
or PD are chosen and the types of each of them are changed to one of SD1, . . . , SDb−1. Then∑b−1
i=1 qi = r. Thus, because of n
∗
SDb−1 > r > n
∗
SDb
, it holds that
j∑
i=1
qi ≤ r < n∗SDb−1 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , b− 1}
b∑
i=1
qi ≥ r > n∗SDb

⇒ kq = b.
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So in view of Corollary 6.4, there exists a time τ such that nC(q, t) =
∑b−1
i=1 qi = r for all t ≥ τ . This
proves the “if” part, and also implies that m ≤ r−∑b−1i=1 ξi. A similar reasoning holds for the case
when r −∑b−1i=1 ξi < 0, implying that m ≤∑b−1i=1 −rξi. Therefore, in any case, m ≤ |r −∑b−1i=1 ξi|.
Hence, in view of (6.72), m = |r −∑b−1i=1 ξi|, and the proof of this case is complete.
2. ∃b ∈ {1, . . . , l} : n∗SDb = r.









pi ≤ dn∗SDb−1e − 1. (6.73)
Now we proceed to the following sub-cases:
(a)
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb−1 and
∑b−1
i=1 ξi ≤ n∗SDb .
By comparing the inequality in (6.73) with
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb−1 , it can be concluded that at least∑b
i=1 ξi−dn∗SDb−1e+1 agents from the types SD1, . . . , SDb must be chosen, and the types of each of
them must be changed to one of the types SDb+1, . . . , SDl or PD. Hence, m ≥
∑b
i=1 ξi−dn∗SDb−1e+
1. Now let q denote the type vector after applying the above changes. Then
∑b












⇒ kq = b.
On the other hand, since the number of the SDi agents, i = 1, . . . , b − 1, has not increased after






ξi ≤ n∗SDb .
Hence, in view of Corollary 6.4, there exists a time τ such that nC(q, t) = n
∗
SDb
for all t ≥ τ .
Therefore, m =
∑b
i=1 ξi − dn∗SDb−1e+ 1 and the proof of this case is complete.
(b)
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb−1 and
∑b−1




According to Theorem 6.4, p ∈ F(r, n) = F b1(r, n) ∪ F b2(r, n). Hence,
∑b−1
i=1 pi ≤ n∗SDb . By
comparing this with
∑b−1
i=1 ξi > n
∗
SDb
, it can be concluded that at least
∑b−1
i=1 ξi− n∗SDb agents from
the types SD1, . . . , SDb−1 must be chosen and the types of each of them must be changed to one
of the types SDb, . . . , SDl or PD. Let d denote the type vector after making these changes. Then∑b−1
i=1 di = n
∗
SDb









ξi − n∗SDb) = ξb + n∗SDb . (6.74)
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So
∑b
i=1 di ≥ n∗SDb . Now if ξb + n∗SDb < n∗SDb−1 , then by (6.74),
∑b
i=1 di < n
∗
SDb−1 , and hence∑b−1
i=1 di < n
∗
SDb−1 . Hence, kd = b. Moreover, because of
∑b−1
i=1 di = n
∗
SDb
, it holds that d ∈
F b1(r, n) ⊆ F(r, n) and hence no more changes are required. Thus, m =
∑b−1





≥ n∗SDb−1 , then by (6.74),
∑b
i=1 di ≥ n∗SDb−1 . Hence, according to (6.73), the desired
type vector p has the property that
∑b
i=1 pi < dn∗SDb−1e−1. So still at least
∑b
i=1 di−dn∗SDb−1e+ 1
agents from the types SD1, . . . , SDb must be chosen and the type of each of them must be changed

















ξi − dn∗SDb−1e+ 1.
Now let q denote the type vector after changing the types of
∑b−1
i=1 ξi−n∗SDb number of SD1, . . . , SDb−1
agents to SDb, . . . , SDl and PD and changing the types of ξb + n
∗
SDb
− dn∗SDb−1e + 1 number of
SD1, . . . , SDb agents to SDb+1, . . . , SDl and PD. Then
∑b





i=1 qi ≤ n∗SDb .




t ≥ τ . Therefore, m = ∑bi=1 ξi − dn∗SDb−1e+ 1 and the proof of this case is complete.
(c)
∑b




According to Theorem 6.4, p ∈ F(r, n) = F b1(r, n)∪F b2(r, n). Hence, kp = b, resulting in
∑b
i=1 pi ≥
n∗SDb . By comparing this with
∑b
i=1 ξi < n
∗
SDb
, it can be concluded that at least n∗SDb −
∑b
i=1 ξi
agents from the types SDb+1, . . . , SDl and PD must be chosen and the types of each of them must
be changed to one of the types SD1, . . . , SDb. So m ≥ n∗SDb −
∑b
i=1 ξi. Now let q denote the type
vector after making the above changes. Then
∑b













Hence, in view of (6.5),
∑b−1
i=1 qi < n
∗
SDb−1 , implying that kq = b. So in view of Corollary 6.4 and
(6.75), there exists a time τ such that nC(q, t) = n
∗
SDb
for all t ≥ τ . Therefore, m = n∗SDb−
∑b
i=1 ξi,
and the proof of this case is complete.
(d) n∗SDb−1 >
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb and
∑b−1
i=1 ξi ≤ n∗SDb .
Since n∗SDb−1 >
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb it holds that kξ = b. Now either if
∑b−1






n∗SDb , in view of Corollary 6.4, there exists a time τ such that nC(ξ, t) = n
∗
SDb
for all t ≥ τ .
Therefore, no changes are needed and hence m = 0.
(e) n∗SDb−1 >
∑b
i=1 ξi ≥ n∗SDb and
∑b−1
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According to Theorem 6.4, p ∈ F(r, n) = F b1(r, n) ∪ F b2(r, n). Hence,
∑b−1
i=1 pi ≤ n∗SDb . Since∑b−1
i=1 ξi > n
∗
SDb
, it can be concluded that at least
∑b−1
i=1 ξi−n∗SDb agents from the types SD1, . . . , SDb−1
must be chosen and the types of each of them must be changed to one of the types SDb, . . . , SDl
and PD. So m ≥ ∑b−1i=1 ξi − n∗SDb . Now let q denote the type vector after making the above
changes. Then
∑b−1


















⇒ kq = b.
Now because of
∑b−1
i=1 qi = n
∗
SDb
, in view of Corollary 6.4, there exists a time τ such that nC(q, t) =∑b−1
i=1 qi = n
∗
SDb
for all t ≥ τ . Therefore, m = ∑b−1i=1 ξi−n∗SDb , and the proof of this case is complete.
3. r ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,min{dn∗SDle − 1, n}}.
According to Theorem 6.4, p ∈ F(r, n) = F l+11 (r, n). Hence,
∑l
i=1 pi = r. By comparing this
with
∑l
i=1 ξi, it can be concluded that m ≥ |r −
∑l
i=1 ξi|. If r −
∑l
i=1 ξi > 0, then the types of
r−∑li=1 ξi number of the PD agents must be changed to SD; otherwise, r−∑li=1 ξi number of the
SD agents must be changed to PD. Now let q denote the type vector after the above |r−∑li=1 ξi|
changes are made. Then
l∑
i=1
qi = r < min
{dn∗SDle − 1, n} ≤ dn∗SDle − 1⇒ kq = l + 1.
Hence, in view of Corollary 6.4, there exists a time τ such that nC(q, t) =
∑l
i=1 qi = r for all t ≥ τ .
Therefore, m = |r −∑li=1 ξi|, and the proof of this case, and hence the whole is complete.
According to the theorem, the number of changes in the types of the individuals to get a desired
cooperation level in the population, does not necessarily depend on the current cooperation level
of the population.
6.6 Concluding remarks
We have studied a finite heterogeneous population of decision-making agents under the myopic
best-response update rule. We have shown that based on the type of the population, the total
number of cooperators in the long run either becomes fixed or fluctuates between two consec-
utive numbers. We have used the convergence results to mathematically explain the level-off
phenomenon, and have shown the existence of sustainable levels of cooperation where increasing
the ratio of the less- or more-cooperative agents does not necessarily change the number of coop-
erators in the long run. This sheds light on how certain cooperation levels can be maintained in
a population of selfish individuals. It can also explain why sometimes increasing the tendencies
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of some individuals in social groups does not lead to a higher level of cooperation. Moreover, the
result indicates that if one wants to control the cooperation level of such populations by influencing
the types of the agents, different choices of manipulated agents might lead to different outcomes.
We have formulated such a control problem more formally in Section 6.5 and investigated how to
control the number of cooperators, and in particular, for a given population and its types, we have
shown how to change the types of the agents to reach a desired number of cooperators in the long
run. Since many real networks are structured and not well-mixed, it is of great interest to extend
the results to the case of structured populations, which is the topic of Chapter 9.
Chapter 7
Convergence of linear threshold
decision-making dynamics in finite
heterogeneous populations
Linear threshold models have been studied extensively in networked populations; however, less
attention has been paid to the perception differences among the individuals of the population. To
focus on this effect, we consider a finite well-mixed heterogeneous population where each individual
is associated with a threshold in the form of a fixed ratio within zero and one that can be unique to
this agent. Each agent is initialized with a random choice of the strategy A or B. Then according
to their thresholds, the agents update their strategies asynchronously. More specifically, at each
time step an agent is randomly activated to update; if the ratio of agents playing A is greater (resp.
less) than her threshold, she updates to A (resp. B); if the ratio is equal to her threshold, she
keeps her current strategy. Despite the simplicity of such a decision-making model, the population
dynamics may exhibit several possible long-run behavior for the same initial condition. Indeed,
we show that for any given initial condition, almost surely after a finite number of time steps, the
population reaches an equilibrium where no agent’s threshold is violated; however, the equilibrium
is not necessarily uniquely determined by the initial condition, but depends on the activation
sequence of the agents. We find all those possible equilibria that the dynamics may reach from
a given initial condition, and show that in contrast to the case of homogeneous populations,
the heterogeneity in agents’ thresholds give rise to several equilibria where both A-playing and
B-playing agents coexist. This confirms the possibility of having both types of players in the
long-run, even in a well-mixed population. Such results highlight the crucial role of perception
differences, characterized by thresholds, among the individuals or in general the heterogeneity of
the population in linear threshold models for the coexistence of individuals playing competing
strategies. We also find necessary and sufficient conditions for the asymptotic stability of the
equilibrium states and show how to calculate the contagion probability for a population with two
thresholds.
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7.1 Introduction
After studying finite well-mixed populations of individuals playing snowdrift and prisoner’s dilemma
games and updating according to the best-response update rule, here we investigate the case when
the individuals play coordination games, leading to linear threshold models. The spread of social
innovations, technological innovations, viral infections and reforms of corporate governance, are
examples of a cascading behavior where the adaption of an action by a portion of individuals makes
it more likely for the action to spread to the rest of the population [119]. At the individual level,
such a behavior can be modeled as follows: I adopt action A only if enough of my pears have done
so. This is actually the essence of the so called linear threshold models originally framed by Mark
Granovetter [52] where each individual has a threshold determining whether to adopt a specific
action based on the current number of other individuals who have already adopted that action.
On the other hand, in a different framework, evolutionary game theory [168, 94, 9, 118, 183, 83]
postulates an equivalent mechanism to describe such cascading behavior, namely the (myopic)
best-response update rule [149], resulting in the best-response dynamics [38, 44, 13, 155]. In this
game theoretical representation, individuals interact with each other and earn payoffs determined
by their strategies (actions) and utility functions that can be unique to each individual. Then
each individual updates her strategy to the one that maximizes her payoff against the average
population. In particular, when the payoffs satisfy those of a coordination game, the best-response
dynamics becomes exactly equivalent to the linear threshold model. Indeed some recent literature
confirms that human does follow the best-response update rule in coordination games [100].
Both the linear threshold model and the best-response update rule have been studied under
different circumstances such as when the population is structured [187, 109, 110, 88, 92, 164, 61],
the update is noisy [84, 8, 7], and other situations [148, 123, 6, 99]. Although these works reveal
interesting aspects of the linear threshold models, e.g., how the topology of the interaction network
affects the spread of a specific action [109], almost all of them consider a homogeneous population,
that is when the thresholds of all individuals are the same. However, some studies have highlighted
the impact of heterogeneity in the best-response dynamics by showing how small degrees of hetero-
geneity in the population leads to complex features such as cooperation sustainability (the level-off
phenomenon) [139, 136]. Also in the experimental work [100], deviations from the best-response
update rule are more likely due to individual heterogeneity rather than time or space. This moti-
vates us to focus on the role of heterogeneity in the best-response update rule, or equivalently the
linear threshold models. In an interesting work [1], linear threshold models in finite networks have
been considered in structured heterogeneous populations, showing the existence of cycles in the
behavior of the individuals when they update synchronously. Although the synchronous updating
applies to situations where agents revise their choices simultaneously, the asynchronous update
rule is perhaps more realistic, specially in scenarios where the consequences of the decisions occur
faster than the decisions themselves.
The aim of this work is to investigate the effect of heterogeneity using linear threshold models.
So to eliminate other effects such as population structures, we consider a finite well-mixed popu-
lation of decision-making individuals having different thresholds. The individuals choose between
two options A and B, and update asynchronously based on the linear threshold model. More
specifically, at each time step, an individual is randomly activated to revise her strategy based
on her threshold and the ratio of A-playing individuals in the population, resulting in population
dynamics. We take the distribution of the A-playing individuals among the agents with different
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thresholds as the state of the system. Similar to the anti-coordination best-response dynamics in
Chapter 6, here we show that regardless of the initial state and the activation sequence, almost
surely the dynamics reach an equilibrium state where one individual becomes a benchmark such
that all others with higher tendencies to play A, play A, and all with lower tendencies play B.
Several results have not been reported in the literature before and are the main contributions of
this chapter. First, in sharp contrast to the anti-coordination or synchronous setup, the popula-
tion dynamics may exhibit several possible long-run behavior for the same initial condition, that
is for the same initial state, the final state may vary depending on the activation sequence of the
agents. Moreover, in contrast to homogeneous setups, the dynamics may allow several equilibria
where both A-playing and B-playing agents coexist. Therefore, it is possible to have both types
of players in the long-run, even in a well-mixed population. These results highlight the key role of
(perception) heterogeneity of the individuals in linear threshold models. In addition, we investigate
the stability of the equilibria and show that clean-cut equilibrium states where individuals with
a particular threshold either all play A or all play B, can be asymptotically stable under some
conditions on the distribution of the thresholds, yet the other type of equilibrium states, which we
refer to as ruﬄed, are unstable. Finally, by using a recursive equation we show how to calculate
the contagion probability, that is the probability of reaching the state where every individual plays
A, in a population with two different types of individuals.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the framework and
formulate the problem. In Section III, we find the equilibrium states of the population dynamics.
In Section IV, we provide the main convergence results of this chapter, which is followed by the
stability analysis in Section V. In Section 7.6, we proceed to the contagion probability and finish
the chapter in Section 7.7 with the concluding remarks.
7.2 Model
We provide two equivalent models for the problem studied in this chapter and start with the linear
threshold model used in the rest of the chapter.
7.2.1 Linear threshold model
Consider a well-mixed population of n agents who choose one of the options A or B over a time
sequence t = 0, 1, . . .. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has a time-invariant threshold τi ∈ (0, 1) and her
choice (decision) at time t is denoted by di(t). At every time step t, a random agent i is activated
to revise her choice at t + 1. The linear threshold model dictates that agent i chooses A, if and
only if a portion greater than her threshold has already chosen A. The choice of B is made if and
only if in the population, a portion less than her threshold chooses A. In case when the portion
exactly equals the threshold of agent i, she continues with her previous choice, allowing choice
robustness for the agents. Namely, the update rule governing agent i’s choice can be written as
di(t+ 1) =

A xA(t) > τi
di(t) x
A(t) = τi
B xA(t) < τi
(7.1)
where xA(t) denotes the ratio of agents in the population choosing A at t.
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Different from the existing study on homogeneous populations where the evolution of xA is
the subject of interest, in this chapter for heterogeneous populations, we consider the challenging
problem of how the distribution of the choices over agents with different thresholds changes over
time. This can be captured by classifying the heterogeneous agents into different types according
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j+1 j = 1, . . . , l − 1. (7.2)







), j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, whom we call a type j agent, but may take place for an agent whose
threshold equals one of the ratios
n∗j
n
, j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, whom we call a type j∗ agent. This leads to
in total 2l different possible types of agents. Let nj and n˜j denote the number of type j and type
j∗ agents. The heterogeneity of the population is then characterized by the 2l-dimensional vector
(n1, n˜1, . . . , nl, n˜l). Let n
A
j (t) and n˜
A
j (t) denote the number of type j and type j
∗ agents whose
choices are A at time t. We stack all nAj and n˜
A
j together to get the population state
x(t)
∆
= (nA1 (t), n˜
A





which lies in the state space
X ∆= {(a1, b1, . . . , al, bl) | ai, bi ∈ Z≥0, ai ≤ ni, bi ≤ n˜i, i = 1, . . . , l}.
The activation mechanism together with update rule (7.1) governs the dynamics of x(t), which
we refer to as the population dynamics. The main goal of this chapter is to determine the asymptotic
behavior of x(t) from any given initial condition x(0). We make the following mild and standard
assumption on the way the agents are activated. We assume that every activation sequence is
persistent, that is for every agent i and every time t, with probability one there exists some
finite time ti ≥ t at which agent i is activated. Before proceeding to the analysis, we discuss an
equivalent game theoretical representation of the above threshold model, which is similar to the
game theoretical model presented in Chapter 6.
7.2.2 Game theoretical representation
Consider a well-mixed population of n agents that make decisions over a time sequence t = 0, 1, . . ..
Initially each agent starts with one of the two strategies A or B. As time evolves, the agents update
their strategies asynchronously according to the payoffs they earn against the average population
and under the best response update rule as explained in the following. Denote the strategy of
agent i by si(t) which is [1 0]
T when agent i chooses A at t and is 1 − [1 0]T = [0 1]T otherwise,
with 1 = [1 1]T . Let xA(t) denote the ratio of the A-players in the population at time t, and
define the average population vector sA(t) =
[
xA(t) 1− xA(t)]T . Then agent i’s payoff at time
t against the average population is calculated by si(t)
Tpii sA(t) where pii is a coordination-game






, Ri > Ti and Pi > Si.
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and the payoffs Ri, Ti, Si and Pi correspond to strategy pairs A-against-A, B-against-A, A-against-
B and B-against-B respectively. At each time step t, a random agent i is activated to revise her
strategy according to the (myopic) best-response update rule dictating that agent i chooses that
strategy which maximizes her payoff against the average population. In case both options A and
B earn the same payoff, the agent sticks to her current strategy. Then the choice of agent i at
time t+ 1 can be shown to bd
di(t+ 1) =






B xA(t) < Si−Pi
Ti−Ri+Si−Pi
.
Hence, the comparison of the coefficient Si−Pi
Ti−Ri+Si−Pi with the ratio of A-players determines whether
agent i changes her strategy when activated. Indeed, the coefficient Si−Pi
Ti−Ri+Si−Pi plays the role of τi
in the threshold model, which clarifies the equivalence of the above game theoretical model with
the threshold model. We use the threshold model in the rest of the chapter.
7.3 Equilibrium states
To better understand type j and j∗ agents, we first show how they revise their strategies according
to the update rule (7.1). Denote the total number of A-playing agents in the population at time t
by nA(t).




A nA(t) > n∗j
di(t) n
A(t) = n∗j
B nA(t) < n∗j
.
If agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is a type j agent, j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, then the update rule (7.1) is equivalent to
di(t+ 1) =
{
A nA(t) ≥ n∗j
B nA(t) < n∗j
.
Proof. The proof follows from (7.1) and the definitions of type j and j∗ agents.
Next, we characterize the equilibrium states. A state x∗ is an equilibrium state (of the popula-
tion dynamics), if whenever the state x(t) equals x∗, it remains there afterwards, regardless of the
activation sequence. For i = 0, 1, . . . , l, define the following 2l-dimensional row vectors
si := (n1, n˜1, . . . , ni, n˜i, 0, . . . , 0),
s∗i :=
(





(nj + n˜j)− ni, 0, . . . , 0
)
where s0 and s
∗
0 are 1× 2l zero vector. All these vectors satisfy two necessary conditions for being
an equilibrium state. First, from the update rule (7.1), we know that an agent plays A at an
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equilibrium if another agent with a smaller threshold also plays A; similarly, an agent would play
B at an equilibrium if a greater-threshold agent plays B as well. Formally, we have the following
result. Denote by X ∗ the set of all equilibrium states of the population dynamics governed by the
update rule (7.1).
Lemma 7.2. At any x ∈ X ∗, it holds that if nAi > 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then nAj = nj and
n˜Aj = n˜j for all j = 1, 2, . . . , i− 1. Moreover, if nAi = 0 while ni ≥ 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
nAj = n˜
A
j = 0 for all j = i, i+ 1, . . . , l.
Second, it follows from Lemma 7.1 that at an equilibrium, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, either nA
is no less than n∗j , and hence, all type j agents play A, or n
A is less than n∗j , and hence, all type j
agents play B.
Lemma 7.3. At any x ∈ X ∗, it holds that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either nAi = ni or nAi = 0.
Fulfilling Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3, si and s
∗
i , i = 1, 2, . . . , l, are candidates for being equilibrium
states. We now show that they are the only candidates.
Lemma 7.4. X ∗ ⊆ {si, s∗i }li=0.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium state x∗ ∈ X ∗. If x∗ = s0 = s∗0, the result is trivial; otherwise, in
view of Lemma 7.3, the smallest index for which nAj = nj, j ∈ {1, . . . , l} exists, which we denote
by i. Then according to Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3, x∗ has to take the following form
x∗ = (n1, n˜1, . . . , ni−1, n˜i−1, ni, n˜Ai , 0, 0, . . . , 0).
Now the equality nAi = ni implies that all type i agents have chosen A, yielding n
A ≥ n∗i in
view of Lemma 7.1. If nA > n∗i , then Lemma 7.1 implies that all type i
∗ agents have chosen A as
well, resulting in x∗ = si. If on the other hand, nA = n∗i , then Lemma 7.1 implies that the number





j=1(nj + n˜j)− ni, resulting in x∗ = s∗i . Hence, in either case, x∗ ∈ {si, s∗i }li=0.
Now we determine those indices of si and s
∗
i corresponding to the actual equilibrium states by
using the sets E ⊆ {0, . . . , l} defined by
E = {0, l} ∪
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1} ∣∣n∗i ≤ i∑
j=1





and consequently E∗ ⊆ E − {0} defined by
E∗ =
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , l} ∩ E ∣∣ i−1∑
j=1





Similar to the definitions in Chapter 6, we refer to the vectors sr, r ∈ E , and s∗r, r ∈ E∗, as clean-cut
and ruﬄed states, respectively. First we show that these vectors are indeed a state of the system,
i.e., they belong to the state space, and then we show that they are equilibrium states.
Lemma 7.5. sr ∈ X for r ∈ E and s∗r ∈ X for r ∈ E∗.
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Proof. The result is trivial for sr, r ∈ E , so we proceed to s∗r, r ∈ E∗. It suffices to show 0 ≤
[s∗r]2i−1 ≤ ni and 0 ≤ [s∗r]2i ≤ n˜i for i = 1, . . . , l where [x]i denotes the ith entry of x. According to
the structure of s∗r, we only need to show that 0 ≤ [s∗r]2r ≤ n˜i, i.e.,
0 ≤ n∗r −
r−1∑
j=1
(nj + n˜j)− nr ≤ n˜r.
The second inequality is an immediate result of the left-hand-side inequality in the definition in
(7.3). On the other hand, the first inequality follows directly from the inequality in (7.4). Thus,
s∗r ∈ X , completing the proof.
Lemma 7.6. It holds that {sr}r∈E ∪ {s∗r}r∈E∗ ⊆ X ∗.
Proof. The result is first shown for sr, r ∈ E . It can be easily verified that s0 and sl are equilibrium
states. So let r ∈ E − {0, l}. It suffices to show that for any tr ≥ 0,
x(tr) = sr ⇒ x(tr + 1) = sr.





(nj + n˜j) ≥ n∗r
(7.2)
==⇒ nA(tr) ≥ n∗i ∀i ≤ r.
Hence, from Lemma 7.1, for i = 1, . . . , r, if a type i or i∗ agent is activated at tr, she either chooses
A or keeps her choice for time tr + 1. On the other hand, according to the structure of sr, the
choices of all type i and type i∗ agents are already A at tr. Hence,{
nAi (tr + 1) = n
A
i (tr) = ni
n˜Ai (tr + 1) = n˜
A
i (tr) = n˜i
∀i ≤ r. (7.5)
Similarly it can be shown that{
nAi (tr + 1) = n
A
i (tr) = 0
n˜Ai (tr + 1) = n˜
A
i (tr) = 0
∀i > r. (7.6)
Now (7.5) and (7.6) result in x(tr + 1) = x(tr) = sr, proving that sr is an equilibrium state.
Next we show the result for s∗r, r ∈ E∗. It suffices to show that for any tr ≥ 0,
x(tr) = s
∗
r ⇒ x(tr + 1) = s∗r.
We first observe that when x(tr) = s
∗
r for some tr, according to the definition of s
∗





Hence, from Lemma 7.1, if a type r∗ agent is activated at tr, she keeps her strategy for time tr + 1,
yielding
n˜Ar (tr + 1) = n˜
A
r (tr). (7.8)
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Moreover, again from Lemma 7.1, if a type r agent is activated at tr, she chooses A. On the other
hand, according to the structure of s∗r, the choices of every type r agent are already A at time tr.
Hence,
nAr (tr + 1) = n
A
r (tr). (7.9)
Now due to (7.2), the following can be inferred from (7.7):
nA(tr) > n
∗
i ∀i < r and nA(tr) < n∗i ∀i > r.
Hence, similar to (7.5) and (7.6), the following can be concluded{
nAi (tr + 1) = n
A
i (tr)




The above equation together with (7.8) and (7.9) imply that x(tr + 1) = x(tr). Hence, s
∗
r is an
equilibrium state, which completes the proof.
Lemma 7.6 implies that the population under study is may have several equilibrium states
depending on the types’ population shares or equivalently the distribution of the thresholds among
the agents. While the lemma only states that the clean-cut and ruﬄed states are equilibrium states,
we show in the following that these are actually the only equilibrium states of the system. Let
E¯ = {1, . . . , l} − E and E¯∗ = {1, . . . , l} − E∗.
Lemma 7.7. It holds that ({sr}r∈E¯ ∪ {s∗r}r∈E¯∗) ∩ X ∗ = ∅.
Proof. Let r ∈ E¯ . Consider some time t1 such that x(t1) = sr. Then by definition, nA(t1) =∑r
j=1(nj + n˜j). Hence, in view of (7.3), r 6∈ E implies that one of the following is in force: (i)
nA(t1) < n
∗
r or (ii) n
A(t1) ≥ n∗r+1. Consider Case (i). If sr is an equilibrium state, then x(t) must
equal sr for all t ≥ t1 under any activation sequence. Consider some activation sequence, under
which a type r agent is activated at some time t2 > t1. If any agent has changed her choice between




in view of Lemma 7.1, the type-r active agent updates to B at t2 + 1. On the other hand, since
x(t2) = sr, the choice of the type r agent is A at t2. Hence, x(t2 + 1) 6= sr, implying that sr is not
an equilibrium state. Similarly for Case (ii), a type r+ 1 agent can be shown to change her choice
after some time, which again results in sr not being an equilibrium state.
Now let r ∈ E¯∗. Consider some time t1 such that x(t1) = s∗r. Then by definition, nA(t1) = n∗r.
Hence, according to (7.4), r 6∈ E∗ yields ∑r−1j=1(nj + n˜j) + nr ≥ n∗r. But then s∗r is not even a state
since [s∗r]2r < 0 (see the discussion in the proof of Lemma 7.6). This completes the proof.
Theorem 7.1. It holds that X ∗ = {sr}r∈E ∪ {s∗r}r∈E∗.
Proof. Lemmas 7.4 and 7.7 result in X ∗ ⊆ {sr}r∈E ∪ {s∗r}r∈E∗ . The proof then follows Lemma
7.6.
Knowing the equilibrium states, now we are ready to proceed to the long-run behavior of the
population dynamics.
7.4. Convergence analysis 141
7.4 Convergence analysis
We determine the asymptotic behavior of the state x(t) for any given initial condition x(0). The
number of initially A-playing agents plays a key role in this procedure, which is illustrated in the
following. Intuitively, if in a population, the ratio of the initial A-players with thresholds not
greater than that of a particular type r∗ agent exceeds the threshold of that agent, then both
the type r∗ agent and others with non-greater thresholds will eventually play A since they make






r ∈ L ∣∣ r∑
i=1
nAi (0) + n˜
A





where L = {0, 1, . . . , l}, n∗0 = −1 and
∑b
i=a is defined to be zero if a > b. When the population
reaches a state where all type j and j∗ agents, j ≤ y1, have chosen A, then this state can be
thought of as a new initial state, at which again some type j and j∗ agents may eventually choose
A. Let k1 denote the greatest i, for which all type j and j
∗ agents, j = 1, . . . , i, will eventually














s ∈ L ∣∣ j∑
i=1
ni + n˜i > n
∗
j+1 ∀j ∈ {y1, . . . , s− 1}
}
.
In what follows, “almost surely” means “with probability one”.
Proposition 7.1. If for a given initial condition x(0), y1 ≥ 1, then almost surely there exists some
time T such that for i = 1, . . . , k1,
nAi (t) = ni, n˜
A
i (t) = n˜i ∀t ≥ T. (7.11)
Proof. First we prove (7.11) for i = 1, . . . , y1. For this we first show by contradiction that for
i = 1, . . . , y1,
nAi (t) ≥ nAi (0), n˜Ai (t) ≥ n˜Ai (0) ∀t ≥ 0. (7.12)
Assume on the contrary, there exists some time t1 > 0 such that at least one of the inequalities in
(7.12) fails. Let t2 ≥ t1 be the first time this happens, namely, first of all, for i = 1, . . . , y1:
nAi (t) ≥ nAi (0), n˜Ai (t) ≥ n˜Ai (0) ∀t < t2, (7.13)
and second, there exists some q ∈ {1, . . . , y1} such that
nAq (t2) < n
A
q (0) or n˜
A
q (t2) < n˜
A
q (0).
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Hence, a type q or q∗ agent is activated at t2 − 1 and changes her choice from A to B at t2. On
the other hand,
nA(t2 − 1) ≥
y1∑
j=1





nAj (0) + n˜
A
j (0) > n
∗
y1
where the last inequality follows from the definition of y1. Hence, in view of (7.2), n
A(t2−1) > n∗q.
So according to Lemma 7.1, if a type q or a type q∗ agent is activated at t2− 1, she chooses A, not
B, a contrary, implying that (7.12) is in force.











nAj (0) + n˜
A




==⇒ nA(t) > n∗i ∀i ≤ y1.
Hence, in view of Lemma 7.1, for i = 1, . . . , y1, whenever a type i or i
∗ agent is activated, she
chooses A. On the other hand, due to the persistent activation assumption, almost surely there
exists some time ty1 ≥ 0 such that all type i and i∗ agents are activated at least once before ty1 ,
and hence, choose A before ty1 . Therefore, (7.11) holds for i = 1, . . . , y1 and τ = ty1 .
Now if k1 = y1, the proof of the proposition is complete, so consider the case when k1 > y1 (the
case k1 < y1 does not take place by the definition of k1). We use strong induction to show (7.11)
for i = y1, y1 + 1 . . . , k1. The statement was already shown for i = y1. So assume that it holds for
all i ≤ r where y1 ≤ r ≤ k1 − 1. Hence, almost surely there exists some time tr such that (7.11) is









nj + n˜j ∀t ≥ tr. (7.14)




nAj (t) + n˜
A




===⇒ nA(t) > n∗r+1 ∀t ≥ tr.
Then similar to what was shown above for i = 1, . . . , y1, the induction statement can be proven
for i = r + 1. This completes the proof of the induction and hence the whole proposition.
When the population reaches the state where all type j and j∗ agents, j = 1 . . . , k1, have chosen
A, still some other types may choose A, but this time it depends on the activation sequence. To
encompass all these potential long-run-A-playing types, we define vk1 = 0 if k1 = l; otherwise, we








nj + n˜j +
l∑
j=p+1
nAj (0) + n˜
A
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k1 if vk1 = 0
1 + min{p | vp = 1, vp+1 = 0} otherwise
where vl+1 is defined to be zero. Namely, for each p, we set vp = 1 if the portion of individuals with
thresholds not greater than that of a type p∗ agent and others who initially play A, exceeds the
threshold of a type (p+ 1)∗ agent; consequently, all type p+ 1 and (p+ 1)∗ agents may choose A in
the long run if they update their choices before any other type or if in the meanwhile other initially
A-playing individuals do not switch to B. Then intuitively, kl provides the greatest possible type
of agents, all individuals with thresholds non-greater than the threshold of which may eventually
choose A. So we do not expect any of the other type j and j∗ agents, j = kl + 1, . . . , l, to all
choose A in the long run. Indeed one can show somewhat the opposite: all type j and j∗ agents,
j = kl + 2, . . . , l, will eventually choose B.
Proposition 7.2. If for a given initial condition x(0), kl ≤ l − 2, then almost surely there exists
some time T such that for i = kl + 2, . . . , l,
nAi (t) = n˜
A
i (t) = 0 ∀t ≥ T. (7.15)
Proof. We first show by contradiction that for i = kl + 2, . . . , l,
nAi (t) ≤ nAi (0), n˜Ai (t) ≤ n˜Ai (0) ∀t ≥ 0. (7.16)
Assume on the contrary, there exists some time step t1 > 0 such that at least one of the inequalities
in (7.16) fails. Let t2 ≥ t1 be the first time this happens, namely, first of all, for i = kl + 2, . . . , l:
nAi (t) ≤ nAi (0), n˜Ai (t) ≤ n˜Ai (0) ∀t < t2, (7.17)
and second, there exists some q ∈ {kl + 2, . . . , l} such that
nAq (t2) > n
A
q (0) or n˜
A
q (t2) > n˜
A
q (0).
Hence, a type q or q∗ agent is activated at t2 − 1 and changes her choice from B to A at time t2.
On the other hand,
nA(t2 − 1) ≤
kl∑
i=1
ni + n˜i +
l∑
i=kl+1





ni + n˜i +
l∑
i=kl+1




where the last inequality follows from the definitions of kl and vp. Now in view of (7.2), we can
conclude from (7.18) that
nA(t2 − 1) < n∗i ∀i ∈ {kl + 2, . . . , l}.
Hence, nA(t2− 1) < n∗q. Therefore, according to Lemma 7.1, if a type q or q∗ agent is activated at
t2− 1, she chooses B, not A, a contrary, implying that (7.16) is in force. The rest of the proof can
be done similarly to that of Proposition 7.1.
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So far we know that all type j and j∗ agents, j = 1, . . . , k1, almost surely will and all type i and
i∗ agents, i = k1 + 1, . . . , kl may eventually choose A and all type j and j∗ agents, j = kl + 1, . . . , l,
almost surely will eventually choose B. Yet, it remains unknown whether x(t) converges to a single
equilibrium state or for example fluctuates between several states or converges to a limit cycle. As
the main result of this chapter, we answer this question in the following theorem. Define the set
X¯ by
X¯ ∆= {sr}r∈K ∪ {s∗r}r∈K∗
where K = {k1, k1 +1, . . . , kl}∩E and K∗ = ∅ if k1 = l, and K∗ = {k∗1, k∗1 +1, . . . , k∗l }∩E∗ otherwise,
where k∗1, k
∗





l + 1 k1 = l





l kl = l
kl + 1 kl < l
.
Theorem 7.2. Given any initial condition x(0) and under the update rule (7.1), almost surely
there exist some time T and some x∗ ∈ X¯ such that
x(t) = x∗ ∀t ≥ T. (7.19)
The following lemma is the main step of the proof.
Lemma 7.8. For each p ∈ {1, . . . , l}, almost surely there exists some time step tp such that one
of the following cases takes place for all t ≥ tp:
1. for i = 1, . . . , p, nAi (t) = ni and n˜
A
i (t) = n˜i;
2. • for i = 1, . . . , p− 1, nAi (t) = ni and n˜Ai (t) = n˜i,
• for i = p+ 1, . . . , l, nAi (t) = n˜Ai (t) = 0,
• and nAp (t) = np and n˜Ap (t) = n∗p −
∑p−1
j=1(nj + n˜j)− np < n˜p;
3. for i = p, . . . , l, nAi (t) = n˜
A
i (t) = 0.
Proof. We prove by induction. First we need to show the result for p = 1; however, the proof
for this case is similar to the general case p = r ≥ 1. So we proceed as follows. Assume that
the lemma is true for some r ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1}, implying that one of the three cases in the lemma
takes place. Cases 2 and 3, however, are straightforward to prove since they already imply that
for i = r + 1, . . . , l,
nAi (t) = n˜
A
i (t) = 0 ∀t ≥ tr, (7.20)
which matches the third case of the lemma for p = r + 1 and tr+1 = tr. So consider the situation
when Case 1 holds for p = r, i.e.,
nAi (t) = ni, n˜
A
i (t) = n˜i ∀t ≥ tr ∀i ≤ r. (7.21)
In general, one of the following two scenarios happens:
Scenario A: There exists some time t1 > tr, at which a type r+1 agent is activated and switches





==⇒ nA(t1) < n∗i ∀i ≥ r + 1. (7.22)
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Now we use contradiction to prove the following:
nA(t) < n∗i ∀t ≥ t1 ∀i ≥ r + 1. (7.23)
Assume on the contrary that there exists some time when nA becomes no less than n∗i for some
i ≥ r + 1. Let t3 ∈ (t1, t2] denote the first time this happens, i.e.,
nA(t) < n∗i ∀t ≤ t3 − 1 ∀i ≥ r + 1, (7.24)
and
∃q ∈ {r + 1, . . . , l} : nA(t3) = n∗q.
Hence, an agent has changed her choice to A at t3. However, none of the type i or i
∗ agent,
i ≥ r + 1, can do that according to (7.24) and Lemma 7.1. The same holds for i ≤ r in view of
(7.21), a contradiction, implying that (7.23) holds. Therefore, in view of Lemma 7.1 and due to
the persistent activation assumption, almost surely there exists some time tr+1 ≥ t1 such that
nAi (t) = n˜
A
i (t) = 0 ∀t ≥ tr+1 ∀i ≥ r + 1.
This matches Case 3 of the lemma for p = r + 1. Hence, the induction statement holds for this
scenario.
Scenario B: No type r + 1 agent switches to B after tr. First, we show by contradiction that
nA(t) ≥ n∗r+1 ∀t ≥ tr. (7.25)
Assume on the contrary that there exists some time t1 ≥ tr such that nA(t1) < n∗r+1. Hence, in
view of (7.2), for all i ≥ r + 1, nA(t1) < n∗i . Then for i ≥ r + 1, if a type i or i∗ agent is activated
to update at t1 + 1, she chooses B according to Lemma 7.1. On the other hand, for i ≤ r, all type
i and i∗ agents have chosen A at tr and do not change their choices afterwards. Hence, no agent
switches to A at t1 + 1, implying that n
A(t1 + 1) ≤ nA(t1) < n∗r+1. Indeed by induction it can be
shown that nA(t) < n∗r+1 for all t ≥ t1. So when a type r+ 1 agent is activated, she updates to B,
a contradiction. Therefore, (7.25) is in force.
Hence, according to Lemma 7.1, almost surely there exists some time t2 ≥ tr, before which all
the type r + 1 agents have updated their choices to A and do not change afterwards, i.e.,
nAr+1(t) = nr+1 ∀t ≥ t2. (7.26)
On the other hand, for the type (r + 1)∗ agents, (7.25) and Lemma 7.1 imply that whenever a
type (r + 1)∗ agent is activated, she does not switch to B. So since the number of (r + 1)∗ agents
are finite, there exists some time t3 ≥ t2 after which no r + 1∗ agent switches her strategy. Then
the number of A-playing agents of type (r + 1)∗ does not change after t3, resulting in one of the
following cases:
Scenario B-1: there exists some time t3 ≥ t2 such that
n˜Ar+1(t) = n˜r+1 ∀t ≥ t3.
Take tr+1 = t3. Then according to (7.26) and (7.21), we arrive at Case 1 of the lemma for p = r+1.
Hence, the induction statement holds for this part of Scenario B.
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Scenario B-2: there exists some time t3 ≥ t2 such that
n˜Ar+1(t) = c < n˜r+1 ∀t ≥ t3 (7.27)
where c ∈ Z≥0 is constant. First we look at type i and i∗ agents, i = r + 2, . . . , l. If nA(t) ≥ n∗r+2
for all t ≥ t3, then in view of (7.2), nA(t) ≥ n∗r+1 for all t ≥ t3. Hence, due to the persistent
activation assumption, almost surely there exists some time ts such that n˜
A
r+1(ts) = n˜r+1, which
is not possible due to (7.27). So there exists some time t4 ≥ t3, such that nA(t4) < n∗r+2. Then
similar to how (7.23) was shown, via contradiction it can be proven that
nA(t) < n∗r+2 ∀t ≥ t4.
Hence, in view of Lemma 7.1, almost surely there exists some time t5 ≥ t4 such that
nAi (t) = n˜
A
i (t) = 0 ∀t ≥ t5 ∀i ≥ r + 2. (7.28)
Now we look at type (r + 1)∗ agents. almost surely there exists some time t6 ≥ t5 when a
(r + 1)∗ agent is activated. The agent does not switch her strategy at t6 + 1 since t6 ≥ t3 and no
(r + 1)∗ agent switches her strategy after t3. So from Lemma 7.1, nA(t6) = n∗r+1. Hence, due to






(nj + n˜j)− nr+1. (7.29)
On the other hand, according to (7.27), n˜Ar+1(t) is constant for t ≥ t3. Hence, (7.29) holds for all
t ≥ t3. Then according to (7.21), (7.26), (7.28) and (7.29), we arrive at Case 2 of the lemma for
p = r + 1.
So the induction statement holds for r + 1 in both Scenarios B-1 and B-2. Since it also holds
in Scenario A, the proof is complete.
Now we show that the population state almost surely reaches one of the clean-cut or ruﬄed
equilibria. This enables us to complete the proof of Theorem 7.2 as follows.
Proposition 7.3. Given any initial condition x(0), almost surely there exist some time T and
some final state x∗ ∈ {sr}r∈E ∪ {s∗r}r∈E∗ such that
x(t) = x∗ ∀t ≥ T.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 7.8. If Case 1 in Lemma 7.8 does not take place for p = 1,
then either Case 2 or Case 3 happens, resulting in x(t) = s∗1 or x(t) = s0, respectively, for t ≥ tp. So
consider the situation when Case 1 takes place for p = 1. Let r denote the greatest p ∈ {1, . . . , l},
for which Case 1 takes place. If r = l, then x(t) = sl for t ≥ tp. Otherwise, for p = r + 1, either
Case 2 or Case 3 takes place, resulting in x(t) = s∗r+1 or x(t) = sr, respectively, for t ≥ tp. To sum
up, almost surely there exists some time T and some final state x∗ ∈ {si}li=1 ∪ {s∗i }li=1 such that
x(t) = x∗ for all t ≥ T . The proof is then complete in view of Lemma 7.7.
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Proposition 7.1 confines x∗ in Proposition 7.3 to {si}li=k1 ∪ {s∗i }li=k∗1 . Simi-








which completes the proof.
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7.5 Stability analysis
From Theorem 7.2, we know that for any initial condition, the population dynamics almost surely
reaches an equilibrium state. However, the stability of the equilibrium still remains an open
problem that we investigate here. In what follows, by ‖ · ‖, we refer to the one-norm, i.e., ‖a‖ =∑2l
j=1 |aj|, and we denote a ball with the radius r and center s by Br(s) = {x ∈ X | ‖x−s‖ < r}. By
stability we refer to the standard definition of Lyapunov stability, but when all possible activation
sequences are considered, i.e., an equilibrium state s is stable if for every ball U(s) there exists a ball
Uδ(s) such that for every x(0) ∈ Uδ, we have x(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0 and for all persistent activation
sequences. Since the state space X is discrete,  and δ must be no less than 2; otherwise, Uδ(s) for
example, only contains the equilibrium state s, automatically implying x(t) = s for all t ≥ 0, even
if s is unstable. Asymptotic stability is then defined correspondingly, namely s is asymptotically
stable if it is stable and there exists some Uδ such that if x(0) ∈ Uδ, then limt→∞ ‖x(t)− s‖ = 0.
First, we focus on the stability of the clean-cut equilibrium states. By definition, we know that
n∗i ≤
∑i
j=1(nj + n˜j) < n
∗
i+1 holds for each clean-cut equilibrium si, i ∈ E . The following result
states that each si is (asymptotically) stable if and only if the inequality is tightened.
Theorem 7.3. The equilibrium state si, i ∈ E , is stable if and only if
n∗i + 1 ≤
i∑
j=1
(nj + n˜j) < n
∗
i+1 − 1, (7.30)
and is asymptotically stable if and only if
n∗i + 1 <
i∑
j=1
(nj + n˜j) < n
∗
i+1 − 1 (7.31)
where n∗0 = −2 and n∗l+1 = n+ 2.
Now if the distribution of agents’ thresholds is too diverse in a population, it is likely that
n∗i + 1 and n
∗
i+1 − 1 are close to each other for some i ∈ E , making it unlikely for (7.30) to hold,
implying the instability of si in view of the theorem.
For the proof of Theorem 7.3, we need to investigate the dynamics of x(t) for those initial
conditions with distance 1 from si that are captured by the following 2l-dimensional vectors:
bi(r) = (n1, n˜1, . . . , nr − 1, n˜r, . . . , ni, n˜i, 0, . . . , 0),
b∗i (r) = (n1, n˜1, . . . , nr, n˜r − 1, . . . , ni, n˜i, 0, . . . , 0),
where 1 ≤ r ≤ i, and
ci(r) = (n1, n˜1, . . . , ni, n˜i, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2r
, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
c∗i (r) = (n1, n˜1, . . . , ni, n˜i, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2r
, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0),
where i ≤ r ≤ l − 1. In what follows, by x(0) = z where z = bi(r), b∗i (r), ci(r) or c∗i (r), we mean
x(0) = z ∈ X , namely z is a valid state. The following lemma describes the behavior of x(t) when
starting from any of the states bi(r) and b
∗
i (r), 1 ≤ r ≤ i.
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Lemma 7.9. For an si, i ∈ E − {0}, it holds that
1. if
∑i
j=1(nj + n˜j) − 1 > n∗i , then if x(0) = bi(r) or x(0) = b∗i (r), 1 ≤ r ≤ i, almost surely
there exists some time t1 such that
x(t) = x(0) ∀t ≤ t1 and x(t) = si ∀t > t1.
2. if
∑i
j=1(nj + n˜j)− 1 = n∗i , then
(a) if x(0) = bi(r), 1 ≤ r ≤ i, or x(0) = b∗i (r), 1 ≤ r ≤ i− 1, almost surely there exists some
time t1 such that
x(t) = x(0) ∀t ≤ t1 and x(t) = si ∀t > t1.
(b) if x(0) = b∗i (i)
x(t) = x(0) = s∗i ∀t.
3. if
∑i
j=1(nj + n˜j)− 1 < n∗i , then
(a) if x(0) = bi(r) or x(0) = b
∗
i (r), 1 ≤ r ≤ i−1, or if ni+ n˜i ≥ 2 and either x(0) = bi(i) or
x(0) = b∗i (i), then there exists a nontrivial event of activation sequences, under which
x(1) 6∈ B2(si).
(b) if ni + n˜i = 1, then if x(0) = bi(i) or x(0) = b
∗
i (i),
x(t) = x(0) = si−1 ∀t.









(nj + n˜j)− 1 > n∗i . (7.32)
On the other hand, according to the definition of si, it holds that
∑i






(nj + n˜j)− 1 < n∗i+1. (7.33)
Now if the active agent at t = 0 is a type j or j∗ agent, j = 1, . . . , i, then in view of Lemma 7.1,
(7.32) implies that she will update to A at t = 1. On the other hand, unless the active agent is a
type r agent, she is already playing A at t = 0, and hence, does not change her strategy at t = 1,
resulting in
x(1) = x(0). (7.34)
Similarly if the active agent at t = 0 is a type j or j∗ agent, j = i + 1, . . . , l, then in view of
Lemma 7.1, (7.33) implies that she will update to B at t = 1. Since all such agents are already
playing B at t = 0, none will change their strategies at t = 1. Hence, (7.34) is also in force for
this case. Indeed by induction it can be shown that as long as a type r agent is not activated, it
holds that x(t) = x(0). However, because of the persistent assumption on the activation sequence,
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we know that almost surely there exists some time t1 at which a type r agent is activated. Then
in view of Lemma 7.1 and (7.32), she updates her strategy to A in the next time step, implying
x(t1 + 1) = si. Since si is an equilibrium state, it follows that x(t) = si for all t ≥ t1 + 1. The
same can be shown for when x(0) = b∗i (r), which completes the proof of the first case.
Case 2) Part 2-a) can be proven similarly to Case 1), so we look at Part 2-b). If n˜i = 0, then
b∗i (i) 6∈ X , and hence, x(0) cannot equal b∗i (i), making the result trivial. So consider the situation




(nj + n˜j)− 1 = n∗i (7.35)




j=1(nj + n˜j) − ni, implying that nA0 = s∗i . On the other hand, from (7.2),
n∗i < n
∗
i+1, resulting in i ∈ E in view of (7.3). Then n˜i > 0 results in i ∈ E∗ in view of (7.4),
completing the proof of this case.
Case 3) If x(0) = bi(r) or b
∗




(nj + n˜j)− 1 < n∗i (7.36)
Now consider the following two cases:
Case 3-a) either r ≤ i − 1 or both r = i and ni + n˜i ≥ 2. Then there exists a type i or i∗
agent whose choice is A at t = 0. Under a nontrivial event of activation sequences, this agent is
activated at t = 0, and hence, will choose B at t = 1, resulting in x(0) 6∈ D1.





(nj + n˜j)− 1 ≥ n∗i − 1,
which in view of (7.36) yields nA(0) = n∗i − 1. Hence,
n∗i−1 ≤ nA(0) =
i−1∑
j=1
(nj + n˜j) = n
∗
i − 1 < n∗i ,
which implies i−1 ∈ E in view of (7.3), completing the proof of this case, and hence the whole.
The following lemma describes the behavior of x(t) when starting from the states ci(r) and
c∗i (r), i ≤ r ≤ l − 1.
Lemma 7.10. For an si, i ∈ E − {l}, it holds that
1. if
∑i
j=1(nj + n˜j) + 1 < n
∗
i+1, then if x(0) = ci(r) or x(0) = c
∗
i (r), i ≤ r ≤ l− 1, almost surely
there exists some time t1 such that
x(t) = x(0) ∀t ≤ t1 and x(t) = si ∀t > t1.
2. if
∑i
j=1(nj + n˜j) + 1 = n
∗
i+1, then
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(a) if x(0) = ci(r) or x(0) = c
∗
i (r), i + 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1, almost surely there exists some time
t1 such that
x(t) = x(0) ∀t ≤ t1 and x(t) = si ∀t > t1.
(b) if ni 6= 0 and x(0) = c∗i (i) or if ni 6= 1 and x(0) = ci(i), there exists a nontrivial event
of activation sequences, under which x(1) 6∈ B2(si).
(c) if ni = 0 and x(0) = c
∗
i (i),
x(t) = x(0) = s∗i+1 ∀t.
(d) if ni = 1 and x(0) = ci(i)
x(t) = x(0) = si+1 ∀t.




(nj + n˜j) + 1 < n
∗
i+1. (7.37)
On the other hand, according to the definition of si, it holds that
∑i




(nj + n˜j) + 1 > n
∗
i . (7.38)
The rest of the proof of this case can be done similarly to that of Lemma 7.9, Case 1).
Case 2) The proof is similar to that of Cases 2) and 3) of Lemma 7.9.
The case
∑i
j=1(nj + n˜j) + 1 > n
∗
i+1 is not investigated in the lemma since it never takes place.
This is because from i ∈ E , we know that ∑ij=1(nj + n˜j) + 1 < n∗i+1 + 1, which is in contradiction
with the previous inequality. Knowing the behavior of x(t) for all states with distance 1 from a
clean-cut equilibrium state, we now proceed to the proof of the main result.
Proof of Theorem 7.3. We prove the result for stability; the result for asymptotic stability
can be done similarly. (sufficiency) We show that δ = 2 satisfies the stability condition for any
B,  ≥ 2. So consider some x(0) ∈ B2(si), x(0) ∈ X , implying x(0) ∈ D2. Should x(0) be at the
equilibrium state si, it would follow that x(t) = si ∈ B2 for all t ≥ 0. So consider the second case,
that is when x(0) equals one of b∗i (r) and bi(r) for some r ≤ i or one of ci(r) and c∗i (r) for some
r ≥ i. Then in view of Lemmas 7.9 and 7.10, condition (7.31) results in again x(t) = si ∈ B2 for
all t ≥ 0, implying the stability of si.
(necessity) If si is stable, then for any initial condition x(0) ∈ D2, the smallest acceptable ball
with center si, we must have x(t) ∈ B2. The proof then follows Lemmas 7.9 and 7.10. 
Now we focus on the stability of a ruﬄed equilibrium state, s∗i , i ∈ E∗, which we intuitively
expect to satisfy a weaker notion of stability since it requires the total number of A-players to be
exactly equal to a fixed value, i.e., n∗i .
Theorem 7.4. The equilibrium state s∗i , i ∈ E∗, is unstable.
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For the proof, we need to investigate initial conditions with distance 1 from s∗i , which are
captured by the following vectors:
b˜i(r) = s
∗
i − 12r−1, b˜∗i (r) = s∗i − 12r
where 1 ≤ r ≤ i and 1i is the ith row of the 2l × 2l identity matrix, and
c˜i(r) = s
∗
i + 12r+1, c˜
∗
i (r) = s
∗
i + 12r+2
where i ≤ r ≤ l − 1. Since Theorem 7.4 postulates the instability of s∗i , it suffices to show that
for each s∗i , i ∈ E∗, there exists one of b˜i(r), b˜∗i (r), c˜i(r) and c˜∗i (r) that drives x(t) to a state out of
B2(s∗i ), regardless of the activation sequence.
Lemma 7.11. For an s∗i , i ∈ E∗, it holds that
1. if i 6= l, then if x(0) = c˜i(r) or x(0) = c˜∗i (r), i ≤ r ≤ l − 1, there exists a nontrivial event of
activation sequences, under which x(1) 6∈ B2(s∗i ).
2. if i = l and n˜l ≥ 2, then if x(0) = b˜∗i (i), there exists a nontrivial event of activation sequences,
under which x(1) 6∈ B2(s∗i ).
3. if i = l, n˜l = 1 and nl ≥ 1, then if x(0) = b˜i(i), there exists a nontrivial event of activation
sequences, under which x(1) 6∈ B2(s∗i ).
The case i = 0 is not investigated in the lemma since 0 6∈ E∗. Moreover, the case i = l, n˜l = 1
and nl = 0 is not possible since then i ∈ E not E∗.
Proof of Theorem 7.4: The proof can be done similarly to that of Theorem 7.3, but when
Lemma 7.11 is used instead of Lemmas 7.9 and 7.10. 
So unlike clean-cut equilibria that may even be asymptotically stable, ruﬄed equilibrium states
are unstable, implying that small perturbations from the equilibrium may lead to moving to some
states.
7.6 Contagion probability
As discussed in Section 7.4, the agent activation sequence is random, so the population dynamics
may reach different equilibrium states in the long run, under different activation sequences. In
other words, given an initial condition, each state in X¯ may be reached by x(t) with a certain
probability. We are interested in the contagion probability, that is the probability of reaching
the state sl where every individual has chosen A. To simplify the analysis, we limit ourselves to a
heterogeneous population with just two types: type 1 and 2, and no type 1∗ or 2∗, i.e., n˜1 = n˜2 = 0.
After all, rarely the threshold of an agent may exactly equal n∗i /n for some i = 1, . . . , n, so this is
not a strong assumption. Then we find a recurrence equation for the probability of contagion as
follows. Define the recursive function P (·, ·) ∈ Z≥0 × Z≥0 by
P (a, b) =
n1 − a
n1 − a+ bP (a+ 1, b) +
b
n1 − a+ bP (a, b− 1), (7.39)
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for a < n1, b > 0 and n
∗
1 ≤ a+ b < n∗2, with the boundary conditions
P (a, b) =

0 a+ b < n∗1
1 a+ b ≥ n∗2
0 b < n∗2 − n1
0 b = 0, n1 < n
∗
2
1 b = 0, a ≥ n∗1, n1 ≥ n∗2
. (7.40)
Proposition 7.4. Consider a heterogeneous population of type 1 and 2 agents. Given an initial
condition x(0) = (nA1 (0), 0, n
A





Proof. We observe that the boundary conditions (7.40) are equivalent to
P (a, b) =

0 a+ b < n∗1
1 a+ b ≥ n∗2
0 n∗1 ≤ a+ b < n∗2, a = n1
0 n∗1 ≤ a+ b < n∗2, b = 0, n1 < n∗2
1 n∗1 ≤ a+ b < n∗2, b = 0, n1 ≥ n∗2
(7.41)
which together with (7.39) result in a unique solution for P (a, b) for each pair (a, b). There-
fore, it suffices to show that the contagion probability of a population with initial conditions
x(0) = (a, 0, b, 0) satisfies the recurrence equation (7.39) and the boundary conditions (7.41). The
boundary conditions can be easily verified. As for the recurrence equation, we know that the
contagion probability for x(0) equals the sum of the probabilities of different possible states taking
place at t = 1, times the contagion probabilities from those new states x(1). Namely, for a < n1,
b > 0 and n∗1 ≤ a+ b < n∗2, one of the following may take place at t = 0 and t = 1:
1) The active agent at t = 0 is an A-playing type 1 or a B-playing type 2 agent, which
occurs with probability a+n2−b
n
. Then the active agent does not change her choice, resulting in




2 (1) = n
A
2 (0). So the contagion probability from x(1) equals P (a, b).
2) The active agent at t = 0 is a B-playing type 1 agent, which occurs with probability n1−a
n
.
Then the active agent chooses A, resulting in nA1 (1) = n
A
1 (0) + 1, n
A
2 (1) = n
A
2 (0). So the contagion
probability from x(1) equals P (a+ 1, b).
3) The active agent at t = 0 is an A-playing type 2 agent, which occurs with probability b
n
.




2 (1) = n
A
2 (0)− 1. So the contagion
probability from x(1) equals P (a, b− 1).
Therefore, we acquire the recurrence equation
P (a, b) =
a+ n2 − b
n
P (a, b) +
n1 − a
n
P (a+ 1, b) +
b
n
P (a, b− 1),
which results in (7.39), completing the proof.
Example 7.1. Consider a population of 100 individuals of types 1 and 2 with populations n1 = 20
and n2 = 80 and n
∗
1 = 25 and n
∗
2 = 33 respectively. Using Proposition 7.4 and by solving the
recurrence equation (7.39), we obtain a contagion probability of 3.13e−8% for an initial condition
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of 12 A-playing type 1 and 14 B-playing type 2 individuals, i.e., P (12, 14) = 3.13e− 10, and that
of 6.7% for an initial condition of 19 A-playing type 1 and 14 B-playing type 2 individuals, i.e.,
P (19, 14) = .067. In general, the expected probability of contagion based on the number of initial
A-players in the population are summarized in Table 7.1 that is taken from [58]. As show in the
table, the contagion probability for low number of initial A-players is quite low, but exponentially
grows as the number increases.











Table 7.1: Maximum and expected contagion probabilities for different initial A-players. The
population consists of 20 type 1 and 80 type 2 individuals where n∗1 = 25 and n∗2 = 33. For each number
of initial A-players in the population, all possible combinations of type 1 and type 2 individuals with
different choices of A and B are considered and the corresponding contagion probabilities are calculated
using the recurrence equation (7.39) and the boundary conditions (7.40). Then the maximum probability,
maxP , and the expected (average) probability, Exp[P ] are obtained.
7.7 Concluding remarks
We have performed convergence and stability analysis on a finite well-mixed heterogeneous popu-
lation where each individual is associated with a possibly unique threshold, and the agents update
asynchronously based on the linear threshold model. We have shown that for any given initial
condition, almost surely after a finite time, the population reaches an equilibrium where no agent
violates her threshold; however, the equilibrium is not necessarily uniquely determined by the
initial condition, but depends on the activation sequence of the agents. Moreover, the dynamics
may be associated with several stable equilibria, i.e., the clean-cuts, where both A-playing and B-
playing agents coexist in a well-mixed population. Such coexistence is impossible in homogeneous
populations, and thus results highlight the role of perception differences or, in general, the hetero-
geneity of the population in linear threshold models or equivalently the best-response dynamics.
We are currently working together with theoretical biologists and sociologists to understand better
the effect of heterogeneity using real data.





Networks of conforming or
non-conforming individuals tend to
reach satisfactory decisions
Binary decisions of agents coupled in networks can often be classified into two types: coordination,
where an agent takes an action if enough neighbors are using that action, as in the spread of
social norms, innovations, and viral epidemics, and anti-coordination, where too many neighbors
taking a particular action causes an agent to take the opposite action, as in traffic congestion,
crowd dispersion, and division of labor. Both of these cases can be modeled using linear threshold-
based dynamics, and a fundamental question is whether the individuals in such networks are likely
to reach decisions with which they are satisfied. We show that in the coordination case, and
perhaps more surprisingly, also in the anti-coordination case, the agents will indeed always tend
to reach satisfactory decisions, i.e., the network will almost surely reach an equilibrium state.
This holds for every network topology and every distribution of thresholds, for both asynchronous
and partially synchronous decision-making updates. These results reveal that irregular network
topology, population heterogeneity and partial synchrony are not sufficient to cause cycles or non-
convergence in linear threshold dynamics; rather, other factors such as imitation or the coexistence
of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents must play a role.
8.1 Introduction
After presenting the results on infinite and finite well-mixed populations in Parts I and II, now
we investigate finite networked populations in this part, and start with populations governed by
the best-response update rule in this chapter. The sharing of resources, division of labor, and
dispersion of crowds represent a few examples of collective behaviors that can emerge on networks
of interacting agents when the adoption of a particular action by too many individuals deters others
from adopting that action. On the other hand, when individuals taking an action makes it more
likely that others will adopt that action, behaviors such as the spread of social norms, technological
innovations, and viral infections can occur. In either case, various factors are thought to contribute
to the emergence of such collective behaviors, including network topology, interaction payoffs,
strategy-update rules, and population diversity [105, 49, 159]. In particular, when agents can take
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one of a finite number of states at a given time, whether by voluntary decisions or involuntary
reactions, the fundamental questions include (i) whether the agents will eventually settle on a
fixed state/action, (ii) which distribution of actions the network will converge to, and (iii) how
long it will take for the network to converge. While most of the literature focuses on the second
and especially third questions, particularly for homogeneous populations where individuals share
the same utility function [187, 84, 8, 109], the first question is perhaps more fundamental since it
deals with convergence at the agent level. Undoubtedly, this action settling is crucial to a wide
range of decision making populations, from collective nest selection by ants [101] to stabilization
of financial markets [29]. Moreover, without establishing such convergence, answers to questions
(ii) and (iii) cannot be used to design policies at the local or neighborhood level [144], which may
help to improve cost efficiency by targeting influential nodes in a complex network.
Best response dynamics is one of the most widely used models to study the types of problems
mentioned above; this is due in part to its rational nature as well as its broad applicability.
Indeed recent experimental studies have shown that humans often use myopic best responses when
making decisions in social networks [100]. The idea behind best response dynamics is simple: in
a network of interacting agents, each agent takes the action that results in the best cumulative
outcome against its neighbors. This framework is frequently considered in a game theoretic context
[149, 85, 139, 158], but its impact is further broadened by the fact that when there are two available
actions for each agent, it is equivalent to a linear threshold model [81]. This comes with an
alternative yet also intuitive interpretation: when a sufficient fraction of my neighbors are taking
action A, I will also take action A. The reverse is also possible: if too many of my neighbors
are taking action A, I will switch to action B. We call agents of the former type coordinating
and the latter, anti-coordinating, according to the standard coordination and anti-coordination
games, which are also sometimes referred to as games of strategic complements and strategic
substitutes, respectively [36]. These switches may be considered voluntary as in changing an
opinion, preference, or habit, or involuntary, as getting infected by virus or defaulting on a loan.
In general, the thresholds of the agents need not be the same, and this is equivalent to agents
having asymmetric payoffs in the corresponding matrix game. Depending on the application, this
can represent differences in the willingness to follow a crowd, susceptibility to infection, perceived
value of interactions, and many other individual characteristics [52]. Variation in thresholds can
thus be thought of as heterogeneity of a population.
The linear threshold model was first motivated and discussed by Mark Granovetter in the
context of fully-connected networks, with an example of how the incitement of riots in crowds
depends critically on the distribution of individual thresholds that will cause each person to join
the riot [52]. Since then, a rich literature has developed around questions related to stability
and convergence of best-response dynamics in matrix games on well-mixed populations [136, 6].
Convergence of homogeneous well-mixed populations under more general non-matrix games has
been established in [33] in the context of congestion games, using potential functions. The con-
vergence properties of networks with arbitrary structure has also been investigated under various
conditions, particularly in the homogeneous (symmetric) case [110, 88, 92]. Recently in [36], a
combination of mean-field approximations and simulations were used to show that synchronous
best-response dynamics in symmetric coordination or anti-coordination games tend to always con-
verge to Nash equilibria. However, in the case of asymmetric coordination games, it was shown in
[1] that synchronous best-response dynamics may not converge to a single action but rather to a
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cycle of alternating actions. Symmetry thus seems to be a significant factor in the convergence of
the threshold model, but we will show that asynchrony perhaps plays an even more important role,
because regardless of the symmetry, the network always converges in the asynchronous case. In
addition to making the convergence more likely, compared to synchronous models, asynchronous
dynamics can provide a more realistic model of the time-line over which independent agents make
decisions and receive information, and they are particularly suitable when the payoff dynamics can
be thought of as fast compared to the update dynamics. For example, decisions on matters such
as which product to buy, which political party to vote for, or which traffic route to take may be
the culmination of many individual interactions. Nevertheless, our results do not require that only
one agent can update at a time; in fact, we show that even small asynchronous perturbations to
fully synchronous dynamics lead to equilibrium convergence.
In this chapter, we show that every network consisting of anti-coordinating agents with asyn-
chronous best-response dynamics will eventually reach an equilibrium state, even if each agent has
a different threshold. Moreover, we show that the same result holds for networks of coordinating
agents. As a corollary, we establish the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in both cases
for arbitrary networks and arbitrary payoffs. On the question of convergence time, we show that
in such networks, the total number of times an agent switches strategies is no greater than six
times the number of edges in the network. In the case of partial synchrony, when a random num-
ber of agents can update simultaneously, we show that the network still almost surely reaches an
equilibrium. It follows that irregular network topology, population heterogeneity and synchrony of
decisions between two or more agents (as long as random asynchronous updating is not completely
excluded) are not sufficient to cause non-convergence or cycles in best-response dynamics; rather,
possible causes include the occasional use of non-best-response strategies, randomization, or a
mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents. Indeed we provide a small example demon-
strating the possibility of cycles in networks containing both coordinating and anti-coordinating
agents.
8.2 Asynchronous best response dynamics
Consider an undirected network G = (V , E) where the nodes V = {1, . . . , n} correspond to agents
and each edge in the set E ⊆ V × V represents a 2-player game between neighboring agents. Each
agent i ∈ V chooses pure strategies from a binary set S := {A,B} and receives a payoff upon





, ai, bi, ci, di ∈ IR.
The dynamics take place over a sequence of discrete time k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Let xi(k) ∈ S denote
the strategy of agent i at time k, and denote the number of neighbors of agent i playing A and
B at time k by nAi (k) and n
B
i (k), respectively. When there is no ambiguity, we may sometimes
omit the time k for compactness of notation. The total payoffs to each agent i at time k are
accumulated over all neighbors, and are therefore equal to ain
A
i (k) + bin
B
i (k) when xi(k) = A, or
cin
A
i (k) + din
B
i (k) when xi(k) = B.
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In asynchronous (myopic) best-response dynamics, one agent at a time becomes active and
chooses a single action to play against all neighbors. The active agent at time k updates at time
k + 1 to the strategy that achieves the highest total payoff, i.e. is the best response, against the































In the case that strategies A and B result in equal payoffs, both strategies are best responses and
we use the notation zi, which is defined to be A, B or xi(k), to allow for several possibilities for
this equality case. Note that we do not require all agents to have the same zi. That is, when both
A and B are best responses, some agents may choose A, others may choose B, and others may
keep their current strategy; however, the agents cannot change their choice of zi over time.
It is convenient to rewrite these dynamics in terms of the number of neighbors playing each
strategy. Let degi denote the total number of neighbors of agent i. We can simplify the conditions
above by using the fact that nBi = degi−nAi and rearranging terms:
ain
A
i + bi(degi−nAi ) > cinAi + di(degi−nAi )
nAi (ai − ci + di − bi) > degi(di − bi)
δin
A
i > γi degi, (8.1)
where δi := ai − ci + di − bi and γi := di − bi. The cases of ‘<’ and ‘=’ can be handled similarly.
Consider the case when δi 6= 0, and let τi := γiδi denote a threshold for agent i. Depending on the
sign of δi, we have two possible types of best-response update rules. If δi > 0, the update rule is
given by:
xi(k + 1) =

A if nAi (k) > τi degi
B if nAi (k) < τi degi
zi if n
A
i (k) = τi degi
. (8.2)
These agents switch to strategy A if a sufficient fraction of neighbors are using that strategy, and
likewise for strategy B. On the other hand, for δi < 0, if a sufficient fraction of neighbors are
playing A, the agent will switch to B, and vice versa. This update rule is given by:
xi(k + 1) =

A if nAi (k) < τi degi
B if nAi (k) > τi degi
zi if n
A
i (k) = τi degi
. (8.3)
In the case that τi /∈ [0, 1], it is straightforward to show that there exists a strictly dominant
strategy, and the update rule (8.2) or (8.3) is equivalent to one in which τi ∈ {0, 1} and zi ∈ {A,B}.
The same holds for when δi = 0. Agents for which δi ≥ 0 are called coordinating and can be
modeled by (8.2). Agents for which δi ≤ 0 are called anti-coordinating and can be modeled by
(8.3). Therefore, every agent can be described as a coordinating or an anti-coordinating agent (or
both).
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Let Γ := (G, τ, {+,−,±}) denote a network game, which consists of the network G, a vector
of agent thresholds τ = (τ1, . . . , τn)
>, and one of +, −, or ±, corresponding to the cases of
all coordinating, all anti-coordinating, or a mixture of both types of agents, respectively. The
dynamics in (8.2) and (8.3) are in the form of the standard linear threshold model [52]. An
equilibrium state in the threshold model is a state in which the number of A-neighbors of each
agent does not violate the threshold that would cause them to change strategies. For example, in a
network of anti-coordinating agents in which zi = B for all i, this means that for each agent i ∈ V ,
xi(k) = A implies n
A
i (k) < τi degi and xi(k) = B implies n
A
i (k) ≥ τi degi. Note that this notion of
equilibrium is equivalent to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the corresponding network game.
8.3 Convergence results
We investigate the equilibrium convergence properties of the agent-based threshold models in (8.2)
and (8.3) that we defined in the previous Section.
Before providing the main results, we precisely define the nature of the asynchronous dynamics.
We require only that at any given time step, each agent is guaranteed to be active at some finite
future time. Let ik denote the agent who is active at time k and let (ik)∞k=0 denote a sequence of
active agents. We say that such a sequence is persistent if for every agent j ∈ V and every time
k ≥ 0, there exists some finite later time k′ > k at which agent j is again active (ik′ = j).
Assumption 8.1. Every activation sequence driving the dynamics in (8.2) or (8.3) is persistent.
Remark 8.1. In stochastic settings, Assumption 8.1 holds almost surely whenever agents acti-
vate infinitely many times with probability one, for example, if each agent is activated at a rate
determined by a Poisson process.
We divide the convergence analysis into two main parts corresponding to the cases of anti-
coordinating and coordinating agents. In what follows, we use 1 to denote the n-dimensional
vector containing all ones.
8.3.1 All agents are anti-coordinating
Theorem 8.1. Every network of anti-coordinating agents who update asynchronously under As-
sumption 8.1 will reach an equilibrium state in finite time.
The sketch of the proof is as follows. We begin by showing that an arbitrary network game
Γ = (G, 1
2
1,−) consisting of anti-coordinating agents in which the threshold of each agent is 1
2
will reach an equilibrium in finite time. Then we extend the result to a heterogeneous-threshold
network game Γ = (G, τ,−) by constructing a homogeneous-threshold augmented network game
Γˆ = (Gˆ, 1
2
1,−) that is dynamically equivalent to Γ. We complete the proof by showing that if the
augmented network game Γˆ reaches an equilibrium, then Γ does as well. The following lemma
establishes convergence of the homogeneous-threshold network game (G, 1
2
1,−).
Lemma 8.1. Every network of anti-coordinating agents who update asynchronously under As-
sumption 8.1, with τi =
1
2
for each agent i ∈ V, will reach an equilibrium state in finite time.
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nAi (k)− nˆAi if xi(k) = A
nˆAi + 1− nAi (k) if xi(k) = B
(8.4)
where nˆAi denotes the maximum number of A-neighbors of agent i that will not cause agent i to
switch to B when playing A. The proof follows from the fact that the function is lower bounded












































, but because an extra A-neighbor has
been added to iˆ, they are dynamically equivalent. To ensure that the added node does not switch,
two B neighbors are added who also will not switch, forming a V -block.
Proof of Lemma 8.1. Consider the function Φ(k) in (8.4) which is clearly lower bounded by Φ(k) ≥
−∑ni=1 degi for all k. Consider a time step k, and let i denote the index of the active agent at
that time. One of the following three cases must happen:
1) Agent i does not switch strategies at time k + 1. This implies Φ(k + 1) = Φ(k).
2) Agent i switches from A to B at time k + 1. This implies nAi (k) ≥ nˆAi + 1. Then, since
nAi (k) = n
A
i (k + 1), we have
Φi(k + 1)− Φi(k) = nˆAi + 1− nAi (k)− nAi (k) + nˆAi
= 2(nˆAi − nAi (k)) + 1 ≤ −1. (8.5)
Moreover, for each j ∈ Ni, if xj(k) = A, it holds that
Φj(k + 1)− Φj(k) = nAj (k + 1)− nˆAj − nAj (k) + nˆAj
= −1, (8.6)
and if xj(k) = B, it holds that
Φj(k + 1)− Φj(k) = −nAj (k + 1) + nAj (k) = 1. (8.7)
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According to (8.3), the fact that agent i switches from A to B at time k+1 implies nAi (k) ≥ 12 degi,
regardless of how zi is defined. Hence, by combining (8.5), (8.6), and (8.7), we have




Φj(k + 1)− Φj(k)
= Φi(k + 1)− Φi(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤−1
−nAi (k) + (degi−nAi (k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ −1. (8.8)
3) Agent i switches from B to A at time k + 1. This implies nAi (k) ≤ nˆAi . Hence,
Φi(k + 1)− Φi(k) = 2(nAi (k)− nˆAi )− 1 ≤ −1. (8.9)
Moreover, for each j ∈ Ni, if xj(k) = A, it holds that
Φj(k + 1)− Φj(k) = nAj (k + 1)− nAj (k) = 1, (8.10)
and if xj(k) = B, it holds that
Φj(k + 1)− Φj(k) = −nAj (k + 1) + nAj (k) = −1. (8.11)
According to (8.3), the fact that agent i switches from B to A at time k+1 implies nAi (k) ≤ 12 degi,
regardless of how zi is defined. Hence, by combining (8.9), (8.10), and (8.11), we have
Φ(k + 1)− Φ(k)
= Φi(k + 1)− Φi(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤−1
+nAi (k)− (degi−nAi (k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ −1.
By summarizing the above three cases, we have that
Φ(k + 1) ≤ Φ(k) ∀k ≥ 0. (8.12)
Moreover, we have shown that every time an agent switches strategies, the function Φ(k) decreases
by at least one. The case where all thresholds are equal to 1
2
is thus a generalized ordinal potential
game, by the definition given in [108]. However, as shown in [7], this does not necessarily imply
convergence to an equilibrium. Hence, we complete the proof by contradiction.
Assume that the network does not reach an equilibrium in finite time. Hence, at every time step
k = 0, 1, . . ., there exists an agent ik whose strategy violates its threshold. Denote by k˜ the first time
after k at which agent ik is active. The existence of k˜ is guaranteed by Assumption 8.1. At time k˜,
agent ik’s threshold either remains violated, implying the agent will switch strategies at time k˜+1,
or is no longer violated, implying that some neighbors have changed their strategies during the time
interval [k+1, k˜]. Hence, at least one switch occurs in each interval Ik = [k+1, k˜+1]. Now consider
the sequence of intervals Ik1 , Ik2 , . . . where the indices kj, j = 1, 2, . . ., are such that kj+1 > k˜j + 1.
This sequence is infinite, and the intersection of each pair of intervals from the sequence is empty.
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Therefore, an infinite number of switches occur in the network over time. Namely, there exists an
infinite time sequence (κj)∞j=1, κ
j ∈ Ikj , such that an agent switches strategies at each κj. Hence,
either Case 2 or 3 occurs at each κj, resulting in Φ(κj + 1) ≤ Φ(κj)− 1. Hence, in view of (8.12),
Φ(k) ≤ Φ(κj)− 1 ∀k ≥ κj + 1. (8.13)
Since (8.13) holds for all j = 1, 2, . . ., we get that
Φ(k) ≤ Φ(κ1)− j ∀k ≥ κj + 1 ∀j ∈ N.
The above inequality implies that Φ is not lower bounded, which is a contradiction. Hence, the
proof is complete.
To motivate our approach for extending this result to an arbitrary distribution of thresholds,
consider for example an agent i with 4 neighbors whose threshold is 1
3
. When playing A, this agent
can tolerate up to 1 A-neighbor (Figure 8.1-a), but 2 or more will cause a switch to B. Similarly,
when playing B, the agent needs at least 2 A-neighbors to remain playing B, while 1 or fewer will
cause a switch to A. Now consider an agent iˆ whose threshold is 1
2
but who has one additional
neighbor who always plays A, for a total of 5 neighbors, as shown in Figure 8.1-b. When playing
A, this agent can tolerate up to 2 A-neighbors before switching to B, and as a B-agent needs at
least 3 A-neighbors, while 2 or fewer will cause a switch to A. Notice however, that with respect




, by adding a sufficient number of fixed A-neighbors, we can always construct a
dual node iˆ with threshold 1
2
whose dynamics are equivalent to the dynamics of the original node
i. Moreover, if τi >
1
2
we can achieve the same result by adding fixed B-neighbors. To ensure that
the added nodes do not change strategies, we simply add two opposite strategy neighbors to these
nodes (Figure 8.1-c). It is then straightforward to show that the strategies of all added nodes
remain constant. We now formalize this argument for arbitrary networks of anti-coordinating
agents, using some techniques similar to those that have already proven useful in studying the
convergence of synchronous networks [1].
We define the augmented network game Γˆ := (Gˆ, 1
2
1,−) based on Γ as follows. Let Gˆ = (Vˆ , Eˆ).
Define a V -block as a triplet of nodes {v1, v2, v3} ⊆ Vˆ along with the edges {{v1, v2}, {v1, v3}} ⊆ Eˆ .
For each agent i ∈ V , we introduce a dual agent iˆ ∈ Vˆ with the same initial strategy, i.e., xiˆ(0) =
xi(0), and with ziˆ = zi. Corresponding to each dual agent iˆ, there are mi number of V -blocks in Gˆ




then mi = 0; otherwise, mi depends on which one of the following three conditions on τi holds:
mi =

|(1− 2τi) degi | τi degi ∈ Z
| degi−r − 1| ∃r ∈ 2Z : r2 < τi degi < r+12
| degi−r| ∃r ∈ 2Z+ 1 : r2 ≤ τi degi < r+12
(8.14)
where 2Z and 2Z+1 denote the set of even and odd numbers, respectively. If τi < 12 , then the initial
strategies of each V -block connected to the dual agent iˆ are xv1(0) = A and xv2(0) = xv3(0) = B;
and if τi >
1
2
, then xv1(0) = B and xv2(0) = xv3(0) = A. In total, Vˆ has n +
∑n
i=1mi agents, the
thresholds of all of which are set to 1
2
. For Eˆ , in addition to the edges for the V -blocks, there is an
edge between any two dual agents iˆ and jˆ in Vˆ , if and only if there is an edge between i and j in
V .
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Lemma 8.2. The strategy of each V -block agent is fixed over time.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume there exists some time when the strategy of one of the
V -block agents changes. Let r denote the first time this happens, and denote the V -block agent
who changes her strategy by i. If i is a v1-node and xi(0) = A, then xi(r− 1) = A and xi(r) = B.
Agent i has two neighbors in the V -block who each play strategy B at time r− 1. Since degi = 3,
we have




⇒ nAi (r − 1) < τi degi ⇒ xi(r) = A,
which is a contradiction. If xi(0) = B, then agent i has two A-neighbors in the V -block and
xi(r) = A. It follows that




⇒ nAi (r − 1) > τi degi ⇒ xi(r) = B,
again a contradiction. Now if i is either a v2 or a v3 node, and xi(0) = A, then xi(r− 1) = A, and
i has only one neighbor, v1, whose strategy is B at time r − 1. Hence,




⇒ nAi (r − 1) < τi degi ⇒ xi(r) = A,
a contradiction. If on the other hand, xi(0) = B, then




⇒ nAi (r − 1) > τi degi ⇒ xi(r) = B,
which is a contradiction and completes the proof.
The following lemma takes the first step towards establishing equivalence of the dynamics
between the original and augmented network games. In particular, we need to show that the
thresholds of 1
2
in the augmented network will be satisfied (respectively violated) whenever the
thresholds of the corresponding agents in the original network are satisfied (respectively violated).
Lemma 8.3. Let nAi denote an instance of n
A
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Proof. First consider the situation when τi <
1
2
. In general, one of the following cases takes place:








The cases nAi < τi degi and n
A
i > τi degi can be shown using the same approach, which verifies
(8.15) for this case.
2) ∃r ∈ 2Z : r
2
≤ τi degi < r+12 : Here, τi degi 6∈ Z implies that nAi 6= τi degi, so we need only to






, nAi ∈ Z
⇒ nAi ≥ r2 + 1 = 12(degi−mi) + 12 ⇒ nAi +mi > 12(degi +mi),











Hence, (8.15) is confirmed for this case.
3) ∃r ∈ 2Z + 1 : r
2
≤ τi degi < r+12 : Again, τi degi 6∈ Z implies that nAi 6= τi degi. Then















nAi ∈ Z, r ∈ 2Z+ 1
⇒ nAi ≤ r − 12 ⇔ nAi ≤ 12(degi−mi)− 12











, then one of the following occurs:
1) τi degi ∈ Z: If nAi = τi degi, then (8.14) implies nAi = 12(degi +mi). The cases nAi < τi degi
and nAi > τi degi can be shown using the same approach, which verifies (8.16) for this case.
2) ∃r ∈ 2Z : r
2
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Hence, (8.16) holds for this case.
3) ∃r ∈ 2Z + 1 : r
2
≤ τi degi < r+12 : Once again, we know that nAi 6= τi degi. Using (8.14),






















Hence, (8.16) holds for this case and for all τi >
1
2
, which completes the proof.
Next, we show in Lemma 8.4 that if whenever an agent in G is activated, its dual in Gˆ also is
activated (while neglecting the time steps that a V -block agent is active), then the dynamics of
each node in G are the same as the dynamics of its dual node in Gˆ (again while neglecting the time
steps that a V -block agent is active).
Consider the network G and let ikG denote the active agent at time k. Correspondingly, denote
by (ikG)
∞
k=0, the sequence of active agents in G. Similarly define (ikGˆ)
∞
k=0 as the sequence of active
agents in Gˆ. Consider (ikGˆ)
∞
k=0 and exclude those agents i
k
Gˆ that belong to one of the V -blocks, to
get the subsequence (ihkGˆ )
∞







corresponds to the times at which the non-V -block agents in Gˆ are active.






k=0, then for k = 0, 1, . . ., it holds that
xi(k) = xiˆ(hk) ∀i ∈ V . (8.17)
where iˆ ∈ Vˆ is the dual of agent i.
Proof. The proof is done via induction on k. By the definition of Gˆ, (8.17) holds for k = 0. Assume
that (8.17) holds for k = r ∈ Z≥0.
Consider agent irG and its dual iˆ
r
G whose threshold and degree are
1
2
and degi +mi, respectively.
Agent irG updates at time k = r + 1, and agent iˆ
r
G updates at kGˆ = hr + 1 where kGˆ denotes the
time in the augmented network game Γˆ. If τi =
1
2
, then both agents have the same threshold




, then in view of Lemma 8.2 and since (8.17) holds for k = r, iˆrG has n
A
ir(r)+mi A-neighbors.
Therefore, according to (8.15) in Lemma 8.3, iˆrG updates to the same strategy that i
r
G does. On
the other hand, if τi >
1
2
, then iˆrG has n
A
ir(r) A-neighbors. Hence, according to (8.16) in Lemma
8.3, iˆrG updates to the same strategy that i
r
G does. Therefore, in all cases, agent iˆ
r
G updates to the
same strategy that agent irG does. That is,
xirG(r + 1) = xiˆrG
(hr + 1). (8.18)
On the other hand, since no other agent has become active at times hr or r,
xi(r + 1) = xi(r) ∀i ∈ V − {irG}, (8.19)
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xiˆ(hr + 1) = xiˆ(hr) ∀i ∈ V − {irG}. (8.20)
Due to the induction statement for k = r, it holds that xi(r) = xiˆ(hr) for all i ∈ V − {irG}. Hence,
(8.19) and (8.20) result in
xi(r + 1) = xiˆ(hr + 1) ∀i ∈ V − {irG}.
Therefore, according to (8.18),
xi(r + 1) = xiˆ(hr + 1) ∀i ∈ V . (8.21)
Now since at each of the time steps hr + 1, hr + 2, . . . , hr+1− 1, the active agent is a V -block agent
whose strategy remains fixed by Lemma 8.2, (8.21) results in
xi(r + 1) = xiˆ(hr+1) ∀i ∈ V .
Hence, (8.17) holds for k = r + 1, which completes the proof by induction.
The remaining step in proving Theorem 8.1 is to show that agents with arbitrary thresholds
will indeed reach an equilibrium state in finite time.
Proof of Theorem 8.1. Towards a proof by contradiction, suppose that the original network game
never converges, i.e., there exists an agent j ∈ V such that
∀k∗, (∃k > k∗ : xj(k) 6= xj(k∗)).
Construct the sequence of active agents (ikGˆ)
∞
k=0 by inserting an agent iˆ uniformly at random from
the set of augmented nodes Vˆ − V after every n elements of the sequence (ikG)∞k=0. This is clearly
a persistent activation sequence on the network Gˆ. By Lemma 8.1, we know that
∃k˜∗ : (∀k > k˜∗, xjˆ(k) = xjˆ(k˜∗)). (8.22)
On the other hand, by eliminating the V -block agents in (ikGˆ)
∞





view of Lemma 8.4, (8.22) implies that
∃k∗ : (∀k > k∗, xj(k) = xj(k∗)),
which contradicts our initial statement. Therefore, x(k) will reach an equilibrium in finite time.
As a result of Theorem 8.1, we have the following corollary, which to the best of our knowledge
has not been shown in the literature to date.
Corollary 8.1. Every network of anti-coordinating agents admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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8.3.2 All agents are coordinating
Theorem 8.2. Every network of coordinating agents who update asynchronously under Assump-
tion 8.1 will reach an equilibrium state in finite time.
The proof of Theorem 8.2 follows similar steps as the anti-coordinating case. The key difference






nˇAi − nAi (k) if xi(k) = A
nAi (k)− nˇAi + 1 if xi(k) = B
, (8.23)
where nˇAi is defined as the minimum number of A-neighbors required for an A-playing agent to
continue playing A. The maximum number of A-neighbors that a B agent can tolerate before
switching to A is then given by nˇAi − 1. As shown in the following lemma, this function also
decreases by at least 1 with every change of strategy for the network game Γ := (G, 1
2
1,+).
Lemma 8.5. Every network of coordinating agents who update asynchronously under Assumption
8.1, with τi =
1
2
for each agent i ∈ V, will reach an equilibrium state in finite time.
Proof. Consider the function Φ(k) =
∑n
i=1 Φi(k), where Φi is defined in (8.23). Clearly Φ(k) is
lower bounded by Φ(k) ≥ −∑ni=1 degi for all k. Consider a time step k, and let i denote the active
agent at that time. One of the following three cases must happen:
1) Agent i does not switch strategies at time k + 1. This implies Φ(k + 1) = Φ(k).
2) Agent i switches from A to B at time k + 1. This implies nAi (k) ≤ nˇAi − 1. Hence, since
nAi (k) = n
A
i (k + 1), we have
Φi(k + 1)− Φi(k) = nAi (k)− nˇAi + 1− nˇAi + nAi (k)
= 2(nAi (k)− nˇAi ) + 1 ≤ −1. (8.24)
Moreover, for each j ∈ Ni, if xj(k) = A, it holds that
Φj(k + 1)− Φj(k) = nˇAi − nAi (k + 1)− nˇAi + nAi (k)
= 1, (8.25)
and if xj(k) = B, it holds that
Φj(k + 1)− Φj(k) = nAi (k + 1)− nAi (k) = −1. (8.26)
According to (8.2), the fact that agent i switches from A to B at time k+1 implies nAi (k) ≤ 12 degi,
regardless of how zi is defined. Hence, by combining (8.24), (8.25), and (8.26), we have
Φ(k + 1)− Φ(k)
= Φi(k + 1)− Φi(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤−1
+nAi (k)− (degi−nAi (k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ −1. (8.27)
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3) Agent i switches from B to A at time k + 1. This implies nAi (k) ≥ nˇAi . Hence,
Φi(k + 1)− Φi(k) = 2(nˇAi − nAi (k))− 1 ≤ −1. (8.28)
Moreover, for each j ∈ Ni, if xj(k) = A, it holds that
Φj(k + 1)− Φj(k) = −nAj (k + 1) + nAj (k) = −1, (8.29)
and if xj(k) = B, it holds that
Φj(k + 1)− Φj(k) = nAj (k + 1)− nAj (k) = 1. (8.30)
According to (8.3), the fact that agent i switches from B to A at time k+1 implies nAi (k) ≥ 12 degi,
regardless of how zi is defined. Hence, by combining (8.28), (8.29), and (8.30), we have
Φ(k + 1)− Φ(k) (8.31)
= Φi(k + 1)− Φi(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤−1




By summarizing the above three cases, we have that
Φ(k + 1) ≤ Φ(k) ∀k ≥ 0. (8.34)
Moreover, we have shown that every time an agent switches strategies, the function Φ(k) decreases
by at least one. The rest of the proof follows in the same way as that of Lemma 8.1.
By following the same process of constructing the network augmentation for anti-coordinating
agents, we are able to extend the result of Lemma 8.5 to a network game with arbitrary thresholds.
We define the augmented (coordinating) network game Γˆ := (Gˆ, 1
2
1,+) based on the (coordinating)
network game Γ, in the same way we defined the augmented network game for anti-coordinating
agents, but with the following difference: If τi <
1
2
, then the initial strategies of each V -block
connected to the dual agent iˆ are xv1(0) = xv2(0) = xv3(0) = A, and if τi >
1
2
, then xv1(0) =
xv2(0) = xv3(0) = B. Similar to Lemma 8.2, the following lemma guarantees the invariance of the
strategies of the V -block agents.
Lemma 8.6. The strategy of each (coordinating) V -block agent is fixed over time.
Proof. The proof is done via contradiction. Assume there exists some time when the strategy
of one of the V -block agents changes. Let r denote the first time this happens, and denote the
V -block agent who changes her strategy by i. If i is a v1-node and xi(0) = A, then xi(r − 1) = A
and xi(r) = B. Agent i has two neighbors in the V -block who each play strategy A at time r− 1.
Since degi = 3, we have




⇒ nAi (r − 1) > τi degi ⇒ xi(r) = A,
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which is a contradiction. If xi(0) = B, then agent i has two B-neighbors in the V -block and
xi(r) = A. It follows that




⇒ nAi (r − 1) < τi degi ⇒ xi(r) = B,
again a contradiction. Now if i is either a v2 or a v3 node, and xi(0) = A, then xi(r− 1) = A, and
i has only one neighbor, v1, whose strategy is A at time r − 1. Hence,




⇒ nAi (r − 1) > τi degi ⇒ xi(r) = A,
a contradiction. If on the other hand, xi(0) = B, then




⇒ nAi (r − 1) < τi degi ⇒ xi(r) = B,
which is a contradiction and completes the proof.
Next, since Lemma 8.3 is independent of the type of agents, i.e., coordinating or anti-coordinating,
it can be used here as well. Moreover, because of Lemma 8.6, the result of Lemma 8.4 can be
readily extended to a network of coordinating agents. With these lemmas in hand, and with the
help of Lemma 8.5, the proof of Theorem 8.2 can be done in the same way as that of Theorem 8.1.
Theorem 8.2 also leads to a corollary on existence of equilibria for networks of coordinating
agents, but in this case we confirm an already known result, e.g., [7].
Corollary 8.2. Every network of coordinating agents admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The following corollary follows directly from Theorems 8.1 and 8.2, and the fact that a network
of homogeneous agents can always be described as all coordinating or all anti-coordinating.
Corollary 8.3. Every network of homogenous agents who update asynchronously under Assump-
tion 8.1 will reach an equilibrium state in finite time.
8.3.3 Coordinating and anti-coordinating agents coexist
Given the previous two results, the natural question arises of what we can say about convergence
when both coordinating and anti-coordinating agents are present in a network. Although there may
be particular configurations that converge, we can demonstrate that this will not hold in general
with a simple example on a network consisting of only two agents connected to each other, namely
a path of length one, i.e., V := {1, 2}, E := {(1, 2), (2, 1)}. Suppose that agent 1 is coordinating,
agent 2 is anti-coordinating, and their thresholds are both equal to 1
2
. Given their respective
update rules in (8.2) and (8.3), agent 1 will always switch to match agent 2 while agent 2 will
always switch to oppose the strategy of agent 1. In other words, the following transitions will occur
with probability one: (A,A) → (A,B) → (B,B) → (B,A) → (A,A), resulting in a never-ending
cycle. This formulation is equivalent to a repeated version of the well-known matching pennies
game. From this we can conclude that convergence is not a trivial result to be expected in all
cases, and can only be guaranteed when all agents are either coordinating or anti-coordinating.
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8.3.4 Convergence time
The following corollary follows from the fact that the potential function Φ(k) is bounded from
above and below and decreases by at least one every time an agent switches strategies.
Corollary 8.4. Every network of all coordinating or all anti-coordinating agents will reach an
equilibrium state after no more than 6|E| agent switches.
Proof. To compute the maximum number of times any agent switches strategies before such a
network reaches an equilibrium, we consider the augmented network game Γˆ, which will undergo
the same sequence of agent switches as the original network game Γ, provided that the dual agents
in Vˆ activate in the same order as the corresponding agents in V . From (8.8) in the proof of
Lemma 8.1 and (8.27) in the proof of Lemma 8.5, we know that whenever an agent i ∈ Vˆ switches
strategies, Φ(k + 1) − Φ(k) ≤ −1. Otherwise, Φ(k) remains constant. It follows that the total
number of agent switches in Γˆ is bounded from above by Φ(0) − Φ(k∗), where k∗ is the time at
which the network reaches an equilibrium. To obtain such a bound, we start by decomposing
the augmented network into three disjoint sets of agents such that Vˆ = Vˆ0 ∪ Vˆ1 ∪ Vˆ23, where Vˆ0
denotes the dual agents corresponding to the oringinal agents V , Vˆ1 denotes the set of v1 agents
in the V -blocks, and Vˆ23 denotes the set of v2 and v3 agents in the V -blocks (we refer the reader
to the proof of Theorem 8.1 for definitions of the augmented network). We can now expand the















Since the V -block agents never change strategies (by Lemmas 8.2 and 8.6), Φi(k) is constant for all
agents in Vˆ23. The final term in (8.35) is therefore equal to zero. The agents in Vˆ1 each have one
neighbor in Vˆ0 who might change strategies (the other two neighbors are in Vˆ23 and remain fixed).
Since nAi (k) can change by at most one for these agents, it follows that the maximum change in












since the size of the set Vˆ1 is simply the total number of V -blocks (mi for each agent), and mi < degi
due to (8.14). Next, we consider the set Vˆ0 of dual agents. For a network of anti-coordinating














degiˆ +1− 0 if xiˆ(0) = B
,
where we used the facts that τiˆ degiˆ−1 ≤ nˆAiˆ ≤ τiˆ degiˆ and that the thresholds in the augmented
network τiˆ are all equal to
1
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+ 1 ≤ degiˆ−12 degiˆ +1 if xiˆ(0) = B
,
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degiˆ +1 for all iˆ ∈ Vˆ0. (8.37)


















degiˆ− degiˆ if xiˆ(k∗) = B
.
























degiˆ for all iˆ ∈ Vˆ0. (8.38)






For each dual agent iˆ ∈ Vˆ0, let i denote the corresponding original agent in V . Since degiˆ =
degi +mi and mi < degi due to (8.14), it holds that degiˆ ≤ 2 degi−1. It follows that∑
iˆ∈Vˆ0




Substituting (8.36) and (8.39) into (8.35) results in




Finally, Lemma 8.4 implies that the sequence of agent switches between an original and augmented
network are equivalent, as long as the dual agents activate in the same sequence as the agents in
the original network. This completes the proof.
This implies that agents cannot switch an arbitrary number of times before the network reaches
equilibrium. It follows that when agent activation times are independent and identically dis-
tributed, the upper bound on the expected time to reach equilibrium is linear in the number of
edges in the network.
8.4 Synchronous and partially synchronous updating
So far, any network of all coordinating or all anti-coordinating agents is shown to reach an equilib-
rium state, as long as the agents update asynchronously. However, the importance of asynchronous
updating to the convergence results remains an open problem. In this section we show that while
full synchrony may not always result in convergence, the results indeed still hold for partial syn-
chrony, in which a random number of agents update at each time step.
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8.4.1 Synchronous updating
We show that networks in which updates are fully synchronous may never reach an equilibrium
state, by presenting counterexamples with only two agents.
First, suppose that both agents are anti-coordinating and start from the strategy vector (A,A).
The agents update synchronously, that is at each time step, both agents activate and update their
strategies according to the update rule in (8.3). Therefore, the dynamics will be deterministic,
and the following transitions will occur on the strategies of the agents: (A,A)→ (B,B)→ (A,A),
resulting in a cycle of length 2.
Now suppose that both agents are coordinating and they start from the strategy vector (A,B).
Following the update rule in (8.2), the following transitions take place under the synchronous
updating: (A,B)→ (B,A)→ (A,B), again resulting in a cycle of length 2.
The above examples prove that equilibrium convergence is no longer guaranteed if the agents
update in full synchrony. However, it is known that any network game governed by synchronous
best-response dynamics will reach a cycle of length at most 2, even when both coordinating and
anti-coordinating agents coexist in the network [2].
8.4.2 Partially synchronous updating
In order to understand what happens in the case of partially synchronous updates, we need to
relax the assumption that only one agent can update at a given time. We must therefore decouple
the activation sequence from the discrete-time dynamics, and consider the activations to occur in
continuous time. Let {tj}∞j=1 denote a sequence of times and {ij}∞j=1 a sequence of agents such
that agent ij is activated at time tj. Figure 8.2 shows the relationship of the discrete time steps
with the agent activation sequence.
0 1 2 3 4 5
t1t2 t3 t4 t5 t6t7 t8 t9 t10 t11
1
Figure 8.2: In the partially synchronous update model, multiple agents can activate in a single
discrete time step. All agents who are active in the absolute time interval [k, k+ 1) update at time
k+ 1 based on the information at time k. The colors red, blue, and green represent three different
agents.
It is now possible that multiple agents update between consecutive time steps. In particular,
all agents who are active in the time interval [k, k + 1) update at time k + 1 based on the state of
the network at time k. Let Ak denote the set of all agents who are active during the time interval
[k, k + 1). We can express the partially synchronous dynamics as follows:
xi(k + 1) =
{
xbri (k) if i ∈ Ak
xi(k) otherwise
,
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where xbri (k) denotes the best response of agent i to the strategies of its neighbors at time k. To
provide a general framework for independent stochastic activation sequences, we make the following
assumption.
Assumption 8.2. The inter-activation times for each agent are drawn from mutually independent
probability distributions with support on IR≥0.
One standard model that satisfies Assumption 8.2 is to use exponential distributions with mean
1
λ
. This represents the case in which each agent updates according to a Poisson clock with rate λ,
and the expected number of agents updating in one unit of time is λn.
From the previous sections we know that the best response dynamics do not necessarily con-
verge to an equilibrium when the updating is synchronous, yet do converge when the updating is
asynchronous. Therefore, the natural question arising is: how much asynchrony do the partially
synchronous best-response dynamics need for convergence? It turns out that even under the rel-
atively mild assumption on the partially synchronous updates in Assumption 8.2, we still have
convergence to an equilibrium state almost surely.
Theorem 8.3. Every network of all coordinating or all anti-coordinating agents who update with
partially synchronous dynamics that satisfy Assumption 8.2 almost surely reaches an equilibrium
state in finite time.
To prove the theorem, we model the network game as a Markov chain and show that it is
absorbing [54].
Proof of Theorem 8.3. Since the updates to x(k + 1) depend only on the state x(k), and since
agent activations do not depend on time, the network game can be modeled as a Markov chain
with dimension 2n. The state transition probabilities depend on the probabilities that each of
the sets Ak will occur, along with the corresponding update dynamics. To prove almost sure
convergence of the network game, it suffices to show that this Markov chain is absorbing, which
requires satisfying two conditions [54, Definition 11.1, p416]. The first condition is that there exists
at least one absorbing state. Absorbing states are equivalent to Nash equilibria of the network
game, whose existence we have established in Corollaries 8.2 and 8.1. The second condition is
that there exists a path in the Markov chain from every non-absorbing state to an absorbing state.
Theorems 8.2 and 8.1 established the existence of such paths, which consist of finite sequences
of asynchronous updates. It follows from Assumption 8.2, i.e., agent updates are independent
and have support on IR≥0, that the probabilities of each agent being the only active agent in a
given time step are strictly positive (they can be computed from the probability distributions for
the inter-activation times of each agent). Therefore, both conditions are met, and the Markov
chain is absorbing, which implies that the corresponding network game will almost surely reach
an equilibrium state in finite time [54, Theorem 11.3, p417].
Note that one technically equivalent but perhaps less practical modeling of the partially syn-
chronous updates would be to simply assume that at each time step k = 0, 1, . . ., a random number
of random agents activate simultaneously and then update at k+1. In other words, there is a fixed
probability that a particular group of agents activate simultaneously at every time step. Then The-
orem 8.3 still holds since the probability that each agent is activated asynchronously is bounded
below by a positive constant. From a broader point of view, Theorem 8.3 holds whenever random
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asynchronous activations are not completely excluded from the partially synchronous dynamics.
Convergence, however, may not be achieved for particular nonrandom activation sequences, dis-












































Figure 8.3: Strategy evolution in the network game Γ = (G, 1
2
1,+) under the activation subse-
quence α1 = ({1}, {2, 3, 4, 6}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}). Red circles indicate those nodes that are activated at
the corresponding time step.
8.4.3 Zero-probability non-convergence
We now show that Theorem 8.3 holds only almost surely. In other words, there exist activation
sequences generated under Assumption 8.2 that do not result in equilibrium convergence; however,
the probability of such sequences happening is zero. Consider the network game Γ = (G, 1
2
1,+)
where G and the initial strategies x(0) are as in Figure 8.3-a. First, we show that if any single
agent is activated when the strategy state equals x(0), then there exists a finite sequence of agent
activations that return the state to x(0). Consider the case when agent 1 is activated exclusively
at k = 0 (Figure 8.3-a), and hence, switches to B at k = 1. Then if agents 2, 3, 4, 6 activate
at k = 1 and agents 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 at k = 2, the strategy state returns to x(0) at k = 3, i.e.,
x(3) = x(0); the process is shown in Figure 8.3-b to 8.3-d. Denote the corresponding activation
subsequence by α1 = ({1}, {2, 3, 4, 6}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}). Similarly, as shown in Figure 8.4, there exists
an activation sequence that returns the state of the system to x(0) when agent 2 is activated at k =
0. The corresponding activation subsequence would be α2 = ({2}, {1, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}).
Moreover, due to the symmetric distribution of the strategies x(0) in the network, the same can
be shown for when agents 3, 4 or 6 are activated at k = 0 (which are similar to agents 1, 2 and 5,
respectively). Denote the corresponding activation subsequences by α3, α4 and α6. Now consider
the event X made by α1 and α2 as follows
X = (xi)
∞
i=1, xi ∈ {α1, α2}.
Any activation sequence in X can be generated under Assumption 8.2 and has the property
that all agents activate exclusively infinitely many times. However, no sequence in X results in
convergence of the network game Γ. Yet this does not contradict Theorem 8.3 since P [X] = 0,
under Assumption 8.2.














































Figure 8.4: Strategy evolution in the network game Γ = (G, 1
2
1,+) under the activation subse-
quence α2 = ({2}, {1, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}).
8.5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that arbitrary networks consisting of all coordinating or all anti-coordinating agents
who update with asynchronous best responses will reach equilibrium in finite time. Moreover, when
updates are partially synchronous, we have shown that the network still almost surely reaches an
equilibrium under mild conditions on the independence and randomness of agent updates. For the
case of anti-coordinating agents, these results have important implications in social contexts where
individuals prefer an action only if a small enough portion of neighbors are using that action,
e.g., deciding which route to take to avoid traffic congestion, volunteering for a dangerous but
important public service position, contributing money or time towards a crowd-sourced project,
etc. For coordinating agents, the results apply to social contexts where each agents prefer an
action only if a sufficient number of neighbors are using that action, e.g., the spread of social
behaviors, technological innovations, viral infections. Our results suggest that in both cases, no
matter how different the individuals are, which neighbors affect their decisions, or how many
simultaneous decisions are made, everyone will tend to settle on a particular action with which
they are satisfied. This means that the presence of cycles or non-convergence must result from
other factors such as imitation or other unmodeled effects in the update dynamics, or a mixture
of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents. These results also open the door to characterizing
the equilibria and investigating possibilities for payoff-based incentive control of the network.
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Chapter 9
Control of asynchronous best-response
dynamics on networks through payoff
incentives
Various collective behaviors occurring on networks of interacting agents can be modeled by asyn-
chronous best-response dynamics, or equivalently, linear threshold dynamics. Building upon recent
convergence results in this framework, we consider how such a network can be efficiently driven to
a desired equilibrium state by offering payoff incentives or rewards for using a particular strategy,
either uniformly or targeted to individuals. We begin by establishing the monotonicity of strategy
changes following an increase in payoffs in coordination games, as well as the uniqueness of the
resulting equilibria. Based on these results, for the case when a uniform incentive is offered to all
agents, we show how to compute the optimal incentive using a binary search algorithm. When
different incentives can be offered to each agent, we propose a new algorithm to select which agents
should be targeted based on maximizing a ratio between a potential function measuring the effect
on the network of an agent switching strategies and the incentive required to cause the agent
to switch. Simulations show that this algorithm computes near-optimal targeted incentives for a
wide range of networks and payoff distributions in coordination games and can also be effective
for anti-coordination games.
9.1 Introduction
We use the convergence results in the previous chapter to provide control mechanisms for finite
structured populations governed by the best response dynamics in this chapter. Faced with the
rapidly growing scale and complexity of networked multi-agent systems, in which agents often have
different and even competing objectives, control engineers are increasingly looking to game theory
for answers to questions on convergence, stability, performance, robustness, distributed control
and optimization, in various game contexts, e.g., potential games [97, 38, 89, 98, 90], stochastic
games [9, 31, 182], matrix games [25], repeated games [96, 155], networked games [57], and others
[46, 162, 10, 173, 95, 113, 50]. In particular, evolutionary game theory has proven to be a pow-
erful tool towards investigating the dynamics and possibilities for control in large populations of
interacting decision-making agents [115, 138, 32, 91, 189]. The best-response update rule, in which
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agents choose the strategy that maximizes their total utility against the current strategies of their
neighbors, is one of the simple yet intelligent mechanisms that evolutionary game theory postu-
lates to understand the emergence of collective behaviors on networks of interacting individuals
[149, 135, 139]. Two common social contexts capturing such behaviors are coordination games,
where the adoption of a particular action by the neighbors of an individual stimulates the individ-
ual to adopt the action as well, such as in the spread of social innovations and viral infections, and
anti-coordination games, where the adoption of a particular action by too many of the neighbors
discourages the individual from adopting that action, such as in traffic congestion and the division
of labor [36]. We refer to agents whose payoffs correspond to the above games as coordinating and
anti-coordinating. In either context, the agents may make their decisions simultaneously, resulting
in a synchronous update rule [1], or they may make decisions on independent time lines, resulting
in an asynchronous update rule [187], which is particularly suitable when the rewards and conse-
quences of the decisions take place more frequently than the decisions themselves. Several studies
have investigated convergence in best-response dynamics for coordination and anti-coordination
games in homogeneous populations, that is, when the utility functions of the individuals are the
same, both on well-mixed populations [6] and networks [110, 88, 92], and some others have studied
the more general heterogeneous case [1, 52, 136], where each individual has a possibly unique util-
ity function. In particular, we have shown in Chapter 8 that every network consisting of either all
coordinating or all anti-coordinating agents who update asynchronously with best responses will
eventually reach an equilibrium state.
Having established these convergence results, we are now interested in how to drive such a
network to consensus in a desired strategy by offering payoff incentives to the agents, motivated
by applications such as hastening the adoption of new technologies or socially/environmentally
beneficial behaviors and controlling the spread of viral epidemics [109]. Indeed, this is a fast
growing research area in which several different approaches are possible, including what to consider
as the control input. For example, under imitative dynamics, the goal in [145, 144] is to find the
minimum number of agents such that when these agents adopt a desired strategy, the rest of the
agents in the network will follow. The input in this work is thus the strategies of the agents,
but it leaves open the question of how to implement such strategy control. In the context of
best-response dynamics, a natural mechanism for achieving strategy control is the use of payoff
incentives. For instance, in [91], the payoffs of a stochastic snowdrift game are changed in order to
shift the equilibrium to a more cooperative one. This type of mechanism is applicable to situations
where a central regulating agency has the power to uniformly change the payoffs of all agents to
incentivize them to play a particular strategy. We refer to this control problem as uniform reward
control where the goal is to lead individuals’ to a desired strategy by offering the minimum uniform
incentive to play that strategy. On the other hand, if the central agency can offer different rewards
to each agent, a more efficient control protocol may be possible. That is, by altering the payoffs of
just some individuals, the population can be led to a desired equilibrium state [144, 186]. We refer
to this problem as targeted reward control. In case the budget for offering such rewards is limited,
which may often be the case, a typical goal would be to maximize the number of individuals playing
the desired strategy subject to the budget constraint, and we refer to this problem as budgeted
targeted reward control.
In this chapter, we seek efficient incentive-based control algorithms for finite networks of hetero-
geneous decision-making individuals who asynchronously update their strategies to best responses,
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presented in the previous chapter. First, we prove that after increasing the rewards of a network
of agents at equilibrium, who are all playing coordination games, the network almost surely con-
verges to a unique equilibrium. This allows us to precisely predict the result of offering incentives
to one or more agents under asynchronous best-response dynamics, which is in general not trivial
since agents updating in random order can lead to many different outcomes. We use this property
to provide efficient targeted-reward control protocols for both unlimited and limited budgets. In
the case of uniform reward control, we use a binary search to find the optimal necessary reward.
For targeted-reward control, we propose the Iterative Potential-to-Reward Optimization (IPRO)
algorithm, which uses a threshold-based potential function and iteratively chooses the agent whose
strategy switch maximizes the ratio of the increase in potential to the reward required to achieve
the switch. We evaluate the performance of our protocol, by running several simulations and
compare the results with those of some alternative approaches. Simulations on networks of coordi-
nating agents show that the IPRO algorithm performs the best of those tested and near-optimal for
a broad range of random networks and payoff distributions. For anti-coordinating agents, uniform
and targeted reward control is trivial, yet budgeted targeted reward control remains challenging.
Interestingly, our simulations suggest that if the potential decrease is weighted differently with
respect to the rewards depending on the size of the available budget, the IPRO algorithm is also
effective in this case.
9.2 Unique equilibrium convergence of coordinating net-
work games
Our approach for reward-based control of the dynamics (8.2) in the previous chapter depends on
some important convergence and monotonicity properties, for which we build upon our previous
results proved in Chapter 8. Theorem 8.2 establishes convergence of asynchronous best-response
dynamics on networks of coordinating agents, and requires only the weak assumption that each
agent is activated infinitely many times as time goes to infinity. The theorem guarantees equilib-
rium convergence, leaving open the question of whether the equilibrium is unique. As the main
theoretical result of this chapter, we show in the following that if the network starts from any
equilibrium state, and the thresholds of some of the agents are decreased, the network almost
surely reaches a unique equilibrium state, regardless of the sequence in which agents activate.
Theorem 9.1. Consider a network of coordinating agents that is at equilibrium at time 0. If the
thresholds of some of the agents are decreased at time 0, then almost surely after some finite time,
the network will reach an equilibrium state which is unique and does not depend on the sequence
in which agents activate.
For the proof, we first show that under the condition of Theorem 9.1, the number of agents
playing A evolves monotonically: when the network is at equilibrium, a decrease in one or more
thresholds can only result in agents switching from B to A.
Proposition 9.1. Consider a network of coordinating agents that is at equilibrium at time 0. If
the thresholds of some of the agents are decreased at time 0, then no agent will switch from A to
B at any time t ≥ 0.
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Proof. The proof is done via contradiction. Assume the contrary and let t1 > 0 denote the first
time that some agent i switches from A to B. We know that the network was at equilibrium
at time 0, so it follows from (8.2) that nAi (0) > τi degi. Since no thresholds are increased and
node degrees are constant, the fact that agent i switched from A to B at time t1 means that the
number of A-neighbors of agent i at time t1 − 1 must have been less than that at time 0, i.e.,
nAi (t1− 1) < nAi (0). Therefore, at least one of the neighbors of agent i must have switched from A
to B at some time before t1, which contradicts how t1 is defined, completing the proof.
Next we show that after decreasing some of the thresholds in a network at equilibrium, any
agents who switch from B to A under one activation sequence will do so under any activation
sequence, although possibly at different times. Consider two activation sequences S1 := {i0, i1, . . .}
and S2 := {j0, j1, . . .}. Denote by x1i (t) the strategy of agent i at time t under the activation
sequence S1, and define x2i (t) similarly for S2. Let t0 be the first time when agent j0 is active in
S1. Then define ts as the first time after ts−1 that agent js is active in S1, for s ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. The
existence of ts is guaranteed by the assumption that each agent is activated infinitely many times.
Lemma 9.1. Consider a network of coordinating agents that is at equilibrium at time 0. If the
thresholds of some of the agents are decreased at time 0, then given any two activation sequences
S1 = {i0, i1, . . .} and S2 = {j0, j1, . . .}, the following holds for s ∈ {0, 1, . . .}.
x2js(s+ 1) = A ⇒ x1js(ts + 1) = A. (9.1)
Proof. The proof is via induction on s. First the statement is shown for s = 0. Suppose x2j0(1) = A.
If x2j0(0) = A, i.e., agent j
0’s strategy was already A in the beginning, then in view of Proposition
9.1, this agent will not switch to B regardless of the activation sequence. Hence, x1j0(t) = A for all
t ≥ 0, implying that (9.1) is in force. Next, assume that x2j0(0) = B. Then agent j0 has switched
strategies at t = 1 under S2. Hence, in view of (8.2),
nA2j0 (0) ≥ τ ′j0 degj0 (9.2)
where τ ′i denotes the (possibly new) threshold of agent i after decreasing some thresholds at time
0 and nA2i (t) denotes the number of A-playing neighbors of agent i at time t under the activation
sequence S2. Similarly define nA1i (t). Clearly
nA1j0 (0) = n
A2
j0 (0). (9.3)
Due to Proposition 9.1, we also have
nA1j0 (t0) ≥ nA1j0 (0).
Hence, it follows from (9.3) that
nA1j0 (t0) ≥ nA2j0 (0).
Therefore, according to (9.2), nA1j0 (t0) ≥ τ ′j0 degj0 , implying that x1j0(t0 + 1) = A, which proves
(9.1) for s = 0. Now assume that (9.1) holds for s = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1. Similar to the case of s = 0,
the induction statement can be proven for s = r: Suppose x2jr(r + 1) = A. If x
2
jr(r) = A, then
according to Proposition 9.1, agent jr will not switch to B regardless of the activation sequence.
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Hence, x1jr(t) = A for all t ≥ r, implying that (9.1) is in force for s = r. So assume that x2jr(r) = B.
Then agent jr switches strategies at t = r + 1 under S2. Hence, in view of (8.2),
nA2jr (r) ≥ τ ′jr degjr . (9.4)
Since (9.1) holds for all s = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1, and because of Proposition 9.1, we obtain
nA1jr (tr−1 + 1) ≥ nA2jr (r). (9.5)
On the other hand, in view of Proposition 9.1, since tr ≥ tr−1 + 1,
nA1jr (tr) ≥ nA1jr (tr−1 + 1).
So because of (9.5), we get
nA1jr (tr) ≥ nA2jr (r).
Therefore, according to (9.4), nA1jr (tr) ≥ τ ′jr degjr , implying that x1jr(tr + 1) = A, which proves
(9.1) for s = r, completing the proof.
We finally prove Theorem 9.1 by using Lemma 9.1 and Proposition 9.1.
Proof of Theorem 9.1. From Theorem 8.2, we know that regardless of the activation sequence, the
network almost surely reaches an equilibrium state. So it remains to prove the uniqueness of the
equilibrium for all activation sequences, which we do by contradiction. Assume that there exist two
activation sequences S1 = {i0, i1, . . .} and S2 = {j0, j1, . . .} that almost surely drive the network
to two distinct equilibrium states, implying the existence of an agent q whose strategy is different
at the two equilibria, say B under the equilibrium of S1 and A under the equilibrium of S2. Hence,
there exists some time τ after which the strategy of agent q is A under S2. So since each agent is
active infinitely many times, there is some time s ≥ τ at which agent q is active and plays strategy
A at time s+ 1 under S2, i.e., x2q(s+ 1) = A. Then in view of (9.1) in Lemma 9.1, x1q(ts + 1) = A,
that is the strategy of agent q becomes A at ts + 1. On the other hand, according to Proposition
9.1, the strategy of agent q will not change after ts + 1, i.e., x
1
q(t) = A for all t ≥ ts + 1. But this
is in contradiction with the assumption that the strategy of agent q is B at the equilibrium state
under S1, completing the proof.
9.3 Control through payoff incentives
In this section we consider the use of payoff incentives to drive a network of agents who update
asynchronously with best responses from any undesired equilibrium toward a desired equilibrium
in which all or at least more agents play strategy A.
9.3.1 Uniform reward control
Suppose a central regulating agency has the ability to provide a reward of r0 ≥ 0 to all agents who
play strategy A. The resulting payoff matrix is given by
( A B
A ai + r0 bi + r0
B ci di
)
, ai, bi, ci, di ∈ IR,
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for each agent i ∈ V . The control objective in this case is the following.
Problem 9.1 (Uniform reward control). Given a network game Γ = (G, τ,±) and initial strategies
x(0), find the infimum reward r∗0 such that for every r0 > r
∗
0, xi(t) will almost surely reach A for
every agent i ∈ V.
First, we observe that the solution to Problem 9.1 for networks of anti-coordinating agents is
simply to choose r∗0 such that the thresholds of all agents are greater than or equal to one. For
networks of coordinating agents, we first investigate how the agents’ thresholds are affected by the
reward.
Proposition 9.2. If a coordinating agent i receives a positive reward for playing A, then the
corresponding threshold will not increase, i.e., ∆τi ≤ 0.
Proof. First, we consider a non-stubborn coordinating agent, i.e., δi > 0. The original threshold






ai − ci + di − bi .
After adding the reward, the new threshold is
τ ′i =
di − bi − r0
ai − ci + di − bi = τi + ∆τi,





Hence, δi > 0 implies ∆τi ≤ 0. Next, we consider a stubborn coordinating agent, that is δi = 0
and τi = 0 if the agent is biased to A, and τi = 1 if it is biased to B. Such an agent remains
stubborn after adding any reward r0. In particular, if the threshold of the agent is already 0,
then the reward has no effect since the agent will still be biased to A. The threshold will also
remain unchanged if it is originally 1, and the added reward is not enough to bias the agent to A.
Otherwise, the reward changes the bias of the stubborn agent from B to A, making the threshold
change from 1 to 0. Therefore, the change in threshold of a stubborn agent i is either 0 or −1,
resulting in ∆τi ≤ 0, which completes the proof.
To compute the value of r∗0 for networks of coordinating agents, we take advantage of the
following key properties of the dynamics: (i) the number of agents who converge to A is monotone
in the value of r0 due to Propositions 9.1 and 9.2, and (ii) simulations of the network game are
fast to compute due to the unique equilibrium property established in Theorem 9.1. In other
words, property (ii) means that since all activation sequences will result in the same equilibrium,
we can choose a sequence consisting of only agents whose thresholds are violated, which will have
a maximum length of n before reaching equilibrium. We begin by generating a set R of candidate




∣∣∣ r = δi(nˇAi − j)
degi
, i ∈ V , j ∈ {1, . . . , nˇAi }
}
.






γi B¯ 6= ∅
0 B¯ = ∅
and B¯ = {i | δi = 0, xi(0) = B} is the set of stubborn agents biased to B. The set R is clearly
finite, and indeed includes the optimal reward as shown in the following.
Proposition 9.3. For a network of coordinating agents, r∗0 ∈ R.
Proof. According to Proposition 9.2, ∆τi ≤ 0 for all i ∈ V . So in view of Theorem 9.1, after adding
a reward r0 > r
∗
0, the network almost surely reaches a unique equilibrium where everyone plays A,
at some time tf . For stubborn agents, we know that if they initially play A, they will keep doing
so, and hence do not require a reward. However, if a stubborn agent is initially playing B, then in
view of (8.1), the necessary and sufficient condition on the reward r0 to make a stubborn agent i
play A is r0 > γi. Hence, r
∗
0 ≥ γi, implying that r∗0 must be greater than γmax. On the other hand,
in view of the update rule (8.2), to have all non-stubborn agents i play A, r∗0 must make the new
thresholds τ ′i satisfy n
A








∣∣∣ r ≥ δi(τi degi−nAi (tf ))degi ∀i ∈ V
}
.









∣∣∣ r = δi(nˇAi −(nAi (tf )+1))degi , i ∈ V
}
.









∣∣∣ r = δi(nˇAi −j)degi , i ∈ V , j ∈ {1, . . . , nˇAi }
}
= R,
which completes the proof.
Let vR denote the vector containing the elements ofR sorted from lowest to highest. Algorithm
1 uses the fact that convergence of the network is monotone in the reward r0 and performs a binary
search to find the minimum candidate reward that results in all agents almost surely reaching
strategy A. In what follows, 1 denotes the n-dimensional vector containing all ones.
Proposition 9.4. Algorithm 1 computes the reward r∗0 that solves Problem 9.1 and terminates in
O(n log |E|) steps.
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i− := 1
i+ := |R|
while i+ − i− > 1 do
r∗0 := v
R




Γ′ := (G, τ + ∆τ1,+)
Simulate Γ′ from x(0) until equilibrium x¯






Algorithm 1: Binary search algorithm to compute the reward r∗0 that solves Problem 9.1 for
networks of coordinating agents.
Proof. Since r∗0 ∈ R due to Proposition 9.3, the minimum r0 ∈ R which results in all agents
switching to A is r∗0. According to Theorem 9.1, if a given r0 results in all agents switching to A
for one activation sequence, then it does for every activation sequence. Therefore, we can test any
given r0 by activating only those agents whose thresholds are violated. Since agents can only switch
from B to A after a decrease in thresholds, such a simulation requires no more than n activations.
Due to Propositions 9.1 and 9.2, the number of agents switching to A is monotone in r0, which
means we can perform a binary search on the ordered list vR. Since the maximum number of
elements in the set R is equal to the sum of the degrees of all nodes in the network which is equal
to 2|E|, a binary search on vR will result in O(log |E|) iterations of the loop in Algorithm 1. The
algorithm performs one simulation per iteration, and therefore requires O(n log |E|) operations in
total.
9.3.2 Targeted reward control
If one has the ability to offer a different reward to each agent, it may be possible to achieve a
desired outcome at a lower cost than with uniform rewards in networks of coordinating agents.
This is because a small number of agents switching strategies can start a cascading effect in the
network. Also, in a network with irregular topology and where the agents have different payoffs,
some agents will generally require a smaller reward than others in order to adopt the desired
strategy. Let r := (r1, . . . , rn)
T denote the vector of rewards offered to each agent, where ri is the
reward to agent i. We now have the following payoff matrix for each agent i ∈ V :
( A B
A ai + ri bi + ri
B ci di
)
, ai, bi, ci, di ∈ IR, ri ∈ IR≥0.
The targeted control objective is the following.
9.3. Control through payoff incentives 187
Problem 9.2 (Targeted reward control). Given a network game Γ = (G, τ,±) and initial strategies




i such that if ri > r
∗
i for each i, then
xi(t) will converge almost surely to A for every agent i ∈ V.
The solution to Problem 9.2 for networks of anti-coordinating agents is simply to set the
threshold of every agent greater than or equal to one. Now consider a network of coordinating
agents, which is at equilibrium at some time te. Let rˇi denote the infimum reward required for




i (te) = (γi − rˇi) degi










if δi 6= 0
0 if δi = 0 ∧ γi ≤ 0
−1 if δi = 0 ∧ γi > 0
.
In order to identify which agents should be offered incentives, we propose a potential function,






nAi (t)− nˇAi (t) if xi(t) = A
nAi (t)− nˇAi (t)− 1 if xi(t) = B
. (9.8)
This function has a unique maximum, which occurs when all agents play A, and increases whenever
an agent switches from B to A.
To evaluate the resulting change in the potential function Φ(x), we again use Theorem 9.1,
which means that the network will reach a unique equilibrium and simulations are thus fast to
compute using an activation sequence of length at most n. Denote this unique equilibrium by x¯.
The total change is then given by ∆Φ(x¯) := Φ(x¯)− Φ(x(0)). Let ei denote the ith column of the
n× n identity matrix. We propose Algorithm 2 to compute rewards based on iteratively choosing
the uncontrolled B-agent that maximizes the ratio ∆Φ(x¯)
α
rˇβi
, where the exponents α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0
are degrees of freedom for the control designer, which we will explore further in the simulations
section. Since rˇi is an infimum reward, we add an arbitrarily small amount  to any nonzero reward
ri to ensure that the targeted agent will switch to A.
9.3.3 Budgeted targeted reward control
It is quite likely that any agency that wishes to influence a network of agents through the use
of rewards has a limited budget with which to do so. In this section, we pose the following dual
problem to the one in the previous section.
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Initialize x¯i = xi(0) and ri = 0 for each i ∈ V
while ∃i ∈ V : x¯i 6= A and
∑
i∈V
ri < ρ do
B := {i ∈ V : x¯i = B ∧ rˇi ≤ ρ−
∑
i∈V ri}
foreach i ∈ B do
Let Γi = (G, τ + ∆τiei,+)
Simulate Γi starting from x¯ until next equilibrium
Set x¯ := new equilibrium and compute Φ(x¯)
end




rj := rˇj + 
τj := τj + ∆τj
end
Algorithm 2: Approximates the solutions to Problems 9.2 and 9.3 for networks of coordinating




whose required reward lies within the budget constraint ρ, where ρ :=∞ when there is no budget
constraint.
Problem 9.3 (Budgeted targeted reward control). Given a network game Γ = (G, τ,±), initial
strategy state x(0), and budget constraint
∑
i∈V ri < ρ, find the reward vector r that maximizes the
number of agents in the network who almost surely reach A.
Algorithm 2 can also be used to approximate the solution to this problem. The only difference
is that the algorithm will now terminate if no more agents can be incentivized to switch to A
without violating the budget constraint ρ.
9.4 Simulations
In this section, we compare the performance of the proposed algorithm to some alternative ap-
proaches. Short descriptions of each algorithm are provided below. Each of these methods is
applied iteratively, targeting agents until either the control objective is achieved or the budget
limit is reached.
• Iterative Random (rand): target random agents in the network
• Iterative Degree-Based (deg): target agents with maximum (minimum) degree for net-
works of coordinating (anti-coordinating) agents
• Iterative Potential Optimization (IPO): target agents resulting in the maximum in-
crease of the potential function (α = 1, β = 0)
• Iterative Reward Optimization (IRO): target agents requiring minimum reward (α = 0,
β = 1)
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• Iterative Potential-to-Reward Optimization (IPRO): target agents maximizing the
potential-change-to-reward ratio (α > 0, β > 0)
For each set of simulations, we generate geometric random networks by randomly distributing n
agents in the unit square and connecting all pairs of agents who lie within a distance R of each
other. We focus on the case when all agents are coordinating to align with our theoretical results,
but we also include one simulation study on a network of anti-coordinating agents to show that
the proposed algorithm can be applied to more general cases. In all simulations of the IPRO
algorithm, we used α = 1 and β = 4.
9.4.1 Uniform vs. targeted reward control
First, we investigate the difference between uniform and targeted reward control to estimate the
expected cost savings when individual agents can be targeted for rewards rather than offering a
uniform reward to all agents. Figure 9.1 shows not only that targeted reward control offers a large
cost savings over uniform rewards, but that the savings increases with network size.



















Figure 9.1: Comparison of uniform and targeted reward control on geometric random networks
for a range of sizes. For each size tested, 500 random networks were generated using a connection
radius R =
√
(1 + degexp)/pin, corresponding to a mean node degree of approximately degexp = 10.




corresponding payoffs are ai =
1−τi
τi
, bi = ci = 0, and di = 1.
9.4.2 Targeted-reward control: network size
Next, we compare the performance of the proposed control algorithms to some alternative ap-
proaches for various sizes of networks of coordinating agents, using the same network and threshold
setup as the previous section. Figure 9.2 shows that the IPRO algorithm performs consistently
better than the other proposed approaches across all network sizes, although the IRO method
requires only slightly larger rewards on average than IPRO.
9.4.3 Targeted-reward control: network connectivity
We now investigate how the connectivity of a network affects the reward needed to achieve con-
sensus in strategy A. We consider geometric random networks of only 12 agents, which is small
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Figure 9.2: Comparison of algorithms for different sizes of networks. The connection radius,
threshold distribution, and payoffs are generated exactly as in the simulations for Figure 9.1.
enough that we can compare against the true optimal solution computed using an exhaustive
search algorithm. Figure 9.3 shows that there appears to be a transition region in the required
reward between sparsely and densely connected networks, and we see that the IPRO algorithm
yields near-optimal results across the entire range, while the IRO algorithm also performs quite
well for dense networks.



























Figure 9.3: Comparison of algorithms on sparsely to densely connected 12-node networks. 100
networks are tested for each connection range, and the threshold distribution and payoffs are
generated exactly as in the simulations for Figure 9.1.
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9.4.4 Targeted-reward control: threshold level
In this section, we investigate the performance of various algorithms as the thresholds of agents
increase and thus become more costly to control. We again consider geometric random networks of
only 12 agents and thresholds of no greater than 0.5 in order to compare against the optimal solu-
tion. Figure 9.4 shows that the IPRO algorithm maintains the best performance across this range
of threshold values, while the distance from optimality increases slightly as the mean threshold
increases.


























Figure 9.4: Comparison of algorithms for various mean thresholds of coordinating agents. 500
12-node networks are tested for each mean threshold value τ0, and the connection radius R is
drawn uniformly at random from the interval [0.3, 1]. Agent thresholds are uniformly distributed
on the interval τ0 ± 0.1.
9.4.5 Targeted-reward control: threshold variance
In the next set of simulations, we change the threshold variance to understand the effect of in-
creasing heterogeneity on the performance of the algorithms. Figure 9.5 shows that the IPRO
algorithm again performs the best of the alternative algorithms. Moreover, as the threshold vari-
ance increases, its performance approaches that of the optimal solution.
9.4.6 Budgeted targeted reward control
Finally, we consider the case when there is a limited budget from which to offer rewards. Figures
9.6 and 9.7 show the results for the cases of coordination and anti-coordination, respectively. In
the coordination case, we see that IPRO achieves greater convergence to A at lower costs when
compared to the other approaches. Interestingly, the IPO algorithm also performs quite well for
low-budget cases. However, there remains significant sub-optimality of all approaches in the low
to middle range of reward budgets. Since budgeted targeted reward control is the only problem
that has a nontrivial solution for anti-coordinating agents, we also compared the algorithms for
an anti-coordinating case. Here, we observe that while IRO works best for small reward budgets,
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Figure 9.5: Comparison of algorithms for different threshold variances w. 500 12-node networks





























Figure 9.6: Comparison of algorithms for budgeted targeted reward control on networks of coor-
dinating agents for a range of reward budgets. 500 networks were tested with 50-nodes each and
a connection range R = 0.2. Thresholds are uniformly distributed on the interval 0.5± 0.1.
IPO performs best for larger reward budgets. This suggests setting the exponent α small for low
budgets and large for high budgets while doing exactly the opposite for the exponent β.
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Figure 9.7: Comparing the performance of several algorithms on the budgeted targeted reward
control problem for anti-coordination games on 50-node networks (R = 0.2). Thresholds are
uniformly distributed on the interval 0.5± 0.1.
9.5 Concluding remarks
We have considered three problems related to the control of asynchronous best-response dynamics
on networks through payoff incentives. Our proposed solutions are based on the following key
theoretical results: (i) after offering rewards to some of the agents in a coordinating network which
is at equilibrium, strategy switches occur only in one direction, and (ii) the network almost surely
reaches a unique equilibrium state. When a central agency can only offer a uniform reward to all
agents, the minimum value of the reward can be computed using a binary search algorithm and
fast simulations, made possible by these monotonicity and uniqueness results. If rewards can be
targeted towards individual agents, the desired convergence can be achieved at much lower cost;
however, the problem becomes somewhat more complex to solve. To approximate the solution in
this case, we propose the IPRO algorithm, which iteratively selects the agent who, upon switching
strategies, maximizes the ratio between the resulting change in potential and the cost of achieving
such a switch, until desired convergence is achieved. A slight modification of this algorithm applies
to the case when the budget from which to offer rewards is limited. Simulations show that this
algorithm performs significantly better than other algorithms based on threshold or degree, and
in many cases very close to the true optimal solution.
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Chapter 10
Imitating successful neighbors hinders
reaching satisfactory decisions
Imitation is widely observed in nature and often used to model populations of decision-making
agents, but it is not yet known under what conditions such a population will converge to a state in
which the agents are satisfied with their decisions. Here we show that every network in which agents
imitate the best performing strategy in their neighborhood will reach an equilibrium in finite time,
provided that all agents are opponent-coordinating, i.e., earn a higher payoff if their opponent plays
the same strategy as they do. It follows that any non-convergence observed in such networks is not
a result of population heterogeneity nor irregular network topology, but rather must be caused by
other factors such as the presence of non-opponent-coordinating agents. To strengthen this result,
we show that large classes of networks containing other types of agents may never converge under
imitation. Comparing to the best-response case, this implies that networks of imitating agents are
less likely to settle on an equilibrium state.
10.1 Introduction
After studying finite structured populations of individuals updating according to the best-response
update rule in Chapters 8 and 9, we focus on the case with the imitation update rule in this and
the following chapter. In social, economic, biological, technological, and other types of networks,
the dynamics of interconnected agents may give rise to complex and seemingly unpredictable
behaviors. While some networks may converge to a state of equilibrium, others may perpetually
cycle or experience chaotic fluctuations [163]. Unfortunately, localized analysis may reveal little
about the underlying causes of these emergent behaviors, in part because the major factors driving
the dynamics may lie not in the individual agents but in their complex interconnections. However,
studying the system from a broader perspective, perhaps at the cost of substantial simplification
of the agent-level dynamics, can help to characterize critical properties such as the conditions
on the agents under which a network is likely to converge or not [149]. Indeed we have seen a
substantial transition from local to network-based analysis across various disciplines in engineering
and the physical and social sciences. This network-oriented approach has led to many influential
discoveries of collective behaviors, even when the individual agents are autonomous and highly
complex. One of the primary toolsets invoked to study these kinds of problems is evolutionary
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game theory [67, 138, 139, 3].
Originally proposed as a framework to study behaviors such as ritualized fighting in animals
[160], evolutionary game theory has since been widely adopted in the social sciences. A key
innovation of evolutionary game theory is that rather than assuming agents make perfectly rational
choices, strategies and behaviors propagate through a population via some dynamic process. In the
biological world, this propagation is manifested through survival of the fittest and reproduction,
which is widely modeled by the replicator dynamics [181]. This system of first-order differential
equations provides a useful and simple framework for studying population dynamics, under the
assumptions that populations are infinite and well-mixed. While these assumptions can lead to
reasonable approximations for large, dense populations of organisms, there are many networks,
especially those involving humans, in which the structure of the interactions plays a major role
[117]. Fortunately, it is still possible to study replicator-like dynamics in populations connected
by networks [121], and it turns out that certain models of imitation, where individuals mimic the
strategy of their most successful neighbor, reduce exactly to the replicator dynamics in the limit
of large networks [153]. An extensive literature has emerged in the field of evolutionary games
on networks, especially regarding the question of how cooperation can evolve and persist under
various conditions and in various types of networks [165, 142, 87, 126, 3, 102, 53]. In particular,
networks of imitative individuals are reported to reach low levels of cooperation [176].
Another fundamental yet less-studied question for imitative dynamics on networks is whether
each individual will settle on a particular action, or equivalently, whether the network will converge
to an equilibrium. Several previous studies have investigated this problem in various contexts. For
example, it was shown in [36] that even when agent dynamics are homogeneous (symmetric) and
synchronous, imitation does not generally result in convergence to equilibria, although it appears
likely for coordination games. Also in the synchronous and homogeneous setting, [185] characterizes
a restrictive set of topological properties for which networks will converge to an equilibrium. It
remains to be seen under what conditions arbitrary networks of heterogeneous agents updating
synchronously or asynchronously can be expected to settle at an equilibrium, and that is the
primary goal of this chapter.
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide sufficient conditions under which networks
of imitating agents can be expected to reach an equilibrium. The key criterion turns out to be
whether agents earn a higher payoff when their opponents play the same strategy as them. We
call such agents opponent-coordinating, and indeed we show that every network consisting entirely
of opponent-coordinating agents will reach an equilibrium under asynchronous updates. Although
not equal, the set of payoff matrices corresponding to such agents has a significant intersection
with that of coordination games, which explains why they are reported to be more likely to lead
the network to an equilibrium. If the agents are strongly opponent-coordinating, then equilibrium
convergence is guaranteed even when multiple agents update simultaneously at any time step,
that is, when the updates are fully or partially synchronous. These results establish a strong set of
sufficient conditions for convergence of a network of imitative agents, and also imply the presence
of non-opponent coordinating agents in such networks when exhibiting non-convergent behavior.
Knowing when a network is expected to converge also opens up avenues for further research
into convergence rates and control. As the second contribution, we provide several examples on
heterogeneous networks including non-opponent-coordinating agents that never converge to a single
state. The examples can be extended to substantial classes of networks of homogeneous agents.
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The comparison of these results with those of the best-response update rule, known to govern any
network of homogeneous agents to an equilibrium [140], postulates convergence under imitation
as a rare phenomenon, and also helps to explain why networks in which imitation is prevalent
may exhibit cyclic or chaotic behavior more often than networks in which agents use best-response
updates, for example.
10.2 Asynchronous imitation updates
Consider an undirected network G = (V , E) where the nodes V = {1, . . . , n} correspond to agents
who over time k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, play 2-player games with their neighbors indicated by the edges
E . The agents start with one of the strategies 1, 2, . . . ,m at k = 0. At each time step, every
agent earns an accumulated payoff against her neighbors, and then one random agent is activated
to mimic the strategy of the most successful agent in her neighborhood. More specifically, the
possible payoffs of an agent i ∈ V against another agent j are summarized in the payoff matrix
pii ∈ IRm×m whose pqth entry corresponds to the strategy pair p-against-q where p, q ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Let xi(k) denote the strategy of agent i at time k. Then the payoff of agent i at time k against





where Ni denotes the set of neighbors of agent i. The imitation update rule for agent i, active at
time k, dictates that agent i updates her strategy at k+ 1 to the strategy of the agent earning the
highest payoff at k in her neighborhood Ni ∪ {i}. In case several agents with different strategies
earn the highest payoff, we assume agent i sticks to her current strategy if she is also earning the
highest payoff. Otherwise, we assume a preference on the strategies such that agent i chooses the
smallest strategy in magnitude, namely
xi(k + 1) =
{
xi(k) xi(k) ∈ SMi (k)
minSMi (k) xi(k) 6∈ SMi (k)
(10.1)
where SMi (k) is the set of strategies resulting in the maximum payoff at time k in the neighborhood









The main goal of this chapter is to study the evolution of the strategy vector
x(k) = (x1(k), . . . , xn(k))
> ,
under Update rule (10.1) and the activation sequence of the agents, defining the asynchronous
imitation dynamics. We assume that the activation sequence is persistent, that is for every agent
j ∈ V and every time k ≥ 0, there exists some finite later time k′ > k at which agent j is active.
This mild condition is equivalent to saying that each agent is activated infinitely many times.
An equilibrium of the dynamics is a state x∗ at which none of the agents will change strategies
if activated, implying that if x(k) = x∗ for some k ≥ 0, then x(k + 1) = x∗, regardless of which
agent is active at k. Because of the implicit stochasticity caused by the activation sequence and the
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nonlinearity of the imitation dynamics, convergence of x(k) to an equilibrium is not guaranteed.
Indeed we provide examples where x(k) fluctuates in a set of several states in the long run and
never converges to a single state. However, there are types of payoff matrices for which the network
always reaches an equilibrium, as we show in the next section.
10.3 Convergence under asynchronous updates
Unlike dynamics such as the best-response where convergence relies on the ordering of each col-
umn’s entries of the payoff matrices (i.e., whether the agents are coordinating or anti-coordinating
[140]), in imitation, the ordering of each row’s entries can be more important. This is because
under best-response, every agent finds the best available strategy to play against the current state
of the network, whereas under imitation, agents never look at how different their payoffs will be
if they change their strategies, yet switches of neighbors’ strategies can change the agent with
maximum payoff in a neighborhood. We call an agent i ∈ V a opponent-coordinating agent if each




p,q ∀p, q ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, p 6= q. (10.2)
Intuitively, this condition implies that agent i’s payoff increases, if a neighbor of agent i switches
her strategy to that of agent i. Payoff matrices of stag-hunt and prisoners’ dilemma games [149]
may or may not satisfy the condition, however, those of snowdrift games never do. It turns out
that convergence of imitation dynamics can be guaranteed for networks of opponent-coordinating
agents, which we show in the first part of this section. Then we extend the result to when the
network also contains non-opponent-coordinating agents whose strategies are ensured to become
fixed after some amount of time.
10.3.1 Convergence of opponent-coordinating agents
Theorem 10.1. Every network of opponent-coordinating agents reaches an equilibrium under the
asynchronous imitation update rule.
For the proof, we make use of a Lyapunov-like function uM, the payoff of the agent(s) with
maximum payoff, formally defined in the following. DefineM(k) as the set of agents with maximum









ClearlyM(k) is nonempty for all k ≥ 0. At time k, every member ofM(k) earns the same payoff
that we denote by uM(k) ∈ IR:
uM(k) = ui(k) ∀i ∈M(k).
Clearly uM(k) is upper bounded. The following lemma guarantees that uM(k) is always non-
decreasing, and increases when any of the neighbors of any of the agents with the maximum payoff
switches strategies.
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Lemma 10.1. The following holds
uM(k+1) ≥ uM(k) ∀k ≥ 0. (10.3)
Moreover, given k ≥ 0, if a neighbor of an agent i ∈M(k) switches strategies at k + 1, then
uM(k+1) > uM(k). (10.4)
Proof. Consider an agent i ∈ M(k). This agent does not change her strategy at k + 1 since she
is already earning the maximum payoff in the network. In general, one of the following two cases
takes place.
Case 1: None of the neighbors of agent i switch strategies at k + 1. Then the payoff of agent
i does not change, i.e.,
ui(k + 1) = ui(k). (10.5)
Now one of the following two cases can happen at k + 1.
Case 1-1: i ∈M(k + 1). Then according to (10.5),
uM(k+1) = uM(k). (10.6)
Case 1-2: i 6∈ M(k+ 1). Then there exists an agent j ∈M(k+ 1) who earns more than agent
i at k + 1. This in view of (10.5) implies uj(k + 1) > ui(k), resulting in
uM(k+1) > uM(k). (10.7)
By combining (10.5) and (10.7), we arrive at (10.3).
Case 2: A neighbor r of agent i, switches strategies at k + 1. According to update rule (1)
in the main text, agent r changes her strategy to that of one of her neighbors, say j, that has the
highest payoff among the rest (j may equal i). Hence, since agent i is already earning the highest
payoff in the network at k, agent j must also do so, i.e., j ∈ M(k). Therefore, agent j does not
switch strategies at k + 1. Moreover, because of the asynchronous updating, no other neighbor of








and at k + 1 equals













Now one of the following two cases can happen at k + 1.
Case 2-1: j ∈M(k + 1). Then according to (10.17),
uM(k+1) > uM(k). (10.9)
Case 2-2: j 6∈ M(k+ 1). Then there exists an agent q ∈M(k+ 1) who earns more than agent
j at k + 1. This in view of (10.17) implies uq(k + 1) > uj(k), resulting in
uM(k+1) > uM(k). (10.10)
By combining (10.9) and (10.10), we arrive at (10.4), which completes the proof.
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Using Lemma 10.1, we can show the convergence of the strategies of the agents with maximum
payoffs.
Lemma 10.2. There exists some time k1 ≥ 0 after which the strategies of all agents in M(k1)
and their neighbors remain unchanged, i.e.,
xj(k) = xj(k1) ∀j ∈ Ni ∪ {i}, ∀i ∈M(k1), ∀k ≥ k1. (10.11)
Proof. Since uM(k) is upper-bounded, Lemma 10.1 implies the existence of some time kM ≥ 0,
such that
uM(k) = uM(kM) ∀k ≥ kM, (10.12)
and that for k ≥ kM, none of the neighbors of any agent i ∈M(k) switch strategies at k + 1:
xj(k) = xj(k + 1) ∀j ∈ Ni ∀i ∈M(k), ∀k ≥ kM. (10.13)
Now (10.12) implies that if an agent earns the maximum payoff at some time k ≥ kM, she will
keep doing so in future time steps, yieldingM(k) ⊆M(k+ 1) for all k ≥ kM. Therefore, sinceM
is upper-bounded by V , it will become fixed after some time k1 ≥ kM:
M(k) =M(k1) ∀k ≥ k1.
Hence, in view of (10.13),
xj(k) = xj(k + 1) ∀j ∈ Ni ∀i ∈M(k1), ∀k ≥ k1,
resulting in
xj(k) = xj(k1) ∀j ∈ Ni ∀i ∈M(k1), ∀k ≥ k1.
Now since the strategies of all neighbors of each agent i ∈M(k1) are fixed, the strategy of agent i
herself also becomes fixed in view of update rule (1) in the main text, which results in (10.11).
Now consider the time k1 in Lemma 10.2, and define the set
V2 = V −M(k1).
If V2 is empty, the network has reached a state which has to be an equilibrium due to the persistent









Clearly M2(k) is nonempty for all k ≥ k1. Denote by uM2(k) the payoff of any member in M2(k)
at time k:
uM2(k) = ui(k) ∀i ∈M2(k).
One can prove a similar result to that of Lemma 10.1, for uM2(k), as shown in the following lemma.
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Lemma 10.3. Consider the time k1 in Lemma 10.2. It holds that
uM2(k+1) ≥ uM2(k) ∀k ≥ k1. (10.14)
Moreover, given k ≥ k1, if a neighbor of an agent i ∈M2(k) switches strategies at k + 1, then
uM2(k+1) > uM2(k). (10.15)
Proof. Consider some time k ≥ k1 and an agent i ∈ M2(k). If i ∈ Nj for some j ∈ M(k), then
in view of Lemma 10.2, agent i does not change her strategy at k + 1. Otherwise, agent i is not a
neighbor of any agent in M(k). Then, since the only agents in the network who earn more than
agent i at k are those in M(k), agent i earns more than all of her neighbors at time k, implying
that again she does not change her strategy at k + 1. Therefore, in any case, agent i does not
switch strategies at k + 1. Now one of the following two cases takes place.
Case 1: None of the neighbors of agent i switch strategies at k + 1. Then similar to the proof
of Lemma 10.2, we arrive at (10.14).
Case 2: A neighbor r of agent i, switches strategies at k + 1. According to update rule (1)
in the main text, agent r changes her strategy to that of one of her neighbors, say j, that has
the highest payoff among the rest (j may equal i). Now in view of Lemma 10.2, agent r is not a
neighbor of any agent inM(k). Hence, j 6∈ M(k). On the other hand, since agent i is a neighbor
of agent r and is earning the second highest payoff in the network at time k, the same must hold
for agent j, i.e., j ∈ M2(k). The rest of the proof can be done similar to that of Lemma 10.1, by
replacing M with M2.
The following lemma can also be proven similar to Lemma 10.2, which guarantees the conver-
gence of the strategies of agents with the second-maximum payoffs.
Lemma 10.4. Consider the time k1 in Lemma 10.2. There exists some time k2 ≥ k1 after which
the strategies of all agents in M2(k2) and their neighbors remain unchanged, i.e.,
xj(k) = xj(k1) ∀j ∈ Ni ∪ {i}, ∀i ∈M2(k2), ∀k ≥ k2.
Now consider the time k2 in Lemma 10.4, and define the set
V3 = V2 −M2(k2).
If V3 is empty, the network has reached an equilibrium. Otherwise, we again defineM3 similar to
how M2 is defined, and show that the same result as in Lemma 10.4 holds for M3. We continue
this procedure and define V3,V4, . . . until we reach an empty set Vl, l > 0. This will certainly
happen since |Vi| < |Vi−1| for all i ≥ 1 such that Vi 6= ∅. Then the network has reached an
equilibrium, which completes the proof of Theorem 10.1.
10.3.2 Biased-agents
We identify types of agents whose strategies are or become fixed after some amount of time, and
provide a similar result to Theorem 10.1. Consider a strategy r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We call an agent
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where degi denotes the degree of agent i. The definition implies that the payoff of an r-biased
agent who plays r is more than all her neighbors playing some strategy different from r. This yields
the following result, implying that r-biased agents’ strategies remain invariant under imitation
dynamics.
Lemma 10.5. Given r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if the strategy of an r-biased agent is r at some time, it does
not change afterwards under the imitation update rule. Namely, for an r-biased agent i, it holds
that
(∃k1 : xi(k1) = r) ⇒ (xi(k) = r ∀k ≥ k1).
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the contrary there exists some time k2 > k1 at
which agent i switches her strategy from r to q 6= r that is the strategy of her neighbor, say agent
j, with the maximum payoff at k2−1. Then the strategy of agent i is r at k2−1 and that of agent
j is q. Hence, the payoff of agent i at k2 − 1 satisfies





and that of agent j satisfies





Now since agent i is r-biased, we conclude that ui(k2 − 1) ≥ uj(k2 − 1), which is in contradiction
with the assumption that agent i changes her strategy to that of agent j at k2.
We say an agent is biased if the agent is r-biased for some r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and completely
biased if it is r-biased for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. When agents are completely biased, they become
fixed from the beginning, regardless of their initial strategies.
Proposition 10.1. Every network of completely biased agents is static under the asynchronous
imitation update rule.
The sufficient condition on biased agents in Proposition 10.1 can be relaxed when there are
only two strategies available to the players. For convenience of notation, we refer to strategies 1
and 2 as A and B, respectively, when m = 2. So biased agents are either A-biased or B-biased.
The following proposition states that unlike in the general case, the strategy of a biased agent
becomes fixed when m = 2, regardless of its initial condition.
Proposition 10.2. Every network of biased agents reaches an equilibrium under asynchronous
imitation update rule, if m = 2.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume on the contrary that the strategy of a biased agent i
never becomes fixed, implying that it keeps switching between A and B. This is in contradiction
with Lemma 5 since if agent i is A-biased, her strategy never changes from A to B, and if she is
B-biased, her strategy never switches from B to A.
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10.4 Convergence under arbitrary number of simultaneous
updates
The result of Theorem 10.1 can be extended to when agents do not necessarily update asyn-
chronously, i.e., when multiple agents can update simultaneously at any time step. Then the
activation sequence becomes a sequence of sets Ak, k ∈ {0, 1, . . .} consisting of agents that are
active at k which may be 1, 2, up to all of the agents. Then the activation sequence becomes
{Ak}∞k=0 where Ak ⊆ V consists of agents that are active at k, and where |Ai| and |Aj| are not
necessarily equal for i 6= j. However, in order to guarantee convergence, the agents must satisfy a
stronger condition than being opponent-coordinating; namely, their payoff matrices must satisfy
piip,p + (degi−1)piip,pmin > degi piip,pmax (10.16)
where degi denotes the degree of agent i, pmin denotes the column of the minimum off-diagonal
entry of the pth row in pii and pmax denotes the column of the maximum off-diagonal entry of the
pth row in pii. We call agents satisfying the above condition strongly opponent-coordinating agents.
Intuitively, each diagonal entry of such agents’ payoff matrices is sufficiently greater then the off-
diagonal entries in the same row. As with asynchronous updates, here we assume the activation
sequence is persistent.
Theorem 10.2. Every network of strongly opponent-coordinating agents reaches an equilibrium
under the imitation update rule, regardless of how many agents update simultaneously at any time
step.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as those in the proof of Theorem 1. Namely all the lemmas
also hold for when the agents do not update asynchronously; however, now Case 2 in the proof of
Lemma 10.1 requires a different argument, which we do in the following.
Case 2 in the proof of Lemma 10.1: A neighbor r of agent i, switches strategies at k+1. Agent
r changes her strategy to that of one of her neighbors, say j, that has the highest payoff among the
rest (j may equal i). This results in j ∈ M(k), implying that agent j does not switch strategies





and at k + 1 equals







Hence, according to the definition of strongly opponent-coordinating agents,
uj(k + 1)− uj(k) > 0. (10.17)
The remaining can be done the same as in that of Lemma 10.1. This modified argument also
applied to similar other lemmas such as Lemma 10.3, leading to the proof of the theorem.
For the especial case of m = 2, a opponent-coordinating agent turns out to be also strongly
row-coordinating, yielding the following result.
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Corollary 10.1. Every network of opponent-coordinating agents with only two available strategies,
i.e., m = 2, reaches an equilibrium under the imitation update rule, regardless of how many agents
update at the same time.
Proof. When m = 2, an opponent-coordinating agent is also strongly opponent-coordinating, i.e.,




for every opponent-coordinating agent i when m = 2. The proof then follows readily from Theorem
10.2.
It is worth mentioning that all convergence results provided so far require the persistence
assumption, yet based on the proofs, the assumption is only needed to guarantee that the final
state is an equilibrium.
Remark 10.1. Theorems 10.1 and 10.2 hold even when the persistence assumption does not hold;
however, then after some finite time, the network reaches and remains at a final state that may
not be an equilibrium.
10.5 Non-convergence behavior
In this section, we provide some counterexamples to demonstrate cases in which networks contain-
ing non-opponent-coordinating agents may never reach equilibrium.
10.5.1 Three anti-coordinating agents in a line
In a network containing only two agents, any asynchronous imitation will result in an equilibrium.
Therefore, the smallest network in which asynchronous imitation may lead to non-convergence is
one consisting of three agents. Such a network can be constructed out of three anti-coordinating
agents connected in a path, i.e. one edge connects agents 1 and 2 and another edge connects agents







Figure 10.1: Three anti-coordinating agents in a line. The payoff matrix of agents 1, 2 and
3 are pi0, pi0 and pi0, respectively, where pi0 is defined in (10.18). The superscripts in blue indicate
the payoffs. (a) Agent’s initial strategies. (b) Agent’s strategies at the first time step an agent
switches strategies. The agent’s strategies at the next time step that an agent switches will be the
same as part (a), resulting in a non-convergence behavior.
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and let pi1 = pi3 := pi0, and pi
2 = pi0, where  < 1. Suppose the initial strategies of this network are
x(0) := (A,A,B) yielding payoffs (0, , 1). Neither agent 1 nor 3 will change strategies, but if agent
2 is activated at time 1, then x(1) := (A,B,B), yielding the new payoffs (1, , 0). From this state,
again neither agent 1 nor 3 will switch and if agent 2 is activated again at time 2, then x(2) :=
(A,A,B) = x(0), resulting in a cycle of length 2, and the network will never reach equilibrium.
This configuration can also appear embedded in much larger networks and demonstrates that
imitative anti-coordinating agents who receive less payoff than their neighbors for the same types
of interactions can quite easily be made to waver between the strategies of more steadfast neighbors.
10.5.2 Extension to a homogeneous network






, P > 0, 0 < R < T, S > P +R. (10.19)
For this, we need to add α1 initially A-playing neighbors to agent 1, and α2 initially B-playing
neighbors to agent 3 (see Figure 10.2) where α1, α2 ≥ 1 are positive integers satisfying
Rα1 ≥ S, (10.20)
Pα2 ≥ T, (10.21)
bR
T
(α1 + 1)− P
T
α2c = 0. (10.22)
Such α1 and α2 exist since one can first choose them to be large enough to satisfy (10.20) and
(10.21), then increase α2 so that R(α1 + 1)− Pα2 < 0, and then start increasing α1 until the first
time R(α1 +1)−Pα2 becomes positive. Since R < T , it then follows that 0 < R(α1 +1)−Pα2 < T ,
satisfying (10.22), proving the existence of α1 and α2.
As in the previous example, we assume that the initial strategies of agents 1, 2 and 3 are
(A,A,B). Sharing the same strategies as those of their neighbors, the adjoining agents neither
switch their own strategies at k = 1, nor cause agents 1 and 3 to do so. The payoffs of agents 1, 2
and 3 at k = 0 are respectively
u1 = (α1 + 1)R, u2 = R + S, u3 = α2P + T. (10.23)
Therefore, u2 < u1 according to (10.20). Moreover, in view of (10.22),
R
T




==⇒ u1 < u3.
Hence, u2 < u1 < u3. So only the strategy of agent 2 can change. Let this take place at some
time k1 ≥ 1. Then the strategies of agents 1, 2 and 3 at k1 will be (A,B,B). Correspondingly the
agents’ new payoffs will be
u1 = α1R + S, u2 = T + P, u3 = (α2 + 1)P.
Therefore, u2 < u3 according to (10.21). On the other hand, from (10.19), S > P +R and T > 0.
So, in view of (10.22),
R
T
(α1 + 1)− P
T
α2 +




==⇒ u3 < u1.































Figure 10.2: Extension of the example in Section 10.5.1 to a homogeneous network. All
agents’ payoff matrices equal that in (10.19), implying a homogeneous network. The superscripts
in blue indicate the payoffs. (a) Agent’s initial strategies. (b) Agent’s strategies at the first time
step an agent switches strategies. The agent’s strategies at the next time step that an agent
switches will be the same as part (a), resulting in a non-convergence behavior.
Hence, u2 < u3 < u1. So again only agent 2’s strategy can change. Therefore, the next time the
network reaches a new state, it will revert back to its state at k = 0, resulting in a non-converging
long-run behavior. The same can be shown when the last three inequalities in (10.19) are replaced
with R > 0, 0 < P < S and T > P + R. Both cases correspond to significant classes of payoff
matrices, implying that even networks of homogeneous agents may often not converge. This is
further supported by the next example.
10.5.3 Ring of asynchronous, homogeneous, non-opponent-coordinating
agents
Consider a ring network G = (V , E) where E = {(1, 2), (2, 3), . . . , (n − 1, n), (n, 1)}. The network






, R < T, T + P < R + S < 2T. (10.24)
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The agents’ initial strategies are as follows: x1(0) = B and xi(0) = A for all i ∈ V−{1} (see Figure




























Figure 10.3: Ring of asynchronous homogeneous non-opponent-coordinating agents. All
agents’ payoff matrices equal that in (10.24), implying a homogeneous network. The superscripts
in blue indicate the payoffs. (a) Agent’s initial strategies. It holds that x(0) ∈ Xˆ . (b) Agent’s
strategies at k = 1 when agent 2 was active at k = 0. It holds that x(1) ∈ X¯ . (c) Agent’s strategies
at k = 2 when agent 1 was active at k = 1. It holds that x(1) ∈ Xˆ , meaning that the strategy
configuration has reached the same structure as it had at k = 0. A similar process takes place for
any other activation sequence. Therefore, the network game never reaches an equilibrium.
where xˆi ∈ {A,B}n and is defined by
xˆij =
{
B j = i
A j 6= i ,
and second, X¯ = {x¯i | i ∈ V} where x¯i ∈ {A,B}n and is defined by
x¯ij =
{
B j = i or j = i+ 1
A otherwise
where i + 1 is counted modulo n. Note that x(0) = xˆ1 under this definition. First, we look at
when the network game starts at a state in Xˆ , say xˆi, i ∈ V . The payoff of agent i is then 2T ,
that of her two neighbors, i.e., i − 1 and i + 1, is R + S and that of the rest are 2R. Hence, in
view of (10.24), if any of the agents i− 1 and i+ 1 are active, they will switch their strategies to
B. However, agent i will not switch strategies, and neither will any of the other agents since both
they and their neighbors play A. So at the next time step, the network either stays at xˆi or moves
to one of the two states x¯i or x¯i−1 in the second class (see Figure 10.3(b)). Now we look at when




T + P j = i or j = i+ 1
R + S j = i− 1 or j = i+ 2
2R otherwise
.
Hence, in view of (10.24), if any of the agents i and i+1 are active, they will switch their strategies
to A. The rest of the agents will not switch. So at the next time step, the network either stays
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at x¯i or moves to one of the states xˆi or xˆi+1 in the first class (see Figure 10.3(c)). Now if in
addition, the activation sequence is persistent, the network cannot remain in any of the classes
forever, resulting in a fluctuation between the two, a non-convergence behavior.
One can further construct an activation sequence that results in a cycle, for example, S =





+ 2 k = 0, 2, 4, . . .
k−1
2
+ 1 k = 1, 3, 5, . . .
,







+1 k = 0, 2, 4, . . .
x¯
r2+1
2 k = 1, 3, 5, . . .
where r1 and r2 return the remainders of the devisions of k by 2n − 2 and 2n − 1, respectively.
So the system undergoes a cycle of length 2n. Note that, however, the probability of such an
activation sequence is zero.
Such behavior never shows up for a network of opponent-coordinating agents in view of Theorem
10.1. Indeed for an opponent-coordinating agent, we have that
P > T ⇒ T + P > 2T,
violating the inequality in (10.24). Other types, however, may satisfy the inequality, including











corresponding to two snowdrift games, both satisfy (10.24). So any homogeneous network of agents
with the payoff matrix piSD1 or homogeneous network of agents with the payoff matrix piSD2 never
converges to a single state.
The results can further be extended to heterogeneous networks, by modifying the condition in






, Ri, Si, Ti, Pi ∈ IR,
and that for any (not necessarily distinct) i, j ∈ V , it holds that
Ri < Tj and Ti + Pi < Rj + Sj and Rj + Sj < 2Ti. (10.25)
Then it can be verified that again starting from xˆ1, the network does not converge to a single state.
As a result, any network of agents, some of which having piSD1 and others piSD2 , never converges,
since then (10.25) is in force.
10.6. Concluding remarks 209
10.5.4 Long cycles in synchronous networks
When networks of anti-coordinating agents update in full synchrony under imitation dynamics,
it is possible for relatively long cycles to emerge. This contrasts with synchronous best-response
dynamics, in which it has been shown that cycles of length at most 2 can occur [1]. Following is
an example of how cycles of length n
2
can appear in rings of synchronous anti-coordinating agents.
Consider a ring of 4p agents, where p ∈ {2, 3, . . . }, and let the payoffs of each agent be given by the
anti-coordinating matrix pi0 defined in (10.18). Suppose that the initial strategies are as follows:
xi(0) =
{
A if (i− 1) mod 4 ≤ 1 or i = n
B otherwise
.
For example, in a ring of 8 agents, the initial strategies are (A0, A1, B1, B1, A1, A1, B2, A1), where




















































Figure 10.4: Ring of synchronous homogeneous non-opponent-coordinating agents. All
agents’ payoff matrices equal that in (10.18), implying a homogeneous network. The superscripts
in blue indicate the payoffs. (a) Agent’s initial strategies. (b) Agent’s strategies at k = 1. (c)
Agent’s strategies at k = 2. The resulting strategy configuration is the same as that at k = 0
but shifted by 4 agents. Therefore, the network game undergoes a cycle of length 4 and never
converges to an equilibrium.
of the B-agent whose payoff is 2 will switch to A and all other agents will keep their strategies,
resulting in the configuration (A1, A1, B1, B1, A2, B1, B0, B1) at time 1. At the next time step, we
will have (A1, A1, B2, A1, A0, A1, B1, B1), which is the same as the initial configuration shifted by
4 agents. It is straightforward to see that after two more time steps, the network will return to
the initial strategy state, completing a cycle of length 4. Indeed for rings of n agents as described




We have shown that any network of opponent-coordinating agents who asynchronously imitate
the strategy of their most successful neighbor will reach an equilibrium state. This finds particu-
lar interest in social contexts where agents’ payoffs when playing a particular strategy are highest
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when their neighbors also play that strategy, e.g., financial investments, the spread of social norms,
technological innovations and voting opinions. Our results imply that regardless of how individuals
are linked (network topology) and how differently they perceive the interaction outcomes (hetero-
geneity of the payoff matrices), the network reaches an equilibrium state, in which all agents are
playing the highest-earning strategies in their respective neighborhoods. If the agents are in ad-
dition strongly opponent-coordinating, i.e., agents’ payoffs when playing a particular strategy are
sufficiently higher when their neighbors play the same strategy as they do, then the network still
converges to an equilibrium even when the individual updates are partially or fully synchronous.
Consequently, non-convergence behavior in such situations may imply the presence of individuals
perceiving the social context extremely different from what it normally is, e.g., anti-coordinating
agents who earn more when they play the opposite strategy of the majority of their neighbors.
Another possibility is the existence of individuals who update not based on the success of their
neighbors but on the frequency of their neighbors’ strategies (best-response update rule). The
convergence results also allow for investigation of convergence time, stationary distribution of the
strategies and methods to control the final state.
The second and more important contribution of this chapter is however to show that conver-
gence under imitation is a rare phenomenon. We have shown this by establishing the potential for
non-convergence of networks containing non-opponent-coordinating individuals. We have provided
networks of heterogeneous agents that never converge to an equilibrium state, the simplest of which
consists of three agents connected on a line, in which the outer agents are biased while the middle
agent is more easily swayed. Such simple configurations may show up as part of any larger het-
erogeneous network, premising that convergence under the imitation update rule is an uncommon
phenomenon, especially in large networks. We have provided further evidence for this hypothesis
by extending the example to significant classes of homogeneous payoff matrices, and providing an-
other homogeneous example on ring networks, both leading to non-converging behavior. The lower
expectation of convergence by imitation is further highlighted if we compare these observations
with what the best-response update rule leads to in the case of two available strategies: any homo-
geneous population and any heterogeneous population of coordinating agents and heterogeneous
population of anti-coordinating agents reaches an equilibrium under the best-response. The com-
parison also makes frequency-based learners (who update based on best-response update rule) more
promising in leading the whole network to satisfactory decisions than success-based learners (who
update based on the imitation update rule) that are less independent (or less self-confident) and
ignore their own situation. This can have consequences in media policies for stabilizing networks
exhibiting chaotic fluctuations such as stock markets by inducing companies to make independent
decisions, rather than mimicking top firms.
Chapter 11
Control of asynchronous imitation
dynamics on networks
Imitation is prevalent in many populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence
results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be
efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium state by offering payoff incentives or rewards for using
a certain strategy, either uniformly or targeted to individuals. In particular, if agents playing
a given strategy receive maximum payoff when their neighbors play the same strategy, then we
show that providing incentives to any network in an equilibrium state will result in convergence
to a unique equilibrium. This result allows the computation of optimal uniform incentives using
a binary search algorithm. When different incentives can be offered to each agent, we propose an
algorithm to select which agents should be targeted based on iteratively maximizing a weighted
ratio of the number of agents who adopt the desired strategy to the payoff incentive required to
get those agents to switch. Simulations demonstrate that the proposed algorithm computes near-
optimal targeted payoff incentives for a range of networks and payoff distributions in coordination
games.
11.1 Introduction
Networks in which agents make decisions by imitating their most successful neighbors appear fre-
quently in sociology, biology, economics, and engineering [171, 176]. Such networks of success-based
learners often exhibit complex non-convergent behaviors even when the agents are homogeneous.
In other words, focusing on the success of others hinders the agents from reaching satisfactory
decisions, as discussed in Chapter 10. This non-convergence relates to volatility and instability
of networks which can have consequences ranging from costly inefficiencies to catastrophic fail-
ures. Imitation is also known to lead to selfish behaviors in various social contexts [176], which
can manifest as social dilemmas such as tragedy of the commons, in which the pursuit of selfish
goals leads to globally suboptimal outcomes. However, in many of these cases it may be possible
to circumvent the undesired global outcomes by administering some small control input to the
agents, locally. Given that this could require a large amount of total control effort, it is critical
to develop methods for achieving these goals as efficiently as possible. Game theory is widely
used to model distributed optimization and learning in large populations of autonomous agents
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[38, 98, 90, 182, 155, 57, 50, 113], but more specifically, evolutionary game theory allows for strate-
gies to propagate through populations by means other than rational choice, and therefore provides
an ideal framework to model networks of imitative agents [32, 115, 189, 138, 139].
Researchers have investigated how to drive populations to consensus in a desired strategy by
offering payoff incentives or economical benefits to the individuals [109, 189, 144, 136]. Several
approaches have been used to control such networks, three of which we have formulated in Chapter
9. First is the uniform reward control where a central regulating agency is assumed to be able to
uniformly change the payoffs of every agent so that they play the desired strategy, and the goal
is to do this by offering the minimum reward. Examples include equilibrium shifting in stochastic
snowdrift games by means of payoff modifications [91]. Second is targeted reward control where
the regulating agency has now the power to target individual agents and offer them independent
sufficient rewards to lead the network more efficiently to the state where every individual plays the
desired strategy [144, 186]. Third is budgeted targeted reward control which is when the incentive
budget is limited, and the goal is to maximize the number of individuals playing the desired
strategy subject to the budget constraint. In addition, there may be situations where we can
directly control the strategies of the agents [145, 144]. The goal then is to find the minimum
number of agents required to adopt a desired strategy, so that the rest of the agents in the network
will eventually follow the same strategy. We call this control problem, direct strategy control. There
are two key properties that facilitate the design of control algorithms for all the above cases; if the
network is at some equilibrium, then providing incentives to the agents should (i) cause no agent
to switch away from a desired strategy, and (ii) result in convergence of the network to a unique
equilibrium state. In Chapter 9, we have demonstrated these properties for coordinating agents,
who earn more if they play the same strategy as that of the majority of their neighbors, under
the asynchronous best-response update rule, and designed near-optimal algorithms for the first
three control problems, which also work well for anti-coordinating agents. However, it remains to
be discovered the conditions under which networks of imitative agents can be driven to a desired
equilibrium.
In this chapter, we find efficient incentive-based control algorithms for three different control
problems on finite networks of heterogeneous decision-making individuals who asynchronously
imitate their highest earning neighbors. We start by building a general framework for asynchronous
network games with two available strategies, A and B. Our main theoretical contribution is to
show that in any such network game, regardless of the update rule, if all agents are A-coordinating,
i.e., agents who update to strategy A would also do so if they had more neighbors playing A, then
providing incentives to the agents when the network is at equilibrium (i) causes no agent to
switch from A to B, and (ii) leads the network to a unique equilibrium regardless of the agents’
activation sequence. Next we prove that networks governed by imitation dynamics satisfy these
conditions provided that all agents are opponent coordinating, i.e., agents’ payoffs are maximized
when their neighbors play the same strategy that they do. These results make possible the design
of efficient control algorithms using payoff incentives, to guarantee the convergence of networks of
imitating agents to a desired strategy. In particular, we propose the Iterative Potential-to-Reward
Optimization (IPRO) algorithm, inspired by the similar approach for controlling best-response
networks in Chapter 9, that selects which agents should be targeted based on iteratively maximizing
a weighted ratio of the number of agents who adopt the desired strategy to the payoff incentive
required to get those agents to switch. Simulations show that the IPRO algorithm performs near-
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optimal in a variety of cases and outperforms other incentive targeting algorithms based on highest
degree or maximum earnings.
11.2 Asynchronous network games
Although the primary focus of this chapter is imitation, some of the results that appear later on
apply to a broader class of dynamics, so we present in this section a generalized framework of
two-strategy asynchronous games on networks.
Consider an undirected network G = (V , E). The nodes V = {1, . . . , n} represent agents who,
at each time k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, play 2-player games with all of their neighbors, with whom they share
an edge in the set E . Every agent starts with one of the strategies A or B at k = 0. Then, at
each time step, the agents accumulate payoffs from all neighbors. The possible payoffs of an agent
i ∈ V against another agent j are summarized in the payoff matrix pii ∈ IR2×2 whose entry pixi,xj
represents agent i’s payoff when playing strategy p against a neighbor playing strategy q where
p, q ∈ {A,B}, and A = 1, B = 2 for the purposes of matrix indexing. We stack all payoff matrices






where Ni is the set of agent i’s neighbors. After collecting all payoffs, one random agent i is
activated at time k and updates to a new strategy at time k + 1 according to some update rule,
which we denote by R:
xi(k + 1) =

A if fi(x(k)) = {A}
B if fi(x(k)) = {B}
zi if fi(x(k)) = {A,B}
(11.1)
where fi : {A,B}n → {A,B, {A,B}}. zi is fixed and equals either A,B or xi(k). By a network
game Γ : (G, pi,R) we mean a network G of agents with payoff matrices pi, who update based on R.
We do not prescribe any particular process for driving the activation sequence, but we do assume
that every agent is activated infinitely many times as time goes to infinity.
Agent’s strategies evolve under the update rule according to the sequence in which agents
activate, and may converge to an equilibrium state or continue to fluctuate. An equilibrium of
the dynamics is a state x∗ at which none of the agents violate the update rule, implying that if
x(k) = x∗ for some k ≥ 0, then x(k + 1) = x∗, regardless of which agent is active at time k. Our
goal is to control the dynamics of network games with the imitation update rule, by offering payoff
incentives, to reach or get as close as possible to a desired equilibrium state where every agent
plays strategy A. By offering payoff incentives to a network, we mean offering a (possibly unique)
non-negative reward to every agent in the network for playing strategy A. The visualization of this
in the payoff matrix, is to add non-negative constants to the entries of the row corresponding to
strategy A. We investigate when a network game with any update rule reaches a unique equilibrium
after offering payoff incentives, leading to the design of efficient control algorithms.
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11.3 Unique equilibrium convergence of A-coordinating net-
work games
Equilibrium convergence is a key property of network games, and can be guaranteed for certain
classes of update rules and agent payoff matrices as discussed in Chapters 8 and 10. However,
it is not generally the case that such networks will converge to a unique equilibrium, a property
which is highly desirable for the design of efficient and predictable control algorithms. Here we
establish conditions on the agents and update rule under which unique equilibrium convergence
can be guaranteed.
We say a network game is A-coordinating if any agent who updates to strategy A would also
do so if some agents currently playing B were instead playing A. Formally, we have the following
definition.
Definition 11.1. We say a network game (G, pi,R) is A-coordinating if for any two strategy vectors
y, z ∈ {A,B}n satisfying
yi = A⇒ zi = A ∀i ∈ V , (11.2)
the following holds
fi(y) = {A} ⇒ fi(z) = {A} i ∈ V (11.3)
and
fi(y) = {A,B} ⇒ A ∈ fi(z) i ∈ V . (11.4)
The A-coordinating property implies that having more A-playing agents in the network may
lead agents to switch from B to A and preserves those already playing A, yielding a monotone
behavior in agents’ strategies. We say a network game is A-monotone if after offering payoff
incentives to the network when it is at any equilibrium, no agent ever switches from A to B.
Proposition 11.1. Every A-coordinating network game is A-monotone.
We need the following lemma for the proof.
Lemma 11.1. Consider an A-coordinating network game (G, pi,R). If for some agent i ∈ V, one
of the following holds at some time k ≥ 0:
1. A ∈ fi(x(k)) and A 6∈ fi(x(k + 1)),
2. B 6∈ fi(x(k)) and B ∈ fi(x(k + 1)),
then an agent has switched from A to B at time k + 1.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume the negation of Lemma 11.1 holds for a network at
some time k and let x(k) denote the state of the network at that time. Since no agent has switched
from A to B at time k + 1, the vectors y = x(k) and z = x(k + 1) satisfy Condition (11.2). Now
if Case 1 takes place, then either fi(y) = {A}, violating (11.3) or fi(y) = {A,B}, violating (11.4),
a contradiction, yielding the result. If on the other hand, Case 2 takes place, then fi(y) = {A},
violating (11.3) since B ∈ fi(z), a contradiction, leading to the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 11.1. We again prove by contradiction. Assume the contrary and let k1 ≥ 1
be the first time that some agent i switches from A to B. Then one of the following cases holds:
Case 1: A 6∈ fi(k1 − 1). On the other hand, either the strategy of agent i is A at 0, yielding
A ∈ fi(0) since the network is at equilibrium at 0, or there is some time kˆ ∈ [0, k1 − 2] such that
agent i switches to A at kˆ+ 1, yielding A ∈ fi(kˆ). So in any case, there exists some k0 ∈ [0, k1− 1]
such that A ∈ fi(k0). Therefore, since A 6∈ fi(k1 − 1) there exists some time k2 ∈ [k0, k1 − 2] such
that A ∈ fi(k2) and A 6∈ fi(k2 +1). In view of Lemma 11.1, this implies that an agent has switched
from A to B at k2 + 1, a contradiction since k1 > k2 + 1 is the first time that such a switch takes
place, yielding the result.
Case 2: fi(k1 − 1) = {A,B} and zi = B. On the other hand, either the strategy of agent i is
A at 0, yielding fi(0) = {A} since zi = B and that the network is at equilibrium at 0, or there is
some time kˆ ∈ [0, k1− 2] such that agent i switches to A at kˆ+ 1, yielding fi(kˆ) = {A}. So in any
case, there exists some k0 ∈ [0, k1−1] such that fi(k0) = {A}. Therefore, since fi(k1−1) = {A,B}
there exists some time k2 ∈ [k0, k1−2] such that B 6∈ fi(k2) and B ∈ fi(k2 + 1). In view of Lemma
11.1, this implies that an agent has switched from A to B at k2 + 1, a contradiction, leading to
the proof.
Moreover, we say that a network switches sequence-independently if, after offering incentives to
one or more agents when the network is at equilibrium, any agent who switches from B to A under
one activation sequence will do so under any activation sequence (possibly at a different time).
Proposition 11.2. Every A-coordinating network switches sequence-independently.
This can be explained intuitively as follows. Consider two activation sequences S1 := {i0, i1, . . .}
and S2 := {j0, j1, . . .}. Let i be the first agent who switches from B to A under S1 (we know from
Proposition 11.1 that switches from A to B are impossible). Agent i will also switch from B to A
at the first time that she is active under S2 since up to that time, agents may have switched only
from B to A under S2, which is “in favor” of other agents updating to A, due to the A-coordinating
nature of the network game. Then by induction, the same can be shown for the second and later
agents who switch their strategies from B to A under S1. We formalize and prove this statement
in the following Lemma, borrowing some ideas from our previous result in Chapter 9. Let t0 be
the first time when agent j0 is active in S1. Then for s = 1, 2, . . ., define ks as the first time after
ks−1 that agent js is active in S1. The time ks exists because of the assumption that each agent is
activated infinitely many times. Denote by x1i and x
2
i , the strategies of agent i under the activation
sequences S1 and x2i (t), respectively.
Lemma 11.2. Consider an A-coordinating network game (G, pi,R) which is at equilibrium at time
0. Suppose that some payoff incentives are offered at time 0. Then given any two activation
sequences S1 = {i0, i1, . . .} and S2 = {j0, j1, . . .}, the following holds for s = 0, 1, 2 . . .
x2js(s+ 1) = A ⇒ x1js(ks + 1) = A. (11.5)
Proof. We prove by induction on s. The statement is first shown for s = 0. Suppose x2j0(1) = A.
The initial strategy of agent j0 is the same under both sequences, i.e., x1j0(0) = x
2
j0(0). Therefore,
since the network game is A-monotone in view of Proposition 11.1, no agent has switched to B
before time k0, under S2. So since the network game is A-coordinating, it follows that x1j0(k0 +1) =
A if x1j0(1) = A, verifying (11.5) for s = 0.
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Now assume that (11.5) holds for s = 0, 1, . . . , r− 1. Suppose x2jr(r+ 1) = A. Now since (11.5)
holds for all s = 0, 1, . . . , r− 1, and because of Proposition 11.1, we obtain that if any agents have
switched and hence fixed their strategies from B to A under S2 up to the time k = r, they have
also done so under S1 up to any time k ≥ kr−1 + 1. Moreover, no agent has switched from B to
A under S1. Thus, the strategy vectors y = x2(r) and z = x1(kr) satisfy the condition in (11.3).
Hence, (11.5) is true for s = r since the network game is A-coordinating.
Proof of Proposition 11.2. The proof follows directly from Lemma 11.2.
These two properties of A-coordinating network games lead to the main result of this section.
We say that a network game is uniquely convergent, if after offering some payoff incentives when
the network is at equilibrium, the network will again reach an equilibrium state which is unique
and does not depend on the sequence in which agents activate.
Theorem 11.1. Every A-coordinating network game is uniquely convergent.
Proof. According to Proposition 11.1, no agent switches from B to A. Since every agent is activated
infinitely many times, it follows that the network reaches an equilibrium state in finite time. It
remains to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium for all activation sequences, which we do
by contradiction. Assume that there exist two activation sequences S1 = {i0, i1, . . .} and S2 =
{j0, j1, . . .} that drive the network to two distinct equilibrium states, implying the existence of
an agent q whose strategy is different at the two equilibria, say B under the equilibrium of S1
and A under the equilibrium of S2. However, in view of Proposition 11.2, agent q’s strategy will
become A at some time under S1, and will not change afterwards because of Proposition 11.1, a
contradiction, completing the proof.
11.4 Imitation update rule
The imitation update rule I dictates that agent i, active at time k, updates at time k + 1 to the
strategy of the agent earning the highest payoff at time k in the neighborhood Ni ∪ {i}. If several
agents with different strategies earn the highest payoff, we assume agent i does not switch, namely
xi(k + 1) =

A if SMi (k) = {A}
B if SMi (k) = {B}
xi(k) if SMi (k) = {A,B}
(11.6)
where SMi (k) is the set of strategies resulting in the maximum payoff at time k in the neighborhood









By comparing (11.6) with (11.1), we obtain that fi = SMi under the imitation update rule.
Asynchronous imitation updates do not generally result in convergence to an equilibrium, but
in Chapter 10, we have established convergence of such networks when all agents are opponent
coordinating agents, i.e., earn more when their neighbors play the same strategy that they do,
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than when the neighbors play other strategies. Formally, each diagonal entry of the payoff matrix








We now prove that such networks are also A-coordinating, leading to unique equilibrium conver-
gence after offering incentives at equilibrium.
Proposition 11.3. Every network game of opponent coordinating agents with the imitation update
rule is A-coordinating.
Proof. Consider two strategy vectors y, z ∈ {A,B}n satisfying (11.2), and let the network be at
state y. First we look at the case when fi(y) = {A} for some agent i ∈ V , implying that the
highest-earning agent in the neighborhood Ni ∪ {i} of agent i is an A-playing agent. Now, if the
strategy of some of the B-playing agents are changed to A so that the network reaches z, then
the payoff of no A-playing agent decreases and the payoff of no B-playing agent increases since
all agents are opponent coordinating. Hence, the highest-earning agent in the neighborhood of
agent i will still be an A-playing agent, yielding fi(z) = {A}, resulting in (11.3). The case when
fi(y) = {A,B} can be proven similarly.
Therefore, A-monotonicity and unique equilibrium convergence follows directly from Theorem
11.1, as stated in the following.
Corollary 11.1. Every network of opponent-coordinating agents is A-monotone and uniquely con-
vergent.
That is if in a network of opponent-coordinating agents that is at equilibrium at time 0, a
(possibly unique) non-negative reward is offered to every agent whenever they play strategy A at
some time k ≥ 0, then no agent will switch from A to B at any time k ≥ 1, and the whole network
will reach a unique equilibrium state in finite time.
11.5 Control through payoff incentives
Using the unique equilibrium convergence properties of opponent-coordinating networks, we now
investigate the efficient use of payoff incentives to drive a network of agents who update according
to the asynchronous imitation rule from any undesired equilibrium toward a desired equilibrium
in which all or at least more agents play strategy A.
11.5.1 Uniform reward control
Suppose that some central agency has the ability to offer a reward of r0 ≥ 0 to all agents whenever
they play strategy A. The resulting payoff matrix is given by
( A B
A ai + r0 bi + r0
B ci di
)
, ai, bi, ci, di ∈ IR,
for each agent i ∈ V . The control objective in this case is the following. Let B denote the
n-dimensional strategy vector in which each agent plays B.
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Problem 11.1 (Uniform reward control). Given a network game Γ = (G, pi, I) and initial strategies
x(0) 6= B, find the infimum reward r∗0 such that for every r0 > r∗0, xi(t) will reach A for every
agent i ∈ V.
In networks of opponent-coordinating agents, it is relatively straightforward to compute the
optimal value of r∗0 once we have established the properties in Section 11.3. First, we take advantage
of the fact that the number of agents who converge to A is monotone in the value of r0 due to the
A-monotone property. Second, simulations of the network game are fast to compute due to the
unique equilibrium property, established in Corollary 11.1. To understand the second implication,
note that according to property (ii), all activation sequences will result in the same equilibrium;
thus, we can choose a sequence consisting only of agents who will switch from B to A, which will
have a maximum length of n before reaching equilibrium.
We begin by generating a set R containing all possible candidate infimum rewards. This set
is generated by computing all possible payoff differences between agents playing B and agents
playing A when they are neighbors or linked by another initially B-playing agent. Consider a
network of opponent-coordinating agents that is at equilibrium at time zero. Let nAi denote the
number of neighbors of agent i who initially play A. Since no agent switches from A to B, the



















∆i = {0, 1, . . . , degi−nAi }.
Now consider an agent s who initially plays B and has a neighbor j whose strategy was either
initially A or became A at some other time. Since the payoff of agent j must be greater than that
of all B-playing agents i in the neighborhood of agent s in order to cause agent s to switch to A,
the reward given to agent j must be greater than
yBi −yAj
degj
for some yBi ∈ ΠBi and yAj ∈ ΠAj . As we




∣∣∣yBi ∈ ΠBi , yAj ∈ ΠAj , j ∈ Ns, i ∈ Ns ∪ {s}, xi(0) = B, s ∈ V , xs(0) = B} ∪ {0}.
Proposition 11.4. For a network of opponent-coordinating agents with initial strategies x(0) 6= B,
r∗0 ∈ R.
Proof. Should all agents’ strategies be initially A, the result is trivial since r∗0 = 0. So consider
the situation where at least one B-playing agent exists. We observe that the network will reach
the state of all A after offering the reward r at time k = 0, if the following condition is satisfied:
for every agent s ∈ V who initially plays B, there exists some time ks such that xs(ks) = B and
xs(k
s+1) = A. Equivalently, for every initially B-playing agent s ∈ V , there must exist some time
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Since uj(k
s) ∈ ΠAj , ui(ks) ∈ ΠBi and xi(0) = B, the condition is satisfied if the following holds: for
every initially B-playing agent s ∈ V , there exists some time ks and agent j ∈ Ns, such that for






for some yAj ∈ ΠAj and some yBi ∈ ΠBi . Now since this is a sufficient condition for r to drive the




∣∣∣r > yBi − yAj
degj







∣∣∣r = yBi − yAj
degj
, yBi ∈ ΠBi , yAj ∈ ΠAj , j ∈ Ns, i ∈ Ns ∪ {s}, xi(0) = B, s ∈ V , xs(0) = B
}
= R− {0}.
By summarizing this case and the case when r∗0 = 0, we arrive at the proof.
Next we sort the elements of R from low to high and denote this vector by vR. Algorithm 3
performs a binary search over vR to find the infimum reward such that all agents in the network will
eventually play A. Denote by 1 the n-dimensional vector containing all ones, and let degmax denote
the maximum degree of the network. In what follows, we also denote by x¯ the unique equilibrium




while i+ − i− > 1 do
r∗0 := v
R




Γ′ := (G, pi′, I)
Simulate Γ′ from x(0) until equilibrium x¯






Algorithm 3: Binary search over candidate rewards to find the value of r∗0 that solves Problem
11.1 for networks of opponent-coordinating agents.
Proposition 11.5. Algorithm 3 computes the reward r∗0 that solves Problem 11.1 for networks of
opponent-coordinating agents.
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Proof. Since r∗0 ∈ R due to Proposition 11.4, the minimum r0 ∈ R which results in all agents
eventually playing A is r∗0. Due to Theorem 11.1, we know that if a given r0 results in all agents
switching to A for one activation sequence, then it does so for every activation sequence. Therefore,
we can test any given r0 by activating only those agents who have higher earning neighbors who
are playing a different strategy. Since agents in opponent-coordinating networks can only switch
from B to A after a decrease in thresholds, such a simulation requires no more than n activations.
We know from Corollary 11.1 that offering incentives to a network of opponent-coordinating agents
will cause no agent to switch from A to B, which means we can perform a binary search on the
ordered list vR.
11.5.2 Targeted reward control
Suppose that rather than offering a uniform incentive to all agents who play strategy A, one has
the ability to offer a different reward to each agent. By targeting the most influential agents in the
network, it may be possible to achieve the desired outcome at much lower cost than with uniform
rewards, but which agents should be targeted and how much reward should be offered to each of
these agents?
Let r := (r1, . . . , rn)
T denote the vector of rewards offered to each agent, where ri ∈ IR≥0 is the
reward offered to agent i, resulting in the following payoff matrix for each agent i ∈ V :
pˆii :=
( A B
A ai + ri bi + ri
B ci di
)
, ai, bi, ci, di ∈ IR.
The targeted control objective is the following.
Problem 11.2 (Targeted reward control). Given a network game Γ = (G, pi, I) and initial strate-




i such that if ri > r
∗
i for each i,
then xi(k) will reach A for every agent i ∈ V.
Towards a solution to this problem, we first observe that for a network at some equilibrium
state x¯, the only way to get imitating agents to switch from B to A through positive rewards
is to offer those rewards to agents who are sure to play A at some time and who have at least
one neighbor playing B. For such an agent, the infimum reward such that at least one B-playing
neighbor will switch to A is
rˇi = max
j∈NBi
y¯j − y¯i, (11.8)
where y¯i and y¯j denote the payoffs of agents i and j at the equilibirum state x¯, and NBi := {j ∈
Ni ∪ {i} : x¯j = B} denotes the self-inclusive set of neighbors of agent i who are playing B. Due
to Corollary 11.1, offering this reward to agent i will result in unique new equilibrium regardless
of the sequence in which agents activate. As a result, we can repeatedly use (11.10) to compute
infimum rewards starting from each new equilibrium. Indeed, any algorithm which iteratively
offers rewards in this manner will produce a reward vector that achieves uniform convergence of
the network to strategy A. A generic version of such an algorithm is described below, in which the
key step is the choice of the agent j at each iteration, and  denotes an arbitrarily small positive
constant.
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Initialize x¯i = xi(0) and ri = 0 for each i ∈ V
while ∃i ∈ V : x¯i 6= A do
AB := {i ∈ V : x¯i = A ∧ [∃j ∈ Ni : x¯j = B]}
Choose an agent j∗ ∈ AB
Let rj∗ := rj∗ + rˇj∗ + 
Let Γ = (G, pˆi, I)
x¯ := next equilibrium of Γ starting from x¯
end
Algorithm 4: Generic iterative algorithm for computing a reward vector such that all agents in
the network will play strategy A.
It is possible to find the exact solution r∗ to Problem 11.2 by performing an exhaustive search
that considers every possible sequence of agents in the sets AB. However, the computational
complexity of such an algorithm prohibits its use on large networks. In Section 11.6, we explore
the use of various heuristics for choosing an agent to target at each iteration, including random
selection, highest degree, and highest payoff. Next, we propose a slightly more advanced heuristic
for incentive targeting inspired by a similar approach to controlling best-response networks in
Chapter 9.
Consider a network of opponent-coordinating agents, which is at some equilibrium state x¯. In





where nAi denotes the number of neighbors of agent i who play strategy A in the state x. This
function has a unique maximum, which occurs when all agents play A, and increases whenever
an agent switches from B to A. Problem 11.2 translates to finding the infimum reward vector
that maximizes this potential function. Therefore we propose a type of greedy algorithm which
iteratively chooses the agent who maximizes the ratio of the change in potential to the reward
required to achieve the corresponding change. Let x¯′ denote the equilibrium resulting from offering
the reward rˇj to agent j. Then we define the iterative potential to reward algorithm (IPRO) as
Algorithm 4 in which the targeted agent is selected as follows.





where ∆Φ(x¯) := Φ(x¯′)− Φ(x¯).
11.5.3 Budgeted targeted reward control
In this section, we suppose that there is a limited budget from which to offer rewards and pose
the following dual problem to the one in the previous section.
Problem 11.3 (Budgeted targeted reward control). Given a network game Γ = (G, pi, I), initial
strategy state x(0), and budget constraint
∑
i∈V ri < ρ, find the reward vector r
∗ that maximizes
the number of agents in the network who reach A.
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Algorithm 5 slightly modifies Algorithm 4 to approximate the solution to Problem 11.3. The
only difference is that the algorithm will now terminate if no more agents can be offered a reward
without violating the budget constraint ρ.
Initialize x¯i = xi(0) and ri = 0 for each i ∈ V
while ∃i ∈ V : x¯i 6= A and
∑
i∈V
ri < ρ do
AB := {i ∈ V : x¯i = A ∧ [∃j ∈ Ni : x¯j = B]} ∧ rˇi ≤ ρ−
∑
i∈V ri}
Choose an agent j ∈ AB
Let rj := rj + rˇj + 
Let Γ = (G, pˆi, I)
x¯ := next equilibrium of Γ starting from x¯
end
Algorithm 5: Generic iterative algorithm for computing a reward vector to approximate the
maximum number of agents who will play strategy A.
11.6 Simulations
Here we compare the performance of the IPRO algorithm to some alternative approaches for con-
trolling networks of agents with imitative dynamics. Each of these methods is applied iteratively,
targeting agents with payoff rewards until either the control objective is achieved or the budget
limit is reached. Short descriptions of each algorithm under consideration are provided below.
• Iterative Random (rand): target random agents in the network
• Iterative Degree-Based (deg): target agents with maximum degree
• Iterative Maximum Earning (IME): target A-playing agents earning the highest payoffs
while having at least one neighbor playing B
• Iterative Potential Optimization (IPO): target agents resulting in the maximum in-
crease of the potential function (α = 1, β = 0)
• Iterative Reward Optimization (IRO): target agents requiring minimum reward (α = 0,
β = 1)
• Iterative Potential-to-Reward Optimization (IPRO): target agents maximizing the
potential-change-to-reward ratio (α = 1, β = 1)
• Optimal: perform exhaustive search to find optimal solution (only practical for small net-
works)
For each set of simulations, we generate geometric random networks by randomly distributing n
agents in the unit square and connecting all pairs of agents who lie within a distance R of each
other.
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Heterogeneous payoffs for the agents are generated as follows:pii = piI + viWi, where pi ≥ 1
denotes the coordination level, vi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the payoff variance, and Wi is a 2 × 2 matrix
whose elements are drawn independently at random from a uniform distribution on the interval
[0, 1]. Also, the Wi matrices are independent across all agents. Next, we introduce four simulation
studies and provide graphical results, which are also summarized in Table 11.1.
11.6.1 Uniform vs. targeted reward control
First, we investigate the difference between uniform and targeted reward control to estimate the
expected cost savings when individual agents can be targeted for rewards rather than offering a
uniform reward to all agents. Figure 11.1 shows that targeted reward control offers a large cost
savings over uniform rewards, but also that the savings decreases as the networks get larger. This
differs from the results of the same comparison on best-response networks, in which the opposite
effect was observed in Chapter 9.



















Figure 11.1: Comparison of uniform and targeted reward control on geometric random networks
for a range of sizes. For each size tested, 100 random networks were generated using a connection
radius R =
√
(1 + degexp)/pin, corresponding to a mean node degree of approximately degexp = 4.




11.6.2 Targeted-reward control: network size
Next, we compare algorithm performance for various sizes of networks of opponent-coordinating
agents, using the same network setup as the previous section. Figure 11.2 shows that the IPRO
and degree-based algorithms perform the best of the tested algorithms across all network sizes.
11.6.3 Targeted-reward control: network connectivity
In this section, we investigate the effect of network connectivity on the total reward required to
achieve consensus in strategy A. We consider geometric random networks of 20 agents, which is
small enough that we can compute the optimal solution using an exhaustive search algorithm and
compare this with the proposed algorithm. Figure 11.3 shows that there is a sharp decrease in the
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Figure 11.2: Comparison of algorithms for different sizes of networks. The connection radius,
threshold distribution, and payoffs are generated exactly as in the simulations for Figure 11.1.
mean incentive required as the networks become more densely connected. All of the algorithms
except for random and IPO yielded near-optimal results in these tests, with IPRO performing the
best.

























Figure 11.3: Comparison of algorithms on 500 sparsely to densely connected 20-node geometric
random networks.
11.6.4 Targeted-reward control: payoff variance
In the next set of simulations, we vary the parameter vi to understand how the algorithms perform
for varying degrees of heterogeneity of the agents. Figure 11.4 shows that the IPRO algorithm
performs the best of the algorithms regardless of the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of
the agents.
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Figure 11.4: Comparison of algorithms for different amounts of payoff variance vi. 500 20-node
networks are tested for each value of vi.
Table 11.1: Simulation Results: Mean Incentives
Algorithm Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
rand .090 .086 .143
deg .046 .066 .120
IRO .051 .065 .119
IPO .060 .075 .131
IME .052 .067 .121
IPRO .046 .064 .117
opt – .063 .116
11.7 Concluding remarks
We have revealed three properties of asynchronous A-coordinating network games under any update
rule after rewards are offered to agents when the network is at equilibrium: (i) no agent will switch
from A to B; (ii) switches occur independent of the sequence in which agents activate; (iii) the
network will converge to a unique equilibrium. This predictability after offering rewards facilitates
the design of efficient and in some cases optimal control protocols. We have further shown that
a subset of networks in which agents asynchronously imitate their highest earning neighbor, i.e.,
networks of opponent-coordinating agents, are indeed A-coordinating, and therefore satisfy the
above three properties. Based on this result, we proposed protocols for three control problems that
apply to this class of networks: uniform reward control, targeted reward control, and budgeted
targeted reward control. In particular, our proposed IPRO algorithm, which iteratively chooses
agents who maximize the ratio of change in potential to offered reward, performs near-optimal in
several different cases and outperforms those based on other heuristics such as maximum payoff-
earning or minimum required-reward.




12.1.1 Part I: infinite well-mixed populations
In Chapter 2, we have focused on continuously differentiable planar vector fields and revisited the
celebrated Poincare´ Bendixson Theorem. We have tightened the theorem for a positively invariant,
simply-connected compact setM by further characterizing for any point p ∈M, the composition
of the limit sets ω(p) and α(p) after counting separately the fixed points on M’s boundary and
interior. Compared to the classical form of Poincare´-Bendixson theorem, what we have further
clarified is the role the interior fixed points of M play to influence the topological structure of
the limit sets. The results can be used to reduce the number of possible limit sets of p, which
we have illustrated by carrying out global convergence analysis for planar replicator dynamics in
three examples.
In Chapter 3, we have studied n-dimensional, n ∈ N, continuously differentiable vector fields in
IRn, possessing an invariant compact curve Γ or more generally an invariant compact manifoldM,
to which the trajectory through some point p ∈ IRn converges. For the case of the curve, we have
shown that the only possibilities for ω(p) are a single fixed point, a continuum of fixed points or
the union of compactly oriented orbits of Γ and possibly some attached continuum of fixed points.
For the case of a manifold, we have shown that the area between each attracting (resp. repelling)
set of the vector field restricted toM and the boundary of its region of attraction (resp. repulsion)
does not intersect the limit set, even when the attracting and repelling sets partially coincide with
the boundary of M. The results shed light on the qualitative property of a vector field near a
compact manifold, which we have illustrated by several 4-dimensional replicator dynamics.
In Chapter 4 we have focused on some 4-dimensional replicator dynamics in a population of
individuals playing a repeated snowdrift game with four typical strategies: ALLC, TFT, STFT
and ALLD. After parameterizing the corresponding payoff matrix, we have demonstrated how
the asymptotic behavior of the resulting 3-dimensional system evolves as the mutual cooperation
payoff changes, and in particular shown that for the full range of payoffs, every trajectory of the
system converges to an equilibrium point. The convergence results help to better understand
how repetition can promote cooperation in populations playing snowdrift games. The results also
enables us to compare the performance of the four strategies, indicating that an ALLC-player,
although perceived as the one that can be easily taken advantage of in snowdrift games, has
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certain endurance in the long run. Finally, the parametric framework makes it possible to actually
control the final population shares by tuning the payoffs of the base game.
In Chapter 5 we have proceeded to arbitrary-dimensional replicator dynamics in a population of
individuals playing 2×2 games with preplay communication. We have studied the evolution of the
population shares of four types of individuals in this setup: homophilic cooperators, heterophilic
cooperators, pure cooperators and pure defectors. Besides having revealed the innate properties
of homophilic and heterophilic cooperators, we have addressed previous research on prisoner’s
dilemma games with preplay communication by proving that the frequencies of all but pure de-
fectors converge to zero in populations containing all four types. This urges studying cheap-talk
games under other reproduction dynamics or when the population is structured.
12.1.2 Part II: finite well-mixed populations
In Chapter 6, we have studied how sustainable cooperation might emerge among self-interested,
anti-coordinating individuals in well-mixed populations governed by the best-response update rule.
We have shown that one can always identify one type of individuals as a benchmark such that
after a sufficiently long but finite time, individuals more cooperative compared to the benchmark
almost surely always cooperate while those less cooperative compared to the benchmark almost
surely defect. Such insight provides theoretical explanation for some complex behavior recently
reported in simulation studies that highlight the puzzling effect of individuals’ heterogeneity on
collective decision-making dynamics. As a second contribution, we have demonstrated how to
control the total number of cooperators by changing the payoff matrices of the agents, resulting in
changes in their types. In particular, for a given population, we have found the minimum number
of changes in the types required to reach a desired number of cooperators in the final state. The
results indicate that the minimum number does not equal the difference of the current number of
cooperators from the desired one. This highlights the side-effects the level-off phenomenon can
cause in such models.
In Chapter 7, we have focused on perception differences among the individuals of a population
using the linear threshold model. We have shown that despite the simplicity of the decision-
making model, the population dynamics may exhibit several possible long-run behavior for the
same initial condition. We have found all those possible equilibria that the dynamics may reach
from a given initial condition, and shown that in contrast to the case of homogeneous populations,
the heterogeneity in agents’ thresholds give rise to several equilibria where both A-playing and B-
playing agents coexist. Such results highlight the crucial role of the heterogeneity of the population
in linear threshold models for the coexistence of individuals playing competing strategies.
12.1.3 Part III: finite networked populations
In Chapter 8, we have focused on networks of agents governed by asynchronous best-response
dynamics in 2 × 2 games, or equivalently, a threshold-based model, and shown that every such
network will reach an equilibrium in finite time, even if each agent has a different threshold,
provided that all agents are either anti-coordinating, i.e., choose a strategy only if a small enough
portion of neighbors are also using that strategy, or coordinating, i.e., choose a strategy only
if a large enough portion of neighbors are also using that strategy. These results reveal that
irregular network topology, population heterogeneity and partial synchrony are not sufficient to
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cause non-convergence of best-response dynamics in two-strategy games; rather, other factors such
as randomness, or the occasional use of non-best-response strategies must play a role.
In Chapter 9, by building upon the convergence results on networks of interacting agents
modeled in Chapter 8, we have proposed control algorithms to efficiently drive such networks to
a desired equilibrium state by offering payoff incentives or rewards for using a particular strategy,
either uniformly or targeted to individuals. Simulations have shown that our proposed algorithms
can be used to compute near-optimal targeted incentives for a wide range of networks and payoff
distributions in coordination games and can also be effective for anti-coordination games.
In Chapter 10, we have focused on populations governed by the imitation dynamics and studied
the conditions that force the population to converge to a state in which the agents are satisfied with
their decisions. We have shown that every network in which agents imitate the best performing
strategy in their neighborhood will reach an equilibrium in finite time, provided that all agents
are opponent-coordinating. Comparing to the best-response case, this implies that networks of
imitating agents are less likely to settle on an equilibrium state.
In Chapter 11, we have considered how to control the network modeled in Chapter 10, by
offering payoff incentives to individuals. In particular, we have shown that if the network is A-
coordinating, then providing incentives to the network in an equilibrium will result in convergence
to a unique equilibrium. This is a generalization of the result in Chapter 9 and allows the com-
putation of optimal uniform incentives using a binary search algorithm, and enables us to design
near-optimal targeted and budgeted targeted control algorithms.
12.2 Recommendations for future research
12.2.1 Part I: infinite well-mixed populations
First we mention possible future work for the mathematical results achieved in Chapters 2 and 3,
and then we discuss the evolutionary game theoretical results developed in Chapters 4 and 5.
The current state-of-the-art stays far away from classifying the possible limit sets of an arbitrary
point in a positively invariant compact region in spaces with dimensions greater than two. It would,
therefore, be of great interest to develop Poincare´-Bendixson-like theorems in higher dimensions,
even for points in compact regions with particular structures. The extension of the results in
Chapter 2 can be helpful in this process. For example, one can investigate Theorem 2.4 for
positively invariant simply-connected compact regions in IR3, whose interior are empty of fixed
points. The results then provide some intuition to extend Poincaree´-Bendixson theorem to regions
in IR3 possessing one or more interior fixed points.
Another approach for the classification of the possible limit sets of an arbitrary point in spaces
with dimensions greater than two is to focus on the case when the trajectory through the point is
known to converge to some compact set and determine where in that set it may actually converge
to. This has been the main topic of Chapter 3 where the compact set is simply a curve or an
arbitrary-dimensional manifold. Although the results of Section 3.3 have been already generalized
in Section 3.5 from a curve to a manifold, they only imply that the areas between the (semi-
)attracting and (semi-)repelling sets and the boundary of their attraction and repulsion regions do
not intersect with the limit set of the arbitrary point. This is despite the fact that the non-fixed
orbits connected to the fixed points on the open curve in Chapter 3.3 never intersect with the limit
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set, even when the fixed points are not an attractor or repellor. So one can investigate that besides
the attracting and repelling sets, which other types of sets in the manifold have the property that
the area connected to them do not intersect with the limit set. Another possible future work would
be to extend the results on hyperbolic manifolds in Section 3.5 to the case when the manifolds are
not necessarily diffeomorphic to a plane.
To further reveal the performance of the conditional strategies in Chapter 4, one can try to
obtain similar convergence results for the replicator dynamics with the same payoff matrix but
under different base games such as the prisoner’s dilemma or the coordination game. Another
possibility is to add a fifth strategy such as the win-stay loose-shift [115] or the outstanding zero-
determinant strategy [133]. Investigating the replicator dynamics in population mixtures of even
three or four conditional strategies containing the zero-determinant strategy reveals the range of
payoffs under which this reactive strategy outperforms the others.
As with Chapter 5, now that the innate properties of homophilic and heterophilic cooperators
have been revealed, it is of great interest to investigate their performance against pure cooperators
and defectors in games other than the prisoner’s dilemma. For example, it remains an open question
whether homophily and heterophily can help the individuals of a population to coordinate on a
particular strategy in games such as the coordination game, or which types of players survive in
the long run under the snowdrift game.
12.2.2 Part II: finite well-mixed populations
There are two main topics that deserve great attention in this part. First is studying the asymptotic
behavior of the best-response dynamics in well-mixed populations containing both coordinating
and anti-coordinating agents. The corresponding results will shed light on the long run behavior
of the dynamics when the mixed-population has a more complicated network structure. Second is
studying the well-mixed populations introduced in Chapters 6 and 7 under the imitation update
rule, which we have started to work on. In contrast to the case with the best-response update
rule, populations of imitating individuals exhibit non-convergence behavior in simulations, making
it quite challenging to characterize the asymptotic behavior of the dynamics. Then one can try to
control the population using a similar approach to that in Chapter 6.
12.2.3 Part III: finite networked populations
We have shown in Chapter 8 that every network of all coordinating or all anti-coordinating agents
converges to an equilibrium state under the best-response update rule. However, it remains an
open problem that for which combination of networks and agents’ thresholds, a population of
both coordinating and anti-coordinating agents converges to an equilibrium state. The same
holds for the imitation update rule in Chapter 10, namely for which combination of networks and
agents’ payoff matrices, a population containing both opponent-coordinating and non-opponent-
coordinating agents converges to an equilibrium. Another interesting problem is to investigate the
asymptotic behavior of a population containing agents who update their strategies according to
the best-response update rule and agents who update according to the imitation update rule. The
solutions to such problems help to find the cause of non-convergence often happening in social
networks.
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On the other hand, for control of networks governed by the best-response and imitation update
rules, an enticing subject is to design efficient control algorithms for general A-coordinating network
games. The algorithms will be perhaps extensions of those presented in Chapters 9 and 11. The
results then can be applied to networks with other update rules, such as the death-birth [120].
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Summary
Networks of decision-making individuals with simple dynamics may give rise to complex and seem-
ingly unpredictable collective behaviors which may have negative consequences such as traffic jams
and market crashes or positive outcomes such as volunteer disaster relief and free-market stabiliza-
tion. Usually on one hand, there is a group task requiring the individuals to cooperate to optimize
the collective performances, and on the other, each individual is self-interested and may prefer to
prioritize her own interest over the group task, resulting in a social dilemma. Typical research
questions in this topic therefore focus on (i) how to predict the long run behavior of the networks
and find factors causing non-converging fluctuations in the actions of the individuals; (ii) how to
build a model to describe the dynamics as cooperation evolves or is promoted among selfish indi-
viduals; and (iii) how to control the number of individuals taking a particular action in a network.
We tackle these problems by modeling networks of decision-making individuals using evolutionary
matrix-game dynamics, performing convergence analysis to understand the asymptotic behavior
of the dynamics, and designing control algorithms to lead the individuals to a desired action. This
is done in three parts, as explained in the following.
In Part I, we focus on infinite, well-mixed populations, leading to continuous dynamics, the
most well-known of which are the replicator dynamics. We start with developing mathematical
results that prove to be useful in analyzing the replicator dynamics as well as other continuously
differentiable vector fields. We revisit the celebrated Poincare´ Bendixson Theorem and tighten it
for a positively invariant, simply-connected planar compact setM by further characterizing for any
point p ∈ M, the composition of the limit sets ω(p) and α(p) after counting separately the fixed
points onM’s boundary and interior. We reveal the role that the interior fixed points ofM play to
influence the topological structure of the limit sets, and show, compared to classical results, how to
reduce the number of possible limit sets of p. Then we proceed to continuously differentiable vector
fields in IRn, n ∈ N, possessing an invariant compact curve Γ, to which the trajectory through some
point p ∈ IRn converges, and determine the possible limit sets of p. We extend the results to when
instead of the curve, the vector field possesses an arbitrary-dimensional invariant compact manifold
M. The results shed light on the qualitative property of a vector field near a compact manifold.
Then we study two promising mechanisms for the promotion of cooperation: direct reciprocity, and
preplay communication. For the first, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of a population of
individuals playing repeated snowdrift games with four conditional strategies under the replicator
dynamics. We compare the performance of the strategies and show how the inclusion of reactive
strategies increases the share of cooperators of the overall population compared to when the game
is not repeated. For the second, we study replicator dynamics for a population consisting of four
types of individuals playing 2 × 2 games with preplay communication: homophilic cooperators,
heterophilic cooperators, pure cooperators and pure defectors. We reveal the innate properties
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of homophilic and heterophilic cooperators, and show that under the prisoner’s dilemma, pure
cooperators survive in face of homophilic cooperators but vanish in the presence of heterophilic
cooperators. We also prove that the frequencies of all but pure defectors converge to zero in
populations containing all four types, which urges studying preplay communication under other
reproduction dynamics.
In Part II, we focus on finite well-mixed populations, leading to discrete dynamics, the most
well-known of which are the best-response dynamics. We consider heterogeneous populations
where each individual is associated with a possibly unique payoff matrix, chooses between two
options A and B, or cooperation and defection, and updates her choice asynchronously according
to the best-response update rule. We start with how sustainable cooperation might emerge among
self-interested, anti-coordinating individuals in well-mixed populations. We provide theoretical
explanations for some complex behavior recently reported in simulation studies that highlight
the puzzling effect of individuals’ heterogeneity on collective decision-making dynamics. We then
demonstrate how to control the total number of cooperators in such heterogeneous populations,
by influencing the individuals’ payoffs gained from the games over time. In particular, we find
the minimum number of individuals whose payoff matrices must be changed for the population to
reach a desired number of cooperators in the long run. Finally, we focus on perception differences
among the individuals of a population using the linear threshold model. We show that in contrast
to the case of homogeneous populations, the heterogeneity in individuals’ thresholds gives rise to
several equilibria where both A-playing and B-playing individuals coexist. This highlights the
heterogeneity of the population for the coexistence of individuals playing competing strategies.
In Part III, we focus on finite structured populations, leading to again discrete dynamics, two
well-known of which are the best-response and imitation dynamics. We first focus on networks
of individuals governed by asynchronous best-response dynamics in 2 × 2 games, or equivalently,
a threshold-based model, and show that every such network will reach an equilibrium in finite
time, even if each individual has a different threshold, provided that all individuals are either
anti-coordinating, or coordinating. The results reveal that irregular network topology, population
heterogeneity and partial synchrony are not sufficient to cause non-convergence of best-response
dynamics in two-strategy games; rather, other factors such as randomness, or the occasional use
of non-best-response strategies must play a role. Building upon these convergence results, we then
propose control algorithms to efficiently drive such networks to a desired equilibrium state by
offering payoff incentives or rewards for using a particular strategy, either uniformly or targeted
to individuals. Then we focus on populations governed by imitation dynamics and show that
every network in which individuals imitate the best performing strategy in their neighborhood
will reach an equilibrium in finite time, provided that all individuals are opponent-coordinating,
i.e., earn a higher payoff if their opponent plays the same strategy as they do. Comparing to
the best-response case, this implies that networks of imitating individuals are less likely to settle
on an equilibrium state. Then we consider how to control networks of imitating individuals by
offering payoff incentives. By generalizing our control results on the best-response dynamics to a
broad class of network games, we design a binary search algorithm to compute the optimal uniform
incentive, and design near-optimal targeted and budgeted targeted control algorithms.
Samenvatting
Netwerken van beslissing nemende individuen met eenvoudige dynamica, kunnen aanleiding geven
tot complexe en schijnbaar onvoorspelbare collectieve gedragingen. Deze kunnen negatief zijn,
zoals verkeersopstoppingen en marktfalen, of positief, zoals vrijwillige noodhulp bij rampen en de
stabilisatie van de vrije markt. Enerzijds is er vaak een groepstaak die vereist dat de individuen
samenwerken om het collectieve resultaat te optimaliseren en anderzijds is er het eigenbelang van
het individu waar wellicht voorkeur aan gegeven wordt boven de groepstaak. Dit resulteert in een
sociaal dilemma. Typische onderzoeksvragen binnen dit onderwerp richten zich op (i) hoe kan
men het gedrag op lange termijn van de netwerken voorspellen en wat zijn de factoren die niet
convergerende fluctuaties in de acties van de individuen veroorzaken; (ii) hoe kan men een model
cree¨ren dat de dynamica beschrijft als samenwerking zich ontwikkelt of wordt gestimuleerd onder
de zelfzuchtige individuen; en (iii) hoe kan men het aantal individuen regelen die een bepaalde
actie neemt in een netwerk. We onderzoeken deze vragen door netwerken van de individuen met
keuzevrijheid te modeleren met behulp van evolutionaire matrix-game dynamica, de convergentie
analyse uit te voeren om het asymptotische gedrag te begrijpen van de dynamica en door regel
algoritmes te ontwerpen die leiden tot gewenste acties van de individuen. Dit gebeurd in drie delen
die we achtereenvolgens bespreken.
In deel I richten we ons op een oneindige en volledig gemengde populatie, wat leidt tot een
model met continue dynamica waarvan de replicator dynamica de bekendste is. We beginnen met
het ontwikkelen van wiskundige resultaten die nuttig zijn bij het analyseren van de replicator dy-
namica en andere continue differentieerbare vectorvelden. We herzien de beroemde stelling van
Poincare Bendixson en verscherpen deze voor een positief invariante, eenvoudig verbonden, vlakke
compacte set M, door voor elke punt p ∈ M, de samenstelling van de limietverzamelingen ω(p)
en α(p) verder te characteriseren, na het afzonderlijk tellen van de dekpunten binnenM en op de
grens vanM. We onthullen de rol van de dekpunten die geheel binnenM liggen op de topologische
structuur van de limietverzamelingen en laten zien, in vergelijking met de klassieke resultaten, hoe
zij het aantal mogelijke limietverzamelingen van p verminderen. Daarna bekijken we continue dif-
ferentieerbare vectorvelden in IRn, n ∈ N, die een invariante compacte kromme Γ bezitten, waar de
oplossingen die door enkele punten p ∈ IRn gaan, naartoe convergeren, en we bepalen de mogelijke
limietverzamelingen van p. Later breiden we de resultaten uit tot het geval dat het vectorveld, in
plaats van een kromme, een willekeurig dimensionale invariante compacte varie¨teit M bevat. De
resultaten verduidelijken de kwalitatieve eigenschap van een vectorveld in de buurt van een com-
pacte varie¨teit. Vervolgens bestuderen we twee veelbelovende mechanismen voor de bevordering
van de samenwerking: directe wederkerigheid en preplay communicatie. Voor het eerste mecha-
nisme onderzoeken we het asymptotische gedrag van een populatie van individuen die herhaaldelijk
snowdrift games spelen met vier voorwaardelijke strategiee¨n onder de replicator dynamica. Wij
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vergelijken de prestaties van de strategiee¨n en laten zien hoe de integratie van reactieve strategiee¨n
het aandeel van samenwerkers binnen de totale populatie verhoogt in vergelijking met wanneer het
spel niet wordt herhaald. Voor het tweede mechanisme bestuderen we replicator dynamica voor
een bevolking bestaande uit vier types van individuen die 2× 2 games met preplay communicatie
spelen, namelijk homofiele samenwerkers, heterofiele samenwerkers, pure samenwerkers en pure
vrijbuiters. We onthullen de inherente eigenschappen van homofiele en heterofiele samenwerkers
en laten zien dat in het kader van het prisoner’s dilemma, pure samenwerkers overleven in de
aanwezigheid van homofiele samenwerkers, maar verdwijnen in de aanwezigheid van heterofiele
samenwerkers. We bewijzen dat de populatie van alle types, behalve de pure vrijbuiters, naar nul
convergeert in populaties die alle vier types bevatten. Dit motiveert om preplay communicatie te
bestuderen onder andere reproductie dynamica.
In deel II richten we ons op eindige volledig gemengde populaties, wat leidt tot discrete dy-
namica, waarvan de best-response dynamica de meest bekende is. Wij beschouwen heterogene
populaties waarin iedere individu geassocieerd is met een, mogelijk unieke, payoff matrix. Een
individu kiest tussen twee opties A en B, tussen samenwerking en vrijbuiting, en actualiseert haar
keuze asynchroon volgens de best-response update regel. We beginnen met hoe duurzame samen-
werking kan ontstaan tussen anti-coo¨rdinerende individuen met eigenbelang in volledig gemengde
populaties. Wij bieden theoretische verklaringen voor sommige complexe gedragingen die onlangs
gemeld zijn in simulatie studies die het raadselachtige effect van de heterogeniteit van individuen
op de dynamica van collectieve besluitvorming onderstrepen. Wij demonstreren hoe het totale aan-
tal meewerkende individuen in heterogene populaties geregeld kan worden door de payoff van de
individuen gedurende de tijd te manipuleren. In het bijzonder vinden we het minimum aantal van
individuen waarvan de payoff matrix moet worden veranderd om een gewenst aantal samenwerkers
in een bevolking te krijgen op lange termijn. Tot slot richten we ons op de perceptie verschillen
tussen de individuen van een populatie met behulp van het lineaire threshold model. We laten
zien dat in tegenstelling to homogene populaties, de heterogeniteit van drempelwaarden van de
individuen aanleiding geeft tot verschillende evenwichten waar zowel A-spelende en B-spelende in-
dividuen naast elkaar bestaan. Dit onderstreept het belang van de heterogeniteit van de bevolking
voor het naast elkaar bestaan van individuen met concurrerende strategiee¨n.
In deel III richten we ons op eindige gestructureerde populaties, wat wederom leidt tot discrete
dynamica, waarvan de best response en imitatie dynamica bekende voorbeelden zijn. Allereerst
richten wij ons op netwerken van individuen die beheerst worden door asynchrone best-response
dynamica in 2× 2 games, wat ook wel een threshold-based model wordt genoemd. We laten zien
dat, mits alle individuen ofwel anti-coo¨rdinerend of coo¨rdinerend zijn, elk dergelijk netwerk een
evenwicht zal bereiken in eindige tijd, zelfs indien elk individu een verschillende drempelwaarde
heeft. De resultaten tonen aan dat onregelmatige netwerktopologie, populatie heterogeniteit en
gedeeltelijke synchroonheid niet voldoende zijn om niet-convergentie van de best-response dynam-
ica te veroorzaken in twee-strategiee¨n games. Veeleer moeten andere factoren zoals willekeurigheid,
of incidenteel gebruik van niet-best-response strategiee¨n een rol spelen. Voortbouwend op deze con-
vergentie resultaten, stellen we regel algoritmes voor om zulke netwerken efficie¨nt te sturen naar
een gewenste evenwichtstoestand door payoff stimulansen of beloningen te bieden voor het gebruik
van een bepaalde strategie. Deze beloningen kunnen zowel gericht zijn op individuen als op de
totale populatie. Daarna richten we ons op de populaties die omschreven worden door imitatie
dynamica en we laten zien dat elk netwerk waarin individuen de best presterende strategie in
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hun buurt imiteren een evenwicht zal bereiken in eindige tijd, op voorwaarde dat alle individuen
tegenstander-coo¨rdinerend zijn. Dat wil zeggen, de individuen verdienen een hogere payoff als
hun tegenstanders dezelfde strategie spelen. In vergelijking met de best response situatie betekent
dit dat de netwerken met imiterende individuen minder waarschijnlijk convergeren naar een even-
wichtstoestand. Daarna bestuderen we hoe we netwerken van imiterenende individuen kunnen
regelen door het aanbieden van payoff prikkels. Door het regel mechanisme voor de best-response
dynamica te generaliseren naar een brede klasse van netwerk games, ontwerpen we een binary
search algoritme om de optimale uniforme prikkel te berekenen en ontwerpen we bijna optimaal
doelgerichte en gebudgetteerde doelgerichte regel algoritmes.
